



Lebanon **2008 - 2009**

The National Human

Development Report

toward a citizen's state



Lebanon National Human Development Report

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND STUDY TEAMS

This project is the result of a collaborative effort between the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) which composed the steering committee for the report and supported the NHDR project team that directed the project. In addition, an advisory board that brought together public intellectuals, policy makers and academics from the public and private sector was established to guide this very complex process. We extend our deepest gratitude to them all for their cooperation, input and effort during this process.

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The final version of this report is the intellectual product of four core authors who utilized the project outline, the work of participating authors that included background papers commissioned for this report, discussions from focus group meetings, the written inputs of discussants, the debates that took place during the workshops and roundtables and their own knowledge. They were assisted in this process by the NHDR team. Our deepest thanks to those individuals for their considerable intellectual efforts. Without you this report would not have been possible.

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The process of producing the NHDR also generated two other parallel projects that focused on specific aspects of citizenship and also resulted in two independent publications; *Education and Citizenship: Concepts, Attitudes, Skills and Action among ninth grade students in Lebanon* and *A Hundred and One Stories to Tell: Civic Initiatives in Public Life*. While the first sought to assess concepts, attitudes and knowledge among ninth grade students across the country on issues of citizenship and democracy, the latter collected, rewrote and publicized a hundred and one initiatives undertaken by individuals and organizations to make a difference in some aspect of public life in Lebanon. We are grateful to the individuals and organizations that participated in the production of each of these publications and to all those who shared their stories with us.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CDP	Community Development Project
CDR	Council for Development Reconstruction
CEDAW	Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
CERD	Center for Educational Research and Development
CivED	Civic Education
CIESIN	Center for International Earth Science Information Network
EdL	Electricité du Liban
EPI	Environmental Performance Index
ESFD	Economic and Social Fund for Development
FHH	Female-Headed Households
FPL	Food Poverty Line
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDI	Gender Development Index
GEM	Gender Empowerment Index
GFCF	Gross Fixed Capital Formation
GoL	Government of Lebanon
HBS	Household Budget Survey
HCE	Household Consumption Expenditure
HDI	Human Development Index
HE	Household Expenditure
HHD	Household
HLCS	Households Living Conditions Survey
HPI	Human Poverty Index
HRC	Higher Relief Commission
IDP	Internally displaced persons
IEA	International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement
IFC	International Finance Cooperation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRFED	Institut de Formation en Vue du Développement
KILM	Key Indicators of the Labor Market
LCD	Least Cost Diet
LDC	Least Developed Country
LED	Local Economic Development
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MHH	Male-Headed Households
MoEHE	Ministry of Education and Higher Education
MoE	Ministry of Environment
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoL	Ministry of Labor
MoIM	Ministry of Interior and Municipalities
MoSA	Ministry of Social Affairs
MPHS	Multi Purpose Household Survey
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NHDR	National Human Development Report

NSSF	National Social Security Fund
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PHC	Primary Health Care
PG	Poverty Gap
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
UBN	Unsatisfied Basic Needs
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USJ	Université Saint Joseph
UXO	Unexploded Ordinances
WDR	World Development Report
WHO	World Health Organization
WSSD	World Summit for Social Development
YCELP	Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy

PREFACE

Toward a Citizen's State is the fourth National Human Development Report (NHDR) for Lebanon. The first of the three was published in 1997 on "A Profile of Sustainable Human Development", the second in 1999 on "Youth and Development" and the third in 2002 on "Globalization: Toward a Lebanese Agenda". Work commenced on this current report at the end of 2005 in partnership with the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR). The theme was first chosen, the general framework for the development of key concepts outlined, a work plan was drawn up that included a list of background papers and brainstorming workshops and discussion groups were organized. This took place under guidance of a steering committee that included the different concerned parties. Of course the project team faced a series of challenges connected to the political and military insecurity that Lebanon witnessed during 2005-2008. Despite these exceedingly difficult circumstances, work continued diligently to develop and produce the report, and gather the necessary statistical data and indicators needed to measure human development, human poverty and gender empowerment in Lebanon.

In parallel to working on this report, two other important and complementary reports were produced on citizenship in Lebanon. The first was on *Education and Citizenship* that was published in partnership with the Ministry of Education and Higher Education. This report analyzes the results of a survey on ninth grade students and examines their knowledge of and attitudes toward concepts of citizenship and participation in Lebanon. It is also part of an international survey that follows a unified methodology and allows a comparison between Lebanon's results and twenty eight other countries. The second book was launched in February 2009 under the title of *One Hundred and One Stories to tell*. It documents civic initiatives undertaken by individuals and civil society organizations in support of civic values and participation. It embodies the vibrant and diversified civil society that Lebanon is known for.

The launch of *Toward a Citizen's State* is particularly timely, since Lebanon is still searching for the appropriate formula for national reconciliation and has been living through continuous dialogue sessions in search of agreements that would reinforce partnership, participation, co-existence and political stability. This report has contributed to a certain extent, through the multiple and different roundtable discussions and focus group meetings that brought together policy makers, intellectuals, activists, academics and representatives from the different groups. We hope that through the discussions that will continue after the launch of this report, we are able to contribute to a general reform agenda that would reinforce citizenship in Lebanon and enhance the role of the state and of civil society.

Citizenship in Lebanon was addressed in this report from three principle perspectives. The first addresses citizenship and the sectarian state. It explores the relationship of the state, its institutions, its constitution and its laws, including personal status laws to citizens. This exploration also engages with Lebanon's system of consociational democratic governance in its different manifestations and therefore addresses the relationship of the state to the individual communities and their representatives and the impact this has on the relationship of citizens to their state. The second perspective focuses on socio-economic citizenship rights and considers social policies from the viewpoints of citizenship rights and comprehensive social development at one and the same time. As such, it examines the relationship of state to citizens and focuses on the rights to education, health and employment, and addresses the problems of poverty and social exclusion. The third perspective looks into citizenship, culture and education and explores shared common cultural values as well as cultural differences that could have a negative impact on national identity in relation to communal identities as sub-national modes of identification.

This report also explores the different roles of the state, civil society, and the private sector and presents specific recommendations on the issues raised. These are presented in the last chapter of the report. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), in partnership with CDR, hopes to engage with the executive and legislative branches of government on the one hand and civil society organizations as well as academics, experts, the media and Lebanese citizens in general on the other hand, to support the general reform process and strengthen citizenship in Lebanon. Empowering citizens leads to a reinforcement of democracy, good governance, the rule of law

and justice reform, as well as social equity toward a sustainable human development in Lebanon.

In addition to all this, this report also presents new statistical information that complement existing surveys that have been conducted until 2004, the most important of which are the *Mapping of Living Conditions (1998)*, *Changes in the Map of Living Conditions between 1995-2004 (1997)* and the *Map of Poverty and Living Conditions Survey in Lebanon, 2004* that were produced in 2008 by UNDP in partnership with the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Central Administration of Statistics.

United Nations organizations will also work to support Lebanon's governmental institutions to implement the national statistical master plan in the coming few years so as to make available credible statistical information in all fields, economic, social and others.

UNDP also looks forward to a continued partnership with CDR for the production of the following National Human Development reports in Lebanon that would complement and support this current report and its efforts to become a thematic studies series, and a general statistical reference for sustainable human development in Lebanon.

March, 2009

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'M. Ruedas', with a stylized, cursive script.

Marta Ruedas
Resident Representative

Lebanon today presents a paradox. On the one hand, it boasts a vibrant multicultural society, an active private sector, and a liberal and democratic political system. On the other, in the last three decades, it has been plagued with civil wars, external wars, military occupations and acute political uncertainty. More recently, its citizens have come together to achieve dramatic and relatively peaceful political change. Yet the country has also seen a rise in sectarian divisions and animosity which have manifested themselves in periodic street clashes in Beirut and around the country. These have brought Lebanon to the verge of renewed sectarian strife.

These seemingly contradictory elements cannot be explained away as symptoms of external interference or deficiencies in the civic values of citizens. Rather, they are the result of complex and intersecting political, social, and economic factors that are directly related to the status of Lebanon's democratic institutions and system. They are also deeply rooted in the ways in which Lebanese citizens define themselves as Lebanese and the vision they have of their nation and state in a regional and global context. *Toward a Citizen's State*, the fourth National Human Development Report for Lebanon since 1996, tries to analyze some of these issues from three different perspectives -political, social, and cultural.

Written over the past three years and in the midst of ongoing political and military turbulence, this report tries to unpack the main elements of dissent and consent regarding what makes this country work. It represents a first attempt to explore the questions of citizenship and identity- making as they relate to larger governance and policymaking processes. It also opens up a political, social, and economic dialogue grounded in questions of justice and equity and explores the impact of the latter on development in the country. The idea is to put forward strategies for reform, based on sound analysis and divorced from political grandstanding. The hope is to reinvigorate political engagement and debates over identity and visions for the country and set forth an agenda toward sustainable growth and peace based on values of justice and equity.

The basic premise of this report is that citizenship is the foundation of democracy, that democratic practices cannot be limited to the procedural dimension, despite its importance, and that effective citizenship concerns not only voting without coercion, but also the formation of relations between citizens and the state and among citizens themselves. The development of such relationships is an ongoing process and is closely connected to various aspects of societal formations. As such, this report considers citizenship from a twin perspective-first, as a legal framework that regulates the interaction between citizens and the state and among citizens themselves, and second, as a lived experience or practice. While the former is regulated by the state, the latter is impacted by social, cultural, and, in Lebanon, religious norms.

In this regard *Toward a Citizen's State* seeks to unpack the different mechanisms that define citizenship and democratic practices in Lebanon and to propose an agenda for moving toward a citizen's state. As the *Human Development Report 2002* argues, democracy is not only valuable in its own right but is also tied to human development. Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, establishes a broad concept of citizenship, encompassing political, civil, and social rights. For UNDP, democratic governance is a key condition for human development, since it is through politics, and not just economics, that it is possible to create more equitable conditions and to expand people's options. Here, political rights are intricately connected to democracy, social rights to human development, and civil rights to human rights, while all of these facilitate and promote the exercise of citizenship.

From this perspective, this report is a call to Lebanon's decision and policy makers, public intellectuals and to members of civil society to recognize that citizenship is an essential weapon not only in the struggle against social and economic inequity but also in the attempt to widen the conception of politics itself. Here, it is important to point out that politics is not only about what politicians do but the choices that citizens make when they decide to get involved in public affairs. In this sense *Toward a Citizen's State* attempts to go beyond a rights-based approach to citizenship to emphasize the importance of social practices that can generate or underpin such rights. In so

doing, the report will explore each of the three different dimensions of citizenship—the political, the social, and the cultural—in an integrated manner.

Furthermore, irrespective of the differences between major philosophical perspectives on citizenship,¹ they all share a common interest in the rights and obligations of citizenship. Citizenship here is not a universal value free notion, but rather carries within it the agenda of active participation (far beyond electoral seasons). Responsible citizenship is connected to civic values such as democracy, equity, human rights, tolerance and social responsibility, solidarity and justice. These values are also directly linked to the view of civil society as a form of associational life that includes all networks, such as NGOs, political parties, social or economic associations, syndicates or labor unions, etc that individuals participate in voluntarily. The idea is that such forms of active citizenship or constructive participation in public life are what make for a productive social capital and economically competitive society. It is also the arena where politics are made through rational dissent, debate and non-violent conflict.²

On the methodological front, recognizing the difficulties of addressing the dilemmas of citizenship in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious context like Lebanon that is also witnessing political and military turbulence necessitated a flexible mechanism that could adapt to rapidly changing circumstances and would allow the innovative integration of citizen concerns and actions, beyond the norms of academic analysis, opinion polls and surveys. Taking cue from Bourdieu, it required an approach that would allow us to highlight contradictions without necessarily resolving them.³ In other words, it demanded a construct that was both top down and bottom up simultaneously.

In this spirit, we launched two separate projects that would shed light on different aspects of citizenship. Given the significance of education to the process of cultivating well informed citizens, the first project, *Education and Citizenship*, was undertaken with the aim of identifying where the youth of Lebanon are today with respect to notions fundamental to democracy, citizenship and social solidarity and compare them to those of twenty eight other countries. The second, *A Hundred and One Stories to Tell* project sought to document civic initiatives in public life. These were complemented by a comprehensive *Statistical Compendium* that mapped out the status of human development in Lebanon in a wide variety of arenas; social, economic, political and cultural at national and governorate levels where possible.

Education and Citizenship considers that essential education comprises of the knowledge, concepts and competencies that every citizen needs to earn to be an active citizen. As such it sought to gauge the extent to which young people in Lebanon were equipped and ready to exercise the rights and obligations of citizenship and the degree to which they were prepared to become active citizens. Covering over 3,000 ninth grade students, in public and private schools in Lebanon, the project focused on what young people (14 year old) should know about a number of topics related to democratic institutions, including elections, individual rights, national identity, political participation, and respect for ethnic and political diversity. These concepts were deemed to be vital for democratic regimes such as the one in Lebanon. It also explored key factors in their educational setting that impact their civic attitudes and how they compare to their peers in different countries.

These questions are particularly relevant to a project whose primary theme is citizenship. The centrality of education for the promotion of democratic practices and the cultivation of civic identities is widely accepted. As much research from around the world indicates, educational methodologies and practices in schools have a tremendous impact on the values of students, their knowledge and sense of civic responsibilities. This surge of interest across the globe in civic education has been ongoing for almost two decades; partly a result of globalization and partly a result of the increased democratization in various countries. However, one of the most profound changes that is reorienting citizenship education, is the recognition that it is valuable for children as children. In other words, citizenship education is no longer considered solely as a content area designed to prepare young people for their

1 In political philosophy literature three major traditions can be identified: liberalism, communitarianism and republicanism.

2 The two main schools of thought on civil society and associational life are represented by Robert Putnam and Jurgen Habermas. The latter in particular has come under extensive criticism for the exclusions that his theory of the politics and the public sphere embodies.

3 Pierre Bourdieu, Loïc Wacquant, 1992, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Polity Press, London.

adult roles in society, but, rather, as a tool that will help them improve and understand their lives and interactions in society.⁴ What was evident from the study on Lebanon is that rather than prepare students in this manner, schools had to a large extent been transformed to spaces that are echoing the vertical divisions plaguing Lebanese society today.

These ideas about active citizenship are the reality of hundreds of individuals whose stories are included in *A Hundred and One Stories to Tell* book project that reflects a passionate belief in the positive contribution of individuals and groups towards the construction of their social realities. From Lebanon's northern border to its southern tip, it depicts a ground crowded with individuals and groups passionately invested in constructing hope and seeking change in Lebanon. At a time of considerable political and social unrest in Lebanon, we found it particularly pertinent to try and capture these passions and say, in a loud and collective voice, citizens still believe. They are making a difference and when they get together they do indeed change the world; at least their own world.

Acknowledging this central role of passion in the construction of social and political identities is also vital to a wider conception of democracy. Passion here is fundamental to notions of citizenship and civic agency that often take center stage in discussions about declining participation in democracy. Understanding such agency requires that we see citizenship not just in formal/legal terms but also with regard to meanings, practices, communication and identities. From this perspective we are able to transcend restricted notions of civil society and in the process acknowledge the role of individuals and groups in making a difference. This acknowledgement also allows us to go beyond the different models of democracy that either sees political actors as being moved primarily by their interests or that just focus on the role of reason and moral consideration in the democratic process.⁵

In Lebanon, the *101 Stories to tell* captured the deep sense of responsibility that citizens have toward each other and toward their communities. They also showed the value of cumulative work in pushing and achieving greater democratization and policy change. At the same time, they also highlighted disconnect between an active citizenship on the ground, trying to make a difference and a polity that has flirted with civil conflict on several occasions in the last few years.

Addressing these issues in today's world, let alone in a context like that of Lebanon of the past three years is no easy task. The question "Are you from Mars?" became a favorite refrain during the production of this project. Who has time to discuss the role of the state and of citizenship in the midst of one of the most acute political crises that the country has ever faced and in the aftermath of a string of assassinations that destabilized the country, a devastating war, a series of "mini" civil conflicts, and the gradual paralysis of all state institutions. Did the report discuss the role of the state? "What state?" we were asked. "We cannot agree on who we want to represent us, let alone what role the state should play." In this environment, organizing an event, no matter how big or small became an unwelcome chore. Would there be a car bomb? An assassination? A parliamentary session for the election of the president that would shut down half the city, only to yield further political stalemate? Would there be a strike that would escalate into conflict? Would there be riots and burning tires?

What kept this project going was the belief that this was indeed the moment to talk about citizenship and what the Lebanese wanted of their country. This was the time to discuss the visions they have for their future and how to realize them. This was indeed the time to begin discussing what role citizens should play in the shaping of their futures and how to harness their energy for a more equitable and democratic system. In 2005, more than two thirds of the Lebanese population took to the streets, in two separate rallies, in support of their beliefs. Since then, many have been increasingly disenfranchised and disappointed by 'politics as usual'. This 'politics as usual' is a product of the system that exists and the challenge today is how to bring those citizens out again, in support of something

⁴ See *The Civic Mission of Schools*, a report from Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE), 2003.

⁵ Chantal Mouffe, 2002, *Politics and Passions: The States of Democracy*, CSD Perspectives, Center for the study of democracy, London.

they can believe in. Can the energies of *One Hundred and One Stories to Tell* be collected and turned into one thousand and one? How can the positive and passionate belief and investment of the Lebanese in their country be drawn upon in ways that will allow them to overcome the divisions that riddle their society and perhaps help Lebanon live up to the myth of being a country that exemplifies the dialogue of cultures and their harmonious coexistence.

It was this belief in the capacity of individuals and groups to make a difference and in the ability of the Lebanese to overcome their differences that allowed this journey to begin. We hope that the work we have done will instigate some debate on the vision(s) of the Lebanese for their country and the means to be used in order to move forward, for as Margaret Mead once said, “Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.”

Maha Yahya
Project Director

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NATION, STATE AND CITIZENSHIP

CHAPTER ONE

NATION, STATE, AND CITIZENSHIP

I. CIVIC MYTHS, NATIONAL IDENTITY, AND CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship is a social category that addresses the group or communal nature of social life in a “universal” manner. Rooted in liberal political theory, enlightenment thought, and capitalism, and taking individualism as a central tenet, citizenship has assumed diverse shapes in different contexts. The rights and obligations of citizens vary depending on the history, cultural background, and sociopolitical context of each country. Irrespective of these differences, citizenship cannot be stripped down to a mere set of services (rights and obligations); to do so is to depoliticize it. Rather, it is a category that encompasses a way of being in public life.

The most common form of citizenship is national citizenship—a form that ties individuals to a sovereign political entity and to a socially and spatially bounded community. Despite the coercive nature of the founding of nation-states, particularly in former colonies, these have persisted due to a series of external and internal factors that include identification documents, taxation, and common history, among others. Another critical factor in the establishment and endurance of the nation-state is the founding or civic myth or the established moment of origin and the particular traditions that support it.

Civic myths, or the “imagined community” of the nation that sees itself as belonging to a shared political collective with an imagined common history, are quite appealing.¹ As Smith argues, they “create the most recognized political identity of the individuals they embrace” by supporting citizenship laws that “literally constitute—create with legal words—a collective civic identity.”² Despite acknowledged or unacknowledged differences, they identify the foundational myth of unity that brought this state together. State institutions, the law, and political representatives are their most potent embodiments.

All states have competing civic myths that support or challenge each other and these become the basis for the state’s political ideology. As Berlant argues, this entails a process by which an “iconography of the nation” is created and then so well assimilated into

everyday life and consciousness that its constructedness is no longer visible.³ Picking up from Berlant, Cinar goes on to argue that the ultimate goal of any political ideology is to become “common sense” and acquire the status of being a natural and obvious way of viewing the world. When its norms, categories, and hierarchies become the dominant frame by which the world is “naturally” and “normally” perceived, experienced, and assessed by many, the boundaries of this ideology fade away under the guise of normalcy.⁴ Accordingly, a state draws its strength and power from the extent to which its founding national ideology becomes the legitimate norm that frames the daily lives of its citizens. Even though contestations of this norm continue, they are often seen in the dominant public discourse as non-viable alternatives. In this sense, the discourses and practices of nation-building and state-formation play a central role in the project of forming abstract “national” publics and particular “sectarian” communities.⁵

Citizenship laws reflect the different themes that exist in various national narratives and which may be competing or compatible. Understandings such as “the National Pact” allow the political community to underwrite various political/legal “rationalities” or aspects of public life through their own logic and to institutionalize specific ways of being in the public realm. Rights and responsibilities are key to nation-state citizenship even though neither has remained static over the last two centuries. For example, and as Marshall and others have argued, in several western countries, initial civil rights (for example liberty of person) were augmented with political rights (for example the right to vote) and

1 Anderson, Benedict, 1999, *Imagined Communities*, London, Verso.

2 Smith, Rogers, 1997 *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in US History*, New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, p.31 also quoted in Joseph, Suad (ed), 2000, *Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East*, NY, Syracuse University Press, p.110.

3 Berlant, Lauren, 1991, *The Anatomy of National Fantasy: Hawthorne, Utopia and Everyday Life*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

4 Cinar, Alev, 2008, “Subversion and Subjugation in the Public Sphere: Secularism and the Islamic Headscarf” in *Secular Publicities: Visual Practices and the Transformation of National Publics in the Middle East and South Asia*, Yahya, Maha, Srirupa Roy, Alev Cinar, (eds), University of Michigan Press, forthcoming.

5 Yahya, Maha, 2008 “Building Cities and Nations: Visual Practices in the Public Sphere in India and Lebanon” in *Secular Publicities*, *ibid.*

social rights (for example health care).⁶ The acquisition of these new rights brought with them new obligations whereby, for example, increased social rights required greater taxation.

However, the expansion of citizenship rights strengthened the moral and functional ties between nation and state and by extension have reinforced the nation-state itself. In this context, and although often contested, citizenship can be understood as a set of practices (judicial, economic, political, social and cultural) which classifies members of society and directs the flow of resources to individuals and groups. This understanding of citizenship of necessity recognizes the multiple forms of identification, integration, and affiliation that characterize complex and heterogeneous societies such as that of Lebanon.

In Lebanon, even though multiple civic narratives such as economic liberalism, the maintenance of an equal distance between the state and each of the various religious groups, and the state as patron of religious institutions resonate and overlay each other, the most important and enduring of all is the myth of sectarian pluralism,⁷ (Box 1.1) which has underpinned public life and identity politics in the country. This myth tells the story of Lebanon as a country composed of different “natural,” religiously defined, communities. In this myth, these religious communities (or sects) are said to have preexisted the Lebanese state and have maintained historical continuity and cohesion. This extends to the writing of Lebanese history, which, as Beydoun argues, expands and contracts according to the identity of its historian and his or her communal affiliations.⁸

Box 1.1: Sectarianism or Communalism

Sectarianism and Communalism both denote the exacerbation of ethno-religious divisions among citizens.* In other words they are characterizations of a body politic that is riddled with divisions based on religious or ethnic difference. While communalism is generally used in the South Asia region to refer to the different religious groups, sectarianism has been the preferred word of choice to describe the same phenomenon in other parts of the world; particularly Lebanon. However, communalism in contemporary south Asia, such as India, can also denote conflicts between groups of the same religion but different regions or classes.

In Lebanon, even though the connections between sectarian and clientalist interests are often noted few theoretical or empirical investigations, if any, have been carried out. There is also little distinction between the

political and cultural aspect of communalism/sectarianism in the sense that what may pass as sectarian in one part of the public realm will be viewed as cultural in another. There is also little questioning of the myth of religious pluralism, or of the mosaic of diverse sub-national identities that is supposedly represented by the allocation of the three top governmental posts to representatives of the three main religious communities. There is also little questioning of the ways in which this myth impacts the role of the state as the 'manager' of this diversity. Even though it is not the goal of this report to present a full theoretical account of the complexities associated with these terms and their interconnections, it will try to engage with some of the issues they raise.

* The literature on communalism and secularism is huge, particularly on South Asia. For further references see for example Hansen, Thomas Bloom, 1999, *The Saffron Wave*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, and Roy, Srirupa, 2007 *Beyond Belief: India and the Politics of Postcolonial Nationalism*, Durham: Duke University Press. For literature on connections to secularism see Asad, Talal, 2003 *Formations of the secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*, California: Stanford University Press

This notion of sectarian pluralism has dominated both public and private life in Lebanon and has resulted in a particular relationship between individuals, communal groups, and the state. It is enshrined in various articles of the constitution and apparent in the judicial organization of daily life that has allowed religious communities to buffer and mediate the relationship between citizens and the state and among citizens. It is also visible in the troubled and sometimes contradictory relation between the civic (or secular) notion of the state and the inherent recognition of the “rights” of each religious community. More critically, this notion of sectarian pluralism has manifested itself recently in increasing polarization between different communal groups and marginalization of all alternative forms of identification, and has reinvigorated the idea of Lebanon as a “house of many mansions.”⁹ (Box 1.2)

Finally, given this background, it is important to point out that the often perceived contradiction between civic or secular views of the state and the rights of religious communities is not particular to Lebanon. The relationship of the civic to the secular is a close and intricate one that dates back to the Enlightenment.

6 Marshall, T.H., 1975, *Social Policy in the Twentieth Century*, London, Hutchinson; Hirschman, Albert O., 1992 *Rival Views of Market Society and Other Essays*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.

7 Also referred to as fragmented political culture, consociational, confessional, sectarian, plural, etc. (Joseph, *ibid*).

8 See Beydoun, A., 1998, *The Struggle over Lebanese History*, Beirut, Lebanese University Publications; see also Nawaf Salam, 2001, *La Condition Libanaise, Communauté, Citoyens, Etat*, Beirut, Dar An-Nahar.

9 Salibi, Kamal, 1990, *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered*, California, University of California Press.

Boc 1.2: From Sects to Sectarianism

Sects in Lebanon are considered moral or incorporeal subjects that enjoy total independence in running their own affairs and religious interests. The head of each sect represents his community toward the state and other religious communities. The sect has several roles, the most prominent of which is protecting the freedom of belief of 'its' citizens, particularly as far as religious practices, freedom of religious education and authority over personal status laws are concerned. Sects are therefore institutions that play a part in organizing the relationship between religion and the state in a framework that respects personal beliefs and maintains religious and cultural pluralism. The Lebanese constitution respects these moral subjects and guarantees them these roles.

However, sectarian communities are also political subjects that enjoy historic privileges and that desire and work toward increasing their influence on state institutions and their own political power. They have entered the political game and have sought to control various institutions. These confessional communities have external allegiances and authoritative figures they follow so much so that external interests sometimes take precedence over national welfare.

The collusion between political and religious leaders over the freedoms guaranteed by the constitution indicates the level of risk that political sectarianism represents to nation and to citizen equally. It is enough to note that one of the newly revised laws for the organization of one of the religious communities, ratified by the Lebanese parliament states that: it is the prerogative of the head of the religious community to "give prior permission to all books, visual and audio publications that address the religious ideology of the sect and to prosecute offenders before the relevant authorities. Through this law, the sect that is a guarantee of freedom of belief has become under a politically sectarian system a potential hindrance to freedom of belief itself.

These two terms are also often used interchangeably when the intent is to point to a non-religious or non-communal system of governance and are also closely associated with the rise of modern nation-state. However, contrary to the dominant popular discourse, secularism does not imply anti-religious values. Rather, it points the way to a separation between religion and the state in ways that are compatible with contemporary democracies. In this sense, secularism is considered not as an abstract concept but as an ideological principle that has acquired quite distinctive and sometimes contrary meanings in practice in various contexts.¹⁰ In the Lebanese context, secularism in principle has meant equal distance between the state and all religious communities. It is in this sense that we consider secularism in relation to the civic state in this report.

Addressing these issues in today's world is no easy task. This chapter first presents a conceptual analysis of citizenship and its connections to identity-making, democracy and the role of the state in a context such as that of Lebanon. It then presents a balance sheet of the elements of integral citizenship; political, social and cultural and a short assessment of the attitudes of citizens toward key issues such as national and civic identities. The chapter ends with an outline of the methodology and structure of the report and a brief statement about the challenges of writing on citizenship in a highly charged political and security climate.

10 See Asad, Talal, 2003, *Formations of the Secular, Christianity, Islam and Modernity*, Stanford University Press; Yahya, Roy and Alev Cinar, 2008, *Secular Publicities*, among many others.

II. THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Debates over citizenship are also directly connected to questions about the changing role of the state. In the last two decades, the dominance of the nation-state has been substantially eroded by globalization, claims of minorities, the emergence of allegiances based on additional forms of identity such as gender, religion, and shared historical trauma, among other factors. In response, many theorists and activists have tried to imagine new integrative mechanisms including alternative forms of citizenship. Many of these fall along a universalism-particularism divide as one group focuses on commonalities, another on differences, or what Iris Young terms "differentiated citizenship." While the former rejects the pluralism and the localism of civil society, the latter refutes cultural conformity. However, both groups are equally concerned with the form of the political community. These alternative forms of citizenship, many of which offer direct criticism of Marshall's national trilogy of territorially grounded political, social, and cultural citizenship, include cosmopolitan citizenship,¹¹ transnational citizenship,¹² professional citizenship,¹³ and urban citizenship.¹⁴

11 Held, David, 1995, *Democracy and the Global Order*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

12 Smith, M. P., 1999, "Transnationalism and the City" in Beauregard, R.A. and S. Body-Gendrot (eds) *The Urban Moment*, Thousand Oakes, CA, Sage Publications.

13 Isin, Engin F., 1999, "Cities and Citizenship" in *Citizenship Studies*, 3 (2).

14 Beauregard and Bounds, 2000, "Urban Citizenship" in *Democracy Citizenship and the Global City*, Isin. F. (ed) (London, Routledge).

In such a context, debates on the role of the state acquire an additional dimension. The de-nationalization of national space through globalization, the increased influence of multi-national companies, and the growth of global risks (financial, ecological, human, and more), among other factors, have placed additional strains on the traditional role of the state and on concepts of citizenship, particularly with regard to the problem of inclusion and exclusion.¹⁵ In a context like Lebanon, where foreign influence plays a considerable role on both the socio-economic and foreign policy fronts, this issue is quite crucial. The loss of power and control at the national level has generated new forms of power and politics at the sub-national level. These have challenged traditional economies of centrality and marginality. This loss of power has also generated a crisis in the political power of the Lebanese state and in its claim to control borders, resources, and coercive force.

On the socio-economic front, approaches to social policy have changed over time also. From a nineteenth-century perspective by which social welfare and poverty alleviation were seen to be the main elements of social policy and the state the primary provider, we have moved to a twenty-first century view that considers social development, social justice, and social equity as key goals of macroeconomic policies.¹⁶ This move is primarily the result of an increased recognition of the links between social and economic policies and the fact that social growth can aid in economic productivity. As developmental experiences, especially in Scandinavian countries and post-World War II Europe, and more recently in East Asia, reveal, there is a strong linkage between sus-

15 See Sassen, Saskia, 1998, *Globalization and its Discontents*, New York, New Press, among others.

16 This is not to say that these are the only two views on the role of the state in social development and welfare provision. Approaches to social development and the formulation of social policy are intricately connected to political ideologies, historic frameworks, and socioeconomic environments—that is, they are context specific with particular variations over time. For more analysis on the growth of social development policies and their transformations over the past century in different political contexts and through various agencies, see among others Yeates, N., *Globalization and Social Policy*, 2001, London, Sage; Yahya, Maha, 2004, *Towards a Conceptual Approach to Social Welfare* UN-ESCWA, Social Policy series no. 8, Beirut.

17 For a more extended outline of these discussions, see among others Giddens, Anthony (ed), 2001, *The Global Third Way Debate*, Oxford, Polity Press; Esping-Andersen, G., 1990, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Princeton, Princeton University Press; Mkandawire, T., and V. Rodriguez, 2000, *Globalization and Social Development after Copenhagen: Premises, Promises and Policies*, UNRISD Social Policy and Development Programme, Occasional Paper 10; Sen, A., 2000, *Development as Freedom*, New York, Anchor.

tainable economic development and investments in social sectors and the development of human resources.¹⁷ That healthy, well educated populations have very productive impacts on the economy is a well documented fact.¹⁸ Employment opportunities, social protection for the most vulnerable, access to basic services, and consensus between different groups and sectors on the means and approaches necessary to carry out such policies have become the cornerstones of approaches geared toward socioeconomic growth. At the same time, the growing recognition by various political schools that sustainable peace and political stability are to a certain degree affected by the policies enacted to address basic needs and equity has meant that socioeconomic rights have been recognized through both international accords and constitutional rights, the latter consecrating access to basic services as a fundamental human right.¹⁹

In this context, policies geared toward social protection and social development should not be considered as mere consumption policies. The focus on the social expenditure or social benefits aspect of public finance has eschewed involvement in debates on the social investment aspect, such as the debate on education and training. A considerable number of new international initiatives and studies focus on the importance of social capital with regard to macroeconomic issues and ways of assessing and monitoring the relationship between its social and economic aspects. These go beyond the role of social policy as a set of remedial measures to correct or address basic needs or provide safety nets for vulnerable sections of the population to consider the role of the public and private sectors in the promotion of development and examine the initiatives and institutions necessary for social development. These include debt reduction,

18 Nutrition studies for example indicate that investing in child nutrition results in stronger adult workers while increasing the labor force's average education by one year may increase GDP by 9 per cent. This holds for the first three years of extra education. Returns beyond those years diminish to around 4 per cent, thus pointing to a major opportunity for a country like Lebanon with a relatively high initial schooling level. Doraid, Moez, "Considerations for Lebanon" in *Linking Economic Growth and Social Development in Lebanon* UNDP, 2000, p. 41; see also Sen, A., 2000 *Development as Freedom*, New York, Anchor.

19 See for example UNDP, 1998, *Integrating Human Rights with Sustainable Human Development*, New York; UNRISD, 2000, *Visible Hands: Taking Responsibility for Social Development*, Geneva; Frankovits, A., April 2001, *Why a Human Rights Approach to Development?*, paper submitted to the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into Swedish Policy for Global Development; Yahya, Maha, 2004, *Towards an Integrated Social Development Policy*, UN-ESCWA, Integrated Social Policy series, Beirut.

democratization, public sector reform, corporate social responsibility, the empowerment of individuals and communities, and public-private partnerships. Many of these debates are enmeshed both explicitly and implicitly in others on the meanings of citizenship rights and obligations in a global world where the traditional boundaries of the nation-state are being systematically challenged.

These issues are also directly connected to questions of equity; a fundamental premise of citizenship. The issue here is that while citizenship is directly linked to questions of identity and is attained, as several theorists have argued, through multiple sites of action and not just vis-à-vis the state, it is the role of the state to view all its citizens equitably and insure a level playing field among them. As will be argued in Chapter Two of this report, these issues are directly connected to equitable and sustainable human development and prosperity.

III. CITIZENSHIP AND DEMOCRACY

Any discussion of citizenship and the rights and duties associated with it brings with it a discussion of democracy and the kind of political framework necessary for the guarantee of these rights. Moreover, various views of democracy inadvertently deal with how citizenship rights are claimed, attained, and maintained. From this perspective, citizenship is not just a legal norm or a right bestowed by the state but is something attained through practice. Citizenship rights are also often the outcome of struggles around specific issues. As experience from around the world shows, citizenship action can also bring significant changes to policy and help to build responsive and accountable states.²⁰ In other words, the practices of citizenship and democracy are closely intertwined and build upon each other.

In this regard, a consensus within the international development community has developed around the role of democracy in the improvement of public policies. Considered as a core value in this discourse, democracy offers prospects for better citizen participation in the formulation of government policies. Theoretically, it also opens up opportunities to ensure that officeholders are accountable, that policymaking is more transparent, and that conflict resolution takes place through constitutional, non-violent, means. However, the promotion of basic rights and public services remains inadequate in many countries. While retaining the basic framework of a democratic system these seem to be unresponsive to voter interests. What is

overlooked in this regard is that it is not enough for countries to be democratic; the *substance* or *quality* of their democracies is equally important. In other words, the question is not an issue of rights as much as of underlying societal structures.

From this perspective, this report concludes that building a citizen's democracy is not about adopting a standard institutional definition of democracy, be it participative, representative, or deliberative, as much as it is a process of struggle and contestation that takes place over long spans of time. As such, this report seeks to analyze some of the intrinsic properties of the democratic system in Lebanon and the ways it which can be enhanced so as to improve the well being of its citizens and facilitate effective social development.

As stated at the onset of this report citizenship is the foundation of democracy and the role of the state is to guarantee equity among its citizens on all fronts; political, economic, social and cultural. These rights of citizenship also come with certain obligations that for many ends up being a reflection of how they view themselves as citizens in this nation-state and their positions toward the civic myths that underpin it. In Lebanon the myth of sectarian pluralism has been the central theme of its contemporary history and has impacted legislative frameworks as well as all forms of social and public life in the country. As will be discussed below and at length in Chapter Three, the "civic" quality of the state is maintained as equal distance from all religious communities as guarantees for these communities are enshrined in various articles of the constitution. The report therefore asks questions such as under what conditions can the Lebanese system insure irreversible equity among all its citizens, deliver adequate social protection and provide equitable opportunities for growth as a fundamental right of citizenship, and what role can such policies play in consolidating the democratic system in this transitional period?

IV. BALANCE SHEET ON CITIZENSHIP IN LEBANON

Lebanon is an electoral democracy, with a universal right to vote granted to all citizens over the age of

²⁰ See for example Kabeer, Naila, 2005, *Inclusive Citizenship: Meaning and Expressions*, London, Zed Books; IDS, In Focus Issue 5, *Building Responsive States: Citizen Action and National Policy Change*, available on <http://www.ids.ac.uk/go/citizens> (accessed September, 2008).

twenty-one and regularly occurring elections. On the social front, social citizenship rights such as access to education and health are guaranteed, while, on the cultural front, freedom of thought, worship, and expression are legally, and in some cases constitutionally, guaranteed. Lebanese citizens enjoy a free if increasingly polarized press, freedom of association, and protection of persons. Notwithstanding weak implementation, Lebanon also has ratified a good number of international agreements and treaties with regard to international human rights, equality under the law, protection from discrimination, protection of labor rights and the rights of children, and guarantees of women's rights.

Despite these universal rights, however, considerable deficiencies remain in representative/active citizenship. The emergence of a full civic culture and the establishment of equity among citizens in Lebanon are hampered largely by the ways in which state-citizen relations are framed by the constitution and by personal status laws. As will be discussed in Chapter Three, Political Citizenship, while the constitution guarantees equity among all Lebanese citizens, the partial implementation of the Taif constitution, the selective interpretation of certain articles of the constitution, and the lack of a civic status law have undermined equity among citizens and the possibility of moving toward a citizen's state. In particular the non-implementation of clauses in the Taif constitution related to the formation of the "National Committee" entrusted under article 95 with the task to "study and propose the means to ensure the abolition of confessionalism,"²¹ the implementation of administrative decentralization, the strengthening of the independence of the judiciary, and the enactment of a new electoral law intended to insure the representation of the "different categories of the population" and guarantee communal "co-existence" have left the door wide open for an increasingly dysfunctional system. Several other clauses have also been distorted in practice.²² Similarly, the guarantees of equity before the law on a wide range of issues are undermined by the absence of a civic status laws. From this perspective, personal status laws have also become a source of political power over the various communities.

21 Cf. article 95 of the Lebanese Constitution, as amended in 1990. (All references are to an English translation of the constitution, with all amendments since 1926, published by the Lebanese Ministry of Justice in 1995).

22 Salam, Nawaf, 2007, *Taif's Dysfunctions and the Need for Constitutional Reform*, unpublished paper.

23 As a result, appointments of public sector employees, recruited through a recent mechanism put in place by the government of Prime Minister Fuad Siniora and which relies on the

In this context, the relationship of state to citizens is "legally confessionalized" and politics has tended to lose its effectiveness as the internal sovereignty of the state diminishes with the ceding of more authority to individual communities. Sectarian communities have been tasked with mediating the relationship between the state and "its" citizens, not only in practice but through the law as well. This includes political, social, and cultural aspects of this relationship.

Institution building has suffered tremendous setbacks as political/sectarian conflicts materialize in political deadlock. State institutions, usually shaped by negotiations among traditional political leaders over political prerogatives, have been transformed into a primary sphere of contestation among the main sectarian groups based on the projected "rights" of these groups. This has also led to the reproduction of traditional power structures and deficiencies in active/representative citizenship while clientelist networks are camouflaged as expressions of the interests of specific communities. The results of this contestation is that political power struggles over state institutions have been exacerbated to the point where these institutions are considered mere instruments in the larger negotiations between representatives of the different religious/communal groups. This is particularly evident in two issues: 1) negotiations over the appointments of civil servants wherein much of the debate has focused on the "rights" of each religious community in terms of quality of posts and number rather than the merit of the candidates and the requirements of the job²³ and 2) the statements made during the formation of new governments wherein political leaders are explicit in their demand for "service" ministries (i.e., ministries that render the maximum volume of services at election time) but also the rights of religious communities to specific ministries.

At the same time, in the last few years, new and detrimental constitutional customs have emerged as different groups vie for political power and attempt to reshape political territory in the post-Syrian era. As Thomas A. Baylis observes in his comparative analysis of executive power in the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, "new rules and institutions ... do not instantly produce firm realities but rather create a loose structure that political actors seek to shape in the interest of their own power and policy objectives."²⁴ In Lebanon,

professional qualifications of candidates rather than their religious affiliation have been blocked.

24 Baylis, Thomas A., 1996, "Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe" in *World Politics*, 48.3, 297-323, p. 302.

and despite the emergence of cross religious political blocs, these practices have reinforced sectarian political power over the different communities.

