HIGHLIGHTS OF THE INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AT A PRESS CONFERENCE BY MICHAEL STEINER, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN KOSOVO

27.06.02

Mr. Steiner was in Geneva to attend a meeting of the Humanitarian Issues Working Group of the Peace Implementation Council which guides UN humanitarian activities in the Balkans.
The Special Representative said Kosovo was a very dynamic society and many things were happening constantly on the ground. There was now a multi-ethnic government. All the de-facto prisoners of war held in Belgrade since 1999 had been handed over to Kosovo. A legal framework allowing for privatization of “socially owned” companies was in place. This was a precondition for investment and economic recovery, important factors in a region with a bad economic situation that was facing a reduction in donor contributions and with an estimated jobless rate of about 60 percent, in society where most than 50 per cent of the population was under 23 years old.
Mr. Steiner told journalists a number of regulations and mechanisms had been put into place to more efficiently combat widespread crime and corruption. A number of arrests had been made and it was encouraging to note that the policy of zero tolerance against crime was highly popular. Decisive steps were appreciated. As an illustration of the development in the public perception of the fight against crime, he said that shortly before his arrival in February, the arrest of a number of former KLA fighters had led to weeks of demonstrations in Pristina and elsewhere. In contrast, the arrests of high ranking former KLA fighters a few days ago provoked minor demonstrations in the region where the arrests took place but none in Pristina.
Mr. Steiner said he had also proposed to the Security Council a concept of benchmarks following the idea of standards before status. This was based on the idea that reliable institutions were needed as pre-cursors to the substantial autonomy prescribed in Security Council resolution 1244. These benchmarks included freedom of movement, reliable security and justice systems and policing. That the Security Council had endorsed the approach was not surprising, Mr Streiner stated. What was astonishing was that the Parliament in Kosovo, the population, the political leaders and the government had agreed to concentrate on the benchmark of a respected society before talking about the status issue.
He said there was now a consensus approach on how to structure the way forward. There was a provisional government and the institutions needed as a basis for substantial autonomy. The UN was now in the phase of transferring authority and competences to the provisional institutions. Some areas such as foreign policy and security would remain his responsibility, but many important areas had been transferred. This was an on-going process which was not easy as everything had to be created from scratch. There was no Westminster democratic experience. These institutions would make mistakes but that risk has to be taken.
Return was the issue addressed at Thursday’s Humanitarian Working Group meeting in Geneva. Mr Steiner said “We must have returns, because we must have a multi-ethnic society and we must have a multi-ethnic society because if we don’t achieve this goal, you the journalists and the people who took part in the 1999 intervention would ask: what was it for? What was the sense of the whole thing".
The Secretary- General’s Special Representative said UNMIK went to Kosovo in 1999 after intensive debate in the societies of NATO member countries in order to defend fundamental human rights. That was why billions had been spent on the civilian and military implementation efforts since then. If the end result would be a mono-ethnic society, then it would pull the rug from under the legitimacy of the initial effort, Mr Steiner asserted. There is no other way than to insist on a multi-ethnic Kosovo and this meant returns.
He described as “dead wrong” people who say returns were not possible after all the hate and fear and cited Bosnia as a good indication of this. He recalled that when the implementation started in Bosnia in 1996, there were doubts about whether return would be possible. Six years later, 200,000 people had returned to minority areas in Bosnia, something no one had thought possible in the beginning. These included thousands of returns to very difficult areas. Thousands would return to Srebenica this year. As this had been possible in Bosnia after three years of war and 300,000 dead, Mr. Steiner was convinced it would be possible in Kosovo.
He said the necessary parameters for return were in place. Three years after the traumatic events meant that sufficient time had passed for the majority of people to accept the return of the minority population. There was a different climate. There was a government where the Prime Minister, to his credit, was saying the right thing, sending out the signals that the government favoured the return of those who left after 99.
A defined concept for return existed as did the right structures. In the end, return was a grassroot thing that could not be engineered from the top down. It must be voluntary, individual and must happen and be organized at the grassroots on the municipal level. That was exactly what was happening.
The Special Representative said that apart from co-operation between the responsible international institutions, UNMIK, UNHCR and KFOR, there was the presence within the government of a Serb, a ministerial co-ordinator for return and, within his Office, of a Serb senior adviser. Both knew their jobs were committed to return and were sending out the right signals.
Returns had started in small numbers in all the five regions of Kosovo. 4,200 had returned so far, under a 1,000 this year. These numbers were not sufficient, but showed that the process had started. The fundamental philosophy for progress was based on two pillars. One was multi-ethnicity. The other was integration. The majority of Kosovo Albanians had to accept that Kosovo did not belong to the Albanians, but to all and must be a multi-ethnic society. The minorities, the Serbs, the Ashkalis should be prepared to integrate into that multi-ethnic society. Multi-ethnicity and integration needed to be brought together. If both peoples accepted this it would work and would be the entrance ticket to European integration. . Responsible politicians were beginning to understand this.
Mr Steiner warned that, in a situation in which the Security Council mandate could be implemented and legitimacy given in hindsight to what had been done in Kosovo in 1999 and later, it would be a joke of history if, in a situation in which return could be made possible, it failed because the international community, in the context of “beauty contests of international crises”, would say they were not ready to support efforts in Kosovo any more, looking instead to Afghanistan or the Middle East. He said the decisive elements in the return process was the sustainability of return. It was not enough to have people go back to where they came from. They needed to stay there. For people to return and stay, security, water, electricity, health care, the ability to participate in local politics and jobs were preconditions. These were not possible without financial engagements. If the situation was ripe as it was now, donors must finance return projects.
Mr. Steiner said in that context UNHCR’s announcement that ,due to shortfalls from the donor community they wanted to cut engagement in Kosovo in the middle of the return season by a third, would be dead wrong. He described it as the absolute wrong signal. There was a contradiction, the Special Representative said “You cannot press on the one hand for a multi-ethnic society. You cannot press and expect to make return possible and then when the return process can start, not support it. That would be a contradiction and it would be hypocritical.”
He said those who went down this road would have to take the responsibility of endangering the return process and in the end of not creating a multi-ethnic society. “Multi-ethnicity will not come for free. You have to finish the job” Mr. Steiner emphasized. He said not finishing the job after engaging in a world crisis as NATO, the UN, the EU and the international community did so massively in Kosovo was much worse than doing nothing in the beginning.
He urged the international community to finish the job in Kosovo saying it should learn from its experience in Afghanistan where, after pressing to get the Soviets out, the country was forgotten. While he was not advocating maintaining the same engagement for the next ten years, he warned that if the job wasn’t finished it would be much more expensive in the end.
Mr Steiner said developments in Kosovo were much more encouraging in the economic and institution building sectors and in terms of creating freedom of movement. He said the murder rate which had been dramatic after '99 with open killings in the streets was completely different. The police force was a success story. He said at a time when engagement really pays, to leave Kosovo on its own because it’s not in the news and one didn’t see any blood flowing would be a very short sighted step. He was pleading for continued engagement so that Kosovo in the end would be a success story.



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