The electoral law, another sphere of contestation between religious communities, has changed nine times in the course of Lebanon's thirteen parliamentary elections since independence. As a result, and even though elections have taken place regularly (with the exception of the period of civil war from 1975 to 1990), Lebanese citizens have had to rely on a deficient and unstable electoral system marked by constantly changing administrative divisions. The law has served to reproduce traditional power structures and hindered the emergence of new, independent, political leadership. Despite these shortcomings, data indicate that voter turnout and participation in the 2005 elections was adequate, at around 42.9 per cent of the electorate, with a range of from 36 per cent in Beirut to 55.5 per cent in Mount Lebanon.

More recent attempts at electoral reform such as the Botrous commission assigned by the government of Prime Minister Fuad Siniora to draft a new electoral law has been blocked by a political agreement to end the political deadlock and civil conflict brokered in Doha, Qatar, in May 2008. Elements of the law were adopted by parliament but the key reforms, such as proportional representation, that would have allowed the emergence of new national political leadership were sidelined. Clauses lowering the voting age to 18 and assigning a quota for women also were not adopted. In their place, a return to the 1960 electoral law was voted in. This law mandates small districts and insures that parliamentarians are voted for by their religious compatriots. In many ways, this act points to the close affiliation between political parties and specific religious communities. Rather than being agents of change, these parties are in fact falling deeper and deeper into crisis, finding themselves unable to renew their discourse as more and more people lose confidence. The absence of laws guaranteeing national political parties has further hindered the ability of Lebanese society to produce new, "nationally oriented" leadership.

In addition to elections, other mechanisms of political control are also being challenged. While some progress has been made on constitutional reform that is aimed at supporting the independence of the judiciary, political interference continues openly in some cases. At the same time, progress on other fronts has also been made with the creation of a new oversight body

for the electoral process and a new inter-ministerial committee for social reform.

On the social front, trends indicate that the basic living conditions of the Lebanese have gradually improved over the past two decades and that while overall access to services is not a main problem for citizens, opportunity is. In other words, it is the quality rather than the quantity of the service that is problematic. This poses some concern since all indications are that those whose social citizenship rights are limited tend to be the same individuals whose participation in other spheres of citizenship is also restricted. Here two main issues of interest are apparent: 1) the growing inequity between the Lebanese and the increasing vulnerability of the almost one third of the population who lie close to the poverty line and 2) the need to address these inequities and the expansion of social protection policies at a time of considerable political and economic uncertainty.

However, access of citizens to social services is also polarized as politicians and representatives of religious communities, to various extents, struggle to monopolize this process. Consequently, many social "rights" or "services" such as education or health are accessed either through local political leaders or through religious organizations funded by the state. Citizens' rights are re-packaged as "favours" while recipients remain oblivious to the fact that these services are in fact provided for by the state. These accentuate the need for clientelist networks and torpedo questions of efficiency in favor of maintaining the interests of and equity among the different religious communities.

On the civic/cultural front, Lebanese citizens enjoy considerable freedoms. *Freedom of association* is guaranteed as are *freedom of opinion* and *personal liberties* (the latter are protected by the constitution through articles 8 and 13). The same cannot be said of the *right to life*, *humane treatment*, and *security*. Human rights violations continue to occur, albeit in a downward trend, while the lack of resources has weakened the administration of justice. Around 17,000 individuals remain "disappeared" from the era of the civil war and despite considerable pressure by concerned civil society groups, limited action has been taken to identify their whereabouts. Prison populations are of particular concern here since their rights are frequently violated and prisons tend to be significantly overcrowded and physically run down. Refugees, particularly Palestinian and Iraqis, have

very few guarantees and even though the right to work for Palestinians was enlarged recently, the latter still suffer from a considerable civil rights deficit.

Similarly, even though some progress has been made regarding the rights of women, of labor, and of children, these remain deficient. Honor crimes and domestic violence against women and children and crimes against foreign labor persist in the absence of adequate legislative framework and protection. The relegation of family matters to the different religious courts is not helpful in this regard. The limited capacity of the state to enforce protection and its inability to claim a monopoly on the use of force in these spheres and others remain a source of concern.

Lebanon enjoys one of the freest presses in the Arab region and *right to freedom of the press* is widely implemented. Most of the visual, audio, and written media in Lebanon is privately owned and politically independent of the state, with significant margins of freedom and maneuver. However, the right to *freedom of information* for citizens is undermined by the undue influence of business/political/sectarian interests on this sector where all the major media outlets are owned by political/sectarian groups. This overlap means that the role of these outlets has become increasingly circumscribed by the interests of these parties and that, as a result, they act as a reflection of social structures rather than a public arena for open debates over matters of public interest or for the enforcement of accountability. Legislative reform would go a long way toward breaking the monopoly of these groups over this sector and the opening up of the arena to multiple new viewpoints.

Similarly, sectarian interests have spilled over into the writing of history and have undermined the right of Lebanese youth to an adequate and equitable education whilst reinforcing existing societal and communal divisions. Continued disagreement over a revised and “unified” history book has meant that schools have resorted to supplementing the currently sanctioned history curriculum, which dates back to the 1970s,²⁵ and thus leaves untouched some thirty-five years of contemporary history, with alternative histories. As a result, various studies, including the Education and Citizenship Survey conducted by the National Human Development Report (NHDR), show a fundamental disagreement in political culture among Lebanese youth around ancestors (good or bad historical figures) and Lebanon's geopolitical context (including which countries are to be considered its friends or enemies).²⁶ These absences lay national history open to manipulation and

reinterpretation based on varied ideologies and different political agendas. Such an approach further reinforces existing divisions among different Lebanese communities. In the absence of alternative approaches that help students acquire the analytical and critical skills to make informed opinions, popular stereotypes that have permeated students' immediate environment are reinforced, as are differences in what children are taught about nation, identity, and civic values at various schools.

Consequently, and even though some progress has been made in different arenas, serious deficiencies continue to plague the ability of citizens to hold state representatives accountable. These deficiencies have also manifested themselves in other spheres of public life and have further accentuated political and social instability among citizens. One of those spheres is civil society.

Progress made over the past fifteen years in different arenas, such as the monitoring of elections, revision of electoral laws, increasing environmental protection, and so on is in part the result of action by civil society groups. Demonstrations, petitions, and nationwide campaigns in the early nineties pressured successive governments into organizing municipal elections, guaranteeing freedom of association and of the press, and sustaining personal freedoms. Their cumulative impact is evident today.

In this regard, and despite the critical role of civil society, general discussions have tended with few exceptions to be more programmatic than analytical, more ideological than historical. Civil society is viewed as a fully formed construct and as the main engine for democratization through its contentious relationship with the state. This report does not offer a historical analysis of the development of civil society but does analyze some of its issues. Suffice it to say at this point that even though civil society organizations, as described earlier, have played a considerable role in increasing democratization (for example campaigns for municipal and parliamentary elections in the early

25 Schools are still teaching books first published in 1968 (for secondary classes) and 1970 (for primary and intermediate classes), the latter produced in conjunction with decree number 14528, dated 23 May 1970. Official government exams are for ninth graders and the Lebanese Baccalaureate are based on these books.

26 UNDP, MEHE, 2008, *Education and Citizenship in Lebanon, Concepts, Attitudes, Actions of Ninth Grade Students*, an NHDR Publication, Beirut; CERD, UNESCO, UNDP, Programme d'Appui à la Réforme du Système Éducatif Libanais LEB/96/005, 2002.

1990s) they are also plagued by many of the same problems that affect society at large, including sectarianism and nepotism. In this regard, and as in other contexts, civil society is not an autonomous agent separate from existing social constructs and networks in Lebanon. Rather it remains just as embedded as the latter in the social and political power structures that make up the country. Evidence indicates that it is only when civil society groups have been able to bypass their primal identities as members of religious communities that they have been able to make a difference on a national scale. In other words, in many ways it is the embeddedness of social actors and members of civil society organizations in the very societal structures that many of them are seeking to change that has reduced the power of these groups.

Finally, it is important to note that as outlined above, even though sectarianism plays a detrimental role in the access of citizens to the state and affects the relation between citizens themselves, it is not the only culprit. Some of the issues discussed above and shortcomings within the system itself and are unrelated to sectarian interests (prisons for example) What is seriously undermining democratic governance, the state and its institutions is the overlap between business, clientalist and sectarian interests to the extent that all attempts to reform the system are perceived or discussed as attempts to “take away” the privileges of one community or the other.

V. ATTITUDES OF CITIZENS

In this overall framework, the question is where do the Lebanese stand on issues related to their civic status and to the question of national identity and what impact does this have on the role they envision for their country. Despite advances made on the political, social and cultural aspects of citizenship, Lebanon remains in crisis in part due to regional and global power struggles, military conflicts and, more recently, widespread economic crisis, which is itself in part due to precarious internal conditions such as those mentioned above. Polls also indicate that Lebanese citizens across the board are concerned about the future of their country.²⁷ This has hindered progress toward democratic citizenship and economic, social, and political development.

Various surveys and polls conducted by different agencies indicate that the Lebanese are, at best, confused about the status of citizenship rights and are

torn between wanting a civic state and considering the current sectarian system necessary to maintain national unity and guarantee the rights of minorities. A survey conducted in 2004 by faculty at the Université St. Joseph (USJ) found that around 45.5 per cent of Lebanese believe that confessionalism in general contradicts national unity and another 42.3 per cent that it contributes to this unity. However, when the question is applied to Lebanon the percentage of those who believe that confessionalism is a direct contradiction of national unity rises to 63.3 per cent while 25.4 per cent believe that it contributes positively; another 11 per cent abstained from responding. Within communities, the percentage of those who consider that confessionalism contradicts national unity is also high.²⁸

However, these results are belied by answers to other questions related to civic status laws within the same survey. More than two thirds of Lebanese believe in the right not to be subjected to the power of confessional authorities. Yet only half of those asked expressed support for a civic status law, while 11.7 per cent did not respond. The wide popular support for civic status laws is no surprise given that the 1998 campaign on this issue garnered close to 50,000 signatures from citizens and the support of around seventy-five organizations. Despite this, it is not clear how far the Lebanese will go in their demands for such a law.

Similarly, the attitudes of the Lebanese toward democracy are ambiguous at best. In 2006, close to 70 per cent of Lebanese polled seemed to accept the particular form of consociational democracy (power sharing) that characterizes Lebanon. At the same time, more than 50 percent also accepted a majoritarian system of governance while another third considered the one party system adequate. Some of these results were impacted by sect, age, and education. Responses to other statements, however, indicate that a large portion of those polled advocate a power sharing system for reasons other than conviction. As Hanf states “... the Lebanese are in favor of a system of democratic power-sharing because they do not see any alternative. A majority are democrats by conviction, and a larger majority by necessity.”²⁹

²⁷ See the series of polls conducted by the Lebanese Opinion Poll Committee on this and several other issues. www.lebaneseopinion.org

²⁸ Mourad, Jean, Novembre 2006, *Les Sentiments d'Appartenance : la Sociabilité*, Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines, Université Saint-Joseph, Beirut.

²⁹ Hanf, Theodor, 2007, *E pluribus unum? Lebanese Opinions and Attitudes on Coexistence*, Byblos (Jbeil), Centre International des Sciences de l'Homme/International Centre for Human Sciences & Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, p. 42.

This confusion with regard to democracy coupled with the ongoing political and economic crisis has also undermined the belief common among many Lebanese in the superiority of a free-market system and in the wisdom of laissez-faire policies. Naturally, this also influences people's choice of government. In a question asking respondents whether they would prefer, "an honest and clean government that rules with a firm hand" or "a government that is perhaps a bit corrupt but respects civil freedoms?" an overwhelming 85 per cent favored an honest and clean government that ruled with a firm hand, up from two thirds who favored the same in 2002. Only 15 per cent want more freedom even if a degree of corruption is its inevitable accompaniment.³⁰

These findings are confirmed in another more recent poll conducted by the Lebanese Opinion Advisory Committee (LOAC) which indicates a rise in support for the equal representation of Muslims and Christians in parliament as mandated by the Taif agreement. In tandem, the number of individuals who do not support this arrangement and believe in a non-confessional parliament, also as required by the Taif constitution, has dropped almost by half in 2007 to rise again in 2008. Support for the distribution of parliamentary seats based on proportional representation of each confession, however, has remained steady.³¹

These results can perhaps be explained by the rise in sectarian tensions and skirmishes in the aftermath of the July 2006 war on Lebanon and the opposition sit-in that shut down Beirut's historic and business center for almost a year and a half. These results also indicate the extent to which attitudes toward democracy in Lebanon, as in other parts of the world, are driven by political events. Lebanon's political and military turbulence of the past three years has played a particularly big role.

These positions are also largely reflected in the attitudes of Lebanese youth toward citizenship, democracy, inter-communal coexistence, and the culture of law. The survey, undertaken by the NHDR in partnership with the Ministry of Education and Higher Education, to assess the knowledge, attitudes, and concepts of students with regard to citizenship and democracy, found the following:³²

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ LOAC, IRI and Statistics Lebanon, *Perceptions of Politics, Leadership and Current Events in Lebanon*, fieldwork conducted May 14-June 11, 2007, p. 11 (http://www.lebaneseopinion.org/upload/Analysis-WITH_SLIDES.pdf) accessed June 2008.

³² UNDP, MEHE, 2008, *ibid*.

The grasp of Lebanese students of the three concepts of citizenship covered in the study, namely democracy, good citizenship, and state responsibilities, was uneven. The high percentage of correct answers to descriptions of what a good citizen is, but not to the characterization of democratic systems, or to questions that try to assess the civic skills of students, suggests that they are responding in an academic manner. The reasons are not really clear and could be due either to the respondents wanting to say what they believe needs to be said (i.e. applying an academic approach to specific concepts) or to their limited experience in democratic decision making, or perhaps to the high degree of polarization in the country.

National sentiment among Lebanese students is very strong, with a powerful penchant toward protectionism and sovereignty. There is no consensus, however, among youth on political options that may be described as national or common. A question on Lebanon's most important historic leader produced a result that was ambiguous at best. Only one figure, Emir Fakhreddine, had any direct historic connection to Lebanon and was named by around 6.5 per cent of the students. Around 34 per cent of students named too many figures to be classified in one particular category and another 35 per cent did not name anyone. The vagueness of the preferred historical leader suggests that the powerful national sentiment evidenced in their responses owes more to a desire to glorify the nation than to civic culture. A similar ambiguity was evidenced in student responses to questions asking them to identify countries considered friends or foes of Lebanon.

On the social front, the tendency to favor social cohesion and the preservation of the current sectarian political system ranges from moderate to strong among Lebanese youth. More than a third of students agree that elections and voting should be condoned by religious leaders while around a quarter believe that voting in elections should take place based on overall family preferences. Furthermore, almost two thirds (64 per cent) of the student population believe that each religious sect should educate its own 'followers' and should provide educational grants for them. This reflects the current strength of religious leaders as the place of first rather than the last resort for the provision of services as well as for guidance on political choices across all sects. In the same vein more than 75 per cent of the surveyed students agreed that ministries and positions in government should be distributed between political leaders equally while

more than half agreed that the three top positions in government should be distributed among the three main religious sects. These responses indicate not only an understanding of the state as an arena where spoils are subdivided among the religious sects and their leaders and thus an acceptance of the current status quo but also points to an alarming endorsement of this status quo by the youth of today based on criteria that have nothing to do with merit.

On the culture of law there also seems to be some confusion. Responses indicated that while students seem to expect others to respect the law, their criticism of violations of the law are quite limited. In other words, violations of the law do not solicit strong adverse reactions from students and seem to be at least partially endorsed by them, reflecting perhaps a confused understanding of legal sanctions. This is also a possible reflection of political conditions in Lebanon today, where breaking the law is sometimes sanctioned by those elected to condone it, and of students' inconsistent expectations of themselves and others.

Finally, the study makes clear that Lebanese youth derive their political positions for the most part from immediate family contexts and not from a larger network of peers. It also indicates that their positions on issues of public interest are gleaned from their home environments and that schools in general are basically the place to study and master the requisite responses to pass their exams. In addition to their poor exposure to different media outlets, this situation reinforces their tendency toward uncritical engagement in politics.

VI. ELEMENTS OF AN AGENDA

The report argues that the first step in the transition toward a citizen's state in Lebanon should be to restore content and relevance to political debate at all levels. Political discussion in Lebanon has become increasingly limited to negotiations between representatives of the different sectarian communities and the public good is defined primarily as the achievement of a balance and the maintenance of peace between the projected interests of the different communities without regard for efficiency, long term sustainability, or development imperatives. In this context, the interests of citizens as part of a communal grouping have replaced their interests as individual members of a larger national polity. This has made it increasingly hard for independent individual and collective voices to be heard. To restore content to politics

beyond these narrow confines, a discussion of what it means to be a citizen in Lebanon needs to take place. Such a discussion will by necessity begin from the question of what type of nation does Lebanese society aspire to and what sort of state should it thus have?

A key issue in this process is the legitimacy and role of the state. Without the capacity to guarantee the rights of citizenship, sustainable development and democracy cannot be maintained. In this regard, we need to move beyond the framework of electoral democracy, which, despite its importance, is not enough. The report therefore calls for a wide reaching and honest debate not only on the role of the state, but on the ways in which it can respond to the nation to which the Lebanese aspire. Such a debate would have to tackle the place and role of Lebanon's confessional communities, the economy, social development, and cultural pluralism. It also needs to address the ways in which the state can effectively guarantee the security of all its citizens, insure a functioning legal system, settle conflicts in accordance with democratic rules, and establish macro-economic balance whilst strengthening social security and development options for its citizens based on the principle of universality. From this perspective, the debate also needs to include a discussion of the economic options that exist for Lebanon and on which the social rights of citizenship depend. The report contends that there are different ways to guarantee social citizenship rights in keeping with a mixed market economy model. This debate, however, must be at the center of public discussion and not limited to technical circles.

The establishment of irreversible equity among citizens is a cornerstone of this agenda without which the country cannot move forward. To do this will require movement on several fronts. Paramount is the establishment of a civil personal status law, for it is only when the playing field between citizens in relationship to their state is leveled, only when they become equal in the eyes of the law, that issues of efficiency and the public [public what?] can take precedence. Second, a focus on quality rather than access in social and economic reform efforts is necessary. Both these shifts relate to the empowerment of citizens and giving them greater control over their own lives rather than disempowering religious communities, as has been claimed.

From this perspective, expanding the realm of politics necessitates larger support for democratic processes within and among institutions (be they state or non-state) and a more concerted promotion of a civic culture. The

aim is to put in motion a course of action that enhances democratic empowerment among citizens, allowing for greater participation and better balance between representation and governance in association with ongoing reform efforts. Whilst Lebanon boasts an active civil society, attested to by the larger number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and extensive civic initiatives that exist,³³ there is still a considerable deficit in civic attitudes. This deficit is apparent in various aspects of social formations and thus requires action on several fronts. First, reform efforts must also be extended to civil society organizations. This can take place through strategies that aim at greater transparency and accountability within non-state institutions be they syndicates, NGOs, private sector entities, or political parties. These institutions are the key to the larger process of democratic and civic transformation and a pre-requisite for embedding a culture of democracy at all levels of society. In tandem, additional strategies to strengthen the relationship with state institutions should also be put in place. Second, promoting civic culture requires sustained attention to the education of Lebanese children and youth, in terms of curricula, pedagogical approach, and general school environment. As the NHDR study on education and citizenship made evident, while students seem to understand what democracy and citizenship mean, such an understanding is not necessarily reflected in their current behavior or intended future participation. Finally, a more concerted sponsorship of civic culture must include a national strategy for the promotion of arts and cultural activities, the practice of which is a right of all citizens.

VII. METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

7.1 Methodology

Addressing citizenship is a difficult task anywhere in the world, let alone in a country like Lebanon that not only boasts eighteen [elsewhere 19!] legally recognized religious sects but has been the site of intense political and civil instability and military conflict particularly in the last three years. To begin with, both the concepts of 'citizens' and 'citizenship' are highly contested in theory and practice, raising a lot of challenges for empirical research. In a context as highly charged as Lebanon, addressing these challenges also means exploring how to tackle discourses of citizenship that either exclude or marginalize segments of the population while at the same time exploring the different ways in which people position themselves as citizens.

Recognizing the difficulties of addressing the dilemmas of citizenship in Lebanon and given the multiple political and social influences on citizens' practices, as well as on the practices of democracy, has meant a somewhat novel departure for this NHDR from some of the norms generally followed in the preparation of such reports. It has necessitated a flexible mechanism capable of adapting to rapidly changing circumstances and of allowing the integration of citizens' concerns and actions, beyond the norms of academic analysis, opinion polls, and surveys. Taking our cue from Bourdieu, we have also felt compelled to adopt an approach that would allow us to highlight contradictions without necessarily resolving them.³⁴ In other words, we have needed to develop a construct that is simultaneously both top down and bottom up.

Accordingly, a multifaceted and outward looking approach has been devised. This aims to:

- Engage the widest possible range of citizens
- Initiate discussion in a variety of forums on different themes related to citizenship
- Bring diverse citizen voices into the project

To achieve these goals and cover the three main aspects of citizenship in Lebanon the study has used various tools. These include the following:³⁵

RESEARCH AND DISCUSSION FORUMS

- Substantive desk research on the theme
- Commissioning twelve background papers, four workshop presentations and nineteen discussants to define problems and concepts;
- Organization of thirty-seven discussion forums and roundtables including academics, practitioners, and members of the general public. These included:
 - Twelve workshops and fifteen thematic focus groups meetings (on six themes);
 - Four general roundtables with specific groups;
 - Two training workshops for young journalists and university students;
 - Partnership with a young NGO on three discussion forums with university students;
 - One discussion forum with high school students;

³³ See UNDP, 2008, *101 Stories to Tell: Civic Initiatives in Public Life*, Beirut.

³⁴ Bourdieu, Pierre, and Loïc Wacquant, 1992, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, London, Polity Press.

³⁵ See Annex for further details on the background papers, workshops, and focus groups.

ENGAGEMENT AND OUTREACH

■ One major activity entitled 101 Stories to Tell that aimed to solicit citizenship initiatives in public life. This entailed a wide scale campaign involving the distribution of 12,000 posters and brochures across the country to all municipalities, public and private schools, MoSA's NGO centers, and hundreds of independent NGOs as well as Television commercials that ran for 2 months on the five major news channels in the country.

■ A large media campaign on the one hundred and one stories that proved to be the most powerful advocacy tools for the promotion of citizenship. The campaign had a simple idea and included coordination with the five major newspapers in Lebanon (three Arabic, one English, and one French) as well as with the seven major television stations, which all featured these stories in different programs. The idea was that no two news outlets would carry the same story but all would appear under the same title, of 101 Stories to Tell.

■ Launch of a website to encourage forum discussions on the theme and background papers. The website has become a major resource for researchers, policy makers, and members of the public seeking data and other matters related to the theme.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

■ A major survey on education and citizenship that assesses the concepts, knowledge, attitudes, and actions of ninth grade students on citizenship and democracy. It included 3,111 students in 113 public and private schools in the six governorates (mohafazat) of Lebanon. It also included questionnaires for school principals and civic education teachers.

■ Preparation of a statistical annex that includes political and cultural as well development indicators. The aim is to establish a reference point for academics, policy makers, and researchers alike.

■ Calculating new Human Development Indices for Lebanon including the HPI-2 and the Gender Empowerment Index (GEM) as well as disaggregating the HDI on both gender and regional bases.

■ Preparing an updated Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) balance sheet.

IMMEDIATE POLICY OUTCOMES

■ Establishment of an Education and Citizenship Observatory in partnership with the Ministry of Education and Higher Education and experts in the

fields of education. The aim of this observatory is to assess the impact of civic education and pedagogical context on the attitudes, knowledge, and actions of students using the education and citizenship survey results; co-organize workshops on the matter; make results with regards to the impact of educational politics and practices on democratic citizenship and peace building better known to decision-makers, researchers, specialists and teachers; and monitor in coordination with concerned NGOs progress on the impact of policy or curricular change.

ADDITIONAL OUTPUTS

As a result of this approach, various supplementary items have also been prepared for dissemination independently and with the report, in addition to the NHDR. These include:

■ *One Hundred and One Stories to Tell: Citizen Initiatives in Public Life* (in Arabic);

■ *Education and Citizenship: Concepts Attitudes, Knowledge and Actions of Ninth Graders in Lebanon from a National and International Perspective* (in Arabic and English);

■ *Statistical Compendium* on political, socio-economic, and cultural matters (in Arabic and English).

7.2 Structure

This report is subdivided into six chapters. Chapter One sets the conceptual and analytical framework for the project and the elements for an agenda that would assist the shift referred to in the report's title, Toward a Citizen's state. Chapter Two analyses the status of human development in Lebanon today. Chapters Three through Five consider the relationship between the state and one of the three sets of citizen rights-political, social and civic/cultural-each of which addresses a different aspect of society, that have been identified for this report. Chapter Six elaborates on the agenda needed for the achievement of the move to a Citizen's state. The aim is to strive toward an inclusive development approach based on principles of citizenship, social justice, and equity, all of which need to be systematically internalized into national strategies and policies.

Given the broadness of the topic and to allow the report to identify with precision some of the issues fundamental to citizenship in Lebanon, a series of broad framing questions were prepared for each section. These were meant to act as a general guide for each chapter and were in part derived from the issues

identified in the different workshops, roundtables, and focus-group discussions.

Political citizenship goes beyond the right to participate in the exercise of political power either as someone invested with political authority or as part of the electorate; in other words, it transcends the confines of the electoral rights that are fundamental to any democracy. The report begins by questioning the relationship between nation and citizen and between state and citizen in Lebanon as defined constitutionally, by the Taif Agreement, and practically, and also explores its historical development. It asks, Does citizenship refer to national identity or stand in opposition to it and how is this relationship mediated by the personal status laws of the different religious communities? How does the law ingrain or undermine citizenship practices in the political/public sphere whether through the constitution, electoral rights, or personal status laws? What role do citizens play in this process whether as members of civil society organizations or as political parties, syndicates, and so on. Underlying these questions is the belief that the contradiction between citizen and nation is not necessarily based on that between constitutional laws and the ways in which they are practiced; rather the contradiction also exists within different items of the constitution.

The framing questions regarding **political citizenship** focused on the following:

1. How are we to redirect the relationship between state and citizen and among citizens themselves in a way that recognizes them as individuals rather than simply as members of a community and in the process acknowledges their fundamental right as citizens to choose?
2. How are we to move from the current debate that is centered on political institutions and practices to one that also includes the content of politics and the construction of democratic power?
3. How are we to enhance political culture and expand people's choices?

Social citizenship rights are taken to be essential and rights necessary for the full exercise of democratic citizenship and the expansion of people's capacities. The consensus reached on the basic components of citizenship considers the rights to education and health as crucial. Likewise, elements that hinder the full integration and participation of individuals in society, such as unemployment, poverty, and inequality, are also considered basic to the practice of effective

citizenship.³⁶ This section asks a series of questions around the state of social citizenship in Lebanon today and the role of the state in this process. Going beyond basic needs to address issues of inclusion, the report explores the impact of social service delivery mechanisms on the access versus quality equation. In the process, it questions whether access to these services is equitable and refers to the impact of sectarian considerations on social service delivery in education and health. It then examines the issue of unemployment and poverty from the perspective of basic citizenship rights. Following from this, the chapter assesses the impact of this process on the well-being of Lebanese citizens and tries to evaluate whether the latter has accentuated the social exclusion of its poor and vulnerable populations.

The framing questions for **socio-economic citizenship** focused on the following:

1. What role does the state play in social sectors and how effectively does it play it?
2. How can economic growth lead to social equity in Lebanon?
3. How do we expand notions of economic justice and social exclusion beyond a focus on marginalized groups and poverty? Economic justice and social inclusion fundamental human rights enshrined in the Lebanese constitution.

Civil citizenship is often taken to be composed of the rights related to individual freedoms, namely, freedom of person, of expression, of opinion, of thought and religion, the right to own property and validate contracts, and the right to justice. In addition to these components, most of which have long been recognized in Lebanon, this chapter expands the civil components to include the cultural dimensions of identity-making and belonging. This is particularly needed because the civic and cultural dimensions of citizenship are sometimes assumed to be contradictory. While the first is meant to ingrain a "homogenous" sense of civic identity, the latter insists upon the multiple identities of individuals. Similarly, the contradiction between the national and the public identities of the Lebanese, that is, between their homogenous identities as Lebanese citizens and their heterogenous identities as members of different confessional communities, has often been pointed to. This section examines the cultural dimensions of citizenship and civic culture in Lebanon and problematizes the ques-

³⁶ See UNDP (Feb 2005), *Democracy in Latin America, Towards a Citizen's Democracy*; p. 118-129.

tion of allegiance assumed to be a basic tenet of different kinds of belonging. It explores the role of art and cultural production in propagating and mainstreaming specific definitions of Lebanese citizenship and delves into the ways in which the public identities of Lebanese citizens are produced by their legal inscription as members of sectarian communities. The chapter then questions the ways in which these identities are reproduced as historic continuities and in the process explores the need for a unified history. It also investigates different individuals' and communities' perceptions of the state of citizenship in Lebanon and the possibilities of identifying a common ground or shared common values for citizenship.

The framing questions regarding **cultural citizenship** focused on the following:

1. What are current identity politics and how do they impact on the development of citizenship values in Lebanon? What notions of citizenship have been promoted in contemporary Lebanese literature and the arts?
2. What role does the educational system play in the promotion of citizenship values and practices?
3. How does the move from text to practice or from law (qanun) to tradition ('urf) in personal status issues affect citizens?
4. What impact do civil society organizations and the media have on citizenship practices? Are Lebanese citizens struggling to make their own democracy?
5. How do we move toward the expansion of people's freedom to choose?

2



The Status of Human Development in Lebanon

CHAPTER TWO

The Status of Human Development in Lebanon

I. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND CITIZENSHIP

Human development, democratic governance, and citizenship rights are intricately connected. While the study of human development has materialized in diverse ways in development literature over the past century or so, its connections to democratic governance, citizenship rights, and civic values has, in the last two decades, garnered sustained academic and research interest. The end of the cold war, increased democratization, the impact of globalization on the rights and jurisdictions of nation states, the amplified assertion of ethnic identities, and related matters have all fostered considerable interest in the concepts of citizenship and of rights and responsibilities and generated renewed attention to the question of equity.

Contemporary interest in equity and justice and their impact on human development comes mainly from theories of distributional justice. Stemming from Utilitarian philosophy that considered the aim of policy to be an attempt to achieve “the greatest happiness for the greatest number” without any concern with its distributional mechanisms,³⁷ modern theories of distributional justice have moved beyond such thinking. Since the early 1970s a number of influential thinkers, including John Rawls and Amartya Sen, have made invaluable contributions to the way in which we consider equity and the means to insure economic and social justice. For Rawls, it was necessary to build a consensus around the notion that the most extensive liberty and the opportunity to acquire what he terms “primary goods” should be open to all members of society. He also suggested that the chosen allocations should be those that maximize the opportunities of the least privileged group in society (the “difference” or “maximum” principle). For Sen, the concept to be equalized across all groups is that of the “capability” set that an individual may choose from. From this perspective, the primary goods proposed by Rawls become inputs into a person's functioning. Despite their differences, both these thinkers have shifted our focus from outcomes to opportunities.³⁸

Equity is also considered a basic premise of citizenship rights. The role of the state in insuring this equity dates back to the post-World War II period in Europe and the development of the Elizabethan poor law into a fully-fledged welfare state based on citizenship rights. The central premise was that the state should guarantee essential social standards and protection.³⁹ Today, in theory, citizenship rights are founded on the equitable premises of the international declaration of human rights. However the enactment of these rights varies from one context to the other depending on the political and economic ideology of the ruling system.

A concern with equity has also profoundly influenced the approach of the United Nations to human development and questions of governance and justice. In today's more integrated world, equity is considered a global legal concept. A common understanding of equity is also influencing the development of international laws, the best known of which is the international human rights system, which is rooted in a commitment to protect the “equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family”; the latter are considered to be the “foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world.”⁴⁰ The UN charter embodies these concepts and laid the foundation for international human rights law through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948.

More specifically, this thinking also highlighted the fact that the social and the economic are closely connected and that social growth can aid in economic productivity (see Introduction). For the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) it led to the creation of the Human Development Index that was meant to go beyond economic yardsticks such as GNP to measure

37 Bentham, Jeremy, 1781. Bentham's position included arguments in favor of individual and economic freedom, the separation of church and state, freedom of expression, equal rights for women, the end of slavery, etc.

38 Rawls, 1971; Sen, 2000.

39 Marshall, 1975.

40 Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.

the welfare of individuals.⁴¹ The premise of this index was that the social and the economic feed off each other and if not addressed simultaneously social problems may eradicate the benefits of economic growth. As James Gustave Speth, UNDP Administrator at the time, stated, “Sustainable human development is development that not only generates economic growth but distributes its benefits equitably; that regenerates the environment rather than destroying it; that empowers people rather than marginalizing them. It gives priority to the poor, enlarging their choices and opportunities and providing for their participation in decisions affecting them. It is development that is pro-poor, pro-nature, pro-jobs, pro-women and pro-children.” (UNDP, 1994, p.13).⁴² In line with this definition, a new set of supplementary indices were developed. Notwithstanding their shortcomings, these showed disparities among regions and segments of the population within countries. These will be discussed at length below.

This renewed attention to citizenship and equity is also due to its recognition as an essential weapon not only in the struggle against social and economic inequity but also in the attempt to widen the conception of politics itself. The fact that political, social, and economic inequities feed off each other and often succeed in trapping families and individuals in an intergenerational cycle of poverty and exclusion is no surprise. The interaction between these inequalities - be they power-based, economic, or socio-cultural - shapes institutions and modes of conduct in society. Moreover, unequal power relations shape policies and institutions and foster the persistence of the original conditions of inequity. Such conditions pose a fundamental challenge to the rights of individuals wherever they may be and threaten the long-term prosperity and human development of all nation-states. They

41 The HDI was a culmination of a series of efforts to devise more welfare-sensitive measurements or indices of development that incorporate variables other than GNP. Major examples are the Unitary Index of the 1960s (Drewnovsky and Scott, 1966), that combines a large set of social variables in the areas of nutrition, shelter, health, education, leisure, security, and social and physical environment; the Physical Quality of Life Index of the 1970s (Morris, 1979), that combines infant mortality, life expectancy at birth and adult literacy; the International Human Suffering Index of the 1980s (Population Crisis Committee, 1992), in which are integrated a large set of variables such as expectation of life at birth, calorie intake, availability of clean drinking water, secondary enrollment, inflation rate, infant immunization and other indicators dealing with civil rights and political freedom.

42 See UNDP, 1998b, NHDR, *Youth and Development*, Chapter 1, for an overview of Economic and Human Development approaches, in particular the indices created by UNDP to assess different aspects of development and well-being.

also foster undemocratic approaches to decision making.

From this perspective, the ideological and political framework of the state shapes social and other policies while the redistributive action by the state is tightly woven into the process of nation building and the broader conception of citizenship rights and entitlements.⁴³ For Lebanon, the incorporation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into the preamble of its constitution has enshrined this principle of equity as a national tenant. However, the enactments of this tenant on the ground are another matter, as we shall see shortly. In what follows an overview of the general political, economic, and policy developments of Lebanon over the past decade or so (since the last NHDR was produced) will be presented. This will set the context for discussing the status of Lebanon's Human Development Indices today.

II. LEBANON OVERVIEW

Lebanon has undergone profound political and economic changes since the last National Human Development Report in 2001. These have impacted the human development situation in the country in various ways. In 2000, Israel withdrew from areas in the South and the Bekaa it had occupied for over twenty-two years. Essential post-civil war reconstruction was almost complete and real per capita income had more than doubled from the 1990 level but still stood a quarter below its pre-war level. The high costs associated with post-civil war reconstruction, however, as well as recurring Israeli aggressions eroded the revenue base of the state. To finance the reconstruction program, the Government of Lebanon (GoL) funded all capital expenditures during this period through market borrowing at high interest rates while international support focused on concessionary loans. As a result, total public sector interest payments were double the size of capital expenditures during the 1990s. With rapidly increasing interest payments absorbing over three-quarters of revenues, the overall fiscal deficit reached nearly 25 per cent of GDP in 2000. Gross public debt, which a decade earlier stood at about US\$2 billion, had grown to US\$25 billion, equivalent to 150 per cent of GDP, and the economy was stagnant.

Against this background, the government of the late Prime Minister al-Hariri launched an economic recovery program. It solicited external support for this program

43 Yahya, 2004.

Figure 2.1: Deprived Households per Governorate (2004)



Source: UNDP, MOSA, 2006b, *Mapping of Living Conditions in Lebanon between 1995 and 2004*

at the Paris II meeting in 2002 at which the international community provided US\$2.4 billion in direct financial support (non-project financing). Complemented by the contributions of Lebanon's financial sector, namely the central bank and commercial banks, Paris II boosted confidence in the country and resulted in a significant decline in interest rates on debt, which fell from 17 per cent of GDP in 2002 to about 10 per cent of GDP in 2005.

In 2004, and despite increasingly detrimental political bickering, macroeconomic performance exceeded all expectations, with real growth at 7.4 per cent, while the overall budget deficit declined to less than 8 per cent of GDP (from 25 per cent in 2000), and the primary budget surplus improving to 2.3 per cent of GDP. The introduction of the Value Added Tax (VAT) benefited fiscal adjustment but impacted the purchasing power of Lebanese citizens. Because of political wrangling the structural components of Paris II, namely privatization, were never fully implemented. By the end of 2004, the level of gross public debt reached 165 per cent of GDP and 175 per cent of GDP.

On the social front, levels of satisfaction of unmet basic needs declined even as income-related poverty rose. Deprivation rates had dropped from 30.9 per cent of households in 1994/5 to 24.6 per cent in 2004/2005. This improvement occurred particularly in the fields of education (+9 per cent), housing (+9 per cent) and access to water and sanitation (+2 per cent). However, income-related indicators, especially with regard to employment and economic dependency, worsened during the same period from 43 per cent to 52 per cent of the entire population. This improvement, as will be discussed below, conceals a regression in the quality of education and standards as well as a mismatch between distribution of facilities and need.

2.1 Insecurity and Conflict

These improvements in Lebanon's economic outlook were such that an average annual growth rate of 6-7 per cent was officially expected for 2005/07. Unfortunately due to a series of internal and external shocks, including the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, the Israeli war of July 2006, and continued internal political instability, Lebanon never achieved this growth rate. These events have profoundly affected Lebanon's socio-economic environment over the past three years and had a devastating impact on the average annual growth rate, which dropped to around 1.6 per cent in the period from 2005 to 2007. As of June 2008, the gross public debt stood at US\$44.5 and net public debt at US\$ 40.4 billion.⁴⁴

2.1.1 Assassinating the Prime Minister

The assassination of Prime Minister al-Hariri along with MP Basil Fuleihan and twenty other civilians on February 14, 2005 in a massive car bomb explosion was a watershed in Lebanon's political history. It prompted hundred of thousands of people to take to the streets in protest for the following two months, leading to the resignation of the government and the eventual withdrawal of close to 14,000 Syrian troops, stationed in Lebanon since 1978. It also curtailed the hegemonic role that Syria had taken in Lebanon's internal decision-making process particularly since the Taif accords of 1990.⁴⁵ A string of politically motivated assassinations have followed Prime Minister

44 Ministry of Finance, 2008, *Debt and Debt Markets*, Quarterly Bulletin, Issue no. 5, Quarter II, available at <http://www.finance.gov.lb/NR/rdonlyres/31BCB444-B1AD-44D4-86E2-2EDFF0F1F06A/0/DebtDebtMarketsQII2008.pdf>.

45 During the civil war Syria was also involved politically and militarily. The tensions between Lebanon and Syria date back to the French mandate and independence periods when Syria grudgingly accepted Lebanon as an independent nation-state.

al-Hariri's murder. These have claimed the lives of eight public and military figures and countless other citizens.⁴⁶

As a result of these events, the rate of economic activity declined dramatically, leading to an estimated real growth of 1 per cent. The shock of the assassination, political turbulence, and insecurity kept large investors away and consumers at home. Rising oil prices and increasing transfers to the Electricity Company (EdL) to cover the additional costs compounded this situation.⁴⁷

The 2005 parliamentary elections transformed the power balance within parliament and led to the formation of a new cabinet with broad support. Around fourteen dialogue sessions aimed at national reconciliation were held between March and June 2006.⁴⁸ These brought together the main religious and political leaders in the country. Lebanon seemed to be on the verge of a new beginning. Confidence was high and despite the economic challenges that followed Prime Minister al-Hariri's assassination, the incoming government of Prime Minister Siniora exerted significant efforts to redress the fiscal situation and rejuvenate the economy. Between July 2005 and June 2006, all public finance indicators were showing strong improvements and expectations were that the real growth rate for 2006 would reach 5-7 per cent. A tourist season of record proportions was expected, exports increased by more than 30 per cent, the primary surplus in the budget more than quadrupled, and the balance of payments, which had showed a deficit of US\$1.5 billion in June 2005, recorded a surplus of US\$2.6 billion twelve months later, on the eve of the July Israeli war.

2.1.2 The July 2006 War

Following the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers on July 12, 2006, Israel launched a massive offensive against Lebanon that inflicted substantial damage on lives and livelihoods and had a devastating effect on Lebanon's macro-economic and social environments. Around 1,187 people, mainly women and children, were killed, close to 4,398 were injured (15 per cent of these injured being permanent) and a quarter of the population, or one million individuals, was displaced. Physical and civilian infrastructure and public services and utilities were severely damaged. Aerial bombardment flattened entire villages in the South of Lebanon and the Bekaa valley and whole neighborhoods in Beirut's southern suburbs and partially dam-

aged or destroyed hundreds of others. Around 117,661 housing units, distributed over 354 villages and towns with an estimated value of US\$1.8 billion were either destroyed or damaged (around 12,000 homes were destroyed and more than 96,000 housing units were partially damaged). The attacks also destroyed a massive portion of the country's infrastructure including ninety-one bridges and three airports as well as eleven hospitals, thirty-five health clinics, 342 schools, and numerous NGO centers. Around thirty large businesses and around 900 smaller industrial installations were directly targeted and close to thirteen per cent of all micro- and small businesses were directly hit. Close to 1.2 million Unexploded Ordinances (UXOs), spread over an estimated area of 32 million square meters, contaminated large swathes of agricultural land in the last days of the conflict while the 15,000 tons of oil spill polluted major stretches of Lebanon's coastline. Another 430,000 unexploded land mines remain from the time of the Israeli withdrawal in 2000. Since the cessation of hostilities, twenty-seven people have been killed and 232 injured and maimed by exploding UXO's (see Indicators section).

Table 2.1: Direct Costs of the July 2006 War

Sector	Damages (million \$)	Damages (%)
Transportation	120	4.3
Electricity	160	5.7
Telecommunications	135	4.8
Water and waste water	40	1.4
Health	15	0.5
Education	45	1.6
Industrial/Commercial (incl. informal sector)	380	13.6
Agriculture and Irrigation	210	7.5
Housing (replacement cost)	1,700	60.7
Total	2,800	100

Source: CDR, 2006, *War Damage Assessment and Restoration Program, Preliminary Damage Assessment Report*, prepared by Khatib and Alami

⁴⁶ In 2005 the assassinations included intellectual and journalist Samir Kassir (June 2), George Hawi (June 21), MP Jubran Tuani, (December 12). In 2006 they targeted MP and Minister Pierre Gemayel (November 21), in 2007, MP Walid Eido (June 13), MP George Ghanem (September 19), Brigadier General Francois el Hajj (Lebanese Army) (December 12), and in 2008 Captain Wissam Eid (Internal Security) (January 25, 2008). Other attempted assassinations in the same period included MP and Minister Marwan Hemade (October 2, 2004), Journalist May Chidiac and MP and Minister Elias el Murr. In addition fourteen other explosions occurred in and around Beirut over the same period.

⁴⁷ In 2005, transfers to EdL from the budget reached about US\$650 million.

⁴⁸ These ultimately did not yield any results even though there was quick agreement over four out of six items on the agenda of the dialogue.

In addition to the physical destruction, the war disrupted a promising economic outlook achieved in the wake of particularly difficult political circumstances. The economic impact of the war and the thirty-three days of siege was widespread and has affected all sectors to various degrees from small-scale farming to tourism, transportation, industrial production, and so on. thus affecting the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of Lebanese. Furthermore, this conflict will also have medium- and long-term impacts on employment generation, economic productivity, and revenue-generation capacity. Unemployment rose during the war to almost 15 per cent and large numbers of skilled youth emigrated from the county. Direct costs were estimated at US\$2.8 billion, with more than 60 per cent of this loss affecting the housing sector. The indirect costs or estimated losses in output and income for 2006 reached a ceiling of US\$2.2 billion, with the industrial and tourist sectors suffering the highest proportion of those losses. Loss of confidence in Lebanon may also have a much longer-term impact on the economic prospects of the country and particular sectors such as real estate and tourism.

As a consequence, during 2006 the economy reported a combination of stagnation and inflation, phenomena that were governed initially by the results of the national dialogue that was then taking place and subsequently by the fall-out of the Israeli war. Inflation rose by 7 per cent during 2006, the highest rate in a decade, and was worsened by the shortage in supplies resulting from the war blockade, leading to a situation of stagflation. Public finance deteriorated as the public deficit rose from its expected 8 per cent in mid-year to 12 per cent by the end of the year raising the debt-to-GDP ratio to a record 181 per cent. Saddled by postwar reconstruction costs, public debt rose to US\$41 billion.

To counteract this situation, on August 31, 2006, less than three weeks after the cessation of hostilities, the GoL presented a program for early recovery priorities at an international donor conference convened by the Government of Sweden and closely coordinated with UNDP. The conference succeeded in raising around US\$900 million for immediate and early recovery. An adopt a village or bridge scheme was also initiated whereby the private sector and donor countries agreed to take on board the full rebuilding of specific bridges or towns. The Lebanese private sector proved its resilience once more, particularly through the *Adopt a Bridge* scheme. Within a year, close to 90 per cent of the destruction wrought by Israel on public infrastructure networks had been repaired.⁴⁹ While

government financial compensation for destroyed and damaged homes is almost complete, the reconstruction of destroyed homes and neighborhoods has taken somewhat longer in part due to the extent and severity of the damage inflicted. Bureaucratic and political hindrances as well as complex tenure arrangements, particularly in the southern suburbs, have also caused further delays in the process.

Box 2.1: Adopt a Bridge

Of the ninety-one bridges that were destroyed by Israel's war on Lebanon, forty-one were rebuilt by fifteen private firms and individuals through the adopt a bridge concept promoted by the GoL. They included banks, private trading companies, and MPs as well private individuals who wished to exhibit their solidarity and support the recovery and reconstruction of the country. Beyond their contributions to the recovery process, their acts of generosity stand as a testament to the role that the private sector has played and continues to play in the country.

2.1.3 Nahr al-Bared 2007

In May 2007, another crisis erupted in the north of the country when violent clashes broke out between the militants of Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese army. Much of the three-month conflict occurred in and around the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared and included aerial and artillery bombings. It resulted in the deaths of 179 soldiers, fifty civilians and 226 militants, the displacement of 27,000 individuals (Palestinian refugees and residents of surrounding Lebanese municipalities), the destruction of around 85 per cent of the public and private infrastructure of the camp and some of its surrounding neighborhoods. Unemployment levels rose to close to 79 per cent from a pre-conflict level of 29 per cent. The areas in the larger vicinity of the camp were also economically affected by the destruction. Since the cessation of the conflict, an estimated 3621 families are still displaced and living in temporary accommodations (prefabricated houses or containers), collective centers, and rented apartments, while another 571 families are living with host families in the Beddawi neighborhood and other undamaged parts of the Nahr al-Bared camp. Recovery and reconstruction of the camp and surrounding communities are estimated to require a total of US\$445 million and will take several years to complete. Of this amount, the GoL was able to mobilize US\$123 million at the 2008 Vienna donor conference.

⁴⁹ For additional information on recovery programs see www.rebuildlebanon.gov.lb the GOL's official website on the matter.

2.2 Political Fallout (2006-2008)

Beyond wars and conflicts, the political polarization between the two main political coalitions (the March 14 majority and the March 8 “opposition”), which began to materialize after the 2005 parliamentary elections, developed into a harsh political conflict. Details notwithstanding, this conflict manifested itself in three grand gestures, each of which was to have a significant impact on social prosperity and security. On November 11, six ministers belonging to the coalition of “opposition” political parties known as “March 8” resigned from government, rendering the cabinet illegitimate in the eyes of some. Parliament was shut down for both ordinary and extraordinary sessions to elect a new president (see Chapter Three). Effectively, the country remained without an acting legislative body for a year and a half and without a president for six months, leading to a paralysis of government.

The quality of public discourse also deteriorated significantly as politicians in both coalitions accused each other of treason. The March 8 coalition staged a “sit in” in downtown Beirut on December 1, 2006 demanding the resignation of the government. This was to last one year and a half and effectively shut down the center of the city. The sit in would also impact on economic growth and investor confidence in Lebanon.

In January 2007, an opposition strike to force the government to resign erupted in sectarian clashes that proved to be the first of several minor street skirmishes in Beirut and across the country including areas in the Bekaa and Akkar, particularly in neighborhoods or regions characterized by inter-sectarian populations. These culminated in the May 7, 2008 outbreaks of fighting in Beirut and the August 2008 clashes in Tripoli. The Beirut clashes shut down the city, the port, and the airport for more than a week, while the Tripoli fighting wrought havoc in two neighboring zones of the city. These led to multiple deaths and injuries.

In May 2008, in an attempt to put an end to the military and political deadlock and elect a president, the Arab League, with the explicit support of regional and global powers, mandated Qatar to broker a peace deal among the different parties. Known as the Doha Accord, the deal ostensibly laid out the essential steps for long-term stability that the different parties would agree to, whilst deferring all other matters to the National Dialogue, to be led by the new president of the republic, Michel Suleiman, once elected. Chief among these was the agreement to revive the 1960

electoral law that is based on the qada (sub-districts) as the foundation for elections to take place in 2009. The rationale was that this law would insure the just representation of the different sects in parliament. The deal also paved the way for the eventual election of General Michel Suleiman as Lebanon's new president.

Most worrisome, however, are the increasingly overt sectarian overtones to political discourse and action, and subsequently to the clashes. Politicians and the media (in particular television stations), all emphasize sectarian representation at the expense of national or civic representation. For the first time in many years, the prospect of renewed civil war looms. These elements obviously have serious implications for the long-term prosperity of the country.

2.3 Policy Choices (1993-2006)

In addition to the political deadlock and security crisis, policy choices made in the early nineties during post-civil war reconstruction, have also had an impact on the political, social, and economic outlook for Lebanon. On the political front they influenced reform efforts and aggravated sectarian divisions in the country. On the economic front, they contributed to a drop in annual growth rates. And on the social front they led to an improvement in Human Development Indicators coupled with an increase in income-related poverty.

Politically, the non-implementation of the Taif Accords, and in particular the clauses dealing with decentralization and the de-confessionalization of parliament through the establishment of a congress for religious representatives, have further ingrained sectarian divisions in the country and bolstered the power of traditional sectarian leaders and war lords at the expense of the state. Similarly, despite several attempts by civil society groups and different political leaders, efforts to legislate a civil status laws have been unsuccessful. As a result, the relationship of Lebanese citizens to the state continues to be mediated by the religious sect to which they belong and Lebanese citizens remain unequal before the law in terms of personal status matters. These issues will be discussed at length in Chapter Three.

On the economic front the average annual growth rate in the post-civil war period of 1993 to 2004 was less than half the rate predicted by the various post-civil war reconstruction programs of the first half of the

1990s. While these programs set 8 per cent⁵⁰ (at constant prices) as an approximate target, the actual rate for the period was only around 3 per cent.⁵¹ At the same time, public debt has increased tremendously since the mid-1990s. Public debt and public debt service rates (registering successively 178 per cent⁵² and 16 per cent of GDP in 2006) tended to escape control because the primary surplus turned, for the first time since 2002, into a primary deficit in 2006. Although the Government restored its primary surplus in 2007 and met key Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) targets in the financial sphere, stagnation and/or deterioration have characterized other critical spheres of the real economy such as external migration, unemployment and inflation rates, while the poverty headcount has risen, as we shall see shortly.


Among these policy choices, are the following, each of which has contributed to the overall situation with varying intensity:

■ **Post-civil War Reconstruction Plans:** In the post-civil war era, several plans were proposed for the reconstruction and reconstitution of state and society. To a large degree, these plans aimed mainly at the rehabilitation and development of infrastructure, particularly electricity, telecommunications, vital public facilities such as the airport and port, water supply, wastewater, hospitals, schools, and roads. The Horizon 2000 program was mainly concerned with the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the physical and state infrastructure, a process that was expected to trigger a trickle-down effect and subsequent economic development. For a variety of reasons this did not take place

and many of the goals of the Horizon 2000 proved to be out of reach.⁵³ The Five-Year Plan did set specific developmental targets. The plan was never fully applied either and like its predecessors fell short of its targets in the implementation process. The Paris I and Paris II conferences focused to a large degree on public debt-related issues. However, political deadlock hindered their full implementation.

What most of these plans have in common is that despite their impressive scope, they focused mainly on the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the physical infrastructure, without incorporating the latter into a global approach for addressing major macroeconomic imbalances, enhancing sectoral development, and reforming public institutions. In other words, while the projects carried out contributed to improved social and economic indicators, they all lacked a comprehensive developmental vision for the Lebanese economy; one that invests primarily in human capital and other sources of comparative advantage whilst addressing sectoral, sub-sectoral, and regional needs. This narrow focus limited the overall impact of the reconstruction process on economic growth, even though a major portion of the country's basic physical infrastructure was fully rehabilitated and new infrastructure constructed. Only recently have social issues and the enhancement of private sector initiatives garnered interest, mainly as a result of projects such as the Community Development Project (CDP) and the Economic and Social Fund for Development (ESFD) program, both housed at the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR).

Figure 2.2: Public Social Expenditure, 1994-2005



Source: Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 2007b, *Social Action Plan: Toward Strengthening Social Safety Nets and Access to Basic Social Services*, Beirut.

50 CDR, 1994, *Horizon 2000 - Plan for Construction and Development*, Beirut.

51 Ministry of Economy and Trade, 2005, *The Lebanese National Accounts 1997 - 2002*, available at <http://www.economy.gov.lb/MOET/English/Panel/EconomicResearchAndPrices/EconomicResearch/NationalAccounts.htm>, accessed June 2008.

52 Ministry of Finance, *General Debt Overview*, <http://www.finance.gov.lb/Public+Finances/Public+Debt/Public+Debt+Overview/General+Debt+Overview.htm>, accessed June 2008.

53 Among these the following are noted: the projected annual rate of growth of real GDP of around 11 per cent between 1992 and 1997; the projected gradual reduction in the budget deficit to 30 per cent in 1997 and the achievement of a surplus of 15 per cent in the year 2000; and, the total debt service in relation to public revenues, projected to decrease gradually from 60 per cent in 1994 to 32 per cent in 1997. (For a critical analysis of the plan, see UNDP, 1998b, pp.42-47.) See also Yahya, 2004, for detailed analysis of the different reconstruction plans.

■ **Weak post-civil war social policies:** Despite the relatively high jump in the share of public social expenditures as a percentage of total public expenditures (see Figure 2.2), post-civil war social policies did not achieve their intended outcomes. Due to a variety of reasons including fragmented vision, overlapping jurisdictions, lack of clear targeting criteria, and duplication of initiatives and projects, increases in public expenditures did not succeed in bridging the gap between economic growth and socio-economic deprivation and in alleviating various forms of poverty, vulnerability, and social exclusion. Chapter Four of this report will address these issues at length.

■ **Public deficit and public debt:** These were in part the result of an expansionary public expenditure policy coupled with a rigid monetary stabilization policy instituted in the immediate post-war era (1990). However, the repercussions of this mix tended to decrease after 1997 as the rapid rise in public expenditures slowed down. Domestic political instability, the persisting conflict with Israel (flaring up in 1993, 1996, and 2006) with its considerable damage to lives and livelihoods, and the slow pace of public sector reform have further exacerbated the situation.

■ **Investment incentives for the private sector:** The flow of domestic and foreign capital into high-profit government treasury bills rather than toward productive employment-generating activities limited Lebanon's potential for growth. It is worth noting in this respect that total investment fell between 1998 and 2002 (as


shown in Figure 2.3) and began to rise after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and the Paris II donor conference. Private investment constituted a major part of total fixed capital formation and at least 75% percent of it was channeled into reconstruction and real estate.

2.4 Socio-Economic Outcomes

2.4.1 Overlapping Geographies of Poverty and of Conflict

Beyond the disastrous impact of wars and insecurity on Lebanon, the overlap between the geographies of conflict and the geographies of poverty means that the poorest strata of the population in the poorest regions of the country have suffered the most. More than 60 per cent of those living in the qadas of Bint Jbeil, Tyre, Nabatieh, Marjaayoun, and Baalbak, as well as the southern suburbs of Beirut—that is, in the areas most heavily bombed during the thirty-three days of direct conflict—lived in extremely poor conditions prior to the conflict. This overlap exacerbated their adverse living conditions, enhanced their vulnerability, and accentuated their exclusion. For example, a postwar survey conducted by MOSA, CAS, UNDP, and ILO found that around 80 per cent of those living in the qadas mentioned above were displaced by the 2006 war.⁵⁵ Close to 36 per cent of those displaced turned to family for shelter, another 17 per cent moved in with friends or other relatives while 20 per cent rented individual homes. Some of these people have yet to return to their homes.⁵⁶

Figure 2.3: Total and Public Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF), 1997-2004 ⁵⁴



Source: MoET, 2005; Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 2007a


⁵⁴ Ministry of Economy and Trade, 2005, *ibid.*; Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Economic Accounts Mission, 2007a, *Economic Accounts Of Lebanon 2005*, compiled and published under the direction of Robert Kasparian, Beirut.

⁵⁵ Earlier assessments had indicated that poverty pockets in Lebanon are concentrated in the *qadas* of Hermel, Akkar,

Minieh, Jezzine, Hasbayya, Bint Jbeil, Tyre, Marjaayoun, Baalbeck, Saida-Zahrani, Nabatieh, Zahleh, West Bekaa, and Tripoli. See MOSA, UNDP, 1998, *Mapping the Living Conditions in Lebanon, Beirut*, Lebanon; CDR, ESFD, 2004a, *Social Development Strategy*; MOSA, UNDP, 2006b

⁵⁶ MoSA, CAS, ILO, 2008, *Postwar Impact Assessment*


Figure 2.4: Percentage of Those Displaced from Their Homes during the 2006 War by Governorate



Source: MoSA, CAS, UNDP, ILO, 2008, *Postwar Impact Assessment* (forthcoming)

Furthermore, close to 65 per cent of families reported a reduction in their incomes in the post war period as compared to 2.9 per cent who reported an improvement. It is apparent that the level of deterioration was also determined by pre-war income levels, in that 67.7 per cent of households with an income of less than LL400,000, or the minimum wage, reported a deterioration in their situation as opposed to 46.1 per cent with incomes of more than LL2,500,000 million. The war impoverished these households further and rendered them more reliant on external aid, particularly local politically affiliated NGOs. Close to 21.5 per cent of families reported receiving aid from different organizations during the war and 26 per cent after the


Figure 2.5: Changes in Household Standard of Living by Monthly Income (pre- and post-war)



Source: Ibid.

57 The study notes that data on aid only includes support to families during the war, and the months immediately before and during which the survey was carried out (January-February 2007). Consequently aid received after the survey was completed is not included and is likely to change the data included substantially.

Figure 2.6: Sources of Financial Aid to Distressed Families Pre- and Post-war



Source: Ibid.

war.⁵⁷ The survey also indicates that 72 per cent of families received financial aid during the war from offspring as opposed to 17.8 per cent who received aid from political parties. In the immediate postwar period, political parties dramatically increased their financial aid to families impacted by the war; Hizbullah, in particular, began disbursing cash within days of the end of the conflict (Figure 2.6). Figures on in-kind contributions are different, with the bulk of such assistance carried out through government agencies.

2.4.2 Social Solidarity

Of note in this context is the remarkable solidarity that emerged during the war, showing itself in the ways in which Lebanese citizens rallied to provide support to the one million displaced individuals across the country. A large portion of those displaced ended up in public spaces in Mount Lebanon and Beirut, particularly schools and other public and private spaces (including places of worship), with no means to sustain themselves. Expatriates, professionals, students, and other ordinary citizens came together and organized support systems for these families. Along with local Civil Society Organizations they were the first on the scene and rapidly organized networks to house, feed, and provide medical treatment and even education and entertainment, to the displaced. Private and public schools were opened up in the largest spontaneous relief effort ever undertaken, as different civil society organizations, many of whom had never worked in the relief business, took on the responsibility of caring for the displaced. Among a host of others were Relief Lebanon, an expatriate initiative that succeeded in raising close to one million dollars in aid; the Samedoun center, a coalition of forty-five NGOs,

which organized shelter and support to displaced families and continued to work in damaged areas after the war; and the American University of Beirut and USJ support teams, which provided health care and other systems of support to displaced families, as well as countless individuals who opened their homes to people they had never met and transformed their kitchens into sources of nourishment for families in need (see 101 Stories to Tell for further information on some of these initiatives). All distributed food packages and other in-kind contributions to families and provided entertainment, education, and counseling to their children.

While this kind of social solidarity is by no means a novelty for Lebanon, the context in which it occurred and which included profound disagreements over who was to blame for the war, was very important. It was a testament to the endurance and solidarity of a nation in crisis.

2.4.3 Challenges to Government Reform Initiatives: Paris III and Beyond

Prior to the war, the GoL was in the final stages of a consultative process over a proposed economic and fiscal reform plan that was to be presented at the Beirut I donor conference. Due to political instability, the conference was held in Paris in what became known as the Paris III conference. It succeeded in mobilizing close to US\$7 billion in grants and loans for Lebanon. (Box 2.2)

While too early to assess, the actions taken on the social service delivery and poverty reduction strategy by the government in conjunction with the implementation of the Paris III agreement is bound to bear results in the near future. These include the institution of safety nets the establishment of improved targeting systems, the implementation of reforms in the ministries of Education, Health, and Social Affairs in order to eliminate overlaps in projects and improve efficiency of services. An inter-ministerial committee for social issues will also be created to elaborate and implement a national social development strategy. This committee will also coordinate the different stakeholders for the delivery of key services.

The prevailing political, economic, and social conditions in the country pose, however, several challenges to the implementation of this program. A major issue has been how to preserve and sustain social stability while maintaining commitment to containing current levels of expenditures, adjusting prices on key pub-

Box 2.2: Paris III

The Paris III reform program as presented constituted a comprehensive plan that included six interrelated pillars, namely :

- Growth-enhancing reforms to increase productivity, reduce costs, and enhance the competitiveness of the Lebanese economy;
- A social sector reform agenda to improve social indicators and develop social safety nets to protect the most vulnerable segments of the population;
- A strong phased fiscal adjustment that aims to increase the primary budget surplus through streamlining expenditures and raising revenues in ways that minimize the negative impact on the poor;
- A privatization program directed primarily at increasing investment, reducing the stock of public debt, and spurring economic growth;
- A prudent monetary and exchange rate policy aimed at maintaining price stability, facilitating credit to the private sector, and maintaining a sound banking system;
- An assistance package to help Lebanon finance the direct and indirect cost of the July war as well as complement domestic adjustment efforts, primarily by reducing interest payments on public debt and creating the kind of confidence that would encourage private sector investment and ease the pain of a domestic adjustment after the war.

The main goals of this program were to:

- Modernize the economy and create an environment conducive to achieving real growth rates of 4-6 per cent in the medium term,
- Achieve economic stabilization by placing Lebanon's large public debt on a downward path in order to eliminate a major source of vulnerability through (a) reducing overall fiscal balance in the medium term to less than 3 per cent of GDP, (b) gradually increase primary surplus from 2 percent in 2005 to 8 per cent of GDP in 2010, and (c) reduce debt / GDP ratio steadily over the medium and long term
- Generate employment while improving social indicators and social assistance to protect the poor, this latter goal to be achieved in part through a Social Action Plan.

lic goods and services (gasoline, electricity, etc.), accelerating the process of privatization of selected public entities, raising some key tax items (VAT, interest), and restructuring the government's subsidy policy. The cost-benefit analysis of the expected outcomes of such policy orientations faces uncertainty, further amplified by the prevailing conditions of political and military instability. Although the Government intention has been to minimize the impact of these fis-

cal and economic adjustments on the needy and vulnerable groups by integrating a social agenda as part of its economic and fiscal plan, this option has been hindered by major obstacles, as follows.

First, Lebanon's profound on-going political divisions hamper the creation of an adequate climate for economic growth and development. These divisions discourage the establishment of a national consensus among key stakeholders regarding the scope and content of major social reforms and alternatives. In addition, the eighteenth-month hiatus in Parliament halted reform efforts by paralyzing all judicial procedures related to the issuing and enforcing of the relevant laws and decrees related to the Paris III reform program.

Second, current social conditions are tense and insecure, not only because of the destructive repercussions of the July 2006 war but also due to the acute rise in inflation, nourished by a set of internal, regional, and international factors. High levels of inflation are having a negative impact on the purchasing power of wage earners, who represent around two-thirds of the total active population and whose nominal wages have just been adjusted for the first time since 1996. This adjustment is, however, minor and does not make up for soaring prices.

The cumulative inflation rate recorded since 1996 amounts to around 60 per cent.⁵⁸ One example is the considerable increase in the food component of the consumer price index. As presented in Figure 2.7 below, the food component of the consumer price index has risen in relation to other items and serves as the major contributor to the CPI's overall rise. This implies that middle- and lower-income groups are

most affected by the increase in prices, since the major portion of their expenditures is usually spent on food. Finally, and even though the national inflation rate is inevitably affected by international inflation trends, the national rate is more than three times the average rate in developed countries.

Box 2.3: The Consumer Price Index and the Food Price Index, 2008


The current CPI issued by the Consultation and Research Institute is composed of around 215 expenditure items for which the prices of around 900 products are collected on a regular basis. There are regrouped into nine categories of varying weights, as illustrated in this table.

The food price index is obtained by calculating the changes in the price levels of the food and beverages category only. Since food items take up the highest share of the average lower- and middle-income household expenditure, changes in the prices of those items can have a significant impact on the overall CPI. This in turn reflects the impact of inflation on the living conditions of those households.

Category	Weight (%)
Food and Beverages	35.40
Clothes and shoes	6.55
Housing	6.49
Durable consumer goods	8.18
Health	9.82
Transport and telecommunications	14.39
Education	12.45
Leisure	2.70
Personal care and other products	4.02

Third, although the lower poverty headcount is slightly above its 2002 level, rising inflation is having a negative impact on a variety of socio-economic indicators.

Figure 2.7: The Evolution of the Food Price Index versus the Overall Price Index



Source: CRI, Consumer Price Index figures

⁵⁸ CPI of CRI. Note that the CPI issued by the Central Administration for

Statistics (CAS) is unavailable for the period prior to January 1998.

The deterioration in socio-economic conditions is not only affecting those living below the poverty line (and more specifically below the lower poverty line), but is also threatening large social groups that are located immediately above the upper poverty line and are highly sensitive to internal and external shocks. This will be discussed in Chapter Four.

III. National Human Development

Against this backdrop of events how has human development in Lebanon fared? Has it departed from past trends? How does it compare to other middle income or Arab countries? What are the issues it must now consider to advance its human development in an equitable manner?

While the shorter-term impacts of events of the past few years were outlined earlier, their long-term impact on human development will take more time to assess. It is however apparent that despite political stability and military insecurity Lebanon has not fared any worse than other countries in the MENA region. In fact, like many of those countries, Lebanon witnessed a paradox of sorts. While income poverty deteriorated in the last decade or so, human development indicators have improved as has access to basic services and satisfaction in basic needs. Delivery of education and health services contributed to this development even as they fell short of their declared targets. In short, empirical findings, as we shall see below, suggest that even with low-income growth levels, attention to education and health services can reap tremendous benefits for the overall human development of the country.

3.1 Measuring Human Development

3.1.1 The Human Development Index (HDI)

The Human Development Index (HDI) is widely recognized as the principal indicator of human development (Box 2.4). During the 1990s post-civil war reconstruction efforts, economic growth and considerable investments in education and health resources, particularly in the first half of the decade, resulted in the HDI regaining much ground. Subsequent deceleration of the rate of growth of GDP per capita from 4 percent in each of 1996 and 1997, to 3 percent in 1998, 1 percent in 1999, and zero in 2000 slowed the improvement in the value of the HDI. In 2002, it started

to increase again rising by 4.5 per cent in 2002, 14 per cent in 2003, and 13 per cent in 2004, possibly as a result of the Paris II meeting and increasing investor confidence in Lebanon. In 2005, in the aftermath of the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri, GDP per capita plummeted by around 5 per cent.

In spite of these fluctuations in growth, the value of Lebanon's HDI has remained relatively steady whether calculated according to nationally or internationally generated data. The value of Lebanon's HDI based on nationally generated data is slightly lower than its value in the HDR. This is due to a variety of reasons. Gross enrolment and literacy figures used in the 2007 and 2008 HDRs relied on projections based on older surveys. Estimates of the same indicators for the NHDR relied on the 2004 national multipurpose household survey undertaken by the Central Administration of Statistics (CAS) and this resulted in revised combined enrolment ratios and literacy rates. While the gross enrolment ratio was revised down, adult literacy rates were revised up. The variation is slight and does not impact the HDI value greatly. The substantial revision of GDP per capita levels, undertaken in the recent HDR statistical update—from US\$5,837 in 2004 to US\$9,741 in 2006, or about 70 percent—had greater impact. These revisions in GDP per capita have impacted the HDI values of all countries to various degrees. When these revisions are applied to Lebanon's 2007 HDI calculations, it becomes apparent that its values and rank have not fluctuated as much as was initially assumed. (UNDP, 2008)

Box 2.4 Measuring Human Development

The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary, composite measurement of human development. It was created to facilitate comparison between countries and regions. It measures overall achievements in a country in three basic dimensions:

- Longevity, as measured by life expectancy
- Knowledge, as measured by the adult literacy rate and combined gross enrollment in the school system,
- A decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) in US\$.

Within the limits of these three components, the HDI has broadened the empirical attention that the assessment of development processes receives. The HDI is not exclusively focused on economic achievement (as is GNP). The HDI sets a minimum and a maximum for each dimension and then shows where each country stands in relation to these scales, expressed as a value between 0 and 1.

Table 2.2: Human Development Indicators

Index	NHDR 2008	HDR 2007-2008	HDR 2008
HDI	0.791	0.772	0.796
GDI	0.779	0.759	0.783
GEM	0.349	NC	NC
HPI-1	7.4	8.5	NC
HPI-2	23.6	—	—
HDI-GDI	NC	-1	-5

[1] For HDI values: per capita income (US\$PPP) obtained from the HDR, UNDP. Gross enrollment rates and illiteracy rates estimated on basis of data for MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006a, *Living Conditions of Household: The National Survey of Household Living Conditions 2004*


NC: Not calculated

What is clear from following trends in human development indices for Lebanon is that despite fifteen years of civil war and countless other conflicts, it has been making steady progress on all fronts since the 1970s. Life expectancy has risen and infant mortality has

dropped. In the last decade or so overall educational delays have also dropped as have illiteracy levels. Not surprisingly, an examination of illiteracy per age group indicates that the largest portion fall within the higher age groups (Table 2.3 and indicators section).

Disaggregating the HDI by region and population group can shed light on how equitable national achievement is distributed. In many countries, the results have sparked national debate and helped national policy-makers assess differences in the reach of human development between rural and urban areas and among regions and ethnic and income groups. Notwithstanding short comings in the data (see statistical annex), calculations of the regional HDI at the level of the governorate, (Lebanon's largest sub-national administrative division) found that while the Beirut and Mount Lebanon regions stand out with human development values higher than the national average, the North and the Bekaa exhibit significantly

Figure 2.8: Trends in HDI Value and Rank for Lebanon, 1985-2006



* As reported in UNDP, 2006a, HDR, *Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis*

** As reported in UNDP, 2008, HDR, *The Human Development Indices: A Statistical Update*

Note: Based on data available in 2005, Lebanon was ranked eighty-eighth out of 177 countries and the HDI appears to have gained 0.024 points. However, using the most up-to-date data series from the international data agencies, Lebanon's HDI value for 2005 should have been 0.795; this would have ranked the country seventy-seventh if the updates had been available and had been used in the last report.

Table 2.3: Trends in Human Development: Select Education Indicators

	Elementary	Intermediate	Secondary	
Percentage of age-grade delay				
1997-1998 ^h	33.8	49.9	45.5	
2000-2001 ⁱ	35.8	54.8	55.7	
2004-2005 ^b	11.2	23.1	26.5	
Illiteracy rates (age 15 years and above)				
1970 ^d	31.8	31.8	31.8	
1996 ^d	11.5	11.5	11.5	
2004-2005 ^b	9.95	9.95	9.95	
Illiteracy by age group (%)	15-24	25-44	45-64	65+
1996	0.7	2.1	4.9	3.8
2004	0.34	1.42	3.91	4.27

Table 2.4: National and Regional HDI

	Life expectancy index	Education index	GDP index	HDI value
Lebanon A	0.778	0.835	0.761	0.791
Lebanon B	0.772	0.835	0.634	0.747
Beirut	0.825	0.838	0.720	0.794
Mount lebanon	0.808	0.858	0.656	0.774
North	0.725	0.829	0.560	0.705
Bekaa	0.742	0.796	0.601	0.713
South	0.802	0.819	0.582	0.734
Nabatieh	0.760	0.797	0.625	0.727

Note: For the sake of consistent comparison- A: Uses life expectancy and GDP per capita values used in the HDR; B uses 1996 life expectancy values and real per capita expenditures derived from the poverty and income distribution study. See Statistical Methodology for details.

lower levels (Table 2.4). Concerted national efforts are required to improve the level of human development in the North Lebanon, Nabatieh, Bekaa, and South Lebanon governorates particularly in terms of income generating activities for the North and improvements in literacy levels in the Bekaa and Nabatieh regions. As will be discussed below, these results confirm findings in other poverty- and deprivation-related studies, such as the Unmet Basic Needs (UBN) assessment, which found that more than 36 per cent of households have low and very low satisfaction levels in the sphere of education (MOSA, UNDP, 2007).

3.1.2 Human Poverty Index (HPI-1)

Poverty is a multifaceted phenomena and measuring human poverty is a complex matter no matter which tool one uses. While approaches that measure value in terms of money fail to capture other dimensions fundamental to basic standards of living, the capability and basic needs approach that focuses on assets and access suffers from a certain level of subjectivity. Collectively, however, these give an indication of the status of the population, and particularly of its poorest and most vulnerable segments.

HPI calculations for Lebanon based on national data indicate that Lebanon is actually two points below the value calculated in the global HDR. This is in large part due to more recent illiteracy data. An attempt to disaggregate the HPI to a regional level was also made. The aim was to give an indication of where the regions stand on poverty issues and to see whether they would correspond to findings in other recent studies. While the data used should be treated with some caution (see note below table 2.5), the disaggregated values at the governorate level point to two main issues.

The first is that despite the considerable gains made with regard to illiteracy nationally, which indicate that Lebanon is close to achieving its MDG target, some regions continue to suffer from unacceptably high levels of illiteracy. Further disaggregation by gender indicates that a larger portion of those illiterate are female (Table 2.6). The second issue highlighted is that even though, as we shall see shortly, North Lebanon reports the highest levels of income poverty, other regions in the country, particularly the Bekaa and Nabatieh suffer from different kinds of exclusions that could potentially maintain families within a vicious poverty cycle.

Box 2.5: HPI

Human development reports have developed a Human Poverty Index (HPI). Whereas the HDI measures average achievement in human development, the HPI for developing countries measures deprivation in the three basic dimensions captured in the HDI. It measures:

- Severe deprivation with regard to health by the proportion of people who are not expected to survive beyond age 40 and the proportion of children under age 5 who are underweight for their age.
- Deprivation with regard of education through the adult illiteracy rate.
- Deprivation with regard to a decent standard of living is measured by the unweighted

3.1.3 Human Poverty Index - (HPI-2)

HPI-2 includes an additional dimension related to social exclusion by measuring long-term unemployment rates. Even though normally applied to OECD countries, this index was found relevant to Lebanon, where inequity and exclusion are often more closely connected to opportunity than to access and are directly related to questions of citizenship rights.

Table 2.5: HPI-1 for Lebanon

	Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 (% of cohort) ^a	Adult illiteracy rate (% aged 15 and above)	Population not using improved water sources (%)	Under-weight children under age five (%)		
	2000	2004	2004	2004		
Regional HPI	P ₁	P ₂	P ₃₁	P ₃₂	P ₃	HPI-1
Lebanon	6.3	9.9	0	3.9	2.0	7.4
Year	1996	2004	2004	1996		
Lebanon B	5.0	9.9	0	3.1	3.9	7.2
Beirut	3.0	6.1	0	2.2	1.5	4.4
Mount lebanon	4.0	7.5	0	1	1.8	5.5
North	8.0	10.0	0	2.3	6.0	8.0
Bekaa	6.0	16.8	0	4.2	6.3	11.8
South	4.0	12.2	0	4.1	4.5	8.6
Nabatieh	4.0	16.7	0	9.8	8.2	11.7

Note: Probability of survival and percentage of underweight children are based on 1996 values taken from UNDP, 2000, NHDR 2001/2002, *Globalization: Towards a Lebanese Agenda*. No adjustments were carried out to these values as they were meant to identify regional disparities rather than depict an accurate HPI figure for the regions. Moreover any life table projections to measure life expectancy will not take into account the difference that investments in the health sector over the last ten years may have made to mortality rates. Similarly, available 2004 data for underweight children were not used since these seem to be over reported for Beirut and under reported for the regions, and for the South and the North in particular.

Table 2.6: Illiteracy by Region and Sex (%)

	Beirut	Mount Lebanon	North	Bekaa	South	Nabatieh
Male	3.47	4.5	7.1	10.98	8.51	9.62
Female	8.1	10.48	12.6	22.7	15.45	23.40
Total	6.06	7.51	9.96	16.82	12.15	16.74

Source: Raw Data MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006a

Even though we used different criteria to assess functional literacy in Lebanon and thus values are more indicative than accurate, the exercise yields several interesting conclusions. As the table below indicates, even though Lebanon is doing as well as other OECD countries on issues of long-term unemployment and longevity, the country's main areas of deprivation are to be found among that proportion of the population that lacks functional literacy skills and in the growing income gaps, as measured by the percentage of the population living 50 per cent below the median gap.

Furthermore, pending further disaggregation, the largest percentage of long-term unemployment levels was found to be among the youth (6.3 per cent of total labor force) while data at the mohafaza level indicates that only North Lebanon and Bekaa exhibit long-term unemployment rates lower than the national average (Table 2.8).

Various skills are becoming important in the knowledge economy, both for individuals and for countries. The changing demands of the labor market, new technologies, and increased globalization are all influencing employment demands and the skills expected

of the workforce. Consequently there is an increasing shift toward highly skilled workers, which in turn calls for individuals not only with certain levels of education but with the ability to adapt and learn new skills quickly. Literacy skills are critical in this context. For Lebanon, a country that prides itself on its human

Box 2.6: HPI-2

The HPI-2 measures deprivations in the same dimensions as the HPI-1 whilst capturing social exclusion. It reflects deprivation in four dimensions:

- Vulnerability to early death is measured by the probability at birth of not surviving to age 60.
- Exclusion from the world of knowledge and communication is measured by the percentage of the population aged 16-65 lacking adequate functional literacy skills.
- Lack of access to adequate economic provisioning is measured by the percentage of the population living below the income poverty line (i.e., less than 50 percent of the median adjusted household disposable income).
- Social exclusion is measured by the long-term unemployment rate (i.e., the percentage of the labor force that has been unemployed for at least twelve months).

Table 2.7: HPI-2

	Human poverty index HPI-2	Probability at birth of not surviving to age 60 (% of cohort) 2000-05	People lacking functional literacy skills (% aged 16-65) 1994-2003	Long-term unemployment (as % of labour force) 2006	Population living below 50% of median income 2000-2004
Netherlands	8.1	8.3	10.5	1.8	7.3
Germany	10.3	8.6	14.4	5.8	8.4
Belgium	12.4	9.3	18.4	4.6	8
Spain	12.5	7.7	—	2.2	14.2
United States	15.4	11.6	20	0.5	17
United Kingdom	14.8	8.7	21.8	1.2	12.5
Italy	29.8	7.7	47	3.4	12.7
Lebanon	23.6	8.9	36.5	2.9	14.37

Note: International data are from UNDP, 2007a. Probability of survival is based on 1996 values. No adjustments were carried out. Functional literacy rates were estimated according to available information- see statistical compendium.

Table 2.8: Long Term Unemployment by Governorate

	Beirut	Mount Lebanon	North	Bekaa	South	Nabatiyeh	Lebanon
Long term unemployment as percent of actual labor force	5.1	2.8	1.4	1.4	3.9	5.3	2.9

capital and whose economy is for the most part a service economy, the availability of a highly skilled workforce is critical-particularly at a time when a large part of this workforce (professional, technical, administrative, and managerial) have emigrated to other countries in the Gulf region, where demand for their services is quite high. While not comparable in terms of functional literacy measurements, the data suggests that far more needs to be done at the level of functional literacy, the issue being one of quality and not just of access to education. In particular, Lebanese youth need focused retraining so as to acquire the literacy and technical skills necessary for them to compete in today's economy.


3.1.4 Gender-Related Development index (GDI)

The Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) reflects inequalities between men and women in the same categories as the HDI. The GDI for Lebanon roughly

follows the pattern of the HDI but is at a lower level, a phenomenon indicative of the presence of gender inequality (Figure 2.9 and Table 2.9). While GDI trends show that Lebanon has made some strides, it is still far from demonstrating gender parity. To measure the impact of gender inequality on human development the value of Lebanon's GDI value was compared to its HDI value and was found to be 98.4 per cent. Of the 157 countries with both HDI and GDI, 107 countries have better ratios than Lebanon.⁵⁹

It is important, never the less, to emphasize the considerable achievements made with respect to both higher female life expectancy and school enrollment and achievement. Despite higher illiteracy levels among older women, female adult literacy levels have also increased considerably in the past years especially in younger age brackets and have led to gender parity in gross enrolment ratios (Table 2.10). Female students now outnumber male students at secondary and tertiary levels at the ratio of 1.12 and 1.19 respectively, up

Figure 2.9: Trends in GDI Value and Rank for Lebanon



59 UNDP, 2008

Table 2.9: GDI Components- Lebanon

Life expectancy index		Adult literacy index		Gross enrolment index		Education index		Income index		GDI
Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	
0.770	0.782	0.839	0.933	0.742	0.726	0.807	0.864	0.646	0.835	0.779

Table 2.10: Gender Parity Index of Gross Enrollment Rates

1970		1988		2003	
Secondary	Tertiary	Secondary	Tertiary	Secondary	Tertiary
0.68	0.32	0.98	—	1.09	1.12

Source: World Bank, 2006, *ibid.*

from 0.68 and 0.32 in the 1970s.⁶⁰ However, female adult literacy levels still lag behind those for males, particularly in outlying rural areas. Another area of great inequity is the gaps in income and income-earning opportunities. The ratio of female to male estimated income is 0.32.

3.1.5 Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)

The **Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)** focuses on women's opportunities as opposed to their capabilities. Neither the global HDR nor previous NHDR's have calculated the value of the GEM for more than a decade. Only one estimate of GEM, 0.212 for 1992, is available and it is indicative of a very low level of

achievement (at the time, Lebanon ranked 103 out of 116 countries considered). The situation has improved in the last sixteen years and the GEM for Lebanon today stands at 0.350. Female participation in the political process has improved slightly, with an increasing number entering parliament. Furthermore, 2004 saw the first appointment of two female ministers. Control over economic resources has also improved significantly in part due to larger female participation in the work force and higher rates of female enrollment in education. Clearly, however, there are still possibilities for improvement, particularly given the levels of female graduates at the tertiary level, the increasing level of female participation in the labor force, and the rising number of female entrepreneurs (see Indicators). Change can also be induced by encouraging greater female participation in the political process through the adoption of female quotas in parliamentary elections and making it possible for women to run in their areas of residence or birth.

3.1.5 Inter-country Comparison

The human development rank of Lebanon compares well to that of Arab countries and developing states in general (Table 2.12). Gulf countries such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have a higher HDI, in part due to higher levels of income and increasing investments in human capabilities. Despite

Box 2.7 Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)

It captures gender inequalities in three significant fields:

- Political participation and decision-making power, as measured by women's and men's percentage shares of parliamentary seats
- Economic participation and decision making power, as measured by women's and men's share of positions as legislators, senior officials, and managers, and of professional and technical positions
- Power over economic resources, as measured by women's and men's estimated earned income represented by PPP in US\$

Table 2.11: Gender Empowerment Index for Lebanon

Seats in parliament held by women (% of total)		Female legislators, senior officials and managers (% of total)		Female professional and technical workers (% of total)		Estimated earned income (PPP \$US) ^a		Share of population		GDI
Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	
4.7	95.3	11.12	88.8	46	54	4,537	15,942	0.502	0.498	0.349

Source: Column 1: Ministry of Interior; Columns 2-5 data calculated from MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006

⁶⁰ World Bank, 2006, *The Road Not Traveled, Education Reform*

in the Middle East and Africa, Washington DC, p. 30.

all the upheavals Lebanon has managed a better performance than immediate Arab neighbors such as Jordan and Syria. This is partly the result of major investments due to rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts and sustained high levels of social indicators, which compare favorably even with countries at the top of the medium human development group. In particular investments in education have had a considerable impact resulting in a combined enrolment ratio for primary, secondary, and tertiary education that is higher than that of all Arab countries in the middle-income group except Jordan and comparable to if not higher than the ratios for countries in higher income groups. Cyprus, in the high human development group of developing countries, shows a substantially better

human development performance than Lebanon, even though it shares similar traits, including the comparable basis of the two economies. Most higher income group countries address human development concerns such as education and health more efficiently and provide better economic opportunities for all.

Similarly, despite increasing poverty, Lebanon registers a relatively low HP1 rank (18) in comparison with other Arab countries including even those in the higher income bracket, such as the UAE. However, it is doing rather poorly on the gender-related development index. In part, this is due to the large difference between males and females in estimated earned income as well as to a significant difference in political representation.

Table 2.12: Select International and Regional Comparisons: HDI

HDI Rank	Human development index value	Life expectancy at birth, annual estimates (years)	Combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary education %	GDP per capita (PPP US\$)	Education index	
	2006	2006 ^a	2005	2006		
High Human Development						
29	Cyprus	0.912	79	77.6	25,882	0.909
30	Kuwait	0.912	77.4	72.6	44,938	0.846
35	United Arab Emirates	0.895	78.5	65.8	34,551	0.818
40	Chile	0.874	78.4	82.5	13,030	0.918
31	Bahrain	0.866	75.4	90.4	34,516	0.89
Medium Human Development						
77	Lebanon	0.791	71.7	73.4	9,561	0.835
91	Jordan	0.768	72.2	78.7	4,628	0.877
97	Tunisia	0.761	73.7	76.2	6,859	0.766
107	Syrian Arab Republic	0.736	73.9	65.7	4,225	0.769
116	Egypt	0.715	71	76.4	4,953	0.726

Table 2.13: Select International and Regional Comparisons in Indices

HDI Rank	Human development index value	Human poverty index (HPI ₁) rank	Human poverty index (HPI ₁) value %	Gender-related development index (GDI) rank	Gender-related development Index (GDI) value	Gender empowerment measure (GEM) value
	2006	2005	%	2006	2006	2005
High Human Development						
29	Cyprus	—	—	26	0.91	0.58
30	Kuwait	—	—	31	0.891	—
35	United Arab Emirates	17	8.4	35	0.876	0.652
40	Chile	3	3.7	42	0.866	0.519
Medium Human Development						
77	Lebanon	18	8.5	72	0.783	0.349*
91	Jordan	11	6.9	82	0.754	—
97	Tunisia	45	17.9	84	0.746	—
107	Syrian Arab Republic	31	13.6	92	0.723	—
116	Egypt	48	20	—	—	0.263

Note: * calculated by the NHDR- may not be comparable to other countries. All other data from UNDP 2008

3.1.7 Lebanon and the MDGs

Lebanon's progress on the MDGs was also mapped out for this report. These confirm the findings of the various HDI and allow the identification of a series of new issues. These include:

- A weak employment to population ratio of 35.7 per cent as compared to 47.8 per cent for the Middle East, the majority of those employed working in the trade and services sectors and more than two thirds (62 per cent) in salaried employment. Youth suffer from higher levels of unemployment with young women suffering the most from the consequences of the economic slowdown.
- Growing poverty in terms of money, leading to increased regional and interregional disparities as well as an increase in urban poverty pockets.
- Elevated rates of illiteracy, particularly among women over forty years of age, especially in rural areas such as the Bekaa as well as regional and inter-regional and inter-urban disparities in rates of completion of primary education. High drop out rates of 10.7 per cent in basic education (primary and intermediate cycles) and repetition rates in public schools of 20-24 per cent are particularly problematic.⁶¹
- Infectious diseases and under-five mortality rates continue to be a problem. High infant mortality rates are related to inadequate neonatal care or insufficient immunizations for children. These are in part the direct result of the absence of a national health policy as well as unsafe environments. It is also due to unequal access to medical services across the county.
- Improvements in maternal health, in pre- and post-natal care as well as in increased dissemination of family planning methodologies also mask regional disparities. Primary health care is also underutilized as health care tends to focus on curative rather than preventive measures.
- Improved incidence of tuberculosis and underreporting of HIV/AIDS cases, the latter being considered taboo socially. This makes it particularly hard to treat the disease and to promote precautionary measures such as safe-sex practices.
- Despite increased efforts to improve environmental performance Green House Gas emissions (GHG) caused mainly by pollution from the energy sector continue to rise. However the use of Ozone-depleting Substances (ODS) has declined considerably due to increasing use of alternative materials in industrial production and the encouragement of

more bio-friendly agricultural practices. The use of CFCs has been reduced by almost half, for example. Access to safe drinking water also continues to be a problem partly as a result of interrupted services whilst access to wastewater networks has improved. More critically the problem of solid waste disposal continues to be major problem with more than 700 open dump sites. Devastating fires that hit the country in the past two years also pose an additional environmental challenge.

- Lebanon's high debt to GDP ratio (one of the highest in the world) will hinder the implementation of a successful development plan. Debt servicing obligations will reduce the effective capacity of the government to address growing development needs.

3.2 Mapping Inequity

Several issues are brought to light by analysis of these indices. The first relates to gender inequity, the second to human poverty.

3.2.1 Inequities of Birth: Let the Numbers Tell the Story

While some progress has been made on gender issues, considerable disparity in the human development of males and females in Lebanon remain. A comparison between Male HDI and Female HDI, calculated for the first time in Lebanon, indicates considerable inequity with male HDI, at 0.813, considerably above the national average of 0.792 while female HDI, at 0.755, is considerably below it. In other words, females have some way to go, particularly where literacy and estimated earned income (substituted for the GDP per capita which is not available based on gender) are concerned.

As discussed earlier, on literacy issues women are making better progress. When it comes to income, males continue to have the upper edge. Even though the salary scale for entrants into the labor market is relatively gender blind, the discrepancy between male and female earned income being greater the further individuals advance in their careers.⁶² Despite these and other cultural and legislative obstacles to the participation of women in the labor market (see Box 2.8), women are increasingly asserting their economic independence, both as employees of the public and private sectors and as entrepreneurs (see Status of Women- Indicators).

⁶¹ Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 2007, *Social Action Plan Report*, sent to Paris III.

⁶² See Chaaban, Jad, 2008, *The Costs of Youth Exclusion in the Middle East*.

Table 2.14: Male to Female HDI

	Life expectancy at birth (years)	Adult literacy rate (% aged 15 and above)	Combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary education (%)	GDP per capita (PPP US\$)	Life expectancy index	Education index	GDP index	Human development index (HDI) value
Females	73.7	83.9	74.2	4,792	0.812	0.807	0.646	0.755
Males	69.4	93.3	72.6	14,860	0.740	0.864	0.835	0.813

Source: All date is from 2004-2005. Columns 1, 4, 5 from UNDP 2008 and columns 2,3 calculations based on MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006

Furthermore, and as the GEM indicates, despite considerable gains, gender empowerment at decision-making levels remains pitifully low, particularly when the comparatively high levels of females enrolled in and graduating from tertiary level education are considered. For example in 2006, 54.5 per cent of university graduates were female and 45.5 per cent were male.⁶³ (See Chapter Four for further analysis). The appointment of females to the higher echelons of the public sector is scarce. As the table below indicates, only 6.5 per cent of Category 1 positions in the public sector are held by females at a time (1995-2006) when the total number of employees doubled (from 3.3 per cent to 6 per cent). The same situation applies to Categories 2, 3, and 4 of civil employment as well.⁶⁴ Furthermore, as the CEDAW 2005 report points out, no woman has ever been appointed to the office of governor and only two women hold the office of district president. The same can be said for women employed in the foreign service, whose numbers have been on the rise since the mid 1990s and the promulgation of Act No. 376 of 4 November 1994, which abolished discriminatory provisions requiring the transfer of a female employee in the foreign service if she married a non-Lebanese and the immediate dismissal of a female employee from the foreign service if she lost her Lebanese nationality.

The judicial sector on the other hand has witnessed notable developments. The number of female justices has more than doubled in the last decade while the number of male justices has remained approximately the same. Despite these gains, however, the gap remains substantial. (Figure 2.10) According to the Ministry of Justice, full equality between women and men in this sector will be achieved in ten years if this pattern continues.

⁶³ CERD, 2008, *Statistical Bulletin for the Academic Year 2006/07*, Ministry of Education, http://www.crdp.org/CRDP/Arabic/ar-statistics/STAT_AR/2006_2007/PDF06_07/Tables_07/HigherEducation_07/Page113_07.pdf, accessed September 2008.

⁶⁴ It rose in Category 2 civil service from 6.6 to 17.37 per cent; in Category 3 from 6.67 to 27.22 per cent and in category 4 from 11.7 to 28.7 per cent.

Inequities in appointments also extend to the private sector and institutes of higher education where in 2004, for example, only one out of sixteen deans and two out of thirty-one deans at the Lebanese University and the USJ respectively were female. Three other universities have no female deans at all (CEDAW, 2005).

Table 2.15: Breakdown of civil servants in government departments by sex, October 2004

Permanent staff	Males	Females	Total	%
Category 1	114	8	122	6.5
Category 2	312	72	384	18.75
Category 3	1,455	570	2,025	28.1
Category 4	4,422	2,069	6,491	32

Source: The Civil Service Commission quoted in CEDAW, 2005, *Consideration of reports submitted by states parties under article 18 of the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women*

Table 2.16: Breakdown of civil servants in public institutions under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission by sex, October 2004

Permanent staff	Males	Females	Total	%
Category 1	10	1	11	9
Category 2	40	2	42	4.7
Category 3	93	9	102	8.8
Category 4	850	54	904	5.9


Source: The Civil Service Commission quoted in CEDAW, 2005, *ibid*

Table 2.17: Breakdown of women in the foreign service by category of office, 1995-2004

Category	Office	1995		2004	
		No.	%	No.	%
1	Ambassador	1	1.44	4	6.77
2	Counsellor or consul general	5	7.44	9	14.75
3	Secretary, counsellor or attaché	12	10.9	24	24.48

Source: The Civil Service Commission quoted in CEDAW 2005

Figure 2.10: Breakdown of the Number of Justices by Sex, 1980-2004



Source: Ministry of Justice, Directorate for the Affairs of Judges and Employees, November, 2004, quoted in CEDAW, p. 50

Another facet of gender inequity in Lebanon that has significant impact on the Human Development of the country is connected to the citizenship rights of Lebanese women who are deprived of the right to pass on their citizenship to non-Lebanese husbands and to children born of such marriages. On the one hand, harsh residency rules for non-Lebanese husbands threaten the integrity of families.⁶⁵ For example, whereas a non-Lebanese woman married to a Lebanese man is granted residency and nationality automatically, a Lebanese woman married to a Palestinian man cannot grant him residency, rendering him stateless or an

illegal resident. Likewise, her inability to transfer her nationality to her own children renders them stateless in cases where the father is also unable to grant citizenship. It also deprives these children of other rights normally granted to Lebanese children. This situation leads to an increased number of stateless persons in the country and deepens their exclusion from society, thus impacting on their future options and life-long potential. Similarly inequities embedded in personal status laws also impact various aspects of human development in the country. These will be discussed at length in Chapter Three of this report.

Box 2.8: Female Labor Force: Obstacles in the Socio-Economic Sphere

The low rate of female participation in the labor force is indicative of a set of issues related to formal market labor laws and regulations as well as to social norms and attitudes. Understanding the interconnections and impact of these factors requires an examination of how economic and non-economic constraints affect decision making within households.

Traditional Gender Paradigm

As the Gender and Development section in the MENA region report points out, the traditional gender paradigm includes four general elements:⁶⁶

- The centrality of the family, rather than the individual, as the main unit of society. As positive as this may be for the maintenance of societal relation and family networks, this emphasis on the family is seen as justification for equivalent, rather than equal, rights, in which men and women are presumed to play complementary roles. Both men and women view the family as important and as a cultural asset.
- Even when women work, the man is assumed to be the main breadwinner of the family. A woman's labor is considered to be primarily supplemental.
- A "code of modesty," in which family honor and dignity rest on the reputation of the woman, imposes restrictions on interaction between men and women.
- An unequal balance of power in the private sphere that affects women's access to the public sphere. This power difference is anchored in family laws.

Lebanon

In Lebanon, like most other MENA countries, labor laws alone do not discriminate explicitly against women. Indeed, Lebanon has come a long way in this respect with significant progress in the legislative context for female participation

⁶⁵ A non-Lebanese man married to a Lebanese woman will be granted residency only if he certifies that he will not engage in remunerated jobs, proves that he has a monthly income of LL5 million from transfers or pension fund and provide a bank statement proving he has an excess of LL300 million. Non-Lebanese women married to Lebanese men are granted automatic residency.

See Rowad, *Frontiers*, January 2008, *Women's Rights in Lebanon, Gender Discrimination in terms of Nationality and Residency, Alternative Report to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women*, 40th session.

⁶⁶ World Bank, 2004, *Gender and Development in the Middle East and North Africa Women in the Public Sphere*, Washington DC.

in the economic and labor force. Lebanon signed International Labor Organization Convention Number 100 (Equal Remuneration) in 1951 and Number 111 (Discrimination in Employment and Occupation) in 1958. While these amendments can be taken as a success story for women's rights in Lebanon, there is much that still needs to be done. Due to weak enforcement, the benefits granted by those laws are not always attainable. In addition, these laws continue to deny to women some non-wage employment benefits whilst reinforcing traditional paradigms.

Labor law (207/2000) discriminates against compensations awarded to women through the National Social Security Fund and employee laws.

- **The National Social Security Fund law** consecrates gender inequity by discriminating against women with regard to social and health benefits. Article 3 of the legislative decree No. 3950 of the Employment Act and Article 46 of the social security law discriminate against women with regard to benefits from family insurance. Women employees are considered as heads of household only in cases where the husband is dead or incapacitated. Furthermore, unlike male subscribers, Article 14 of the social security law bans female subscribers from extending medical insurance to their spouses unless they are over sixty-five years of age or prove to be physically or mentally incapacitated; male subscribers do not suffer from this restriction. In addition, Article 16 prohibits female subscribers or their relatives from benefiting from maternity leave before ten months of subscription have passed, in contrast to male subscribers, who may benefit after three months of subscription have passed. Finally, while male subscribers benefit from unconditional tax deductions based on the number of their children, working mothers do not benefit from such additional deductions except in a limited number of cases, such as the death of the father. Despite this, judicial authorities apply the ILO covenants to the advantage of women in this field.
- The 1964 law that governs **labor relations and conflicts** does not include paid agricultural labor. Consequently, paid agricultural workers, including seasonal workers, the majority of whom are women, are deprived of social security, health services, and annual leave.
- **Employee laws** discriminate against women in a variety of ways. Thus, for example, female workers in the private sector are permitted only forty days of maternity leave, while female civil servants, salaried employees in public administrations, and workers in the private sector enjoy sixty days.
- **Minimum Wage:** labor laws exclude domestic servants, workers in agricultural corporations not connected to trade and industry, workers in family businesses employing solely family members, and casual or temporary workers in public administration from the minimum wage. This ultimately discriminates against female workers, who form a large percentage of these categories.
- **Wage and Value Added Differentials:** in a survey on micro- and small enterprises in Lebanon gender differences were noted.⁶⁷ The ratio of added value of female- to male-run enterprises was equivalent to 58 per cent, while the added value of female-run MSEs was \$900 per month compared to \$1,541 per month for males. However, this disparity becomes less severe when the added value per worker is taken into consideration. Here the ratio of female added value to male is 83 per cent while the monthly added value per worker for female-run MSEs is \$460, compared to \$542 for male-run SMEs.
- In 1997, **wage disparity between female and male wage earners** was around 22 per cent. In the period 2004 to 2005, the estimated earned income of males was USD15,942 as compared to USD4,537 for females.⁶⁸ The average salary for wage earners is around LL679,000 and the median salary is LL560,000, while the average salary stands at LL687,000 for males and 661,000 for women and the median salary at LL600,000 for males and LL500,000 for females.⁶⁹

This rigid channeling of benefits diminishes the protection of families in a situation where there is an increased feminization of the public sector, which normally provides such non-wage benefits, and the larger move of male employees toward the private sector, where the range of non-wage benefits is more limited. This is important at a time when the country is undergoing significant economic changes and shifts in the labor force with an increased move toward the service sector. It also reduces Lebanon's ability to compete on the international market.

These legal obstacles are compounded by discrimination against women under family laws which sometimes curtail her ability to participate in the labor force. Such traditional laws and regulations (customary and state) fail to recognize the flexibility needed for women to enact their multiple role as mother, wives, workers, and citizens and in so doing to maximize family welfare.

67 CRI & ERF, 2004, *Micro and Small Enterprises in Lebanon* available on http://www.erf.org.eg/cms.php?id=publication_details&publication_id=458. 68 UNDP, 2008, NHDR calculations based on national data. See Statistical Compendium for further information.

68 UNDP, 2008, NHDR calculations based on national data. See Statistical Compendium for further information

69 MoSA, CAS, UNDP, ILO, 2006, p. 83.

The Way Forward: Toward a New Agenda

Given regional economic changes a new labor agenda that addresses gender roles is necessary to achieve greater efficiency and equity. The aim would be to encourage greater economic security and opportunity for female employees and their families. This can be advanced through the promotion of two major principles of good governance: 1) greater inclusiveness in decision-making and 2) greater accountability of institutions in their employment and benefit procedures. Such an agenda would cover four broad policy areas addressing gender disparities :⁷⁰

- Review of the legislative environment to provide consistency between women's constitutional rights and ordinary legislation.
- A supportive infrastructure that would facilitate women's participation in the public sphere. This would include investments in standard infrastructure, such as better transport and telecommunications, as well as expansion in market services that cater to women's needs and that would also allow them to combine work and family responsibilities.
- Continued attention to education, particularly in areas that provide women with better market skills. Although men in the region face a similar problem, women face additional challenges, such as early marriage and childbearing, which interrupt their schooling and employment, leading to their skills becoming outdated. These issues could be addressed by providing vocational and lifelong learning opportunities.
- Reform of labor laws and regulations that need to be realigned with the region's new development model so that they create better incentives for job creation in the private sector.

Achieving these goals is the joint responsibility of the state and its citizens. While state leadership matters a great deal, advocacy by civil society and more active political and economic participation by women for women will also serve this agenda. The example of Laure Mughazel is exemplary in this respect (see 101 Stories to Tell).

3.2.2 Life Cycle Inequities: The Poverty Trap

Even though the HPI tries to draw a composite profile of poverty in any given context, it fails to capture many other elements related to this phenomenon, including the difference between quantitative and qualitative aspects of deprivation. In the last decade, several attempts were made to map income and standards of living inequity in Lebanon by different institutions.⁷¹ These include qualitative as well as quantitative approaches to capture both human and income poverty. While the quantitative approaches include money-metric measurements such as the “cost-of-basic-needs” methodology, or consumption and expenditure distributions, qualitative methodologies have focused on rapid assessments or the Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN) method. What most of these studies indicate is that Lebanon has witnessed a growth of income-related poverty as well as of inter-regional and intra-regional disparities. Although the percentage of poor individuals on a national scale decreased from 31 per cent to 24.6 per cent, regional disparities have persisted and even grown, as has the percentage of vulnerable population overall. (see Table 2:19, Box 2.2, and Figure 2.11).

The Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN) poverty index used to measure this change also shows that the income component of this index actually worsened in 1996-2004 (Box 2.8). More recently, a Poverty, Growth and Income Distribution report for Lebanon

monitored poverty trends between 1997 and 2007.⁷² According to this report, only 8 per cent of the Lebanese population (or 300,000 individuals) suffer from extreme poverty (defined as living below the lower poverty line of US\$2.4) and are thus unable to meet their basic food and non-food needs, while close to a third of the population fall below the upper poverty line (US\$4 per day). Furthermore, the 2004-2007 period saw overall extreme poverty levels rise after they had fallen between 1997 and 2004.⁷³

The poverty headcount has also risen substantially in some of the regions particularly in the North, which has a 52 per cent poverty headcount using the upper poverty line, and 17.5 per cent using the lower poverty line. It is followed by the South, which has a 42 per cent poverty headcount. (Table 2.19) The capital, Beirut, on the other hand has a low prevalence of extreme poverty (below 1 per cent) and overall poverty (below 6 per cent).

However, while such regional disparities are not unique to Lebanon, within-governorate inequality accounts for most of the inequity in Lebanon. Much of the recent data indicates that inequality in Lebanon,

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Among others see MOSA, UNDP, 1998, 2006 and, 2008a and 2008b; CDR, ESFD, 2004.

⁷² This study uses expenditure data from MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006. MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2008a, *ibid*.

⁷³ *Ibid*.

Box 2.9: How Poor are We? Estimating Human and Income Poverty

Living Conditions Measured by the UBN Model

The Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN) index measures poverty according to the degree of satisfaction of population groups with their level of achievement of the basic needs considered necessary to maintain an acceptable standard of living. In Lebanon, the following indicators are used:

- **Housing:** number of rooms and built area per person and principal means of heating
- **Education:** pursuit of studies and level of education
- **Water and sewerage:** connection to the water supply network, principal source of potable water, and sewerage facilities
- **Income-related indicators:** number of cars owned by the household, economic dependency rate, and main occupation.

A comparison between the 1995 and 2004 UBN results indicate that, overall, satisfaction levels have improved. Households with “intermediate” and “low” degrees of satisfaction have declined from 42.3 per cent to 39.9 per cent and from 30.9 per cent to 24.6 per cent respectively. Income was the only category to witness deterioration, from 42.8 per cent to 51.6 per cent. This indicates that improvements in living conditions are not necessarily connected to improvements in income levels, particularly in a country like Lebanon, where family incomes are often supplemented by remittances from abroad.

Table 2.18: Categories of Household Satisfaction in 1995 and 2004 (%)

Category	Low	Intermediate	High	Total
1995				
Housing	25.9	26.5	47.6	100
Education	32.8	31.3	35.9	100
Water and Sewerage	18.9	67	14.4	100
Income-related	42.8	31.9	25.3	100
HHs living conditions index	30.9	42.3	26.8	100
2004				
Housing	16.6	23.6	59.8	100
Education	24.1	32.1	43.8	100
Water and Sewerage	16.6	48.4	35	100
Income-related	51.6	29.1	19.3	100
HHs living conditions index	24.6	39.3	36.1	100

Source: MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2008e *Poverty Growth and Income Distribution in Lebanon*

Table 2.19: Poverty Measure by Governorate


Governorate	Using Lower Poverty Line			Using Upper Poverty Line		
	P0	P1	P2	P0	P1	P2
Beirut	0.67	0.07	0.01	5.85	0.95	0.24
Mount Lebanon	3.79	0.69	0.21	19.56	4.45	1.52
North	17.75	3.65	1.08	52.57	18.54	8.63
Bekaa	10.81	1.89	0.53	29.36	8.05	3.06
South	11.64	2	0.53	42.21	11.35	4.22
Nabatieh	2.18	0.21	0.05	19.19	3.97	1.26
All Lebanon	7.97	1.5	0.43	28.55	8.15	3.32

Poverty Measures by Governorate

The unsatisfactory nature of income-related indicators becomes even more evident when quantitative measures using poverty headcount methods based on household expenditures are employed. The three main elements are:

- **The Head Count Index (P0)** is a measure of the prevalence of poverty. It denotes the percentage of households that are poor (as defined by the poverty line) as a proportion of total population. This measure, however, is insensitive to the distribution of the poor below the poverty line. The latter is captured by the following two indices, P1 and P2.
- **The Poverty Gap Index (P1)**, is a measure of the depth of poverty and denotes the gap between observed expenditure levels of poor households and the poverty line. Assuming perfect targeting, the Poverty Gap Index indicates the amount of resources (transfers) needed to bring all poor households up to the poverty line.
- **The Poverty Severity Index (P2)** measures the degree of inequality in distribution below the poverty line and gives greater weight to households at the bottom of the income (or expenditure) distribution.

Figure 2.11: Evolution of Poverty per Governorate, 1997-2007



Note: L: Lower Poverty Line and U: Upper Poverty Line

using the GINI coefficient, is relatively similar to other middle-income countries particularly in the MENA region (0.37) and significantly lower than Latin American countries (average GINI is 0.55). It is estimated to be 0.37 for nominal consumption and 0.3 for real consumption in Lebanon. (Table 2.20) About 13 percent of aggregate inequality in consumption in Lebanon is attributable to inter-governorate inequality, while the remaining 87 percent is due to within-region inequality. In 2007, governorate intra strata inequality ranged from 18 percent in North governorate to 9.7 percent in South and Mount Lebanon. (See chapter 4 for further discussion of this issue). However, the distribution of expenditures among the population is relatively unequal. While the bottom 20 per cent of the population expend only 7 per cent of all consumption in Lebanon, the richest 20 per cent accounts for 43 per cent.⁷⁴

3.3 Beyond Inequity

Inequalities manifest themselves in a variety of dimensions, including health, education, and income. These dimensions do, however, interact with and reinforce one another. In other words, inequities in one dimension often translate into inequalities in other dimensions. Thus inequities in health impact the earning capacity of individuals while inequities in education impact their future economic opportunities, and so on. For example 23.3 per cent of children under five born to illiterate mothers and 20.1 per cent of those born to mothers who can read and write but have not experienced secondary education suffer from stunting, which is double the national average of 11.5 per cent. In comparison, only 6.7 per cent of children born to mothers with a secondary education are stunted.⁷⁵

Table 2.20: Inequality Measures by Governorate, 2004-2005

Governorate	Gini index	Theil [1]index	Within strata Theil inequality index	Between strata Theil inequality index
Beirut	0.341	0.19	0.187	N/A
Mount Lebanon	0.339	0.19	0.171	0.019
North	0.373	0.227	0.187	0.041
Bekaa	0.336	0.187	0.165	0.021
South	0.347	0.192	0.192	0.003
Nabatiyeh	0.299	0.146	0.138	0.008
	0.361	0.215	0.176	0.039
All Lebanon	0.186			
	0.028			

Source: MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2008e *Poverty Growth and Income Distribution in Lebanon*, p.44

[1] The Theil index referred to measures the log deviation measure, which is zero for perfect equality and for complete inequality (i.e., a situation in which one person consumes everything) and extends to infinity. It is most sensitive to inequality at the bottom of the distribution range.

74 MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2008a, ibid.

75 League of Arab States, MoSA, CAS, 2004b, *Lebanon Family Health Survey PAFAM*, p. 147.

Similarly, being disabled increases the likelihood of poverty. Thus 50 per cent of the disabled have a very low level of satisfaction with their living conditions, 41 per cent have an average income of less than USD266 (which is less than the average wage), 38 per cent are illiterate, and 68.9 per cent have no medical insurance.⁷⁶ Difficulties in accessing schools and societal stereotyping sustain their continued exclusion. Similarly, youth tend to be the first to lose their jobs when employment becomes scarce, leading to a youth unemployment rate of 19.2 per cent as compared to a 7 per cent adult unemployment rate. Among female youth unemployment is significantly higher than among male (22.45 per cent versus 18.51 per cent respectively).⁷⁷ The conditions of working children can in the future have adverse impact on their health and well-being. Around 26-30 per cent of working children complain of having to endure adverse environmental conditions (loud noises, humidity, cold, and heat) for long hours, and this in turn may have long term impacts on their health and productivity.

Over time, this interaction between inequities leads to what is often termed the intergenerational poverty trap. In such situations, gender inequities are very relevant to the social and economic well being of families and, if addressed, can help pull individuals and households out of such cycles of poverty and help enhance the future prospects of children. Countless studies today indicate the direct causal relationship between improved education of the mother and better health and educational outcomes for their children. For example, a recent survey found that 40.7 and 31 per thousand children under five years of age and under 1 year respectively born to illiterate mothers die each year as compared to 13.9 per thousand, or one third fewer, born to mothers who have completed a secondary education.⁷⁸ Another study conducted for the NHDR on the civic education of ninth graders and their attitudes, knowledge, and actions in relation to key concepts found a direct statistical correlation between the educational attainment of the parents and the level of knowledge and understanding that students exhibited with regards to civic concepts.⁷⁹

Furthermore, these income and basic living conditions inequities between and within governorates, point to more embedded issues related to access and to opportunity. For example, the improvement noted in the education sector actually conceals a regression in educational quality and standards as well as a mismatch between

regional distribution and need. This was evident in the survey results of the civic education study, which is based on the international Civic Education survey conducted by the IAE. The study found that ninth graders systematically scored below international standards on civic concepts and knowledge. In the distribution of the twenty-eight countries into three groups (low, average, high) on the basis of performance, Lebanon leads the group of countries with a low score in civic knowledge and comes last in the same group in civic skills. Whether a school was in the public or private sector also impacted on the performance of students with regard to civic education issues. Performance varied across governorates as well. Furthermore, pedagogical methods employed continue to rely overwhelmingly on indoctrination rather than on interactive techniques.⁸⁰

The impacts of such inequity in access, resources, and opportunity for different strata of the population may have severe implications for the long-term prosperity of the country and the capacity of its population to realize their full potential. As experience from around the world has shown, inequality of opportunity traps people into poverty cycles that often become inter-generational. Economic, social, and political inequalities are embedded in unequal social and cultural institutions. The social networks that the poor have access to are considerably different from the ones that the rich can tap into. Such networks are closely aligned with cultural values that link individuals together in a society. Such inequality traps affect not only the distribution but also the aggregate dynamics of growth and development. In the long run this may imply that equity and efficiency may complement, rather than substitute for, each other. Sustaining gains in human development and accelerating the pace of growth means paying close attention to several new challenges, especially in health and education. Closer attention will have to be paid in particular to demographic changes and new demands on the world market, as the Lebanese compete in a global arena.

The adverse impact of such inequity is not limited to the socio-economic well being of citizens. Rather it goes to the heart of notions of citizenship. As outlined in the introduction to this chapter, democratic citizenship includes not only political and civil rights but social rights as well. People's understandings of these rights and fulfillment of their obligations as citizens are at the center of their identification as citizens with a particular national identity.


76 Raw data calculated for the NHDR from MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006a
77 Chaaban, 2008

78 League of Arab States, MoSA, CAS, 2004b, p. 156.

79 MEHE, CDR, UNDP, 2008

80 Ibid.

3



POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE SECTARIAN STATE

CHAPTER THREE

POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE SECTARIAN STATE

I. CITIZENSHIP IN THE CONSTITUTION: THE LIMITS OF SECTARIANISM

1.1 Introduction

The term “citizens” (*muwatinun*) entered the Lebanese Constitution for the first time in 1990, thanks to the Taif Accord.⁸¹ Part C of the amended Preamble, attests to the “equality in rights and duties among all citizens, with no discrimination or preference.” The word “nation” (*watan*), also makes its first appearance in Part A of the new Preamble. These terms - “citizens” and “nation” - can be considered as substitutes for the terms “the Lebanese” and “Lebanon” that were central to the original 1926 Constitution. Those earlier terms totally by-pass, however, the philosophical essence of the principle of citizenship. We also find the expression “Lebanese citizen” (*watani lubnani*) in Article 21 of the old constitution, on electoral rights. Although this matches *citoyen libanais* in the French constitution, it referred in fact to an individual that one would consider today “a holder of Lebanese citizenship” and thus does not fully encompass the concept of citizenship either.

Does this mean that the pre-1990 constitution was not concerned with instituting the foundations of citizenship and enforcing the associated rights and duties upon the Lebanese? In fact, despite the gaps in terminology, the 1926 constitution seems to have displayed a strong if not overriding concern with these matters. Chapter Two of the constitution, as it sets out the types of basic freedoms, firmly asserts that Lebanese should be equal in their rights and duties, rights and duties that are usually guaranteed by constitutions in democratic countries. Most of the different chapters also lay out the measures for creating the various institutions of governance, the foundations for their work and the limits of their prerogatives. The preamble to the new constitution spells out what in practical terms had regulated the formation of branches of government and governed relations among them - the idea that the people are the source of all authority and are sovereign, and that the Lebanese state is a parliamentary and democratic

republic. Age was the sole criterion set out for enjoying the right to vote, while merit and competence alone were to be used in assessing a citizen's right to employment in the public sector.

In this regard, the spirit that dominates both the old constitution and the new preamble reflects the concept of citizenship, upon which state authority is built. It assigns a priority to preserving citizens' rights, while the goals of public authorities and the duties of citizens are oriented toward preserving the citizenry, i.e., the nation, while at the same time protecting their rights as individual groups. The problem facing the realization of citizenship under the Lebanese state's political-legal system does not lie in the general spirit of the country's Constitution. Realizing citizenship necessitates the creation of public individuals who enjoy democratic rights and freedoms and are characterized by equality of rights and duties. This individuality arises due to a series of factors, such as the history of a given society and the power of the law, through a process of political abstraction that renders individuals devoid of their various sub-national identities and sentiments, and that differentiates between individuals of the same “imagined community” or nation. This process of political abstraction seeks to establish equity between individuals that make up this sovereign national entity, or “the people,” by focusing on their shared public identity as citizens of the one nation. It is only through this process of political abstraction that citizens become equal in terms of rights and duties.⁸²

1.2 The Sectarianism of the Constitution: “Temporary,” “Transitional,” and Non-Exclusive

The above begs, however, the question of what are the clauses that violate this general spirit of the constitution, whether in its articles or in other laws? What is evident is that the collective legislation that established

⁸¹ The Accord was hammered out in the Saudi Arabian town of that name the previous year. Amendments to the constitution are recorded in the Lebanese Parliament's publication of the Lebanese constitution in 1990

⁸² Ibid.

the sectarian character of Lebanon's political system, some of which predate the Constitution, are connected to other pieces of legislation that also render key aspects of the civil lives of Lebanese citizens sectarian in character. However, further analysis of the contents of the constitution, which governs all other laws, reveals that sectarian passages within the constitution itself deviate from the general spirit of text. These provisions can be divided into two categories, the "temporary" and the "transitional," and were created to support the move from an undesirable situation within an adequate timeframe. In time, the prerogatives established by these articles were extended, due to factors unrelated to the constitution itself, and actually came close to violating the legislator's original intent (as with passages connected to state institutions) or were considered as guarantees given to the various sects, without limiting the guaranteed rights exclusively to sectarian bodies and thus subjecting citizens to their control with or without their consent (as in clauses related to sectarian institutions). Gradually, these guarantees were transformed into a type of de facto exclusivity enjoyed by the sects, through which citizens were held captive. By allowing this de facto exclusivity, the state relinquished its right to engage in parallel, non-sectarian legislation on issues covered by these guarantees. And when the state "exercised its rights" by establishing institutions similar to those it allowed to the sects, it allowed the sects to dominate these institutions or subject them to the control of various parties. These transformations have nothing to do with the Constitution; rather they were connected to the contemporary history of Lebanese society and to the legacies of the pre-state and pre-constitutional (or Ottoman) eras.

Glaring examples of the above are Article 95 of the 1926 constitution and the stipulations related to the abolition of sectarian representation in the revised 1990 constitution. Among the articles that were temporarily extended was Article 95 of the old constitution, which is concerned with the equitable representation of sects in public sector posts and in the formation of cabinets and which was supposed to be a temporary clause to insure "justice and accord." This article remained in effect from the promulgation of the constitution in 1926 until its amendment in 1990. Amendments to this article were based on a passage derived from the Taif Accord that sought the abolition of political sectarianism and designated the steps leading toward this goal. This article remained, however, on hold. Furthermore, unlike the conditions of the older Article 95, the transitional aspect of the new

constitution specified that the first parliamentary election in which Christians and Muslims took part on an equal basis, and which took place in 1992 and has been repeated twice since, would be the point at which the transitional period would end and all measures to eliminate political sectarianism would be carried out. Failure to do so would be considered a clear violation of the constitution.

1.3 Abolishing Political Sectarianism and Article 95

The new Article 95 establishes a "transitional period" during which the phased plan to abolish political sectarianism is to be implemented. Consequently, all rules and regulations created or maintained during this period, and which give a sectarian character to the state, are considered transitional. The only exception is the Senate that represents all religious sects that is to be created as per requirements of the Taif Accord and the 1990 National Accord or constitution. During this transitional period, parliament is to be divided equally between Muslims and Christians, with further proportional distribution among the sects. Sectarian balance is also to be maintained in the formation of Cabinets, while appointments to the civil service on a sectarian basis are limited to Grade One posts (the highest rank in the state bureaucracy) and their equivalents.

To implement this transitional plan (as proposed by a "Higher National Commission to Abolish Political Sectarianism"), sectarian membership criteria for the cabinet, parliament and civil service posts must be dropped. Also, a senate would be established and its prerogatives limited to what the constitution considers "crucial national issues" (*masa'il masiriyya*). Once the state is free from the logic of sectarian representation in the allocation of all public sector posts, the senate would be expected to eliminate any remaining disguised sectarian predominance in these areas, and prohibit other types of potential dominance. In other words, the role of the senate would not be oversee the distribution of sectarian dividends in all domains; instead, it would prevent arbitrary discrimination among Lebanese based on sectarian or other affiliation.

It is therefore an exaggeration to say that the "Taif Constitution" rendered political sectarianism more deeply rooted by making sectarianism a core element of parliamentary representation rather than just an element of the electoral law. The philosophies of the Taif Accord and the subsequent constitution were one

and the same and were meant to insure the widest and most equitable sectarian representation during the transitional period toward the abolition of political sectarianism. The same logic is to be discerned in the demand for the abolition of political sectarianism that has been made by various Lebanese politicians ever since Independence. The implementation of the Taif Accord, however, allowed no consideration for this logic. In fact, the circumstances that should have ensured, and the coalitions that should have cultivated, its realization, as well as the measures that should have been taken to guarantee its sound implementation,

had changed dramatically and proved themselves corrupt by the time that the implementation of the Taif Accord actually began. In spite of everything, however, the accusation leveled against the Taif constitution of undermining the protection provided to the concept of citizenship, and thus the ingraining of sectarianism in the political and social life of Lebanon and its institutions, can be considered valid only if these transitional provisions, with their concern for the peace and stability of the state and nation, are regarded as permanent (see Box 3.1 below).

Box 3.1: Sectarianism, Public Administration, and Article 95

The allocation of public sector posts in the Lebanese state bureaucracy is regulated by Article 95 of the Constitution, which states that “The principle of confessional representation in public sector jobs, in the judiciary, in the military and security institutions, and in public and mixed agencies is to be cancelled in accordance with the requirements of national reconciliation; they shall be replaced by the principle of expertise and competence. However, Grade One posts and their equivalents are exempt from this rule, and the posts must be distributed equally between Christians and Muslims without reserving any particular job for any confessional group but rather applying the principles of expertise and competence.”

In the last fifteen years, the sectarian allocation of administrative posts has superseded this relatively limited requirement of Article 95. The division of posts according to sects has been applied to institutions beyond the scope of Article 95, including the President and Vice Presidents of the Central Bank, the head of Middle East Airlines, and most of the existing or newly-created state institutions. Furthermore, even though Article 95 specifically identifies Grade One posts, in practice all public sector positions have been informally subject to the requirement of sectarian balance.

This practice has further aggravated sectarian divisions in the country and has often paralyzed the efficient performance of the public sector. The allocation of all public sector posts prompted an ongoing debate among the different sectarian and/or political groups with regard to the “quality” or number of high-ranking positions associated with each sect, and has led to bitter public bickering. More critically, this practice of sectarian allocation has also spilled over in some cases to civil society and private sector organizations.⁸³

The public sector's performance has been hindered in various ways. First, sectarianism has introduced a layer of complication into the working of the Lebanese bureaucracy, adding to its existing difficulties, which include a 50 per cent vacancy rate in all positions.⁸⁴ Satisfying the sectarian requirement has often come at the expense of merit and competence in the hiring and promotion of public employees. Examinations have been cancelled and promotions postponed in order to produce an acceptable sectarian pool of employees.⁸⁵ Second, this process has often led to extended delays. Posts have remained vacant, waiting for a candidate of the “right” sect or for a suitable alternative to be found for members of other sects.⁸⁶ Finally, the requirement of sectarian balance has often been applied through clientelist networks, further deepening the reach of clientelism into the public administration. Finally and more importantly, the practice of sectarian balance has failed to generate the political stability and legitimacy it was originally meant to secure. Sectarianism, and its use by clientelist networks, has transformed every nomination in the bureaucracy into a source of political conflict and further de-legitimized the Lebanese public administration and state.⁸⁷ As one MP has noted, “We are not facing in Lebanon a situation of normal political conflicts, but one of existential conflicts between Lebanese communities. This conflict took on a military connotation in the past and an administrative connotation in the 1990s.”⁸⁸

83 See Baroudi, Sami E., 2000, 'Sectarianism And Business Associations In Postwar Lebanon', Arab Studies Quarterly, Fall.

84 The weak performance of the bureaucracy is due to its outdated administrative structure, inadequate staffing, lack of resources, and political interference in its functioning. See OMSAR, 2001, *Strategy for the Reform and Development of the Public Administration in Lebanon*.

85 al-Jammal's study of public administration at the pre-university level illustrates these practices. See al-Jammal, Khalil, 2005, *Les Liens de la Bureaucratie Libanaise avec le Monde Communautaire*, L'Harmattan

86 The deadlock in the nominations of the deans of the Lebanese University was resolved through the creation of a new college to cater to the requirement of sectarian balance. See An-Nahar newspaper, 20 March 1997 and 2 July 1997.

87 For a review of the conflicts related to the state bureaucracy during the postwar period, see Debié, Franck and Pieter, Danuta, 2003, *La Paix et la Crise: Le Liban Reconstituit?*, Presses Universitaires de France.

88 An-Nahar newspaper, 9 March 2002

Thus, political sectarianism in the constitution, which was dictated by Article 95 of the older document, is in force only temporarily, while the amendments of 1990 rendered it a transitional arrangement. There was a firm obligation to transcend political sectarianism in the formulation of Article 95 and Part C of the preamble to the amended constitution, along with Articles 22 and 23, which involved dropping sectarian membership criteria in electing members of Parliament.

1.4 ...and the Limits of “Civil Sectarianism”

We may also distinguish between political sectarianism (related to Lebanon's branches of government and bureaucracy) and “civil sectarianism,” by which we mean the rights granted to sects, particularly in personal status laws (Article 9) and education (Article 10). Both are articles from the 1926 constitution. Article 19, which is new, grants the heads of the sects the right to consult the Constitutional Council (*al-Majlis al-Dusturi*) on “matters related exclusively to personal status, freedom of belief and practice of religious rites, and the freedom of religious education.” Undoubtedly, Article 9 does not impose a sectarian character on all legislation dealing with personal status. Rather, it leaves open the possibility for non-sectarian (or civil) legislation that does not put an end to sectarian laws and that emanates from a demand by a group of citizens that their personal status laws be regulated by civic legislation irrespective of their religious affiliation. It stipulates that “freedom of belief is absolute,” while there is no sectarian exclusivity to guarantee the “respect for the personal status system and religious interests” for one and all, thus leaving the door open also for compulsory civil legislation that does not do away with sectarian laws but rather enframes them and runs in parallel to them.

Article 10 of the constitution guarantees sects “the right to open their own private schools.” However, it constrains this right by stipulating that these schools must be run “in accordance with public regulations that are issued by the state pertaining to public education.” More importantly, this article acknowledges the freedom of education, as evidenced by the existence

of both public schools and private, non-sectarian schools. Thus, Article 9 begins by establishing freedom of belief, while Article 10 begins with affirming freedom of education. The first specifies the rights connected to religious rites (as defined by state laws and regulations) and those connected to personal status, while the Lebanese state honors and respects all religions and sects. But while Article 10 involves a tangible manifestation (the existence of public education), the general principle parallel to it in Article 9 lacks a suitably tangible and legislative expression: there is no public, non-sectarian civil status code, despite two stormy attempts to generate such legislation, in the 1930s and the late 1990s, as we shall see shortly.⁸⁹

Moreover, the right given to heads of sects to petition the Constitutional Council (in matters concerning their rights of their sects) does not mean that there are no limits to these rights. First, this Council enjoys a sovereign decision-making power, based on its understanding of the Constitution. Second, the responsibility for safeguarding the rights of existing sectarian institutions is also limited. Petitioning the Constitutional Council cannot take place haphazardly; the authorities are also prevented from improvising rights that are likely to involve contradictions and conflict. Third, these stipulations indirectly draw a line beyond which religious sect leaders cannot claim that their stances and attitudes are more privileged than those of other citizens. Finally, this situation enshrines the ascendancy of conventional or “positive” law (as represented by the Constitution) over sectarian laws.

II. PUBLIC IDENTITY AND PRIVATE SELVES: PERSONAL STATUS LAWS

A Lebanese citizen automatically inherits upon birth both the nationality and sect of the father. While the Lebanese nationality is a generic identity, sectarian identity is specific to a religious group or community (*milla*). This compound identity reflects the sectarian diversity within the country, in that Lebanon officially recognizes eighteen sects. However, it also creates a

⁸⁹ On the first attempt, see Rabbath, Edmond, 1970, *La Formation historique du Liban politique et constitutionnel*, Beirut, Publications de l'Université Libanaise, pp. 90-97. On the second attempt, see Beydoun, Ahmad, 1999, *Nineteen Surviving Sects, Lebanese and the Civil Marriage Battle*, Beirut, Dar An-Nahar. Also, see the text of the voluntary civil code that was presented by President Elias Hrawi to the cabinet in 1998, in al-Nashef, Antoine and Khalil al-Hindi (eds), 1998, *Voluntary Civil Marriage in Lebanon*, Tripoli, al-Mu'assasa al-Haditha lil-Kitab, pp. 256-284. In contrast to the quasi-social opposition

faced by the second attempt on the part of religious authorities from all sects, a field study on values conducted by Jean Youssef Mourad shows that a significant portion of Lebanese (albeit with disparities among the sects) acknowledge the right to establish family ties on civil foundations. This is certainly sufficient for a voluntary civil personal status option for those who wish. See Mourad, Jean Youssef (dir.), November 2006, *Les Sentiments d'Appartenance, la Sociabilité*, Beirut, Université St. Joseph, Faculty of Letters and Humanities, pp. 22-30.

confused hierarchy of affiliations, where sectarian diversity has come to override patriotic loyalty to the nation, as well as other socio-cultural considerations, particularly class. As mentioned above, Article 9 of the Constitution defines the state's legal position vis-à-vis sects and religions, confirming that it “respects all religions and confessions” and maintains neutrality. Lebanon, in fact, is the only Arab state whose Constitution does not mention a specific religion or identify it as the primary or only source of legislation. The neutrality of the state is a feature of a secular state, which guarantees the right to freedom of religion and belief. However, this neutrality does not relieve the Lebanese state of its responsibility to carry out legal oversight over these confessional institutions, ensuring that state authorities exercise their right to legislate in matters concerning personal status. This, in turn, guarantees true freedom of religion and belief for citizens and equality before the law.⁹⁰

2.1 The Makeup of Personal Status Laws: A Privatized Structure

In Lebanon, personal status matters are the prerogative of religious groups. Personal status laws govern the autonomous situation of citizens as individuals. Such a system also organizes family relations,⁹¹ determining their role and position in society, alongside resulting rights and duties. These diverse, yet closed and authoritarian personal status systems have impeded the unity of Lebanese society, despite the emergence of a strong political and civil society. The confessional stratification of civil society has rendered Lebanon vulnerable to divisions along sectarian lines.

Such a context poses the question of whether it is individuals or sects who truly enjoy personal status rights. One argument holds that the Taif Accord provides individuals with rights, while providing religious groups with guarantees. This theory has not been translated in practice. A Lebanese acquires, by birth,⁹² the sect of his or her father and is obliged to become subject to this sect's general rules and regulations. The

⁹⁰ Article 7 of the constitution stipulates that “All Lebanese are equal before the law and equal in the civil and political rights they enjoy, which involve public duties and obligations, with no difference among them.”

⁹¹ There are many opinions when it comes to determining the meaning of personal status laws. Some believe that they involve people; others believe that personal status is subject to personal law. Still others consider personal status to be a form of family law, see The Mediator in Explaining Personal Status Laws, Abu al-Sa'ud, Ramadan, 1986, Dar al-Jami'iyya, p. 12 ff: “...the family is the natural social unit, formed of groups of individuals descended from a common lineage and linked together by marriage and filiation.”

individual is subject to the laws implemented by the sect's courts from the cradle to the grave but does not participate in or benefit from effective state oversight over religious authorities. If one wants to leave one's sect, one must “convert” to another and thus be subjected to the personal status system of the second sect. In the absence of a general civil law, if an individual's sect lacks a personal status system, then the individual is effectively stripped of his or her personal status rights. Some sects in Lebanon continue to lack a personal status law; including those that are considered “traditional” such as the Ismailis, or those that never became popular, such as the Bahais. The lack of state recognition of these religious groups has forced their members to switch confessions, resorting to a recognized sect with authority over personal status. With respect to marriage, Lebanese citizens may have a civil marriage outside the country in accord with foreign law, after which they must resort to Lebanese civil courts to settle the matter of their marriage duties and related matters. Article 9 of the constitution affirms that “freedom of belief is absolute,”⁹³ while individual rights are only acknowledged when one belongs to a sect.

2.2 The Gap between the Constitution and Conditions on the Ground

This absence of a public law has led to a monopoly over personal status matters by the sects, while the state maintains neutrality and non-intervention. If we examine the actual record, however, historical considerations seem to have proven stronger than the structure of personal status codes, while local and regional balances of power have trumped the authority of the constitution.

2.2.1 The Legislative Role

Political considerations have dominated the legislator's role when it comes to personal status affairs. After

⁹² The compulsory belonging to a specific religion contradicts all of the conventions that expressly stipulate the respect for freedom of belief, and particularly Article 14 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which Lebanon has signed. The first provision of this article stipulates that “States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,” while the second says that “States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents and, when applicable, legal guardians, to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child”; the role of parents is limited to orientation and it is the child who decides.

⁹³ Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights says that “everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice,” a right that is respected by all the Abrahamic religions.

affirming freedom of belief for individuals and sects and laying the foundations for a civil system, the legislative branch has hidden behind its neutrality. Parliament has approved the laws of some sects but not others while at the same time failing to exercise oversight over sects or set criteria that would guarantee, at even a minimum level, the rights of citizens. Thus, the role of public law has been vitiated by limiting the legislator's role to organizing the structure of those sects that have their own personal status laws. Moreover, personal status laws of various types are often authoritarian and patriarchal. They do not take into consideration changes in society nor do they interact with the state's public legislation. Some of their regulations even contravene the constitution. In the preamble to the constitution, the state commits itself to embodying the principles of United Nations charters and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "in all areas and domains, without exception." Effectively, however, it is the sectarian authority that wins out on personal status matters that trespass its own authority in cases where religious groups do not consider themselves bound by state commitments when the latter contravene their own. Individual rights, for instance, which have been endorsed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international covenants, have no impact on matters of concern within the family. The question thus remains: why does the state refrain from intervening to enforce its own commitments, even by way of supporting civil society in activating a social dialogue with the country's religious authorities?

2.2.2 Judicial Authority: Oversight over Religious Courts

While Lebanon's sectarian judiciary is considered a separate part of this branch of government, it is a part

94 Mansour, Judge Sami, 1999, "The Protective Role of the Civil Judiciary in Personal Status Matters," in *The Lebanese Judiciary: Building Authority and Developing Institutions*, p. 297 (joint volume published by the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies).
95 At the beginning of the French Mandate, a Court to settle disputes was established by Decision 2978, on December 15, 1924. With the promulgation of the Law on Organizing the Judiciary on October 16, 1961, by Edict 7855, the General Commission of the Court of Cassation became the competent body to determine the competent court upon any active or passive dispute over prerogatives, according to Article 42. Article 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure stipulates that: "the General Commission of the Court of Cassation, which convenes based on a quorum specified in the Law on Organizing the Judiciary, looks into requests to appoint a competent judicial body upon the active or passive dispute arising over competence: a) between two courts; b) between a regular court and a sectarian or Sharia court; c) between a Sharia court and a sectarian court; and d) between two different sectarian or Sharia courts.

of the state's judicial institutions. This is either explicitly the case, as with Islamic sects, or it is a matter of "custom," as is the case for non-Islamic confessions.⁹⁴ Sectarian courts enjoy quasi-independence from the regular judiciary, though they are subject to its oversight in certain areas. This judicial oversight over sectarian courts is restricted to intervention by the General Commission of the Court of Cassation with regard to the implementation of verdicts. Oversight of the latter is limited and pro forma, since the court is tasked with implementing verdicts while respecting a minimum level of the foundations of public order. This body⁹⁵ is not a court of cassation or a hierarchical authority prevailing over the religious and Sharia (Islamic law) courts. It does not monitor the legality of their decisions but only exercises oversight for one of two reasons: lack of competency or a violation of the essential tenets of public order. This limited judicial oversight and the wide prerogatives given to the religious and Sharia courts contradict the right to a just trial, to which the state is committed under the Constitution.⁹⁶

2.3 The Content of Personal Status Laws: Relations of Power

Personal status laws in Lebanon are quite diverse in terms of their number, their sources, and the authorities to which they have recourse; however, they favor relations of power over considerations of justice.

2.3.1 Equality under Diverse Laws

There is no fixed number of laws that oversee matters of personal status and family in Lebanon. Seven laws

96 Article 20 of the Constitution stipulates that "Judicial power is to be exercised by the tribunals of various levels and jurisdictions. It functions within the limits of an order established by the law and offering the necessary guarantees to judges and litigants." Article 7 of the International Declaration of Human Rights affirms that "All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law," while Article 8 says that "everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law." As part of the special covenant on the independence of the judiciary, adopted by the United Nations in 1985, we see the principles underlying equitable justice for all, such as: 1) the impartiality of the judiciary branch... is distant from any political or religious considerations; and 2) the judicial authority shall guarantee free expression and jurisprudence. These principles were crystallized at the Arab level in a conference held in Beirut in 1999, "The First Arab Conference on Justice," followed by "The Second Arab Conference on Enhancing the Independence of the Judiciary," held in Cairo in February 2003. Most importantly, these conferences clearly linked "democracy as a political system" based on the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary as basic conditions for achieving justice.

are applied to Christian Lebanese: there are 13 recognized Christian denominations in the country, six of which are Catholic sects, which have a single law. Meanwhile, there are four different laws applied to Muslims, meaning a total of eleven laws. To this we may add an unknown number of foreign civil laws that are applied by civil courts in Lebanon.⁹⁷ Of course, each court has its own approach to the law and judges enjoy wide latitude in the interpretation, or violation, of legislation, without being held accountable. Moreover, the content of legislation changes over time, based on verdicts and fatwas that are issued, whether from inside or outside of the country, and these legal pronouncements are usually influenced by political factors. Some say that the sectarian system preserves a unified legal situation for individuals within the sect. However, is it not the task of civil law to protect the unity of the system within Lebanese society? Is equality before the law possible in such a situation?

The absence of equality, i.e. the injustice contained in sectarian laws in force, can be observed in the legally inferior status of women, which is anchored in these statutes. Although these laws are diverse vis-à-vis their orientation, matters of competence, and conditions set down for marriage, the rights of wives, parents, and children, adoption, divorce, custody, alimony, inheritance, and so forth, they are all nonetheless underpinned by the same patriarchy and violate the principle of gender equality in one way or another.⁹⁹ Moreover, these sectarian laws may establish different conditions when it comes to the conditions for a sound marriage, the possibility of ending such a union, limitations set on inheritance by female offspring who have no male siblings, and so on. Some people are thus obliged to change their sect or religion to find a solution to a practical problem. This is harmful simultaneously to faith to the law, and to those who are obliged to engage in such behavior.

2.3.2 Women in Personal Status Laws: Dual Marginalization

LEGAL VIOLENCE

The marginalization of women is two-fold. As a first step, women's rights as human beings need to be acknowledged in order for these women to then be able in turn to benefit from these rights when granted.

⁹⁷ See Kazzi, Judge John, 2008, *The Lebanese Judge Against the World*, Beirut.

⁹⁸ See the background paper prepared by Mary-Rose Zalzal for the 2008-2009 Lebanon NHDR entitled *Public Identity and Special Features: the Role of the State in Personal Status Laws*, pp. 12-18.

Personal status laws have enshrined a patriarchal social structure that reinforces a culture of discrimination against women in their social roles and lifestyle. Personal status laws reinforce the traditional approach, ascribing gender roles to biological and physiological differences, thereby rendering discrimination permanent and unchangeable. Women are thus regarded as inferior and subordinate, while men monopolize authority, effectively reproducing the same patriarchal structure that generates and entrenches discrimination.

It is well known that modern approaches that have effected change on the ground have taken as their starting point discrimination resulting from the traditional socio-economic role women have played. This subordinate role, however, is liable to change, as social roles are dynamic and responsive to socio-economic circumstance.

Women have a central role in raising families, just as mothers have a fundamental role in the stability and growth of family units. All monotheistic religions have honored women, and they are a source of celebration and inspiration across cultures. Positive laws and international covenants, which Lebanon has ratified, protect mothers and children and the relationship between them. Policies as well as national and global programs target women with the objective of improving their conditions and performance. This brings us to the question: where do women actually stand when it comes to personal status laws?

In both national and sectarian laws, kinship is based on blood relations rather than matrilineal descent. Judaism is the sole exception, where though kinship

Box 3.2: Discrimination among Women

Women suffer degrees of discrimination in both rights and responsibilities that vary both from sect to sect and within the same sect. The most prominent types of discrimination against women as individuals and as members of families include:

- Deprivation of personal independence in issues like legal capacity and the need for a custodian (father, brother, husband, or son);
- Discrimination with regard to marriage contracts, and thus with regard to alimony, desertion, request for divorce and compensation resulting from divorce;
- Discrimination with regard to relations with children, in issues of child custody;
- Discrimination with regard to the inheritance rights of women and their practical ability to exercise these rights.

is based on matrilineal descent, authority in family relations remains the prerogative of the father. While kinship relations allow one to obtain a national identity, Lebanese women cannot pass on their nationality to their children if the father is a foreigner. Children furthermore automatically inherit the sectarian identity and last name of the father.

The family is organized around relations between a mother and her children at the various stages of nursing, rearing, guardianship, and custodianship. In the event of marital dispute, these relationships merely accentuate the weakness of a mother, serving as tools for blackmail. These rules are justified under the pretext of family stability, and are invoked even by those who have no objection to unilateral and unconditional divorce by one partner.

The Lebanese state is unable to deal with this problem due to the absence of a Personal Status Law with a mandate to override the sects at the national level. The International Office for Social Patronage, as a non-official international mechanism of mediation for securing the rights and interests of children, has tried to make progress on this issue. However, its efforts have not been effective. Who shall engage in negotiation, and on what basis, the state or the sects? This question was posed in the review of bilateral conventions that were encouraged by the 2004 Malta Judicial Conference on Cross-Frontier Family Law Issues.

ECONOMIC MARGINALIZATION

The traditional gender-based division of roles has hindered the rise of women, for the latter commits women to non-remunerative work that is not assigned value if undertaken to help the family's well-being. Sectarian laws governing maternal relationships ignore the fact that women's reproductive and parenting roles are general social functions; therefore, these laws' provisions contradict a number of policies that target women within families. Public authorities and civil society organizations are thus obliged to strike a balance between these programs and these legal foundations, even if this takes place at the expense of the effectiveness of these efforts; this is a huge waste of energy and resources. Moreover, these laws ignore the personal and professional burdens imposed on the mother at the time of childbirth, leading her to leave the labor force and in turn lose her wage-earning capability.

Men clearly benefit from this status of traditional work or labor. Women work full time but do not receive an income:

Box 3.3: Child Custody

Lebanon's personal status laws determined the conditions of custody of children while demonstrating the seriousness of the lack of a civil personal status code whose implementation is supervised by specialists. This is particularly important in mixed marriages and relations with other states, as international law is based on citizenship and national laws. Custody is an arena of conflict between parents, which harms the interests of children and the rights of the other spouse. In Lebanon, we have recently seen a number of cases of the abduction of children by their parents, to and from Lebanon, sometimes involving violence.

Regarding custody and the interest of the child, conditions differ from one sect to another. Gender discrimination also exists. Custody begins at two years for boys and seven for girls in the Shiite sect, and between six years for Jewish boys and up to the point of marriage for a Jewish girl. In the Catholic sects, the interest of the child determines the matter, although the mother's opinion is not taken into consideration.

In disputes between spouses, custody is considered women's weakest point, in that they may be obliged to compromise their rights, whether these be material, legal, or social, in order to retain them. In all cases, women make these compromises, such as refraining from re-marrying or having relationships following a divorce, in order to not lose the right of custody.

Taking a child away from its mother is a human tragedy felt equally by both mothers and children; it may also be experienced by those granted custody rights, when they are unqualified or uninterested in such a responsibility. These tragedies are exacerbated when court verdicts are implemented, especially by public authorities.

As for jurisdiction in custody cases, the authority that conducted the marriage settles disputes arising from this union, including custody. There are complications when a foreign element (*) enters the picture, as in such cases civil and sectarian authorities contend with each other. Besides the human tragedies involved, the disputes usually involve long court cases in which the "situation on the ground" eventually wins out.

() For example, a French woman, B.L., who has married a Lebanese man in a civil ceremony, has two children by him. Her husband goes to Lebanon with the children, supposedly for a summer vacation, but does not return. B.L. travels to Lebanon and demands her children; the husband takes the initiative by placing the children in the custody of the Sharia Court. B.L. returns to France and obtains a decision requiring their return to their mother, with the French court to decide on custody. For two years, B.L. has sought the implementation of the decision in Lebanon, to no avail.*

Box 3.4: Women and Inheritance: A Case Study

M.B., a woman in her 30s who works as a teacher, has been the sole provider for her parents since her two brothers immigrated to Australia. The father died and the sons insisted on partitioning the shares of the inheritance based on Sharia, i.e., the males taking shares equal to that of the females. M.B. sought the assistance of a shaykh, who told her that the sons were receiving their legal right under Sharia, and that they were not obligated to help support their mother. However, the mother did not file a lawsuit requesting support, while M.B. declined to abandon her humanitarian responsibility toward her mother.

housework and raising a family are the responsibility of women alone. They are also obliged to help fathers and husbands who are artisans or farmers, robbing them of the time that could be devoted to remunerative work. As for regulations covering financial matters, all Lebanese sects feature a system of partitioning shares; in cases of divorce, a woman is unable to demand her share of the money earned by the husband during the period of the union. In the case of some sects, women only receive financial compensation for a period of two months, should they divorce, or a deferred dowry payment that by the time it is paid will have been consumed by inflation and currency price fluctuations. And this is to say nothing of women's inheritance rights - or the redistribution of family wealth in Islamic sects - which involve injustice when it comes to women.

2.4 From a Confederation of Sects to a state of Law and Order

2.4.1 Circumventing the Law: The Precedence of Reality

The personal status of individual citizens and that of the family often takes precedence over . People are generally unaware of personal status laws during normal times. However recurrent societal obligations, stretching from cradle to grave, oblige them to return to their respective sources of authority. At the same time, every move toward a civil society culture that values individual initiative and openness, negotiation, and dialogue with others, embodying the values of justice and freedom, suffers a setback during these major personal events and crises, reinforcing a culture of obedience and acceptance or, where possible, circumventions of the law.

Citizens challenge the insularity of the laws through mixed marriages or civil marriage abroad. They also challenge the law by finding and using loopholes in the law itself. Thus, should an individual's personal status system, for instance, not suit his needs, he may change sects before the country's religious and civil authorities. For example, inheritance laws, which consider members of different religions ineligible for inheritance, are challenged in this manner. This is done by concluding sales contracts or proxy representation for real estate owned by the spouses, or through joint bank accounts. If they are unable to skirt the law, they return to the positions and roles imposed upon them by law.

Circumventing the law becomes more acceptable and prevalent where the actual application of the law renders people's lives harder rather than easier. Laws on the other hand should be amended when they no longer correspond to general public opinion.

2.4.2 Actual Change and its Impact on Personal Status Laws

A growing level of inter-family participation has led to limited changes in some laws, while producing no modifications whatsoever in others. Changes in practice are ascribed not to changes in the law but to social and religious factors that have fashioned these differences. Many personal status laws in Arab and Islamic countries have changed due to popular calls for change and the opening up of *ijtihad* or the independent interpretation in Islamic law.

A number of Arab countries have enacted modern personal status laws which have set down several conditions promoting family stability, including prohibiting or restricting polygamy and limiting divorce when it is requested by the husband alone, while granting women more rights within the family. Some laws have furthermore widened the scope of conditions set down in contracts, so that both parties are given the freedom to set the guidelines of married life (see Box 3.5 below).

2.4.3 The Vacuum is Legal, the Law Civil

The most prominent feature of the legislative branch of government in Lebanon has been its failure to legislate a unified, albeit voluntary, civil law that would serve as public national law, despite the fact that such a law is needed and has been lobbied for. The state has sought to compensate for this by merely recognizing civil marriages conducted abroad, and designating to civil courts the power to rule on marital disputes.

Box 3.5 Trends in Changing Personal Status Laws in Lebanon

Some amendments to Lebanese personal status laws have been endorsed. For example, Catholic sects recently modified their laws in light of modern science, with support from the Vatican. These sects still prohibit divorce but have widened the scope of the annulment of a marriage, and now allow it a number of cases. They have also incorporated the notion of burden-sharing within the family when it comes to rights and responsibilities. However, the change has been limited and partial, and is not overseen by the state's legislative and judicial authorities.

Changes in other sects have taken different directions. With regard to *ijtihad*, and in the light of external changes, Lebanese Ja'farite (*Shiite*) courts have recently seen the prevalence of *ijtihad*, which is not in line with other positive law; women are robbed of rights that they previously enjoyed. The Ja'farite Court has ruled on inheritance matters by saying that a widow "does not inherit land without trees or buildings. She does, however, inherit one-quarter of the value of the trees on cultivated land and one-quarter of the buildings left behind by the deceased, no more; also, the heirs other than the wife have the further option of giving the plaintiff the value of the buildings and trees or of allowing her outright ownership of the same property." This interpretation has been applied since the early 1990s in order to strengthen the position of males in families, even though it contradicts positive law and religion. The verdict cannot be implemented since real estate laws hold that properties constitute integrated units, made up of the land and the buildings on it. The Quranic Chapter "Women" (*al-Nisa'*) does not distinguish between "trees and buildings," but rather gives the woman one-fourth of everything left by the husband. When a widow lodged a challenge before the General Commission of the Court of Cassation, it ruled that it had no jurisdiction because it did not monitor the content of verdicts. (*) This example of *ijtihad* and the oversight limits of the General Commission have put women at the mercy of other heirs, which in practice means the payment of small sums to widows, who are generally powerless.

Women thus face a new type of discrimination, over and above that to which they were exposed under the former system of division of inheritance. Inheritance laws serve as a means of redistributing wealth within a family; modern concepts of justice require that women obtain a share equal to that of men, especially now that they have become partners in production and spending on the family.

This unfair law demonstrates how sects can give higher priority to considerations of power, and to the reproduction of patriarchal society, than to those of justice and religion itself. This manifests itself through robbing of women of their legal rights, limiting their options, and weakening their capacities, all of which works against those development efforts that which seek to widen people's options and empower them to exercise them.

(*) A. H. is a mother of four minors and the widow of a wealthy man who owned built-up and non-built-up properties. The family of the deceased, who are the guardians of the minors and control their money, agreed to retain the properties and give the widow an amount equaling her share. After the assessment of the properties and the calculation of her share were carried out in a way that suited the family of the deceased, they decided to pay her in installments, and exerted themselves to ensure that these payments should be sufficient to guarantee that the family would be provided for. Fearful of losing her children, the widow consented. What hurt A.H. most in this affair was that she was young and able to work; if she had owned land she could have been able to obtain a loan to establish her own business and thus provide for herself and her children.

One form of escape from Lebanon's sectarian laws, the lack of equality of rights, or verdicts that go against one's value-system, is to resort to civil marriage abroad. People who do not consider sectarian law a suitable organizer of marital relations and related matters also opt for this solution. Lebanese courts recognize these marriages and decide in cases concerning them, relying on the foreign law under which the marriage in question was conducted. While Lebanese by the thousands have resorted to this solution, it may create problems in the long term, where children are unable to inherit from their parents due to a difference in religion. Furthermore, reliance on foreign law is a course that ultimately secures neither the dignity of the state nor of its citizens.⁹⁹

Moreover, some Islamic sects have yet to put forward a draft personal status law containing a clear codification of rulings to be endorsed by parliament. In these cases, Sharia courts cite "what is known" of the religion's rulings in rendering their judgments. While Sharia law accepts the existence of contradiction in jurisprudential interpretation (*ijtihad*), in some cases the interpretation of rulings is subject to the judge's whims. This opens the door to the application of arbitrary and differing criteria to similar rulings, while violating the principle of equality of rights among litigants. Finally, litigants bear the expenses of the judge, which vary among the members of various sects with regard to a given court case, and this is a further violation of the principle of equality that those who believe in the principle of equality must find difficult to justify.¹⁰⁰

99 Zalzal, op. cit., p.19.

100 Ibid, p. 8.

Box 3.6: Court Fees

Fees to the Islamic Sharia courts do not exceed LL100,000 while the court fees of most Christian religious courts are high and differ from one sect to another and sometimes even from one region to the other within the same sect. Court fees for divorce may reach LL2 million in Armenian counts and if the reasons for divorce are numerous may exceed LL3 million among some Catholic sects. Divorce fees in Orthodox churches in Beirut stand at almost LL100,000 but may reach LL1,200,000 in a court of the same sect in Mount Lebanon. A similar amount may also be paid when the verdict is pronounced.

Lebanon's need for a single legislative code for personal status matters does not spring, it must be emphasized, from the right to chose that this code would ensure to citizens in as much as it would relieve them of the need to join, under duress, one of the recognized sects-and here again, such duress sits poorly with the freedom of belief guaranteed by the constitution- but rather from the principle, already referred to in many guises, of equality before the law among its citizens. Such a national personal code would, it follows, find its underpinnings in the twin principles of freedom and equality, or, in other words, in the two pillars of citizenship.

2.4.4 A Civil Personal Status Law: Public and Private

Today, the structure of Lebanon's personal status laws is sectarian. The civil status law endorsed prior to independence in decree 60 of 13 March 1936 has yet, however, to be implemented.¹⁰¹ Moreover, Article 79 of the Code of Civil Procedures stipulates that civil courts may settle disputes arising from a marriage conducted abroad between Lebanese of different religious backgrounds or between a Lebanese and a foreigner, according to the civil code of the country in question. The article continues, "The provisions of laws connected to the competency of Sharia and

¹⁰¹ Article 14 of Law 60 stipulated that "the sects follow an ordinary law regulating their affairs and managing them freely within the limits of civil laws." Article 17 also stipulated the following: "Personal status matters for Syrians and Lebanese belonging to one of the sects mentioned in Article 14 and following, or those not belonging to one of these sects, shall be subject to civil law."

¹⁰² On February 8, 2007 the Third Court of First Instance in Maten, headed by Judge Jean Kazzi, issued a Initial Decision 34/2007, based on Article 79 of the Code of Civil Procedures, which gave Lebanese civil judiciary the authority to settle disputes arising from marriages, to approve the adoption of a child under civil law in Cyprus, on the grounds that adoption is related to a marriage contract.

Druze courts shall be respected, if both parties to the marriage are Muslims and at least one is Lebanese."¹⁰² Domestically, the attempts to pass civil personal status laws have reflected the latent struggle for power that pits the state and the sects against civil society. There have been several draft laws on the topic: the first was authored by the late lawyer Abdullah Lahoud. This draft law, which was also adopted by the Democratic Party, laid the foundation upon which all subsequent laws were based. Lawyer August Bakhos made it a point to place the draft law twice every year on the agenda of the Parliament's Administration and Justice Committee, which he chaired.¹⁰³ Discussion of the legislation, however, was always postponed.¹⁰⁴ Other efforts followed. The Democratic Secular Party put forward its draft, followed by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. President Elias Hrawi engineered the most recent attempt; the legislation was endorsed in the cabinet but was not delivered to parliament for ratification. The country's sectarian authorities ordered instead that the issue be shelved.¹⁰⁵

Box 3.7: The Problem of Civil Marriage and the Crisis of Civil Status Laws

"Because the legislator who does not acknowledge civil marriage in Lebanon later on comes to accept the results of these marriages when they are carried out by a Lebanese citizen abroad and based on specific rules and regulations, the equation today has become one of equivalence between the private obligations of the sects that prohibit [such marriages] and the needs and evolutions that allow and justify them. Thus the Lebanese judge comes to rules in the name of the Lebanese people according to the requirements of foreign laws! The problematique is one that is unique in its comprehensiveness, since it affects the personal status of a wide cross section of society." [excerpt from John Kazzi, *The Lebanese Judge Against the World*]

¹⁰³ The text of the draft was printed in its entirety by al-Liwa newspaper, 16 August 1979, in an article entitled: Bakhos' Draft Law on Personal Status: The First Step to Abolishing Religious Courts or Step toward Secularism?" The same headline added: "Administration and Justice Committee discussion of the Most Dangerous Draft Law since Independence Begins on Monday."

¹⁰⁴ Hamade, Najla; Makdissi, Jean; Joseph, Suad (eds), 2000, *Citizenship in Lebanon, between Men and Women*, p. 165 ff, Beirut, Dar al-Jadid.

¹⁰⁵ This was the first attempt by the executive authority, to present a voluntary personal civil status code and pass it in the Cabinet on March 18, 1998. Twenty-two ministers approved this *Hrawi draft*, as it was called. For the first time as well, a legal committee was created to draft an integrated personal status code, based on the state's right to legislate in civil status matters, and because the delegation granted to sects on this item is not absolute.

Every time the state has attempted to enact its legislative role, the country's sects have sought to obstruct the process. In 1959, a group of legal experts from a number of sects put forward a draft Law on Inheritance which they hoped would open up a joint public space, transitioning from a state of compulsory insularity to one of national interaction. All segments of society lobbied hard for the bill, but after its passage it was applied only to non-Muslims. Muslim clergymen argued that Islam contains binding and non-violable statutes on inheritance matters. In fact, non-Sharia statutes are applied in inheritance cases and no one considers this a violation of religious law. For example, a person's end-of-service indemnity is distributed equally among heirs, without adopting Sharia guidelines, while some real estate property, known as "amiri," is also distributed in equal fashion. Thus the issue of civil marriage reflects both the cultural and

structural impasse that Lebanon's personal status system has reached.

THE STRUCTURAL IMPASSE

The prospect of a Civil Personal Status Code raised unpleasant questions for the country's sectarian authorities to which they did not wish to respond. Does the issuance of such a law represent the establishment of a non-confessional civil community" (*taifat el haq el aam*)? Would this non-confessional community be the sect of the Lebanese state? Where would this new community stand vis-à-vis the political system, and what would be its relationship to other sects? Given the sectarian system, what if the members of this new community demanded their share of civil service posts, and seats in the legislative and executive branches of government?¹⁰⁶

Box 3.8: The Gathering for a Voluntary Civil Personal Status Code *

"We, the undersigned, based on our belief in the principles of democracy, equality, and our right to free choice, and in order to enhance social cohesion among people from the same nation, declare that we demand a Voluntary Civil Personal Status Code. Yes to freedom of choice!"

The Gathering for a Voluntary Civil Personal Status Code, known in Lebanon as the "civil marriage campaign," was launched in April 1998. It was preceded by a number of events, such as the Conference on a Civil Law for Personal Status in Lebanon, organized by members of the People's Rights Movement (*Harakat Huquq al-Nas*), and the law on civil marriage drafted by then-President Elias Hrawi, which was approved by twenty-one out of thirty Cabinet ministers, while the then prime minister, Rafiq al-Hariri, declined to send the legislation to Parliament for approval. The country's Muslim religious authorities mobilized in response to the cabinet vote; they held a news conference at Dar al-Ifta', the highest Sunni religious body, to condemn the legislation and asked that it be shelved and not sent to parliament. A number of Islamic and civil associations supported this stance by the religious authorities and demonstrations were held in Tripoli and Beirut to protest the cabinet's vote. Religious authorities agreed with this rejection and were supported by a number of politicians, while Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri pledged not to accept any draft law that did not enjoy the prior approval of the country's religious authorities.

The Gathering boasted a wide membership of political parties, associations, and individuals, who launched a plan of action similar to the one used successfully in the "My Country, Town and Municipality" (*Baladi, Baldati, Baladiyahati*) campaign to promote municipal elections, which included the formation of a civil network in various parts of the country to support and participate in the campaign's activities. It gathered under one umbrella some seventy-five organizations, institutions, and committees (thirteen political parties, twenty-eight legal and civil associations, seven associations, twelve student associations, seven cultural associations, and four unions). They agreed to conduct a national advertising and media campaign, organize demonstrations and sit-ins before the cabinet and parliament and held a year-long petition drive that gathered 50,000 signatures from people of various regions and affiliations. In addition, a draft Voluntary Civil Personal Status Code was prepared; it was a voluntary code that was binding on whoever chose it, and did not require spouses in mixed marriages to change their religion or sect. Men and women were equal in marriage, divorce, custody, and inheritance; divorce was permitted for reasons detailed in the law and required a court decision.

Despite the concerted counter-attack by religious authorities, supported by an important portion of the country's politicians, the "civil marriage campaign" succeeded on March 18, 2002, five years after its launch, in obtaining the signatures of nine MPs, while a tenth legislator agreed to wait before signing; (4) the draft was presented to the parliament as a "Voluntary Civil Personal Status Code" but has yet to be put on the legislature's agenda and has been relegated to Parliament's General Secretariat (for more details, see "A Hundred and One Story to Tell")

* Taken from a text prepared by Karam Karam for A Hundred and One Stories, relying on his personal archives and his book *Le Mouvement Civil au Liban. Revendications, protestations et mobilisations associatives dans l'après-guerre*, Paris, Karthala-IREMAM, pp. 183-185

106 Assaf, George, Autumn 1999, « Système communautaire et déconfessionnalisation: La problématique de la mutation du

système politique libanais » in *Travaux et jours*, No. 64.

In a move meant to intimidate, some insisted that belonging to this non-confessional group would force one to abandon his or her religion (they did not use the word “sect”). They even threatened to petition the Constitutional Court in order to preserve their rights over personal status matters. When the topic of a civil personal status code was raised, proposals to abolish political sectarianism re-surfaced.

Operating from the premise that people are the primary source of power, civil society groups persisted in their advocacy campaign for a unified civil personal status code. This was part of their campaign to create a legal environment that would boost positive interaction between state and society, while promoting the rights of individuals and civil society as a whole. The presence of a strong cultured secular social base across all sects strengthened the campaign's call

for a civil code and was an indivisible part of the crystallization of the notion of citizenship and equality among citizens.

As a legal relationship, the concept of citizenship is not limited to political and civil rights, but extends to all activities that fall within the public sphere, covering the whole spectrum of human rights, including personal rights, so long as the latter fall within the domain of civil life. By way of reference to the public space, the notion of citizenship incorporates people and concepts in an interactive, participatory framework. Thus, personal status matters are considered part and parcel of citizenship rights and certainly a component of human rights.

The state's commitment in the preamble of the Lebanese constitution to the Universal Declaration of

Box 3.9: Various “Religious” Stances on Civil Marriage

Some Muslim reformist legal scholars believe that religion does not prevent a Muslim woman from marrying a Christian or Jew. The Lebanese authority, Shaykh Abdullah al-'Alayli, held that this injunction was tribal in origin, since some tribes adopted endogamy and banned exogamy. As al-'Alayli said, “This matter, even if related to religious jurisprudence, leads to a national problem, and is an obstacle to a more comprehensively fraternal nationhood.” He believed that the consensus by scholars “in this issue in particular came late, and does not support the pretext, unless based on decisive evidence.” He cited the stance of Imam Abu Hanifa when he rejected consensus, remarking “They are men, and we are men.” After outlining a number of Quranic verses, Shaykh al-'Alayli concluded that “the evidence is not supported” for the claimant, and does not involve a ruling or obligation; he later summed this up by saying, that a Muslim woman could marry a fellow monotheist (Christian or Jew) (*Al-'Alayli Where is the Error? (Ayna al-Khata'?)*)

Shaykh Suleiman Ghanem, the advisor to the Druze Community Court, had the following to say about the reasons behind the call for civil marriage: “There has recently been much debate about the Personal Status Law. One group of people has revived its argument that it is necessary to modernize the law, while another, conservative group believes that it is dangerous to legislate religious statutes, based on the Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet, in the same way the Christians do.” Ghanem adds: “In my view, there are two important motives for broaching this topic: the first is the movement for female equality, which has made important progress in achieving its goals, and which remains very active. This movement has succeeded in passing laws allowing women to hold high-level public positions, while the three monotheistic religions have given the husband authority over the family and obliged wives to submit to their husbands. Thus, women have succeeded in secular states in seeing the passage of certain positive laws, such as civil marriage. It is natural that this movement should have infected Arab women in general, and Lebanese women in particular. This was the [reason for the?] attack against the call for a civil marriage law [check Arabic complete?]. The second reason is that Lebanon's sectarian system recognizes nineteen sects, and out of these a secular sect has now arisen, which might become the twentieth. This latter “sect” is trying to obtain a civil marriage law that frees it from religious constraints and sectarian rituals that govern marriage (Nour al-Qa'samani, “Civil Marriage: Rejection and Acceptance, Opposition and Support,” *al-Nahar*, 17 April 2008.)

Brother Abdo Suleiman, a member of the Maronite Mariamite Order, says that civil marriage is one of the most debated issues of recent times, and has been rejected emphatically by the Church. “This is because marriage is one of the Church's sacraments.... the sacrament of marriage is important because it provides the spouses with permanence and continuity. We are well aware of the magnitude of problems that we face; thus, the Church insists on the sacrament of marriage because an individual requires the divine blessing of strength to be able to continue and overcome life's problems and his personal and psychological crises. The sacrament supports the individual and gives him the strength to match what is being asked of him; it also supports the relationship of these two people and guides them so that this relationship may enter a divine dimension. Moreover, the sacrament of marriage is an institution both human and divine; it is natural that one of its most important results is child-bearing and raising children in a sound Christian manner, based on this sacrament, or directing them toward the plane of the divine.”

Human Rights and other international covenants embodying these principles in all domains without exception, necessitates that the state endorse a civil personal status code.

THE CULTURAL IMPASSE

Some clergymen, particularly from the Sunni sect, however, have also rejected the principle of civil marriage. They argue that in allowing for the marriage of a Muslim woman to a Christian or Jew, civil marriage constitutes a violation of Sharia.¹⁰⁷

2.4.5 The Desired Role for the State: Bias toward the Individual

The neutrality of the state vis-à-vis sects and religions is considered the primary foundation of a civil state. Article 9 of the Lebanese constitution established and laid the foundation for this neutrality. This negative

position, however, needs to be offset by a positive position represented by a state bias toward the individual and the citizen, a notion enforced in Article 9 and in the preamble to the constitution.

Personal status codes, which are expected to protect families, are unable to carry out this role because they are out of touch with the vast socio-economic and cultural developments taking place. These codes run against the interests of individuals and families and lead to insularity and disintegration. They produce crisis-ridden relations that are resolved through violence, while families require (based on their prevailing nuclear structure) participation and cooperation so that they can play their proper roles. Thus there is a need to deal realistically with individuals and families, creating a system that promotes the human rights of individuals and groups and contributes to consolidating the family. Some studies in fact reveal that a large cross-section of Lebanese citizens believes that they have a right to be free of the shackle of sectarianism.

Box 3.10: Attitudes toward the Civil Status Law and Mixed Marriages

Attitudes toward civil status laws and inter-religious marriage vary. A study conducted by St. Joseph's University in 2004 found that more than two-thirds of the Lebanese believed that liberation from the power of sects is a right. These attitudes change based on the confessional affiliations of the individual respondent. Of note was the high rate of agreement among all sects as well as the lack of response among Shiites and Druze.

Right to be liberated from the authority of confessional communities

Strongly Agree	35.7
Agree	31.9
Disagree	17.9
Strongly Disagree	7.2
No response	7.2

Right to be liberated from the authority of confessional communities

	Christians	Muslims	Druze
Strongly Agree	39.72	54.5	55.4
Agree	36.77	29.3	8.9
Disagree	15.26	21.2	5.4
Strongly Disagree	5.23	9.12	5.4
No response	4.5	8.22	25

Source: Jean Mourad, 2006, *Les Sentiments d'appartenance: La Sociabilité*, pp. 21-22.

Interestingly, and even though liberation from the power of the confessional group is considered a right by the majority of Lebanese, there was considerable reserve when it came to support for a civil status law. Around half of the Lebanese supported this right while 11.7 per cent did not respond. Also, females tended to be more conservative on this issue than males (45.8 per cent versus 65 per cent for civil status laws). At the confessional level, Christians generally favored civil status laws more than Muslims (see the Indicators section for additional details, by sect).

Right to adopt a civic status law (National)

Strongly Agree	15.8
Agree	28.9
Disagree	29.8
Strongly Disagree	14.8
No response	10.6

Right to adopt a civic status law (By Religious Community)

	Christians	Muslims	Druze
Strongly Agree	19.47	11.18	35.7
Agree	38.8	21.1	16.1
Disagree	27.6	33	12.5
Strongly Disagree	5.95	23.26	5.4
No response	8.13	11.34	30.4

107 See Beydoun, Ahmad, *Nineteen Surviving Sects*, Beirut, Dar An-Nahar, for information about the profound discussion of various

stances taken during this period on the proposed draft law.

These results indicate that while the Lebanese in general seem to consider civil status laws a right, based on principle, the situation changes when it is to be translated into a concrete reality. As seen in the table below, the percentage of those who supported the use of secular standards in marriage and inheritance laws declines, while those who strongly disagree rises by around 6 per cent. More critically, and as Mourad points out, the age groups that stand out in this regard are mainly those between age twenty-five and thirty-four (52 per cent) and forty-five and fifty-four (52.7 per cent). As for the sectarian break-down, the results are quite surprising. Around 23-29 per cent of Muslims who traditionally consider inheritance and family laws as inalienable religious rights, favored applying some sort of secular standard to these laws. More than half the Christians (56.25 per cent) expressed direct support for the application of secular standards to family laws (see the Indicators section for further details on break-down by sect). This attitude across confessions was directly correlated with higher educational standards.

However, despite these indications, a recent survey

Right to adopt a civic status law (National)	
Strongly Agree	11.8
Agree	27.2
Disagree	29.8
Strongly Disagree	20
No response	11.1

Right to adopt a civic status law (By Religious Community)			
	Christians	Muslims	Druze
Strongly Agree	15.98	7.06	26.8
Agree	38.82	17.48	7.1
Disagree	26.3	33.8	17.9
Strongly Disagree	10.02	29.04	5.4
No response	7.85	12.59	30.4

Source: Mourad, *ibid*, p. 27.

indicates that the approval of inter-religious marriage has declined slightly among adults since 1987.

In contrast, approval for inter-religious and inter-sectarian marriage among young people is high, while varying among the country's governorates; the country's highest rate of acceptance among male students was recorded in the governorate of Beirut. Such support of mixed marriages could be directly correlated to higher tolerance of difference, increased participation in extra-curricular activities, greater participation in democratic decision-making processes, greater understanding of citizenship concepts, and acceptance of gender equity.

Attitudes towards Inter-Religious Marriage

	1987	2002	2006
"One man says: 'It is not so important if my daughter marries a man with a different religion, as long as she loves him.'"			
A second man says: "Marriages between people of different religions are not good and are often unhappy. I don't want my daughter to marry someone with a different religion."			
Do you agree with the first or second statement?			
Agree with the first statement:	40	39	36

Source: Theodor Hanf, *E pluribus unum? Lebanese opinions and attitudes on coexistence*, (Jbeil, Lebanon) the International Center for Human Sciences and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, (2007), p.18.

Youth Attitudes towards Inter-Religious Marriage

	Do not agree	Agree	Don't know	No answer
(G14b) A girl marrying a boy from another religion is acceptable	36.8	55.7	6.2	1.3
(G15b) A girl marrying a boy from another sect is acceptable	28.2	64.9	5.8	1.1

Source: UNDP, MEHE, and CDR, 2008, *Education and Citizenship*

III. "INTOLERABLE LAXITY" IN DEALING WITH THE CONSTITUTION

From this perspective, the constitution obviously is not what is limiting the materialization of citizenship in the full sense of the word, in the civil and political domains, nor is it what is imposing a sectarian characterization of citizens and preventing citizenship from taking root. Instead, this is occurring as a result of a full arsenal of laws paramount among which are the electoral and personal status laws, as well as political traditions and practices and other de facto

features. This situation is further bolstered by a tendency among politicians to denigrate the constitution and conspire against it to the extent of paralyzing the implementation of some key elements, thus undermining some core political and legal principles without any significant objections from the populace at large.

The recently added Article 95-i.e. the move toward extricating the political system from the sectarian structure - is not what is hindering the process. The civil personal status law furthermore is not the only item that has not seen the light. Sectarianisms allowed to control the public education sector, and

nearly the entire education system, instead of allowing education to control sectarianism. Public schools are no longer a meeting space in which Lebanese from across the board gather. Instead, public schools have to some extent become spaces that pertain to narrow, local affiliations, mirroring the country's sectarian geography. This took place because the educational system experienced the same economic and living conditions that Lebanese were subjected to. The current status of the Lebanese University is a case in point.

The Constitutional Council, which rules on the constitutionality of legislation, parliamentary appeals and so forth for long periods remained non-existent or paralyzed, while the Higher Court, designed to try ministers and leading politicians (president, speaker and prime minister), never saw the light. Institutions and major functions of fundamental importance to the state were in turn paralyzed. The paralysis of state institutions was met with by only lukewarm objections, in stark contrast to the commotions and constitutional interpretations, both local and foreign, that were generated when the issue touched upon the sectarian balance of power for state positions, interests and privileges.

IV. THE NATIONAL PACT OF INDEPENDENCE VERSUS THE SECTARIAN “MYTH” PACT

Like the Constitution, Lebanon's National Pact (*al-Mithaq al-Watani*) is considered an instrument that confines citizens within their sects, impeding the development of a wider sense of citizenship and engagement in public life. Though Lebanon's public sphere may exhibit externally a degree of vitality, it remains underdeveloped. Many misgivings and doubts have been generated over the actual content of and commitment to the National Pact over the three decades between independence and the outbreak of civil war. These doubts were further intensified subsequent to the end of war and the endorsement of the Taif Accord.¹⁰⁸

108 See Jisr, Basim, 1997, *The 1943 Charter: Its Rise and Fall*, Second Edition, Beirut, Dar An-Nahar, pp. 10-14.

109 We see this from reviewing the minutes of parliamentary sessions, cabinet statements, and speeches by President Beshara Khoury, from his election until 1948. Prior to this, we find a description of the first independence government's statement in an exchange of letters between the president of the republic and the mufti of the republic in 1944, as “a national charter.” We then find the Charter mentioned in a speech delivered by Riad Solh in Parliament in 1947. However, this term had not been settled on prior to 1947-1948. Historians of the

Dating the year of independence, the Pact was not publicly acknowledged as a “Pact” until four years after its release.¹⁰⁹ The content of the Pact was reduced to the two “nos” that were famously depicted by Georges Naccashe in one of his articles.¹¹⁰ These are the Muslim “no” to Syrian (or Arab) unity, and the Christian “no” to western tutelage. These two “nos” are euphemistically presented as an affirmation of Lebanon's willingness to cooperate with Arab states and show solidarity on their issues, while confirming openness to western civilization, with all that this entails in terms of relations between Lebanon and both the Arab and Western world, as well as international institutions, for which the country's independence is prerequisite.

In the decades following independence, however, the National Pact gradually came to be understood as a sectarian formula to distribute political power among the major religious groups. It became increasingly known as a charter of “sectarian coexistence,” or the “Pact of Coexistence” (*Mithaq al-'Aysh al-Mushtarak*). The Ministerial Declaration of the first independence cabinet remained the definitive authority on interpreting the content of the Pact. Articles in this Declaration that did not contradict the tenets of sectarianism were highlighted, while a prominent paragraph emphasizing the need to abolish sectarianism was overlooked, as was the fact that its author, Riad Solh, the then Prime Minister, made serious though ultimately unsuccessful efforts in support of this goal, returning to it repeatedly in subsequent statements and texts.

In fact, there is nothing sectarian about the Pact in the form in which it supposedly existed when it was signed, except the parties to it. These were two in number, if we accept the then prevailing but unexamined notion of a Christian-Muslim dichotomy. Division of power on a sectarian basis and all that flows from that, however, does not originate within the Pact itself. This sectarian “formula” (*sigha*),¹¹¹ is in fact older, more firmly established, and more deep-rooted, both historically and in actuality than either the Pact or the Constitution and has thwarted their goals to varying degrees at different intervals in the country's history, dragging the country and its people down with it.

National Charter have ignored what we may call “The Charter's Path to Becoming a Charter,” assuming, thanks to ignorance that might or might not be deliberate, that the “charter” of 1943 became the “Charter” in that same year.

110 See “Deux négations ne font pas une nation,” 1949, in Naccashe, Georges, 1983, *Un Rêve Libanais, 1943-1972*, Beirut, Editions FMA, pp. 52-58.

111 See Beydoun, Ahmad, 2003, *The Constitution, the Pact, the Formula*, Beirut, Dar An-Nahar, pp. 11-23.

Lebanese politicians, at least since the end of the civil war and the conclusion of the Taif Accord, have been vague about the fate of the 1943 Pact. It was often argued that the long war negated the Pact of 1943. The Taif Accord was instead sometimes called the “Taif Pact,” without delving into what this new term implied. Taif was officially referred to as the “Document of National Accord” (*Wathiqat al-Wifaq al-Watani*). Both the text of the accord itself and the preamble to the constitution, mentioned the “Pact of Coexistence,” holding that any political authority contravening this pact lacked legitimacy. Even so, “coexistence” was left undefined, as was the essence of the relevant “Pact:” Was it the well-known Pact of 1943, the recognized sectarian “formula” for the division of power, or something else entirely? During Lebanon’s recent political crisis, government ministers who resigned believed that their very act of resignation had robbed the cabinet of legitimacy. This implies a

reading of the “Pact of Coexistence” in the light of the Taif Accord that takes the latter as be equivalent to precisely the conventionally accepted “formula,” which is to say to that very formula that the agreement in question states should be abolished.

This vague and confusing terminology has had a very negative impact on the sense of citizenship within the country’s government and institutions which the citizens have delegated to implement their conception of the public space of which they are a part. This confusion has similarly solidified the position of a single authority, namely the sect, while dividing the public space among Lebanon’s religious communities, and these in turn have become the unavoidable channel via which official posts are filled and the attitudes of citizens and other groups toward the state and its work generally, as well as toward other citizens, are shaped.¹¹²

Box 3.11: Excerpts from the Policy Statement of the Independence Government

Organizing Independence

First of all, we must organize this independence well, so that it becomes a reality... No nation, whether “entity” or independent state, can arise without the beating hearts of all its people. Patriotic hearts are the Nation’s best protection...

Organizing National Rule

Just as the Government organizes independence and realizes its goals, thus rendering it sound, so it will apply itself to the organization of national government so that it be a sound government... On this basis, the Government will introduce various reforms to the instruments of governance and to the country’s public, political, national life...

Treating Sectarianism and Regionalism

Among the foundations of reform, which are required by Lebanon’s higher interest, is the treatment of sectarianism and the abolition of its negative aspects. This foundation of sectarianism hinders national progress and hurts Lebanon’s reputation, not to speak of its poisoning the spirit of relations between various spiritual communities that make up the Lebanese people. We have seen how, in most cases, sectarianism has been a tool to ensure private interests or sap the strength of national life in Lebanon to the benefit of others. We are confident that when the people are filled by the national sentiment that has arisen under independence and a system of popular rule, they will be reassured and accept the abolishment of the sectarian system, which weakens the nation.

The moment at which sectarianism is abolished will be a blessed moment in the history of Lebanon of comprehensive national awakening. With God’s help, we will strive to see this take place soon. Naturally, its achievement will require preparation on various fronts; we will all cooperate to pave the way and prepare for this, so that all are reassured as to the achievement of this critical national reform. What we have said about sectarianism applies also to regionalism, which if it becomes stronger, will turn a single nation into many.

Amending the Electoral Law

The Government believes that the current Electoral Law contains defects whose impact is hidden from no one, and has generated many just complaints. Thus, the Government will soon deliver to Parliament a draft law to amend the Election Law so that it guarantees better popular representation, in line with the desire of Lebanese. It believes that reforming this law is a way to guarantee the rights of all Lebanese, without discrimination among them.

112 Using this channel appears to be a condition for taking effective stances, which have various types of benefits. It is also a condition for limiting or anticipating damage and harm. The sects appear to be the only surviving entities in the jungle of pacts whose meanings and future are conflicted, and with the

“formula” becoming a force for subjugating or paralyzing the constitution, which guarantees of citizens’ rights; they can block any pact that seeks refuge in purely “citizens’ rights” (as well as those advocating such a move).

Guaranteeing Social Justice

We should also turn to the consequences and impact of rising prices, particularly among the poor. The government will take the initiative to treat the resulting poverty and desperation with the relief available. To this end, it will provide humanitarian and charitable institutions with all assistance possible. The Government will conduct a precise study of the international projects proposed during this war [World War II] to improve society and establish social justice, taking whatever is suitable for our country and whatever will guarantee an end to misery in all its forms.

V. THE UNITY OF THE SECT AND INTERNAL ARBITRATION

The growing ownership by Lebanon's sects of private institutions of all sorts (albeit always headed and controlled by the sects' political establishments) has led to two results: A) The development of semi-closed or semi-self-sufficient sects as alternatives to the formation of the nation (see Box 3.12 below). This quasi-independence has occurred despite the sects' need to rely on the state, in its role as political entrepreneur both inside and outside the country and to benefit from services and privileges, both private and public, that only the state could provide. The same sects, however, have not felt a need to call on the state in its role as a mechanism for the representation of the nation, the implementation of the society's policies, or the safeguarding of public interests. B) The formation of the state as a unitary authority and arbitrating force, has been impeded, in that it has been constantly pulled

this way and that by the internal divisions of the political community with all the feuding among the various societal forces that this implies and given that it was a tool for the comprehensive execution of the country's laws and systems. Thus the concerted opposition of the sect in the face of any given law or system has become sufficient to guarantee that that law or system will be blocked; or that, at the least, its implementation would be, perforce, inadequate.¹¹³ We have seen that this rule remains in force as far as the statutes of the constitution itself are concerned, as evidenced by the failure of the listless attempts [to assert the authority of the state? please check this with the author!] when influential forces collude to block their progress. At another level, the lack of an arbitrating force amounts to an expression of the lack of public national will and opens the door for foreign parties¹¹⁴ to claim a role, of necessity, of crisis managers, given that there is a constant need to shore up the status of this or that sect and to protect it from expected crises or to maintain a balance designed to prevent crises before they arise.

Box 3.12: Sects and Civil Society Institutions: Data from the Field

Lebanon has a long history with NGOs, one of which dates back to 1710, during Ottoman rule. A recent survey by the Ministry of Social Affairs found that there are close to 6,032 registered NGOs in the country. A large number of those, however, may be non-operational.¹¹⁵

Moreover, slightly less than one-quarter of NGOs that were assessed have a self-declared sectarian affiliation. A large number of these are directly affiliated with existing political parties and in many cases serve as their social and economic services arm. This in part is evident in the geographic distribution of these NGOs, a large number of Shiite NGOs for example, being concentrated in the Bekaa and the south of the country, areas which have the largest Shiite

113 See "The Formula, Back and Front," in Beydoun, Ahmad, 1990, *What You Have Learned and Tasted, Paths of the Lebanese (Civil) War*, Beirut, Arab Cultural Center, pp. 133-142.

114 Between independence and the 1975-1990 civil war, the Presidency of the Republic, with the constitutional prerogatives that it enjoyed at the time, represented this arbitrating force. In any case, this was a limited exception and one not without, in any case, its many stormy moments, and it commenced a long time after the rise of the sectarian system, which caused the civil strife of 1840-1860. After this, the role of arbitrator was performed by the non-Lebanese Ottoman governor (*mutasarrif*), though his role was contested by the European consuls. Power then passed to the French High Commissioner during the quarter-century of the Mandate. The President of the Republic following independence inherited the prerogatives of the commissioner in attenuated form and after the civil war, the "Syrian High Commissioner" became "the government." We grant that to restore the power to arbitrate to the Maronite president (or another president "anointed" by his sect) after the civil war, the Taif Accord, and what followed, has

become impossible. The Maronites of today are not the Maronites of 1943, and the same goes for the other sects. The regime's evolution has led the sects to feel a kind of equality, making it extremely difficult for any group to yield a position of hegemony or predominance to any other. This is one of the types of historical "paralysis" caused by the evolution of both society and the system toward the sectarian formula. Thus, there is no way to remove the need for foreign tutelage (and the general chaos resulting from this tutelage itself, which is projected, when foreign power raises tutelage is removed, into the public arena) unless we abandon the entire sectarian formula.

115 Of those, 423 were identified as direct affiliates of political parties, for-profit health dispensaries or local offices for international NGOs, and were excluded from the survey. Another 398 NGOs were found to be non-operational. Moreover, of the total number of registered NGOs, 1851 were classified as unreachable. These include those reported as closed by non-members and those that refused to co-operate. These may also include additional non-operating NGOs.

populations. (Among others, see Deeb, 2006 and Norton 2007 for a discussion of Hizbullah- and Amal-related NGOs). The same may be said for other sects.

For many people, these NGOs have served to provide much needed social, educational, health, and other services in areas where they are lacking. In tandem, they have also played a role in the construction and assertion of local identities and sense of self for the different communities. Many of these NGOs, both those with political affiliation and those with a purely sectarian affiliation, were created during the civil war and post-civil war period to cater to the needs of local communities (see the Indicators section for further details).

Self-declared sectarian affiliation of NGO's by period of establishment

	Pre Independence (-1943)	Independence (1944-1974)	Civil War (1975-1990)	Post War (1991-2000)	2000-2006
With Sectarian Affiliation	53	22	23	17	16
Non Sectarian	47	78	77	83	84
Base	97	602	557	1024	492

Self-declared sectarian affiliation by Mohafaza (%)

	Lebanon	Beirut	Mount Lebanon	North	Bekaa	South	Nabatieh
Non Sectarian	79	82	75	85	79	82	75
Sectarian Affiliation	21	18	25	15	21	18	25
Base	2836	577	1007	486	373	231	162

Self-declared sectarian affiliation by Sect and Mohafaza (%)

	Lebanon	Beirut	Mount Lebanon	North	Bekaa	South	Nabatieh
Sunni	20	43	10	29	20	19	0
Shi'a	25	12	15	1	51	50	88
Druze	8	8	15	0	0	2	3
Kurdish	0.3	2	0	0	0	0	0
Maronite	15	5	22	28	8	10	0
Catholic	7	5	8	7	11	7	0
Orthodox	5	5	3	15	4	0	5
Aremnian	7	11	10	7	0	2	3
Other	12	9	17	13	6	10	3
Base	588	106	248	72	80	42	40

Note: The base for some Muhafazas is very low and impacts analysis of data. Also 0 does not necessarily indicate the total absence of a sectarian NGO in these areas. Rather that they may simply not have declared themselves as such.

Source: MoSA, CDR, June 2008, *Evaluation of the Non-Governmental Organizations National Survey: A Community Development Project of the Council of Reconstruction and Development*, Draft report prepared by Karin Seyfert based on field work implemented by ECE in association with Padeco Co. Ltd., pp. 39-40.

This state of affairs impedes the birth of the nation and the sovereignty of state. The birth of a nation entails experiencing the historical transition from divisions and confrontation among lineage-based groups to the acceptance of the national identity as a dominating pole superseding any other group identities. This transition is mediated by a growing public domain, whose cultural institutions frame the institutions of the state and those voluntarily entered into institutions

that dominate the formation of both political and civil society. In this domain, citizens are equal in rights and enjoy the same public freedoms. No discrimination in rights based on gender, religion, ethnic affiliation, class, and the like is accepted. By "state sovereignty," we mean both the superiority of the state over domestic forces, within the limits of the law, and independence from foreign forces, within the limits of the Constitution, international law, and the national interest.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶ See Baechler, Jean et al., *La Nation*, op. cit., pp. 9-26, and also Mairet, Gerard, 1978, "Peuple et Nation" in Châtelet, Francois, *Histoire des Idéologies*, Hachette Paris, , vol. 3, pp.

57-79, and Habermas, Jurgen, 1998, *L'Intégration Républicaine*, Fayard, Paris, Chapter 4.

In a context like Lebanon, it is not the diversity of sects or communities *per se* that is the issue, as many other societies in the world also exhibit “diversity” whether in religion, ethnicity, or languages. The difference, rather, is that other systems have not reflected the varied make-up in their social fabric in their political systems. By refraining from doing so, these states have avoided Lebanon’s repeated afflictions—subordination of independence to security considerations; conflict and civil war; lack of state control over the country’s institutions, and a chronic inability to safeguard the statutes of the constitution or enforce the law. Foreign and domestic powers have joined forces to maintain this situation in Lebanon, as the various “players” involved have succeeded one another over time. In all cases, they have impeded the functioning of the constitution and of state institutions and policies aimed at nation-formation. Many modern or contemporary nations have arisen through the unity of national institutions and the cohesiveness of public policies aimed at enacting this nation-formation. Their historical formation was incomplete and their affiliations and culture were disunited when they were born as states. Rather, they were, and continue to be, made up of groups that retain, for the most part, their special religious, ethnic, or cultural status and were not obliged to abandon any of this diversity.¹¹⁷

In Lebanon, sects moved toward crystallization under a system which regarded them as the essential units of political and civil society. One after the other, these sects became multi-functional communities, which totally absorbed their members under the pretext of “unity of sectarian affiliation,” while maintaining little relation to any model of political organization intrinsic to the religion or sect. Piety was not generally a condition for sectarian affiliation in the customary Lebanese sense of the word. Instead, belonging to a certain sect depended strictly, with regard to the relevant systems and laws, on inherited membership, or in other words on birth.

Any serious aspiration to reform the political-sectarian system in such a way as to extract it from the political-sectarian system was thus blocked by this total “immersion” in the sect and compulsory identification with it. In many ways this acceptance and in some instances pride in forms of political sectarianism have enfeebled state institutions, threatening national independence, and undermining the security of the country

and peace among its people. The general feeling predominated that that everything was predestined and to be accepted graciously; or, at best, others, on the inside or the outside, were blamed. Structural corruption pervaded all levels of public life as sectarian affiliation became compulsory and encroached on the political lives of citizens and others. Accordingly, sectarian affiliation began to be demanded and evoked where it did not exist, and increasingly perceived as the rule rather than the exception. This corruption is connected, in its origin, to the monopolistic disposal of the rights of their members by the leaderships of the sects, who extended unconditional protection to the latter in return for loyalty and subservience¹¹⁸ (see Box 3.13).

5.1 Minds and Texts

Such sectarian hegemony has undermined any serious efforts at political reform. The new slogan came to be “reform the minds and souls’ before the texts.” thus rendering the difficulties of eliminating of sectarian-based state institutions palpable. The reality is that these institutions, their daily mechanics, and the laws that regulate them, constitute the foundation upon which the notion of citizenship has been constructed for many Lebanese citizens. State institutions can lead the process of nation-building. Once liberated from subordination to less than national interests state institutions can release citizens from having to resort to people of power and influence within their sects in order to secure their legal rights. As a first step, reaffirming the mediating role of the state between citizens. There can be no solid basis of existence for citizens—whether as “public” figures or members of the nation—if the highly tangible (i.e., in this case, institutional) components of an “abstract” relationship between themselves and this national entity are not available, predominantly via the state. Citizenship is not merely a matter of nationality. It is not an “essentialist” affiliation, i.e., one acquired spontaneously, but a relationship whose conditions must be fulfilled if the relationship between a simple individual (the citizen) and a nation represented by a state is to proceed on a sound footing.

The development of a “culture of citizenship” is no doubt a prerequisite to nation-building, in its contemporary sense, where neither cultural (including linguistic) nor

117 See Habermas, Jürgen, 2000, *Après l’Etat-Nation*, Fayard, Paris, pp. 70-71.

118 See Matar, Mohammed Farid, “Corruption and Ways to Treat It” in Salam, Nawaf (ed), 2004, *Lebanon’s Options*,

Beirut, Dar An-Nahar, pp. 179-212, and also, “Lebanese Corruption: Cost to Politics or the Capital of Politicians?” in Beydoun, Ahmad, 2005, *Different Adventures: Lebanese as Sects, Arabs and Phoenicians*, Beirut, Dar An-Nahar, pp. 52-61.

Box 3.13: Burgeoning Sectarianism

Various mechanisms have been devised by the Lebanese political system to contain sectarian rhetoric in the public sphere. For example, the preamble of the Lebanese constitution tied the legitimacy of governments to respect for 'sectarian coexistence'. Similarly, some of the previous electoral laws, which were based on mixed districts, aimed at encouraging inter-sectarian alliances. At the same time, explicit sectarian rhetoric by political entities in the articulation of political demands was often frowned upon socially, in part due to its direct association with the bloody violence of 15 years of civil war.

In the last two years this restraint has given way to a more blatant and pervasive sectarian discourse that has dominated the public sphere and fuelled sectarian violence disguised as political conflict between government and opposition forces. The challenge posed to the constitutionality of the government as a result of the withdrawal of members of one religious sect was articulated in sectarian terms with the different sides accusing each other of treachery. The year and a half long opposition encampment in the centre of Beirut was given a sectarian cast and generally considered in terms of the invasion by one sect of the territory of another.

This rhetoric also took over political discourse, reducing all public debates to a sectarian dimension. Discussions of the state of public administration and the reform required were reduced to a battle over the sectarian composition of public institutions and claims of bias against various communities. Politically unaffiliated public sector employees felt 'unprotected' in times of trouble. Different perspectives on what electoral law is appropriate for Lebanon politically and socially were ignored, with the issue of sectarian representation emerging as the only criterion by which to evaluate the appropriateness of any new electoral law. In effect, the law proposed was judged mainly by its ability to allow members of the same sect to choose their own representatives. Similarly, every few months newspapers are awash with claims that land is being bought in religiously homogenous areas by members of opposing religious groups for political purposes. More critically all the different media outlets have given full reign to hate campaigns, of differing degrees of vehemence, against the political representatives of 'opposing' religious sects, sometimes with the participation of different religious and political figures.

Such discourse, occurring in parallel to rising political tensions, spilled onto the streets. This was clear in the Arab University clashes of January 2006 and in the more recent fighting in Beirut and Mount Lebanon in May 2007. It has also led to the forced displacement of many based on their sectarian affiliation. Numerous individuals and families have reportedly been forced out of their home areas because they were of a different religious background from their neighbors. Similarly, several reporters and members of the press corps have been forced to flee to different parts of the city because of their political affiliations. Reports in the press and in coffee house discussions of kidnapping by rival sectarian groups are on the rise as are the sporadic clashes between rival groups in different areas of Beirut, the North and the Bekaa. For many this has brought back dark memories of the civil war.

religious or ethnic homogeneity is assumed. Consequently, eliminating political sectarianism at the level of the state does not assume the eradication of sectarianism in all of its forms, meaning "social sectarianism." It does, however, entail, as a point of departure, proper recognition of a negative truth, namely that the sectarian principle has failed (as demonstrated by years of history and by our present situation) in governing Lebanese society in a manner that guarantees to it its most basic rights, including the right to national independence, safety, civil peace and security, political stability, and effective public governance, in a climate of freedoms guaranteed by the constitution.¹¹⁹

Moreover, resolving this conflict between "citizen-

based" and "sectarian" identities will take a long time and require huge efforts on all fronts, and particularly that of education. A study entitled "Education and Citizenship," undertaken by the research team of the Lebanon National Human Development Report in partnership with the Ministry of Education and Higher Education, highlighted the serious impact of the current social sectarian polarization on the values and concepts of citizenship among youths. The study looked at ninth-graders and their relations with the institutions governing their daily lives. Findings revealed limited trust in Lebanese state-run or state-related institutions, whether these involved politics, the judiciary, political parties, or security. The study also indicated a low level of trust in the media, whereas trust in religious institutions ranked higher.

119 The resulting content of civil and political culture, referred to above as "reforming people's minds," will make the first condition available. It is not, in any event, mere rhetorical flourish,

but a condition for establishing a "state of laws and institutions," to be taken seriously by citizens and for fortifying them against the "culture" of political and social sectarianism.

Although these ninth-graders exhibit highly nationalist and strongly pro-sovereign sentiments, there is no consensus among them over political options that can be termed national or inclusive. The lack of clarity over the identity of the favorite historical leader means that the nationalist trend is more about patriotic sentiment than citizenship. Four questions about favorite political leader, favorite historical leader, friendly state, and enemy state demonstrated to what a degree students have become integrated into the environment of sectarian polarization.¹²⁰ In summary, there is obvious confusion among Lebanese students when it comes to who is Lebanon's friend and enemy, or the identity of Lebanon's historical reference-point. No politician enjoys unanimous support. These results, of which those involved in public life may be scarcely aware, are extremely important when we talk about citizenship.

The inclination toward social cohesion, meanwhile, is modest. Students displayed a higher degree of support for freedom, social and political rights, and the existence of organizations and forms of expression that are compatible with democracy, while they exhibited interesting attitudes about the state. Most of them believed that the state should intervene to monitor newspapers (87 per cent), place restraints on private actions (70.5 per cent), and ban newspapers from printing items that demean sects and groups (54 per cent). Students were widely divided over the separation of religion and state (48 per cent in favor versus 41 per cent against and unenthusiastic about the idea of people taking part in political parties to influence the government (41 per cent thought that this was good). This attitudes may relate to their understanding of the state and of political parties; it is as though they believed that political parties were something opposed to the state's authority. Chapter Five will expand further on these concepts.

It may be supposed that the gains that civic sentiments and values are bound to make as a result of their frequent discussion should act as a protective cover for state institutions from the current dominance of political sectarianism. This process should also see the state gain a true social presence in all social domains to balance that of the sects, without this necessarily translating into a plan to eliminate them. The state should develop and advance the public educational system while establishing national academic benchmarks for national education in private schools. The state should not retreat, as it has done since the outbreak of civil war, leaving sectarian forces to appropriate its institutions, and leaving public schools, which once served as a meeting point for all cross-sections of society, to become closed spaces, characterized by sectarian social segregation (see Box 3.15).

This vision of the state differs, to varying degrees, from image of "the state in the era of globalization" that is currently being promoted. The type of state needed here is not one that withdraws from its leading role. Instead, such a state should be present in all sectors and able to lead society, compensating for deficiencies without compromising freedoms and even boosting freedom against the possibility of seeing its citizens captured by non-state forces or trends. Lebanon is not alone in requiring such a state, which is different than the kind usually touted as being suitable for the present era. Many societies share this need, in which the political-social make-up boosts centrifugal forces and frustrates those that are centripetal. Many communities in the developing "South" require such a state, and many of them of have witnessed various types of bloody civil strife.¹²¹

Box 3.14: The Lebanese University¹²²

The Lebanese University was founded at the start of the fifties of the last century (1951-1953) in Beirut. It was organized under a 1959 decree, which also established permanent colleges, such as those of Humanities, Law, and Science, and the Social Science Institute. A 1967 law affirmed LU's independence from the country's political authorities. Since that time, however, LU has been on the decline and seen its theoretical independence weakened, thanks to the behavior of political and sectarian forces and their intervention in university affairs, whether directly or through legal regulations that gave Lebanon's political authorities wide prerogatives within LU, and particularly in appointments and the budget. The fifteen-year civil war completed this emasculation of the institution, partitioning it into separate branches, coinciding with a decline in teaching and administrative standards. Before the war, student and union associations called for the creation of LU branches outside the capital, under the slogan of administrative decentralization and balanced

120 See the review of this study and the results from 1998 in al-Amin, Adnan and Muhammad Fa'ur, 1998, *University Students and their Political Orientations, the Legacy of Divisions*, Beirut, Lebanese Association for Education and Science.

121 See Held, David, 1995, *Democracy and the Global Order, From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*, Polity Press, Cambridge-Oxford, pp. 135-140, and Habermas, J., *Après l'État-Nation*, op. cit., pp. 71-76.

122 Sources: Beydoun, Ahmad, 2006, "The New Draft Law on Organizing the Lebanese University: Proposed Structural Justifications," paper prepared for an Education Ministry workshop; Malaeb, Walid, 2008, "The Reality of the Lebanese University," in al-Anba', March 25, 2008; Favier, Agnès, 2000, "L'Université Libanaise: l'impossible réforme," *Maghreb-Machrek*, no. 169, July-September, pp. 87-99; UNESCO, UNDP, 1996, *Le système d'enseignement supérieur et l'Université libanaise. Éléments de diagnostic*, (ouvrage collectif), Beirut, MEHE.

(urban-rural) development. When the wartime situation “stabilized,” the situation switched to one of sectarian groups demanding their right to create these branches.

In addition to the fragmentation, bloating, lack of order and declining educational standards (Le système d'enseignement supérieur et l'Université Libanaise, 1996), LU may be described as a locus for the system of sectarianism and clientelism in Lebanon. In 1977, decree 122 endorsed the creation of LU branches outside the capital and cited the country's security situation and the inability of students to go to Beirut as a justification. This decree saw a rise in the number of LU students, as many could now study at the regional branches. However, the overall course of LU suffered, as the five branches (1-West Beirut, 2-East Beirut, 3-Tripoli, 4-Bekaa and 5-South) gathered students on a sectarian basis (94 per cent Muslim in Branch 1, 94 per cent Christian in Branch 2, with lower rates in the provinces (Favier, 2000, pp. 88-89)). The militias dominated these branches, by insisting on opening LU sections in their regions (Nabatieh, Aley) or by intervening in the appointment of professors and directors, or even in examinations. The Christian militias dominated Branch 2, Amal and Hizbullah Branches 1 and 5, while other branches were subject to various locally dominant forces.

Thus, despite the change in form and method, the postwar period saw no change in content, as politicization, patronage, sectarian and political division of resources, and influence were the fundamental criterion in running all LU affairs, even in many of the approaches adopted to institute reform. Moreover, professional associations were politicized and a number of representative bodies, such as the National Union of Lebanese University Students, which defended the interests of LU and its students, fell into abeyance.

Despite the creation of a university complex in Beirut, none of these critical matters has yet to be settled, , irrespective of the many reform projects, and despite the fact that LU has around 70,000 students (i.e., more than half of Lebanon's total number) in five regional branches, with seventeen colleges and forty-five departments (Malaeb, 2008). The discussion continues today between supporters of the reunification of LU, as an example of re-concentrating the state and achieving national cohesion after the war, and those who support retaining and improving the branches, and not reforming LU's educational, financial, and administrative aspects.

It is important to point out here that expectations of a long struggle between the “citizen-based” and “sectarian” models of political development should not overshadow the fact that political reform is in fact the fundamental act necessary for transcending sectarianism. This need for reform might properly be called “people's minds needing texts.”¹²³ Rather than accepting that this need exists, sectarian forces in Lebanon have ripped the term “accord” from the dictionary of political systems and professed to believe that the Lebanese system is deserving of it, not to mention their blind intoxication with the insipid jingle of “minds and texts.” Those in Islamic history who engaged in interpreting religious law were luckier when it came to striking a balance, as they used the term “consensus” for what Lebanese sectarians called “accord,” be this from shame or in order to disguise their actual goals.¹²⁴

123 See Beydoun, Ahmad, *Different Adventures*, op. cit., p. 62.

124 Until recently, a discussion in Lebanon of a “consensus-based system” was the province of specialists. The articles of Michel Chiha (the term “accord” was not used in his day) and the works of Antoine Messara constituted the reference-point for discussing this Lebanese formula for the regime. In recent years, “accord” has become even more prevalent, used by politicians and the media. The term has taken on a flexible aspect, with the result that the constitution, state institutions, and all laws and covenants are subject to perpetual negotiation. If something does not enjoy the consensus support of “the people,” it has no chance of being implemented. Elsewhere in this report, we have mentioned the difference in attitudes between political scientists with regard to this type of political regime. Things are made more

5.2 From Claims of Accord to the Impossibility of Consensus

However, what could, have been described as “accord” (*tawafuq*) has in fact become a request for “consensus” (*ijma'*) as a political formula for the country. Such a formula cannot be operational, if this consensus is not adhered to, at least during the last three years. In the last year, this demand has taken the form of calling for a “national unity government,” put forward equally by the pro-government and opposition camps, as the preferred system for governing Lebanon. The conflict between the two sides was limited to the numbers or percentages of cabinet seats that each camp should have the right to hold during the formation of the new government. The current crisis demonstrates that this social acceptance that consensus should be a

difficult in the Lebanese case, as it is unique among its “consensus”-based counterparts in the world, in which citizens, based on their rights, enter compulsorily-drawn categories (sectarian, ethnic or other). We find this mention of “uniqueness” in Schnapper, Dominique, in Baechler, Jean et al., *La Nation*, op. cit. p. 161. See also the principal words of Messara in this regard: Messara, Antoine Nasri, 1983, *Le Modèle politique libanais et sa Survie*, Beirut, LU, and 1994, *Théorie générale du Système politique libanais*, Paris, Cariscript, and a discussion of the Lebanese experience in light of general “accord”-based regimes in Hudson, Michael, “The Problem of Authoritative Power in Lebanese Politics: Why Consociationalism Failed” in Shehadi, Nadim and Dana Haffar Mills, 1988, *Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus*, London, Center for Lebanese Studies, and I. Tauris, pp. 224-239.

structural formula of governance is fast becoming a steadfast norm.¹²⁵

This new “structural formula” is distinct from the “decision-making formula,” in that the latter is concerned with the presence of a majority and a minority during decision-making. In this formative approach, debates between two political camps is limited to arguing over whether the system should depend on consensus and whether the minority can oust the majority if the latter refuses to comply with its demands. This practice is completely new in Lebanon's political practices, regardless whether the first formula, or the second, or both formulas are employed. But what is the significance of each formula and what brought about this situation to begin with?

Under this new formula, the government, in its political make-up, is a miniaturized image of parliament, and the country's political society. This implies the practical elimination of the opposition in the conception of the political system. However, upon closer examination, it appears that this opposition has not been abolished, but has instead entered government, despite differences in political views between its bloc and other blocs represented. The disparity of political views is then either successfully camouflaged in ministerial decrees, which are usually produced with great difficulty, or is made explicit, thus putting into question the credibility of these statements. In any case, the debate as to whether to keep the opposition outside the government or accept its presence within the cabinet reveals at every point of disagreement a rather jarring political revelation, namely that there is neither ruling party nor opposition. Needless to say, this situation impedes the formation of a common public sphere conducive to the construction and expansion of civic identities.

In the Lebanese case, confusing the government with the opposition and merging them indicates how consensus has been fabricated to form governments and exercise political power. Both short or long answers

125 None of this was altered the creation by the Arab Initiative to end the May 2008 civil strife, in the final stage of the crisis, of a “third bloc” that would guarantee the president of the Republic (who does not vote) a “deciding vote,” or more accurately the power of arbitration. Such a capacity had no constitutional basis, and would generate, if accepted, a wager of prevailing political “winds.” Such a capacity would rob the president of his political immunity, since it would be labeled sectarian, and destroying this presumed status would be dangerous at the first important juncture. A losing party would presumably turn against the president in such a case and attribute his actions to sectarian reasons. This is a reason that sectarian forces in the country could not establish without by so doing splitting the ruling front once again, and

can be formulated in response to the question of how Lebanon has reached this principle of consensus. The short answer involves how we describe the course of Lebanese political society since the formation of the modern Lebanese state. The first factor to consider here is the interaction between societal forces and the formation of national identity. The second factor to consider is the relationship among these groupings and sects; that is, the successive modes of political sectarian representation and the space allotted to non-sectarian political groupings. The long answer may or may not adhere to a series of historical incidents which have formed the country's historical path during various epochs. For the purpose of this report, a response between the long and short will be adopted, with all the risks and difficulties that this entails.

VI. DEADLOCK OVER LEBANON AS A “POLITICAL ENTITY”

It is popularly stated that when the modern state of Lebanon was created, it was renown as the country with half its citizens described as enemies to this entity. In other words, various groups that lived within the geographic borders of what became Greater Lebanon advocates alternative arrangements. This does not mean that the other half of the “people” was unequivocally in support of this new nation or state. The latter portion of the population was in support of the new state in so far as it was considered the accomplishment of the specific community to which the portion of the population belonged. In fact, a series of historical events since that time, in Lebanon have highlighted a dynamic confrontation between these two camps.

Concepts such as citizenship, the state, and the nation continue to be contested, and are certainly important when it comes to defining national identity in Lebanon. It would be an exaggeration to claim that a national identity arose that encompassed both the residents of “Old Lebanon” (pre-1920) and those who were annexed

with it the country. In fact, what is proposed here would create a quasi-presidential system, robbed of legitimacy and stability, because there is no direct election of the president, while candidacy is the exclusive right of only a part of the “voters.” This constitutional contradiction indirectly leads us to the other contradiction (political or actual), which is the assumption of consensus over the governance system. In stating the above, we do not wish to pass judgment, whether positively or negatively, on any attempt to re-start constitutional institutions, which are paralyzed or otherwise blocked today. We want to point out that this re-operationalization (which is clearly needed) will not be a “solution” for the crisis as long as it does not treat the origin of the problem, and will not prevent its re-appearance .

to the country under the French Mandate (from the South, the North, and the Bekaa). However, these “new” Lebanese and those with similar political interests from within “Old Lebanon” seized all available opportunities to improve the conditions of their membership in the new “entity” and their involvement in its institutions, both during the period from independence to 1958, up to the eve of the long civil war, and up to the Taif Accord. Although resistance toward the “Lebanese entity” and its system appeared in various forms, none of the chief opposition groups was truly “unionist,” seeking to dissolve Lebanon and merge it with another political entity. In fact, decade after decade, these groups became more strongly attached to the notion of Lebanon, seeking to improve their positions within the political system. To leverage their positions, some factions

allowed certain regional or foreign parties to become involved in domestic matters, claiming that an improvement of ties with these foreign powers was a national necessity. Foreign and national interests rarely overlapped, while foreign powers naturally safeguarded their interests first. The foundations for a Lebanese national identity were established early on; however, sectarian conflict, especially when the factions sought to shift the balance of power, prevented it from becoming dominant. This national identity grew during a fevered struggle over the (sectarian) rights it entailed, becoming stronger during the various phases of this struggle. In the end, the idea of a single Lebanese national identity became strong enough¹²⁶ to spur the kind of struggle we see today, in which each side is in fact competing over who is more “patriotic” than the other.

Box 3.15: From the Catastrophe of Palestine to the Lebanese War: The Collapse of the Arab state System

The Palestine “Catastrophe” (*nakba*) of 1948 greatly weakened the Arab state system, as represented by the Arab League, and “exposed” the true nature of the Lebanese arena in the face of the Arab world’s confrontations over a full decade. In geopolitical terms, the British were on the retreat as they moved from supporting “Arab unity” during World War I to fiercely defending their position, as a string of coup d’états began to take place in the region. The entire logic of the Lebanese-Syrian relationship changed during the period of coups in Damascus.

Thus the pillars of the Lebanese system’s political “immunity” began to weaken or collapse from the period of the early independence era, even though Beirut attracted Arab capital fleeing from Palestine. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel-Nasser, Britain’s leading rival in the Arab world, inherited the support of certain Lebanese Muslim political circles, while the country’s leading Christian force moved toward requesting western protection for Lebanon’s security and system. The “1958 Uprising,” supported by the United Arab Republic (a merged Egypt and Syria), erupted in the face of then-President Camille Chamoun.

This uprising ended with an American military deployment on the outskirts of Beirut and an understanding between the US and Egypt (and Syria, due to its unification with the latter) that saw the election of the commander of the army, Fuad Shehab, as president. Shehab’s approach to Lebanese-Arab relations was a kind of reprise of early independence period policy, while on domestic matters Shehab was characterized by greater seriousness about reform, which had been discussed by the administration of President Beshara Khoury. Shehab anchored his rule on this understanding, backed by Lebanese Muslim politicians who became prominent during his presidency. Meanwhile, key Christian groups persistently and violently opposed this Shehabist era.

With the Arabs’ defeat in the June 1967 war, Nasser’s backing for Shehabism weakened, as the Egyptian president became personally involved, through the 1969 Cairo Accord, in weakening Lebanon’s stability. The Palestinian resistance, which had ensconced itself in Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps and elsewhere during the previous year, resulted from the Egyptian and Syrian desire to “remove the traces of the (1967) aggression,” and both countries wanted to influence this resistance to serve their own ends. Thus, the Lebanese state began to corrode, leading ultimately to the civil war, which began with a split between Lebanese supporters and opponents of armed Palestinian action against Israel. During the war, the Palestinians served as the Muslims’ leading armed force, or at least one of the sources from which these were drawn. Lebanese supporters of Palestinian arms also represented a challenge to decades of Christian political predominance. This battle was waged by Lebanese groups that had found an opportunity to remove opponents or victors, within each sectarian group, or in the same geographical region.

The Impact of the Syrian Role

While we cannot cover the entire Lebanese civil war here, it is sufficient to recall that the 1982 Israeli invasion was a decisive moment, as the Palestinians’ fighting force was ejected from Lebanon. The war ended with a US-Syrian understanding

126 On the issue of identity in Lebanon, see “The Identity of the Lebanese: an Attempt at an Overview” in Beydoun, Ahmad, 1999, *The Dismembered Republic: Destinies for the Lebanese*

Formula after Taif, Beirut, Dar An-Nahar, p. 479-499; also “The Arabness of Lebanon and Its Embodiment in the Taif Agreement,” in Beydoun, Ahmad, *Different Adventures*, ibid, p.77-93.

that was forged amid the circumstances of the Gulf War of 1991. The first domestic result of the Syrian political role was the weakening of Christian political forces through the imprisonment or exile of the community's most prominent leaders, after they had been weakened in internecine battles following the Taif Accord. The second result was the delegation of the task of rebuilding and revitalizing civil life to the rising Sunni leader, Rafiq al-Hariri. Al-Hariri enjoyed a relative margin of maneuver - although the supervising power (Syria) continued to look on - as well as a network of contacts, and financial clout. This gave him a presence that transcended his sect during the first years in office, while his sect became fiercely partisan to him when Syria began to turn against him. Al-Hariri's presence was also strengthened by his ability to deliver services, relying on his personal financial capabilities. The third effect of the Syrian role was the concentration of Shiite political activity on a pair of concerns. One was privileged access to state resources, in the sense that these were not to be allowed to escape from the logic of political patronage into that of effective development or to rise to the level of a true partnership in rebuilding the country politically and economically. The second concern focused on resistance aimed at liberating the occupied south from the Israeli enemy. This resistance enjoyed joint Syrian-Iranian sponsorship and has remained connected, even after liberation, to these two states' insistence on retaining an open front with Israel that brings them no significant direct consequences. The fourth consequence of the Syrian role has been the revival of the Druze political dichotomy of Jumblatt versus Arslan, after the latter had been marginalized by the civil war.

6.1 The Tribulations of Citizenship

The crystallization of the sects or communities as dominant forces in society prevents a national identity from overcoming other, sub-national, identities. It also prevents the emergence of a formula that might render citizenship the basis of the political system and thus give the system necessary immunity and strength to deal with ongoing changes in society, the region, and the world. No system whatsoever can hold out against these transformations even if it ignores the challenge they pose to its ability to adapt and adjust. Despite differing circumstances, resources, alliances, and historical legacies the crystallization moved in one single direction, namely a type of union (or some practical equivalent thereof) between the sect and its political leader thus impacting the political order as a whole. The civil war and its aftermath were both a key era in this move toward making the political identification of each sect or community and one single leadership synonymous.

Today, this overlap between sect and leader presents a very difficult problem for the sectarian system, namely the absence of the viable alternatives sectarian leaders within individual sects that were available in the past. It has become the distinguishing mark of the absolute power of sectarianism in the era of its greatest impotence. From this perspective, it is a powerful obstacle to the firm establishment of a national identity, or the appearance of citizens as a political force. It dictates that sectarian conflict dominate all confrontations, not only within political society but in all other areas of national life. The proposed reforms we hear about today are not based on a clear desire for reform by the groups theoretically able to take such an initiative, but on the general failure of the sectarian

system's ruling groups - and of the actual principle of political sectarianism - to successfully manage the system, and the country along with it. We see this dilemma in the urgent need for civic reform of the political system (i.e., both the system of rule and the foundations of the formation of political society) and in the weakness of political will directed toward this end. This is indeed Lebanon's dilemma today.

6.2 Sectarianism has a History...

To understand this country's contemporary history, one must take into account the simple fact that Lebanese sectarianism and the political system built upon it have a history. However, we see little attention paid to the nature of the relationship, in each era, between the changes in inter- and intra-sect relations and structures on the one hand, and the political order's ability to carry out its public functions and deal with its crises on the other. Sectarianism and the political order have a history in the sense that each difficult period has led from one phase to another. They have a history in the sense that no major crisis through which they have passed can be a repetition of an earlier one. Rather they should be considered an ongoing development that poses questions about the future of the system and the sectarian formula governing it, while generating different answers each time.

Recently, specialists and non-specialists alike have tended to assume the existence of cycles, each of which begins with a crisis and ends with a settlement, which in turn leads to another crisis. They have monitored the repeated major crises in Lebanon's modern history, even if these crises have differed in their form and their impact. Specialists have tended to highlight two types of crisis in which they find an essential similarity. At

the domestic level, they believe, a crisis takes shape when a rising sect seeking to make ground takes on another that is dominant and well entrenched. At the external level, the eruption of a major crisis requires the existence of a major conflict, with an international dimension, in the region, according to which the two domestic players align themselves, or which, more accurately, align the two players. The crisis creates a partnership or union between the two domestic and the foreign actors, which is amplified as the crisis proceeds. Each incident in the crisis, and each of its phases, thus has two readings, put forward simultaneously: one delves into the domestic motives for the incident or development, while the other delves into foreign motives.¹²⁷ As the foreign actor supplies the conflict with a principle component of its material and political assets, and provides a depth that is indispensable for its domestic protagonists. the foreign actor ends up obliged the former to perform tasks in which the foreign party's interest, as "the commissioner of the project" wins out, to a greater or lesser degree, over that of the local, or "contracting," party. Despite this, the project of the local "contractor" and its requirements remain a burden that the foreign "commissioner" cannot avoid bearing.

VII. DEMOCRACY AND CONSOCIATIONAL SYSTEMS

This schematic representation of the phases of Lebanon's political history from the mid-19th century to the present appears to be clear. However, we lack considerable amounts of information and thus clarity of the historic evolution of the different sects in relation to changing political circumstances. While we cannot list here all of the detailed changes in the make-up and goals of Lebanon's principal sects or even their varied visions for Lebanon, it would be quite useful to review Lebanon's modern history, focusing on the interplay among sects and relations with regional and geopolitical struggles. This could be the unifying project for a history of modern Lebanon that considers the role of its sects, their relationships

to power and interactions with external powers and its subsequent impact on Lebanon. Suffice to say at this point that the increased "crystallization" of sects or communities into self enclosed entities weakens the political system's ability to adapt to the dictates of each new phase. This weakness, which is at its peak today, is reflected in the absence of sectarian alternatives when sectarian groups cannot agree. It then becomes impossible to move forward, as the state's ability to arbitrate and end political stalemate disappears as well.

7.1 Consociation: Impact and Limits

In recent decades, the Lebanese political system has been labeled "consociational," using a term that has become popular in the works of the American political scientist Arend Lijphart.¹²⁸ Naturally, the phenomenon long predates this term, and such systems often inspire heated debate among those who study them.¹²⁹ Partisans of such a system call it an appropriate alternative to such unpalatable options as class struggle; an existing or potential tyranny by group or alliance of groups against other groups in an (ethnically, linguistically, religiously, etc.) diverse country; or "aggression" by the majority in a democratic system or by the dominant power in non-democratic systems, which opposes the rights of marginalized minorities. Opponents of consociationalism say that in many cases it fails to produce a stable or effective formula of rule. They believe that in most cases it widens differences and exacerbates conflict among groups, instead of promoting solidarity and cohesiveness. Certainly, vertical differences in a given society do not necessarily require consociationalism as a form of democracy, since such differences exist in all societies. Consociationalism starts out as a possible cure for the politicizing or politicization of these differences, but we end up with "thick borders" that delineate such a society's political map. We end up witnessing the freezing of the consociational formula and a return to civil strife every time there is a meaningful change in the given country's balance of power - i.e., a return to the problem that the formula was supposed to cure.¹³⁰

127 For a proposed typology of the Lebanese civil wars, see Choueiri, Youssef, 2007, "Explaining Civil Wars in Lebanon" in Choueiri, Y. (ed), *Breaking the Cycle, Civil Wars in Lebanon*, London, Stacey International, p. 21.

128 Lijphart has written many books and articles, some of which deal with the consociational regime of a given state (Holland, his native country; Belgium; South Africa, etc.) and others comparing these regimes. He has also written on the theory of consociationalism. His authoritative work on the matter is Lijphart, Arend, 1977, *Democracy in Plural Societies: a*

Comparative Exploration, New Haven-London, Yale University Press.

129 We will rely here on the conclusions vis-à-vis such regimes in the report by Brendan O'Leary, based on the UNDP's World Human Development Reports, 2004-2009. O'Leary is a supporter of the consociational formula but also accurately discusses criticism of it; see his "*Building Inclusive States*," Background Paper for HDR, 2004, UNDP.

130 For the arguments of the opponents, see O'Leary, op. cit., pp. 22-26.

But democracy is not necessarily equivalent to Consociationalism; the former may be realized wherever the latter is realized. Even if consociation arises among different parties, the question of how much democracy is achieved, given the socio-political formation of each party remains a legitimate one, and the answer to it will affect the nature of the whole project. No accord among parties whose political representation, or part of whose political representation, is characterized by authoritarianism can be considered democratic.¹³¹ We should bear this in mind as we consider the character of the Lebanese political system, i.e., at the existing Consociationalism among groups in a political society ruled by sectarianism and

at the degree to which the different parties exhibit democratic characteristics.

We should also examine changes in Consociationalism, based on various events during the country's modern history and the transformations that the various sects have undergone. We should consider whether Consociationalism generally steers the sectarian system closer to or farther away from democracy. Finally, we should ask whether this movement helps anchor the political regime as a system of rule, rendering it more suitable to society's needs and more effective in managing problems, or whether instead it works to exacerbate crises, leading to political paralysis. (See Box 3.16 below).

Box 3.16: Attitudes toward Democracy (Data from the field)

Democrats by Necessity, Not Conviction

In 2006, close to 70 per cent of Lebanese polled seemed to accept the particular form of consociational democracy (power sharing) that characterizes Lebanon. At the same time more than 50 per cent also accepted a majoritarian system of governance, while another third found the one-party system adequate. Some of these results were affected by sect, age, and education.

Attitudes towards Democracy and Governance

There are many countries that, like ours, have a variety of different groups - language groups, religious groups, ethnic groups and others. Together these countries have different systems of government and there are differing opinions about the best system

	1987	2002	2006
"The country must be partitioned and each group should found its own state."	4	11	9
"The strongest group should govern. The other groups must accept what this group decides."	20	8	6
"The numerically strongest group should govern. The other groups must accept what this group decides."	6	12	10
"One group should govern, and groups that don't like it must leave the country."	10	9	6
"One single party that everybody can join should govern without an opposition."	35	28	33
"Everybody votes for the party of their choice. The party or parties that win form the government; the other parties remain in the opposition."	71	54	51
"Everybody votes for the party they want, but the government should be formed on the principle that all groups should have a share of power." ^[1]	80	65	68

[1] In 1987 the item read: "Given the nature of Lebanese society, all important political decisions must have the agreement of all large communities." The new formulation was chosen to facilitate international comparisons. Source: Hanf, Theodor, 2007, p.39. However, responses to other statements indicate that many respondents advocate a power-sharing system for reasons other than conviction. As Hanf states, "... the Lebanese are in favor of a system of democratic power-sharing because they do not see any alternative. A majority are democrats by conviction, and a larger majority by necessity" (Hanf, *ibid.*, p. 42).

Reasons for Power Sharing

	1981	1984	1986	1987	2002	2006
"Because of the nature of Lebanese society, important decisions need the agreement of all large communities."	*	*	*	80	77	90
"Lebanon won't have a strong and united government until authentic representatives of the communities have a share in power."	67	79	73	66	72	86

Agreement in percentages, rounded; * Between 70 per cent and 80 per cent; Source: Hanf, *ibid.*, p. 42.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 66, etc.

A more recent poll conducted by the Lebanese Opinion Advisory Committee indicates a rise in support for equal representation between Muslims and Christians in Parliament, as called for by the Taif Accord. In tandem, the number of individuals who do not support this arrangement and instead support a non-confessional Parliament dropped almost by half in 2007 and rose again in 2008; meanwhile, we have seen steady support for the distribution of parliamentary seats based on proportional representation of each confession. These results can perhaps be explained by the rise in sectarian tensions and skirmishes in the aftermath of Israel's July 2006 war on Lebanon and the sit-in, led by the domestic "opposition," that took over downtown Beirut for almost a year and a half.

Finally, these results indicate the extent to which attitudes toward democracy in Lebanon are also driven by political events, particularly the political and military turbulence of the past three years.

Attitudes towards Confessional Distribution of Seats (%)

Which one of these views is closest to your own?	July 2006	Nov-Dec 2006	May-June 2007	March- April 2008
Equal number of seats in parliament for Muslims and Christians	63	55	70	66
Seats should not be allocated according to confession	15	23	12	20
Seats should be allocated to confessions in proportion to their population size	20	21	19	13
No answer	2	1	--	1

Source: LOAC, IRI, and Statistics Lebanon, *Perceptions of Politics, Leadership and Current Events in Lebanon*, Fieldwork conducted 14 May to 11 June 2007, p. 11 (http://www.lebaneseopinion.org/upload/Analysis-WITH_SLIDES.pdf)

Consociationalism represents only one way (albeit it may be questioned whether it is indeed a unitary concept) of sharing or dividing power. Systems such as federalism and confederalism do not necessarily constitute Consociationalism (the United States, Germany and Australia, for example, are federal without being consociational).¹³² Meanwhile, divisions of power can take place in undemocratic systems, given that democracy arises from the relationship between the political authority and citizens, and not, in the first instance, from the nature of the relationship among the parties wielding authority (Communist-era Yugoslavia, for example, featured a division of power but lacked democracy). Critics say that consociational systems usually freeze a particular political formula, considered "sacred" or eternal, to avoid the continuous calls to arms that the mere call for its re-examination would cause. This type of system therefore consigns to the trashcan any examination of the continuous change that society and its preoccupations of necessity undergo. The formula eventually produces civil conflict, as division replaces accord.¹³³ These systems have complicated structures and awkward decision-making principles. In many cases, the decision-making process is characterized by slowness and weak content. This is because such decisions involve concluding "settlements" among opposing groups that have contradictory demands.¹³⁴ This last point of criticism might seem the least sound, were it not for the fact that in some

countries, with regard to certain issues and under certain conditions, the slowness of the decision-making process leads to considerable public harm. Often arising in the wake of conflict, such systems further weaken political society and orient it toward a climate of conflict and violence that the system was set up to cure. Finally, consociational formulas tolerate vetoes by different groups in the executive branch of government. This scenario involves several conditions: the agreement should predate what we call in Lebanon the country's "fixed fundamentals," i.e., principles that guide detailed policies in various domains; the conditions under which a veto can be used should be clearly spelled out; and the law should contain a "way out" of any dilemma or crisis that leads to the use of this veto (such as Switzerland's resort in certain cases to referendum, for example).

Two observations are called for here: one is that the relatively few successful models of consociationalism are considered attractive; (the Swiss case is perhaps the most well known success story, although it differs decisively from others. camouflage its relative failure in most other contexts) This observation is true of majoritarian democratic models as well. From this perspective there is a need to consider domestic political and social developments as more important than the view of the political regime that takes diversity as the singular trait of society. It becomes clear that

¹³² Ibid., pp. 75 ff.

¹³³ Ibid., pp. 23-24.

¹³⁴ Ibid, p. 65.

the existence of a political space that is independent (of tribal or religious group solidarity, for example) is problematic. The second observation is that the models of consociationalism that have been tried throughout the world are so diverse that critics of Lijphart have argued that they should not be grouped under the same category.¹³⁵

7.2 The Civic Management of Diversity

Most importantly, Consociationalism is not the only model implemented or the only one that is theoretically possible for the democratic management of diversity in societies with such vertical divisions. The first assumption of Consociationalism is that the principle of political representation should take these vertical differences as the chief, if not the only, basis the distribution of power among the different politically recognized groups. . .

On the other hand, for the sake of comparison, there are democracies in the world with many vertically organized units (most notably the United States), whose system is oriented toward the protection of minorities (and majorities too) not by distributing shares among these groups but by banning any form of discrimination that undermines the equality between citizens or in other words by prohibiting the use of a person's membership to a vertical group as a basis for granting or denying the rights of citizenship.¹³⁶ In Lebanon, one may inform a citizen that a given state post is not his or her "right," because he or she is from the "wrong" sect, while an American, whether in the public or private domain, who tells a fellow-citizen such a thing might end up in prison. This is appropriate in the US, a country made up of immigrants and people from different origins, as well as in countries that have until recently exhibited ethnic homogeneity but that lately have become culturally diverse, such as France. The latter has adopted a majoritarian system in which minorities confront major problems

of assimilation. The system in place, however, manages to absorb such problems by ensuring that citizens enjoy their fundamental democratic rights. This allows these citizens to engage with the authorities, over their social rights and status in society at large.¹³⁷

These cases demonstrate totally contradictory principles for identifying and protecting citizen's rights. In the American case (and in the case of democracy itself), rights are attributed to individual human beings, or citizens, and it is unthinkable (or at least efforts are exerted to make it unthinkable) that the affiliation of these individuals with a sub-national group should either reduce or reinforce these rights. In the Lebanese case, rights are granted to these primordial and traditional groups, since individuals only receive them as members of these groups. Discrimination takes place among Lebanese, based on the group to which they belong. In the Lebanese case, a multi-sectarian society is reproduced in miniature in the political system; in the American case, the system protects diversity in one of the world's most complex societies. Thanks, however, to the rule of law and the principles of politics and civil action, the American system does not need to turn into a map of traditional-natural society. Along with safeguarding this diversity, and indeed before concerning itself with this, the system seeks to systemprotect individual citizens from the tendency to authoritarianism of groups, whether their own or that of another that might be hostile to it. While both the success of the American system and the failure of the Lebanese in reaching their objectives are controversial, we have seen fifty years of success in the one and of failure in the other. It could be rightly said that the US suffered for two centuries from considerable violence and discrimination, as it moved from slavery to the possibility of electing the first person of color as president. It could also be added that the US system has always exhibited a dominant group that preserved its unity, i.e., the "WASPs"; but these two features appear to be on the wane, while the unity of society does not appear to be suffering (see Box 3.17 below).

Box 3.17: Attitudes toward Sectarianism and the Sectarian Political System (Significant Field Data)

Differing surveys highlight contradictory attitudes of the Lebanese toward political sectarianism in Lebanon. While they long for a "civil" state, in their words, they support the current sectarian division of power. This disparity indicates a prevalent fear among citizens of each other and of being unjustly deprived of their rights.

135 Grofman, Bernard, 1997, *Arend Lijphart and the New 'Institutionalism'*, Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine.

136 See the summary of the conditions of the American experience and the difficulty of adopting it when these conditions do not obtain in O'Leary, op. cit., pp. 79-81.

137 It cannot be said cannot say that these minorities remain, in this conflict, at the same point as they have been for some decades, or that society continues to hold the same attitudes about their problems, nor will the claim that the majoritarian democratic regime is the true reason for these problems hold water.

A study conducted by Université St. Joseph in 2004 indicates that the attitudes of Lebanese are equally divided with regard to the relationship between sectarianism and national unity. Results show that while around 45.5 per cent believe that sectarianism directly contradicts national unity another 42.3 per cent find that it contributes to this unity. These figures differ considerably from one sect to another, with 54.5 per cent of Muslims believing that political sectarianism contradicts national unity, while one third of Christians (33 per cent) believe otherwise. However, when the question is posed to Lebanon as a whole, the percentage of those who believe that sectarianism is in direct contradiction to national unity rises to 63.3 per cent, while 25.4 per cent considered that it contributes positively and another 11 per cent abstained from responding. Within communities, the percentage of those who consider sectarianism contradicts national unity is also high (see Indicators for further details).

Sectarianism and National Unity in General

	Christians	Muslims	Druze
Sectarianism Contradicts National Unity in Lebanon	39.72	54.5	66.1
Sectarianism Contributes to National Unity in Lebanon	57.7	31	10.7
No Response	8.57	14.52	23.2

Sectarianism and National Unity in Lebanon

	Christians	Muslims	Druze
Sectarianism Contradicts National Unity in Lebanon	66.42	60.66	69.6
Sectarianism Contributes to National Unity in Lebanon	25.87	25.7	14.3
No Response	7.7	13.62	16.1

Source: Mourad, *ibid*, p. 18.- Note: Given the dramatic political crisis that has plagued Lebanon since the survey was conducted and the current political polarization in the country these figures may have changed.

In another study, conducted by Hanf in 2006 to uncover certain attitudes of Lebanese to the relationship between politics and religion and other matters, it appeared that the largest portion of respondents supported a division between the two.

Religion and Politics

	1981	1984	1986	1987	2002	2006
"One should not mix religion and politics."	84	84	87	93	78	79
"The best solution to Lebanon's present dilemma is a completely secular state and society."	*	75	52	63	57	65
"Every Lebanese should have the right to join a secularized community that has the same rights as the other communities - personal status law, political representation, etc."	*	*	*	50	54	70
"It doesn't matter what anyone wants, secularization doesn't seem to have a chance in Lebanon. Community membership is a reality you have to accept."	*	*	*	54	64	69

Agreement in per cent; *Not asked; Source: Hanf, *ibid* p. 46.

Despite this stated interest in separating religion from politics, the percentage of those requesting this separation has decreased from an overwhelming 93 per cent in 1987 during the civil war to 79 per cent in 2006. Similarly, despite increasing acceptance of the enforcement of the 1936 law that establishes a secular community that one can opt into, enjoying the same rights as other religious communities, an equal percentage believe that the current sectarian structure is one that can neither be bypassed nor overcome. This latter figure is interesting in itself, since it indicates the first instance of clear majority support for this policy since 1987. To a certain extent, these results indicate tendencies among Lebanese, who, on the one hand, would like a modern, functioning, and sectarian state and, on the other, accept the reality of the sectarian structure in Lebanon (see Box 3.10 on Attitudes toward Civil Status Laws and Inter-Religious Marriage).

This pragmatism is further expressed in answers to other questions, such as which group has the most influence in Lebanon and whether the system can be changed in the near future. The first suggests that for the Lebanese, the once powerful pre-war influence of the traditional *zu'ama*¹³⁸ and the wartime power of political party leaders (and militia heads) has been overtaken by religious leaders. The power of ministers and military figures has also decreased. However, in light of political tensions over the past two years, these figures may have well changed to the advantage of traditional political leaders and former militia leaders. At the same time, the second expresses the desire of individuals for change even though they know it is difficult to achieve.

138 *Zu'ama'* (plural) are traditional notables who lead the populace and negotiate compromises between family, regional, communal, and personal interests. For an in-depth investigation see

Gilsenan Michael, 1996, *Lords of the Lebanese Marches; Violence & Narrative in an Arab Society*, London, I. B. Tauris and the Center for Lebanese Studies.

Group Influence in Lebanon

	before 1975[1]	1981	1984	1986	1987	2002	2006
Zu'ama'	57	6	17	18	38	27	24
Religious leaders	11	7	10	12	3	7	23
Party leaders	4	54	38	41	30	10	13
Large landowners	7	4	7	2	2	2	12
Ministers	9	1	-	3	1	20	11
Military officers	4	5	6	6	3	12	9
Bankers	2	5	5	-	8	3	5
Merchants	3	13	16	17	14	3	2
Industrialists	2	4	1	--	1	1	1

[1] Estimated in the survey of 1981; Source: Ibid p. 26.

Sectarianism and the Political System

	1987	2002	2006
"The system has been flawed from its inception because it institutionalises the separation of the various communities. For this reason it should be replaced by a system more appropriate for a country aspiring to modernity."			83
"The Lebanese have reached a level of maturity that helps them get past sectarian isolation. And we will be able to build a new political system in the near future."			78
"Come what may, our communities are rooted in society and are not going to disappear. In the long run their power and resilience will stand in the way of important changes."			76
"Considering the reality of Lebanese society, this system is acceptable, and if correctly applied, it can work."			75
"Perhaps it doesn't look like it, but it is possible that the political system can be changed in the near future."	35	50	77
"The strength of the different communities makes fundamental long-term change in the political system impossible."	52	62	71

Source: Hanf, ibid, p. 44.

Youth Attitudes towards Inter-Religious Marriage

	Do not agree	Agree	Don't know	No answer
(F1b) Candidacy and voting in parliamentary elections should be based on support of / from clergymen	55.8	33.4	9.6	1.2
(F2b) When I can vote, we - my family and I - should vote for the same candidate	63.5	23	12	1.4
(F7b) Each sect should educate its own and provide scholarships for them	29.4	64.6	5	1
(F3b) Ministries and civil sector posts should be equally distributed among the zaims	19.3	72.6	6.8	1.2
(F4b) The State's top three posts should go to the leaders of the three main sects	28.7	58.4	11.8	1.2

Some of these attitudes seem to have become even more ingrained among Lebanese young people today. A survey conducted by the NHDR on Education and Citizenship indicated that at least one-third of 14-15 year old students believe that parliamentary elections should be based on the approval of religious authorities; 72 per cent that ministries and public sector positions should be allocated among the religious groups and close to 60 per cent that the current system of allocating the three top positions in the state to the different religious groups is acceptable. When cross-correlated with other questions and sample characteristics, these attitudes were found to be coupled with a decrease in social tolerance and the acceptance of democratic decision-making processes. These responses support answers to an earlier study on the consequences for democracy of separating religion from the state. An overwhelming 48 per cent of Lebanese students thought that this would be bad for democracy.

Youth Attitudes on the Separation of Religion and State

	Very bad/sort of bad for democracy	Very good/sort of good for democracy	Don't know	No answer
(A14) The separation of religion and state will be ...	48.3	41	9.1	1.7

Source: UNDP, MEHE, CDR, 2008.

7.3 A Many-Sided Balance

For decades in Lebanon, the dominant sectarian blocs had a “lighter” as well as certain types of discrimination had less of an impact. Today, we have arrived at a strong sense of equality among various groups, or the right to such equality. It has become unacceptable for one group to dominate another, whatever the size and strength of such groups. The scholar Régis Debray has proposed calling this phenomenon “catastrophic equality.”¹³⁹ Perhaps this, rather than any emulation of regional examples, paved the way for the end of the Muslim-Christian dichotomy and the inclination of sectarian groups to move toward the playing-field, each brandishing its special identity, transcending political alliances. Today there are four significant sectarian groups of which three are Muslim (Sunni, Shi'a, and Druze). Contrary to appearances the fissures seem to be greater on the Muslim side. Moreover, these four communities could well become six so-called “big sects,” (whereby the Christians are divided into Maronite, Orthodox and Catholic) or even nine, if the smaller sects, and secular individuals, form abstract units with specific legal demands even if they do not, of necessity, take the form of political blocs. In any case, from now on, with the increasing number of vertical 'groups' it appears that one of the conditions for the sustenance of consociationalism, namely a limited number of parties, appears to have been lost.¹⁴⁰ The inability to establish a form of geographical federalism also renders this situation more impossible. In this context, this “catastrophic equality,” with the exponential rise in the number of political players that it involves, will make the continuation of the sectarian formula as the mainstay for governing the country an impossibility.

In sum, the Lebanese case appears to resemble the famous title of Kamal Salibi's book *A House of Many Mansions*, one that has come to resemble a weighing

scale with many pans, which rises and falls according to the weights placed in or removed from them. As long as the sectarian principle alone governs the system, the argument remains valid that the various weights in the scale (the sectarian formula) remain stable, whatever happens, since they carry “eternal” identities, and do not represent political forces whose goals change over time. This “eternal” or essentialist argument and its related formula produce a system that falls ill, to varying degrees, whenever anything changes in the country or in the world. Such a system becomes upset when the birth rate in a given sect rises, or when the emigration rate rises in another, when education and money becomes more available, when people descend from rural areas to the outskirts of cities looking for work, or when a foreign country begins addressing a group that has not been paid attention to for a long period of time, and so forth.

This is not all that there is to say about consociationalism. We prefer to look closely at the specific conditions of the Lebanese model as it really is, and judge it according to the same values and objectives that it uses to judge its own adherence to democracy, leaving aside any attempt to cast an objective light on particular features of its image that may be used for comparison with other situations. Saying that Lebanese consociationalism has protected the rights of sects from each other leads us to ask about the nature of these rights that have been protected, or are being protected. The rights of vertical cultural, religious, or linguistic groups are usually cited as requiring protection, along with the idea that each group should be tasked with this protection, under the law. This is the communal (or collective) domain of the sects, and nothing indicates that it was seriously threatened at any point in Lebanon's contemporary history. Everything else is common ground that brings us back to the rights and duties of citizens, and to the Citizen's state and its considerations. Proponents of consociationalism acknowledge, for example, that the

¹³⁹ Private conversation, in which we discussed with Debray this rejection, which resulted in the rest of the Lebanese sects, as a result of the war, to accepting the

predominance of one of their number.

¹⁴⁰ As for the low number of parties, as a condition of consensus-based stability, see O'Leary, *ibid.*, pp. 68-70.

principle of already-defined shares of political representation for primordial groups has nothing to do with democracy. If they accept this in order to protect the minimum level of rights of a small group, they never endorse it as a general principle for the formation of the entire political system.¹⁴¹ This squeamishness has two causes whose validity may easily be scrutinized in the Lebanese context. The first is that, in Lebanon, dividing up representation in parliament, the cabinet and top state positions on the basis of sectarian “shares” has encouraged the entrenchment of sects in opposing camps, and the spread of blatant sectarianism to political organizations. Victory by sects in parliamentary elections and participation in governments form a principle force for their construction and direction (though neither victory nor participation are in and of themselves unworthy goals). Secondly, the division of shares system forces citizens, both candidates and electorate, voluntarily or compulsorily, toward political units that are called sects and makes their political “presence” (i.e., their citizenship) a pawn to their submission to these pressures, a situation that is complemented in the civil domain by the sectarian personal status system.

7.4 Dividing Power or Dividing the State?

Lebanese sectarianism has produced a division of power (in what can be called the public domain) that hardly resembles that of other consociational systems. Other forms of consociational rule involve a very high level of political cohesion, represented by the unity of the state, and managed by the central authority that is charged with issues and prerogatives that, if lost, make it impossible to conceive of a sovereign or stable national state or of a legal system for the state, or even to consider citizenship a basic principle for the nation-state. Foremost among the areas over which a centralized state cannot cede control are policy on citizenship, public finances, money, foreign policy, defense policy, and general security (particularly related to cross-border movement, controls on foreign nationals, national intelligence bodies, and so on). More specifically, the central state apparatus includes the higher authorities needed to determine the constitutionality of laws and regulations, the judiciary, and social security. With the expansion of developmental decentralism and local and regional power, the central authority continues to have ways to orient national growth, ensure that local and regional

governments abide by the law, and maintains hold over state institutions (as we have seen in the case of Switzerland). State institutions and facilities are the nervous system of the country and for various types of communication among regions, and between the country and the external world, as well as for economic activity, and so on. Instead of protecting these priorities areas for a national state, sectarian and external forces have combined in the Lebanese case to create a political society based on “sectarian specialization,” with the following division of labor—Shiite liberation, Sunni reconstruction, and Maronite sovereignty.

7.4.1 Shiite Liberation

A long period of Israeli occupation of part of South Lebanon, dating back to 1978, eventually led to a single Shiite organization (Hizbullah) taking on the tasks of resistance and liberation. This followed very bloody civil confrontations during the second half of the 1980s, which extended to the eve of the Taif Accord in 1989. When the resistance achieved liberation in 2000, it kept the southern front open, contrary to the logic of the new situation. The resistance maintained its structures, prevented the development of the liberated areas, and forbade the deployment of the Army to the international border with Israel. When Syrian tutelage over Lebanon was lifted in the wake of momentous events in 2004 and 2005, the resistance organization took two other steps. First, it entered the Lebanese cabinet, a step it had previously declined to take. This entry increased the state's direct responsibility for Hizbullah's behavior in the border region. Second, Hizbullah presented itself as a national defense force, and not only a national liberation force, irrespective of whether such military action was ordered by the state or not. With this step, Hizbullah completed its appropriation of the state's exclusive role in protecting the country, until further notice. It was not long before it took the initiative to launch a military operation behind the Blue Line (the “line of withdrawal” drawn up the United Nations in 2000, following Israel's withdrawal); as a result, Israel launched a destructive war against Lebanon in the summer of 2006. This demonstrated the consequences to the country of this appropriation of war-making power. These consequences were not limited to human and material losses; there were also political consequences affecting national unity, which was being tested by one political group's monopoly of a

¹⁴¹ See *ibid.*, pp. 50-54, where we find criticism of the system of shares and an examination of the Lebanese case; Lijphart

does not encourage such a formula but relies on proportional election system as a fair way of representing groups.

key national right that is a prerogative of a central and sovereign state.¹⁴²

7.4.2 Sunni Reconstruction

One sect was thus viewed, at the very least, as a competing partner of the state over national defense, even though only one of its political forces was the beneficiary. Another sect, the Sunnis (and also in the form of just one of its representatives) was seen as having taken on board the task of reconstruction in postwar Lebanon, rendering this mission the sect's "specialty." But instead of the sect acting as a competitor to the state, the focus here was on its most prominent power broker and politician, namely the then Prime Minister, Rafiq al-Hariri. The postwar reconstruction process was the foremost issue during this period and its direct association with an individual with enormous personal financial resources and significant regional and international contacts meant that a sectarian light would soon be cast on reconstruction initiatives. The successful postwar reconstruction of Beirut, particularly its historic center and the massive infrastructure projects that were undertaken, lead to a symbolic association in the minds of many and in popular discourse between investments in reconstruction, the mounting public debt, and the Gulf countries; or, more crudely, that the "Sunnis were responsible" for business ties with the Gulf and for the crushing debt as well. This perspective tended to draw a partial veil over public discussion of money's spent (or wasted) in other areas (that were not viewed as "Sunni preserves"), such as compensation for the wartime displaced, military personnel, improving the supply of electricity, state-financed hospitalization and medical care, the contracting operations of the Council for the South, and filling the ranks of the state bureaucracy. In Beirut, the impact of development was apparent, as there were highways leading to it and the airport. But elsewhere, there was a fleeting distribution of quickly-consumed benefits, or quasi-charitable assistance.¹⁴³ Support by politicians of these kinds of interpretations and their propagation of such ideas in

the public sphere torpedoed all possibility of serious public discussion of post-war reconstruction plans or of the state's fiscal strategy. It also led, whether rightly or wrongly, to a perceived corruption of the political impact of reconstruction itself. Reconstruction became a place of sectarian discrimination and division and not of unity between a state recovering its power in order to revive and a society whose physical capital had been destroyed by a war that had claimed both people's lives and their decades-long efforts to create inclusive service structures, both public and private.

7.4.3 Maronite Sovereignty

In step with what had happened in the areas of national defense and reconstruction and public finance, the recovery of state sovereignty and independence appeared to have been appropriated by a specific sect as well. From the end of the civil war to al-Hariri's assassination, Lebanese Christians, and particularly Maronites, increasingly raised the slogans of sovereignty and independence. This was not a new "specialization" for the Christians; the two slogans had long been pillars of their political rhetoric due to their role in forming the Lebanese "entity." During each phase of the country's contemporary political history, Christian political forces exhibited a disparity in their conception of independence and sovereignty. Some of these groups sought protection from external or foreign powers when they identified a specific threat to Lebanon's independence, and this in turn exposed Lebanon's sovereignty to newer threats and mortgaged it to these new powers. Toward the end of the civil war, in 1989, a group (the Aounists) remained outside the political establishment that resulted from the Taif settlement, which was supported by the Maronite Patriarchate. However, the endorsement of the Taif Accord by many of the most important Christian groups was contentious and did not mean their acceptance of Syrian tutelage over the country nor of that of the political groups that responded positively to

142 The impact of this monopoly on other Lebanese is not aided by the following concerns that they hold: their doubt that these Shiite weapons have another function in the struggle over power domestically; their knowledge that Hizbullah "came from the womb of the Iranian Revolution," as a leading Iranian figure said recently; and that there are unbreakable links between its acts and Iranian interests, in the ongoing struggle in the Middle East. Neither is this take-over blunted by the conformity of Iranian interests (and thus the behavior of Hizbullah, equipped with Syrian "strategic depth") with the requirements of the Syrian regime's well-known conception of

"proper" relations between Syria and Lebanon. The suffering under this conception is what brought hundreds of thousands of Lebanese onto the streets to demand Syria's withdrawal in 2005. It is no surprise that they did not share the loyalty of Hizbullah, its huge base of support and its allies, to this conception.

143 This disparity led to a sectarian reading of reconstruction. However, it is also easy to overstate the case, as it ignores the fact that Beirut is the country's capital, and that the Sunnis make up only part of its inhabitants. If we add all of the people who go frequently to Beirut, we end up with all Lebanese.

that tutelage.¹⁴⁴ Many boycotted the first and second parliamentary elections in 1992 and 1996 consecutively.

The election of presidents Khalil Herawi and then Emile Lahoud in 1998 failed to restore any balance to Christian representation, i.e., to deal with the so-called “Christian frustration” of the time, in reference to the weak overall share of Christian participation in the political system. A statement by the country's Maronite bishops in September 2000 that publicly criticized the prevalent political system, the weakness of Christian representation, and Syrian control over the country is considered by many the first milestone in the path to sovereignty and independence. The formation of the (pro-sovereignty) Qornet Shehwan grouping in April 2001, brought together politicians whose political positions were close to the church, initiated the gradual return of the Lebanese Forces militia to open activity, and launched efforts to coordinate positions with the Free Patriotic Movement and its leader, General Michel Aoun. Meanwhile, Muslim political groups did not exhibit noticeable solidarity with Christian politicians in this expanding drive for independence and sovereignty prior to 2004, when a confrontation was generated by Syria's insistence on extending President Lahoud's term. The harassment of Prime Minister Hariri by Syrian politicians was a smoldering fire that would flare up intermittently, or borrow Lebanese mirrors in which to show its face. This passive stance by Muslims, naturally, had profound affects on the significance of the entire battle and only the dramatic change of circumstances beginning in the summer of 2004 would heal some of these wounds, for the broad Shiite front, along with other, secondary forces, had risen up against the new alliance that brought together the Christian strongmen with the strongmen of the Sunni and the Druze. It soon became apparent that the chronic conflict over who would be considered the prime leader of all Christian groups and the entire independence front would not disappear any time soon.

¹⁴⁴ Syria's exclusive role as sponsor became stabilized with American and Israeli support in the first half of the 1990s. Most Christians boycotted the 1992 parliamentary elections, with the blessing of the Maronite Patriarchate. The struggle then moved to excluding the Lebanese Forces from power, the imprisonment, and trial of its leader, Samir Geagea, and an official prohibition of the group in 1994. However, many Christian figures, both independent and close to the patriarch, continued to cooperate with the president of the Republic and the Government, along with others installed directly by Syria. This cooperation did not end what was called at the time “Christian frustration,” i.e., the political weakness of the community. This frustration saw the balance of sectarian powers as a curbing of the

7.4.4 Transforming Achievements into Punishments

The Lebanese can point to three momentous achievements after the end of the long civil war- the rebuilding of the country in the 1990s, the liberation of the south in 2000 after twenty-two years of Israeli occupation, and the liberation of Lebanon from Syrian tutelage in 2005 after the assassination of Prime Minister al-Hariri and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from the country. These achievements came at a high price for the country. The sectarian aspect of each meant that there were different costs and subsequent benefits, depending on the sect. However, since none of these achievements was the work of a “random sample” of Lebanese, and since each of them continued to be branded as the work of a particular sect, they could not be considered as accomplishments of Lebanese citizens at large. Those of other sects who participated in any of these accomplishments either withdrew in resignation or were sidelined to differing degrees even if the margins of participation in the last accomplishment (ending Syrian tutelage) had expanded considerably during the final phase. The sectarian hijacking of each these three achievements meant that they were used by the various political/sectarian groups against each other. It was this that made “consensus” an almost impossible task. In the process, each one achievement was transformed into a divisive element that pulled the Lebanese closer to brink of the abyss. Local and foreign powers united to carry out these achievements and manage the consequences; once they were completed, these forces then faced off against each other, warning of disastrous repercussions for the country. The division of the Lebanese into sects when it comes to politics, and their ties to rival forces in the region, turned these achievements into disastrous punishments for Lebanon and themselves.

VIII. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN INFLUENCES

8.1 The Paths of Foreign Powers

For their part, foreign powers (some of which have been present in Lebanon over the last four decades) have attempted to co-opt various political groups in Lebanon, that have in turn responded positively to

Presidency, which is reserved for a Maronite, compared to the speaker of parliament and particularly the prime minister. This does not apply to the post-Taif constitution alone, but to the logic of Syria's management of these groups.

such foreign “offers Of assistance.” Here, we should examine this assistance from three perspectives. The first is the material. This involves assistance, sometimes financial, that turns into a basic source of support for the recipient. Such assistance may take the form of expertise, intelligence data, or various types of services and facilities, or it may take the form of weapons, military equipment, training and planning, or direct military support during external or civil wars. This phenomenon has prompted Lebanese commentators of late to observe a “type of (economic) production of politics,” referring to the many people who make some or all of their living (directly or regularly) from financing that is mostly foreign in origin and that manipulates political loyalty. The second kind of assistance is political. This involves a foreign power using its capacities and influence in international or regional organizations or networks to support and protect a dependent Lebanese party or group from any threatening moves by its rivals. There are various types and levels of this dependency; most of this process does not involve individuals, but rather parties with organizational and representative features enabling them to carry out the “big agendas” of various sectarian groups, and enjoying the loyalty of a decisive segment of these groups. Thirdly, there is symbolic or educational assistance. This involves the system of values, ideas, sentiments, and behavior that can effectively mobilize people. This is irrespective of whether the mobilization is political- or party-based, or involves rallying a group around certain stereotypes in which the common or mass aspect wins out over the individual or personal. It could also involve the regular holding of many mass events, which promotes group homogeneity and solidarity. These diverse types of mobilization all involve political or political-military “returns” and when they affect more people, the returns grow, along with the possibility of seeing the process become better-rooted and attracting future investment in it. The form of this mobilization with the deepest reach is the religious, to the extent that religious “unity” is understood as being based on a group, and not individuals, and to the degree that piousness is explained as the dominance of a higher will over the details of daily life. The channels

145 From this standpoint, it is a sectarian and not a religious party. However, Hizbullah has shown an inclination to control and link the two paths in the areas under its control, while greatly transcending what had usually been the case in these same areas. Moreover, Hizbullah incorporated highly sectarian elements in its political-military mobilization, even if it did not do so in strictly political and legislative endeavors. These tactics demonstrate that the party, since leaving behind the slogan of “an Islamic Republic in Lebanon,” both resembles and does not resemble Sunni fundamentalist movements. This goes

involved in relaying this kind of support include the media, the school, political organizations and their specialized activities, religious and non-religious areas of public meeting and address, city walls and streets, and so on¹⁴⁵ (see Statistical Compendium for data on the attitudes of youth toward some of these issues).

8.2 “Foreign Powers” and Civil Peace

In any event, Lebanon has seen many examples of appeals to foreign powers during its modern history; indeed, one could almost draw a map of the country's political conflicts, not only in their explosive but also in their calmer forms, through their lens. This appears to be a Lebanese “tradition” and is a striking counter-example of what citizenship, or even holding nationality, should involve in terms of loyalty to the state and what is permitted by the law in a sovereign state. The mere mention that the Lebanese constitution prohibits such contacts between a domestic party and foreign power provokes cynical reactions, given all that is known about Lebanon and given people's despair that the situation will ever be remedied. This reliance on foreign powers guarantees the symbiosis between domestic and foreign in the country's successive destructive crises. Every attempt to differentiate between the different contending sets of factors (foreign and domestic), or to emphasize the dominance of one over the other, appears as a form of useless verbal jousting. Naturally, when the conflict between local parties becomes intense, there is a more urgent need for this reliance on the outside world. It is also true, however, that foreign parties, or at least some of them, are inclined to view Lebanon as being in a state of struggle and division, and possibly war, whenever the conflict heats up. This is because the Lebanese arena becomes a place in which successive deals are done among the foreign powers that control this space. These forces threaten their rivals by harming their allies or interests inside the country when their own interests are harmed, in Lebanon or elsewhere. Alternatively, they may exhibit flexibility toward their rivals in their existing confrontations

beyond using religion for political mobilization and local control, and becomes an effort to impose religion and religious law as an identity on the entire state, or what it can monopolize of it, and declare it an Islamic “emirate.” The Christian environment also produces such fundamentalist “groups” from time to time; they continue to lack an independent form of expression in the public or political domain. It remains difficult to assign a place to them in the sectarian sphere and how much impact they might have on citizenship among the country's Christian communities.

by limiting the danger to the interests of these enemies and their allies in Lebanon, in return for some *quid pro quo*, to be made in Lebanon or elsewhere.

This process usually involves the gradual disintegration of the guarantees for a civil domain and the gradual appearance of parallel mechanisms that are controlled by warring parties. Violence is used (this is commonly described as “sending messages”) to guide the polity toward disintegration, or move it from one phase to another. Foreign parties require their Lebanese allies to strike a balance between their objectives in the struggle, which have their own logic, and the deals generated by the external conflict. At times, this difficult process appears to turn domestic groups into mere proxies, while at others it appears that they are taking the initiative and following a certain strategy. This implies that, in order to make a sound assessment, we should study the entire process, and not just a single moment during its course.

This is the logic according to which Lebanon's political groups make their demands on outside parties and it is a logic that favors war in Lebanon over peace. When the domestic struggle is slack, foreign parties benefit from Lebanon as a forum for their ideology, a market for investment, or a place in which positions are built up in expectation of future need. When the conflict is raging, however, the benefits to some foreign parties are greater. They are helped by the country's fragmented situation, which becomes an arena for threats and counter-threats, some of which will be carried out while others are recoiled from, according to the particular circumstances of the struggle. This atmosphere of conflict in Lebanon turns the country and its people into hostages and opens the door to foreign deals. At such times, the Lebanese live to the rhythm of the statements, visits, and conferences of politicians here, there, and everywhere, even though they themselves may not necessarily be the subject of the conference, visit, or statement in question. Meanwhile, foreign parties measure their ability to exchange political pressure and violence with their rivals in Lebanon without necessarily being directly responsible for the violence, which has its cost, after all. They may not, either, enter directly into any violent contest, for which, as usual, the cost will be highest.

Foreign intervention also has more durable features that must be studied, and that are not restricted to times of crisis or war. Foreign parties appear to wield significant and ongoing control, via the resources that they can mobilize, and which we have listed above, over the realm of politics and social services, as well

as the symbolic domain. The threads of this network of influence delineate, in advance, the borders of mutual solidarity (particularly of a sectarian nature) with foreign forces when they find themselves face to face during a given crisis. If it is the external material or political support that appears to determine the loyalty of a given domestic party during a sudden crisis or incidental confrontation, then it is the symbolic dimension that helps protect foreign interests in the country in the longer term. Thus the call for a breaking of the link generally comes late, during an unsolvable crisis between a domestic and foreign party. This tardiness is due to the fact that the link may have been left to consolidate itself, drawing strength over the years from similar events in the country's past, or its present. The link, then, has become consolidated and the interests and sentiments that support and protect the relationship have grown in magnitude, turning the call to sever the connection into something absurd

Within the country, the war looks like a struggle over state power, though the ferocity of the struggle for an authority that has been characterized throughout its history by weakness, dissipation of effort, and circumscription may appear strange. Even stranger is the prevalent discourse that suggests there is no need for the Lebanese state to intervene in and direct a society that tends toward economic liberalism and is inclined to acquire its services and fulfill its needs, however inadequately, through the lineage-based internal and external networks of its citizens, and the connection of these networks to their foreign existence and, specifically, through their reliance on the logic of profit and return. However, this seeming paradox is unraveled in the following two-part analysis of the role of the state and its connections to the corridors of power in Lebanon.

A weak state is fought over in order to protect its weakness and enshrine its division into portions for distribution. Huge benefits accrue to the dissipation of state sovereignty: The process begins with avoiding legal authority and its requirements when it comes to business, not only in terms of material costs but also in terms of rules and conventions. Political influence protects many violators or evaders of the law and covers up many illegal practices. This protection and cover up are necessary if this influence is to continue, in turn, to be protected by a large public, with which it trades protection. The producer of this protection usually distributes it between two sides: it is used to provide huge benefits for the powerful, and differing levels of the same for the weak. This has an impact on the balance of power within each sect, finally affecting

the general balance of power among sects. state transactions that are easy or difficult to carry out form, respectively, important retarding or energizing factors, and those who have interests to manage view this process with either fear nor enthusiasm; in the end, the process strengthens some people and humiliates others. Politicians in Lebanon are obliged to violate the law and protect violators in order to appear “popular,” while these same politicians are tasked with enacting laws. Needless to say, the violation of state sovereignty by establishing relations with foreign powers is not permitted by international practice, not to mention law; rather, such cases, par excellence, require a weak state. These violations produce weakness on the margins of the state and protect this weakness within the state.

Meanwhile, the state is also contested space because its hands are not tied to the extent that one might imagine, and what it spends is sufficient to inspire the greed of others; the state is by no means powerless in the fields of economic policy-making and social services. The state has inherited the old tradition of dependence on the emir. No stigma, therefore, attaches to being employed within the state's agencies and bureaus, even though there may be no reasons to justify the hiring - quite the opposite, in fact. Since indirect taxes dominate the state's collection of resources, this helps hide the link between the sharing in these resources by those entrusted with them, their need to preserve them from being squandered, and their determination to limit their spending to public interests. To the spread of this connection between public sector employment and the provider role attributed to the state, and to the facilities offered by influence in the state when it comes to business activities and relations, must be added the direct interventions undertaken by the state in the fields of economic activity and social services using a number of different instruments, the most important of which are tax policy, infrastructure works, and the social upgrading that occurs subsequent to or is supported in connection with these. We should also add the directing of direct spending, i.e., especially, the awarding of public works contracts and estimation and distribution of various types of compensation.

All of this adds up to the fact that the state in Lebanon is weak where it should be strong, in other words in securing its rights and controlling individual and group actions toward it, under the law. At the same time, it is strong where it should be weak, in the expansion of the margin granted, in its actions and contacts with the public, to the logic of dependency,

patronage, and influence-peddling. These two aspects work together to render state authority a very desirable objective for domestic and foreign parties to contend for, and to render such contentions liable to slip into a state of murderous war.

However, the civil war was also a struggle among groups seeking to hold social power and represent the group politically. This occurs in such a way as to raise some factions in the group and lower others, heralding a new balance of power upon the resumption of “normal life.” This second conflict is as important as the first in determining the political-social outcomes of war, or in winning the right to interpret its internal dimension. War is an opportunity for some groups to rise, for leaders to take revenge for a marginalization that has been imposed on the group, or to translate growing social power into political power that is quickly invested in developing the group's social power as well. The accumulation of benefits from the war, the consolidation of positions in the hands of local players, and the desire of foreign parties to see the series of deals continue - all of these factors work together to prevent the war from being decided by one of the parties, or to block a settlement. Under such conditions, a war is likely to continue (and this is indeed what happened) for a long time and undergo many upsets, unexpected “impossibilities,” and direct interventions in the fighting between local and foreign forces. Lebanon's civil war underwent phases of extreme violence and phases of back and forth, when violence spread from front to front, taking on diverse forms in order to meet the goals of the moment. War also knows periods of waiting, in which violence is limited to keeping the state of war in “running order.”

The most conspicuous domestic consequence of the union between local and foreign parties is the aggrandizement of the former, giving it a multifaceted importance that far transcends their own weak and divided resources of a local power. Here we do not have in mind only material, but also political or symbolic, resources). Thus it is that when the “de facto” rulers that wield mobilized masses and enhanced financial resources come into contact with ambassadors, visiting foreign personalities, and media stars, they may take precedence over those who hold official authority. Such symbolic capital, lavishly bestowed, does not alter, however, or transform the very real and dependent relationship with external powers. This inflation of resources acquired through accepting a client relationship with a foreign party that has its own calculations to make leads, in the end, to permanent dependency. Exiting from or overturning this situation

is close to impossible due to the great losses and change of status to be incurred. It also becomes dangerous, since the party that turns against a foreign power will find itself confronted by another wanting to take its place with the support by the same external provider of good things.

The path leading to the war, or the war itself, whether viewed from the inside or the outside, involves developments that deliver a severe blow to citizenship and the very principle of citizenship. "Patriotism" might be attributed, in going beyond dependency, to a given domestic party, or to all parties. However, this patriotism is not citizenship. The attachment may be strong to a land or a society (i.e., a nation) where "freedom" is understood to involve, among the many things it involves, concluding contracts in parallel to the state and exchanging political services with foreign powers, where "legitimate" foreign financing of political parties and media, in exchange for their loyalty to a foreign power, is permitted and people are supplied with arms that flow across the border, a process that "patriots" seek to allow to continue unimpeded, and so

on and so forth (see Box 3.18 below). This strong attachment might serve as a special type of "patriotism" and might produce speeches, articles, and poetry in its defense. This means that attachment to the nation has many contradictory causes, among which may be numbered the causes of its destruction. Citizenship, meanwhile, cannot become stable unless a state based on the law becomes stable, along with the loyalty of citizens to this state and their compliance with its sovereignty. This is precisely the meaning of the oath that the President of the Republic takes in Lebanon and something similar to which, in many other countries, a newly-naturalized citizen also swears, when that person is deemed deserving of citizenship. Lebanese law does not succeed in performing its function in this regard and nor do the Lebanese appear to sufficiently resist traditions (some of which have been worthy of note) whose history has found good reason to instill into them. Nor have international law and the international political order succeeded to any great extent in preventing states who wish and are able to do so from destroying, sooner or later, the various resources of small, fragile societies.

Box 3.18: Political Parties: Roles and Distribution

Since the second half of the 19th century, Lebanon has been a laboratory of ideas and a place in which all political and ideological movements in the Levant have been tested. Before the appearance of political parties in their current form, Lebanon experienced types of political organization, as part of cultural associations and political clubs, which were principally concerned with the crisis of the Ottoman Sultanate, its breakup, and the decline of its role as an inclusive political framework for the various Arab regions. In short, when parties appeared in Lebanon and Arab countries, they could be classified into five categories: pan-Arab nationalists seeking unity and rejecting sub-national entities, Islamists seeking to establish an Islamic state, regional nationalist parties trying to unite "natural" Greater Syria, nationalist parties, and communist parties (Abi Saab, 2006, p. 39). If we examine this century-long experience of parties in Lebanon under these five broad classifications, ideas and party action have been dominant in various phases, without this meaning that these were the given party's only concerns. At the beginning, the parties concerned themselves with the new political entity of Lebanon, their attitudes toward it depending on a given party's intellectual and ideological stances. As the system became consecrated within the framework of the Lebanese state, parties turned their attention toward political, economic, and social reforms, boasting several achievements in this regard. However, the outbreak of the civil war and the direct participation of parties in this conflict had a number of negative effects on the development of parties in Lebanon, which came to be characterized as violent, armed militias. With the war's end, the parties returned to the topic of the country as political entity and national union, and with the implementation of the constitutional reforms stipulated by the Taif Accord of 1989, which brought the war to an end the following year thanks to foreign tutelage that imposed its conditions on political action in Lebanon. With the parties' gradual return to political life, from the 2000 parliamentary elections to the 2004 local elections and 2005 parliamentary round, conducted after the withdrawal of Syrian forces from the country, their attention has focused primarily on entering government and on the distribution of posts and prerogatives. We find that each phase has built on the content of previous phases, which explains why some concerns and demands raised by a number of parties since independence have remained unchanged to the present (abolition of political sectarianism, reform of the electoral system, administrative decentralization, and so on). We also see that there is a type of interactive relationship between these dominant concerns, the type of party, its internal structure, and the special social features of its followers.¹⁴⁶

Moreover, the more than forty active Lebanese political parties do not enjoy the same particular characteristics. They differ in terms of numbers of members (from dozens to tens of thousands), structure, and institutional organization (from hierarchical to unstructured), geographical spread (nationwide reach to local and regional reach), and sectarian diversity of membership (from uni-sectarian to multi-sectarian). They also differ in terms of their origin; there are parties following traditional leaders, ideological parties (in line with Arab and international political trends), parties established

146 El-Khazen, 2002; Ashti, 2006; Ashti and Ashti, 2007

as militias, parties organized around a certain leader that end up becoming political currents, and political currents becoming parties. At the same time, parties differ in terms of intellectual and ideological content. Some have a clear ideology while others move in the orbit of a specific leader, without having a specific political platform. All of this produces a difference in the role and position of parties in society - this is especially the case with the content and dimensions of the formative political messages, that they propagate, and the relationship with the country's political authorities, at the local and national levels. A significant number of Lebanese political parties have a network of social, cultural, health, educational and sporting institutions, media of various kinds and direct extensions inside unions and professional associations. This imparts on these parties diverse political, cultural, social and economic roles. The parties boosted the capacity of these networks during the civil war in tangible fashion, dividing state facilities and resources among themselves. In the postwar period, the development of a large number of parties became dependent on the development of certain institutions and their specializations, benefiting from various types of material sources of support, whether personal (the wealth of an individual or a party), official (state ministries and institutions) or external (material support from foreign states or political parties).

By seeking to extend their network of institutions in various sectors and parts of society, party/sectarian leaders have tried to impose their hegemony over civil society institutions, particularly unions, associations and labor and vocational cooperatives. In so doing, they have created a confused relationship between parties and these civil society groups. The inter-party struggle for power among the unions, in the postwar period in particular, led to voiding these unions of their content and distanced them from playing their socio-economic role; they were brought under control to serve party and group interests, without any consideration given to their sectoral demands. This is what happens when "the keys to the labor movement are in the hands of a few sectarian leaders, who move based on a logic in which socio-economic demands are only weakly or tendentiously represented. The division of labor prevents the groups concerned with these demands from any kind of united action and holds their activities, including any initiatives on the socio-economic front, in check..." (Beydoun, 2008). The political authorities have also assisted in this marginalization, based on a gradual and methodical plan aimed at taming and splitting all labor or other forces that might protest or object to their policies and plans. "If intervention in labor affairs has accompanied the exercise of state power since independence, over decades, than its post-Taif intervention in labor affairs has been exuberant, using all of the tools available to the state to achieve its dominance over the unions, in terms of their status, organization, and role." (Hamdan, 1997, p. 105). This was carried out at first by creating a large number of unions with a specific sectarian or religious cast, followed by direct intervention in union decisions and the General Labor Confederation's internal organization, paralyzing and dividing this body (in 1997) (*), and finally by the failure by successive cabinets to deal with labor demands. As for legislation that oversees and safeguards the formation of parties in Lebanon and their activities, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Lebanon signed and incorporated into the Preamble and Article 13 of its Constitution, the 1908 Law on Associations, and the ministerial cabinet decision of 8 August 2005 to establish a National Commission to amend the parliamentary election law, these are all considered to be largely liberal and confirm the principle of the freedom to establish parties. However, despite the liberal nature of these texts, the multiplicity of parties, their many members, supporters, and activities, their permanent presence in public life since the establishment of the political system; despite their networks of institutions and their participation in all electoral processes and their representation in various cabinets, parliaments, local councils, student and union bodies, etc.; despite all of this, parties are not the main force in Lebanon's political life, for a number of reasons. Most importantly, the political and electoral systems affect the party system, limiting its role, while there has been a decline in the effectiveness of ideology and political platforms in the determination of people's political adherence. Political divisions in successive Parliaments did not operate on a party basis, and the formation of cabinets took place without party representation (El-Khazen, 2002).

In addition to the above, and the impact of the political and electoral systems on the party system, the political divisions, which had already begun, started to become fixed on the eve of the civil war in 1975 and to turn into party-based dichotomies (left-right, reform-conservative, etc.) that struck roots into society's various groupings, classes, bodies, and regions, roots which were, then gradually and in stages, dissolved by the war. The parties that entered the war in 1975 based on an ideological confrontation, a difference in program, and a vision of the Lebanese state, its orientations, and how it should be reformed, exited the war fifteen years later as armed, sectarian militias that dominated, through force and exclusion, the resources of specific geographic or demographic areas. Based on their retreat into these cantons, the parties during the postwar period took part in political life in a state of intellectual confusion, which resulted from a number of interconnected elements, of which the most important were:

First, parties, whose slogans and platforms, were exhausted during the war, have been unable to renew their thought and programs in the postwar period. Or perhaps more accurately, they had no reason to do so, since they were not asked to undertake self-criticism, whether by their supporters and members or by national political authorities seeking to open a serious and profound debate about the war, in all of its aspects, in order to truly turn that page and build reconciliation and a durable peace. Also, parties did not take part in postwar political life based on their political programs and aspirations; electoral alliances between parties were not based on a political platform, not even a temporary one.

Such alliances during this period were usually imposed by those in charge of running Lebanon, within the Syrian system, in an artificial manner that gathered contradictory figures on the same electoral list in order to serve private interests (The 2000 *Parliamentary Elections in Lebanon, Re-run and Change*, Suleiman, 2002; Suleiman, 2007). In addition to the renewal of sectarian polarization and tension within a number of parties after the war, we find that some - which might have been no more than a tool for electoral victory - were successful in attracting voters and offering diverse material temptations to them, of which money played a chief part. This “political” or “electoral” money was the prime mover in election results (Iliya, 2007). Of course, a number of party members did win parliamentary seats, but they never constituted a majority. From 1922 to 2000, the proportion of party members in parliament has averaged 20 per cent, while before the war, certain political families controlled 60 per cent of the seats (El-Khazen, 2002). In the 2005 round, and although most MPs were elected from lists in which political currents or parties dominated, and later formed parliamentary blocs based on political divisions, none presented a political program for government, while the opposition failed to offer an alternative political program. Likewise, these parliamentary blocs were unable, despite their alliances, to form a true political majority that could remain in power, since the essence of the struggle between them remained a division of power, influence, and spoils, among and within the sects.

Second, rules for political participation imposed on parties since the implementation of the Taif Accord-divided political parties radically into either “for” or “against” camps. This blocked diverse and multi-party political competition based on a program. Political participation by parties became conditional on accepting not just Taif, but the tutelage of the Syrian system, and approving its arbitrary implementation of the accord. Thus, no importance was given any longer to intellectual or ideological divisions. This negative formula continues to govern political life, even after the division disappeared following system the Syrian army’s withdrawal from the country. Political participation is now based on a new binary equation, one that also blocks political diversity, between two groups that share tactical and ad hoc alliances and interests, but not views of reform plans and programs covering the various domains of public life (political, economic, social, cultural).

Third, yet another group of elements is linked to international political and intellectual transformations. The fall of the Soviet Union and its political-economic system left a vacuum and confusion in its wake, not only for communist parties or advocates of socialism but also at the general intellectual level. The collapse of the liberal-socialist dichotomy according to which most political orientations since World War II had been aligned and, with the spread of the market economy in the place of long-standing command economies, the positing of liberalism beginning in the mid-1990s as a dominant ideology enabled the rise of personal identity ideologies (religious, sectarian, ethnic, racial, and so on) at the expense of political doctrines and affiliations. These external changes certainly had their impact on parties in Lebanon, and particularly the ideology-based ones.

Leading active political parties in Lebanon (*)	Year of establishment
al-Ahbash	1983
Union (Ittihad)	1975
Popular Nasserite Organization	1975
Lebanese Tawhid Movement	2006
Free Shiite Movement	2006
Kafa'at	1996
Civil Society Movement	2006
Future Movement	1990s
Free Patriotic Movement	1990s
Muslim Brotherhood	1964
Democratic Renewal Movement	2001
Islamic Tawhid Movement	1982
People's Movement	1999
Democratic Nasserite Movement	1999
Democratic Left Movement	2004
Amal Movement	1991
Arab Socialist Baath Party	1940s
Environment Party	2005
Christian Solidarity Party	
Progressive Socialist Party	1949
National Dialogue Party	2004
Lebanese Democratic Party	2001

Lebanese Communist Party (LCP)	1922
Democratic Workers Party	2004
Lebanese Forces Party	1993
Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP)	1932
Hizbullah	1985
Marada	2006
Ramgavar	1906
Tashnak	1906
Phalange	1936
National Bloc	1943
Democratic Forum	2001
Hentchak	1908

(*) For a comprehensive presentation of political parties, trends, and movements in Lebanon since the establishment of Greater Lebanon in 1920 and to the present, see Ashti and Ashti, 2007, at www.appstudies.org

IX. CIVIL SOCIETY

9.1 Conceptual Boundaries for Civil Society

Over the last three decades, the term “civil society” in Lebanon has been promoted as heavily as in many other countries. It is generally understood to mean a group of organized forces that protest and have demands on the state, while remaining independent of state authority (even if this authority is elected). Civil society speaks on behalf of various segments of society as they confront state policies and the government's implementation of them. These social groups, which are not organized under any particular political banner, lobby political organizations in order to force the political authorities to meet their demands. It follows that “civil society” must be at odds with “political society,” which also claims to embrace the entirety of the ruling and other political forces, both those that are loyal and those that are in opposition. In democratic societies, socio-economic issues dominate the actions of civil society, which also stresses the need to protect and enhance civil, political, and other freedoms and their practice. The socio-economic aspect of civil society lies not only in making such demands but in its own initiative in organizing various types of services. Civil society allocates these services according to various conditions: the delivering party's motives; the receiving party's motives; participation by beneficiaries in the work or the cost; the existence of material payments or lack thereof, etc. The service provider may benefit from state or foreign assistance, but at all events it is to be considered society's attempt to meet its many needs in areas where the state cannot do so, and may not even be expected to do so. As a result, NGOs have

become a leading pillar of civil society in recent decades, even becoming to some degree synonymous with the concept, even though the term's original meaning considerably transcends the scope of NGOs.

Civil society only partially overlaps with the public sphere because civil society requires various types of freedom of expression and media pluralism in order to function properly. Civil society in effect is the prime practitioner of the debate upon which concepts like the public domain, transparency, and freedom are based. But while the state, political society and the media are part of the public domain, they are not civil society. Civil society confronts the first (the state), orients itself toward the second (some or all of political society), and seeks out the third (the media) as an ally. Civil society uses the media to “ask for the public's help” on a given issue, to shape, guide and mobilize public opinion. The concept of civil society also intersects with the notion of “social movement,” although the latter may be dominated by more traditionally political concerns, such as how governments are formed, who they represent, and what policies they carry out. Civil society is made up of organized, well-established groups, or those that are capable of being so. At the same time, it and its activities usually exhibit considerable diversity and pluralism; it is also characterized by heterogeneity, a local presence, and decentralization. As demands for social services and other matters are made, civil society efforts often take on the aspect of a “campaign,” mobilizing interested citizens. Thus civil society may be characterized by temporary mobilization for specialized objectives. When this mobilizing aspect is dominant (in deeds, not words), we find something that nearly arrives at “direct” democracy.

9.2 Confusing Complexities

In any society, the civil society picture is likely to be complex, and “Lebanonization” is a concept that can only add confusion and amorphousness to it. If we stress the “civil” and rely on the narrow meaning of the term, then Lebanon largely lacks a civil society, by which we mean the civil confronting the political, brandishing the demands of socio-economic groups and demands related to civil and political rights and freedoms. Socio-economic groups are based on conditions and not, in the manner of families and sects, or even villages and neighborhoods, on origins or traditions, meaning that Lebanon's social diversity does not automatically translate into a healthy civil society movement. Civil and political rights and freedoms should be governed by the criteria of public citizenship, even if they are the rights and freedoms of a limited group of citizens, or of an individual citizen. Families and sects have constitutionally-protected rights in democratic systems, and Lebanese law is particularly keen on enhancing some of these freedoms. Naturally, these groups seek to defend these rights and freedoms; their institutions and associations strive to serve their communities. But granting family or sectarian groupings the primary sponsorship of socio-economic and civil rights usually means handing them over to someone other than the rights holder. Civil society may also find itself backing demands against the wishes of associations with religious and sectarian support. Thus submitting rights holders to such sectarian divisions or characterizations, and the subjugation of these right holders to various political/sectarian interests, may lead to conflict among the same right holders or to results that stand in opposition to the interests of the concerned group of rights holders. In other words, this kind of characterization favors the exploitation by political-sectarian groups of the civil groups they claim to represent, if we stick to the definition of civil society adopted above.

To solve this problem of terminology, Lebanese observers have distinguished between “civil” and “communal” associations. In Lebanon, one uses the label “communal association” for a family-based association that is concerned with serving or assisting needy family members. Other groups, which advocate legal and political reform, women's rights, or a civil personal status code, for example, are called “civil associations.” In practice, the “communal” element dominates. We lack studies about the conditions in this sector, its efficiency, and the groups and regions it covers, but we do know that thousands of

associations have applied for formal recognition by the Lebanese state (through a process called *'ilm wa khabar*, or giving notice to the authorities). However, many of these associations are non-operational, and their activities are limited to boosting the status of local notables or justifying the spending of a meager budget based on financial assistance from certain ministries or political figures who seek good ties with those running a given association (see box 3.12 and the Statistical Annex for details on NGOs and their sectarian affiliations). Such associations imply a widely-spread, diverse, and complex network; their possible concerns cover the areas of services, demands, rights, and development. Depending on their specialization, they also deal with education and health, culture (including political culture), sports and the environment; they might support small-scale producers, the disabled, women's maternal rights, music, dancing, vaccination campaigns, or clean-up campaigns in villages. Some associations have a cooperative structure, while others rely on volunteer work or obtain support from other parties. Some associations' activities are limited to a family or village, others are large and hold activities in various regions. Some are directly affiliated with political or sectarian figures, while others try to be more diverse and tackle national or larger concerns, aiming for a secular policy or one that is open to various political and sectarian groups. Some associations with homogenous structures may form networks, the most important of which are union confederations (headed by the General Labor Confederation), or, in another domain, the Association of Catholic Schools, which supports hundreds of schools directly affiliated with various groups. However, the direct subordination of socio-economic issues or civil rights to for the most part political-sectarian concerns is a clear enough indicator of how much “civil-ness” remains in what one may call Lebanese civil society.

9.3 Erasing the Political and Civil Role of Unions and Business Groups

Two key examples clarify this relationship of subordination of the civil to the political. The first are professional syndicates and labor unions that are vital pillars of civil society. They also include associations of self-employed professionals and business groups. Given their wide range of specializations these are directly connected to most socio-economic concerns. To assess the effective role of unions in meeting the initial conditions for their establishment, necessitates a comparison between today's situation

to that of nearly a quarter century ago. During the final stages of the civil war, a period that was unfriendly to traditional socio-economic demands, the General Labor Confederation (GLC) held a leading position among the various social groups protesting against the continuation of the war; one of its most famous positions was a demand that militia checkpoints be eliminated. This meant the GLC separated itself from the political forces (i.e., the warring parties) that dominated society at the time, and in confronting these forces, spoke out on a civil matter that transcended its “specialization,” i.e., socio-economic matters. The GLC thus approached the realm of more comprehensive rights at a time when the economic crisis was at its worst and the national currency was collapsing. Such rights involve ensuring that citizens meet their daily needs, that safety and security prevail, and that the state is unified and sovereign. Nonetheless, Lebanon's unions also suffered from huge organizational problems, prior to and after the war, under the considerable influence of political sectarianism.

If we look at today's GLC we find a very different picture, which has resulted from political-sectarian subjugation during the period of Syrian tutelage. Political (i.e., sectarian) organizations have almost completely divided the unions as it is rendered almost entirely into a pawn in the confrontation between them. As a result, unions have lost their effectiveness in making a difference as even its socio-economic demands appear as tools in a larger political-civil confrontation. Blatantly sectarian arrangements for union elections, have become a political tradition, and have paved the way for this unhealthy situation. This arrangement also resembles those of professional associations; indeed, the latter may have been in the vanguard in this respect. This also indicates that the socio-economic confrontation between sects (which always exists) can be easily “universalized” at the “right” political juncture and thus become a facet of a larger civil conflict that may easily be made to degenerate into violence.

This “sectarianization” of socio-economic issues has spread to other areas, such as employment and employee hierarchies, as well as in the key areas of investment, construction, and import-export to the extent that one can talk of sectarian financial capital (despite the lack of data to assess more precisely this situation) This process was enhanced by the war, which isolated certain regions and sects from one another, although large economic institutions were by and large exempted from this (as in the case of a

handful of banks). Sectarianism might appear in the ownership and management of these banks, even if they have established branches throughout the country. To attract clients and ease communications, often these institutions will insure that branch employees are of the same sect as most of the inhabitants in the surrounding areas leading to a different kind of sectarian homogeneity. Certainly, market forces and their drive toward unifying practices have limited the move toward economically insulated sects and regions. But fragmentation also involves huge returns to beneficiaries, even though we continue to lack sufficient data to measure its development over the last few decades.

The dangerous implications of this situation as far as civil society is concerned is that political/sectarian leaders now have sway over leading economic and social groups and individuals that exist in their sphere of action and to pressure these groups into decisions that meet with the interests of these leaders. The actions of unions and of capitalists have never been divorced from the larger political conflict and its main participants. Under normal conditions, politicians pay close attention to labor action and capitalist behavior, while those making socio-economic demands must be taken into consideration and often enjoy the freedom to engage in lobbying. This relationship between economic and sectarian interests is one way to measure the development and effectiveness of civil society. When economic interests predominate, it signals a free and dynamic movement of a diverse civil society, one that is not subject to “natural” or traditional divisions. But when the movement for socio-economic demands is dominated by a handful of sectarian leaders, such demands are expressed weakly, while division prevents the unification of certain socio-economic groups behind such demands. These groups are also prevented from taking the initiative in the socio-economic arena, under pretexts that are sometimes unrelated to internal Lebanese politics (the struggle with Israel for example). As a result, the socio-economic movement is flagrantly marginalized and deeply “falsified” (leftist political groups have long noted this, without investigating its primary aspects).

9.4 Sectarian Management of Socio-Economic Issues

Does this mean that sectarian political forces do not deal with socio-economic questions? It does not. However, they are powerful enough to block civil society movements, or even prevent its emergence.

These forces deal with socio-economic issues from the “summit,” as it were, managing them according to their interests. In the economic domain, these interests are often connected to capitalists from within a given sect: these capitalists are under the sway of the sectarian group's leadership in countries where the law is too weak to protect legitimate business activities or deter illegalities, when “protection” covers these latter acts. Businesspeople are too weak to force sectarian leaders to adopt policies that protect the interests of the former unless they accept these leaders' dictates. Sometimes, sectarian leaders are involved as partners in business activities, leading to a mafia-like situation. This process suits the very nature of the sect, as a political association in which politics is not separate from the economy, private is not separate from public, and the law is not separate from communal custom.

This type of sectarian “management” of socio-economic issues does not produce healthy solutions. This management style addresses certain labor demands outside the scope of an employee-employer relationship; it does not burden businesspeople with all of their responsibilities (*vis-à-vis* rising poverty, unemployment, and deteriorating living conditions). If such burdens are taken up, the system imposes the mediation of politicians or political groups. These sectarian leaders, or the states that protect them, intervene in such cases to exploit needs in return for political loyalty, at their own expense or that of the state. Under crisis conditions, these leaders treat unemployment by recruiting people into militias and by using other political tools to treat the problem. When conditions calm down, they exploit charitable or supposedly charitable works and garner support through public events and elections. The remainder of the problem is taken care of by emigration and remittances, or remains in the shadows and takes care of itself by rather dubious means. This does not produce a cohesive civil society that champions certain demands and meets various and contradictory needs; instead, it paves the way for civil conflict.

9.5 The Rise and Fall of Lebanese Civil Society?

The second example of the subordination of “civil” to “communal” involves groups struggling to secure political and civil rights.¹⁴⁷ The movement of these groups that flourished in the early 1990's in the post-war era, has been documented, particularly the diverse campaigns demanding specific political and

civic rights. This period saw the launching of associations that were largely independent of sectarian political structures and, thanks to their members' social-professional status, did not require the approval of sectarian leaders to advance their demands. This applies to intellectuals, self-employed professionals, and students. These people and associations are not involved in a race for traditional political power or posts, although some rebels may not remain that way for long, due to purely personal reasons or social status issues. In his book, Karam Karam focuses on four such campaigns, which supported the holding of municipal elections, permitting civil marriage, lowering the voting age to eighteen, and learning the fate of the wartime disappeared. Clearly concerned with rights and reform, these campaigns abandoned the standard existential issues of Lebanese politics at the time: sectarian balances of power, incomplete national sovereignty, the crisis of the sectarian system, and rising corruption. They understood politics more as policies and put these policies in their non-traditional context, focusing on political and civil rights, the foundations of popular, political, and local representation, development issues, the environment, and so on. They selected specialized topics in these fields and tried to impose their approach on them, avoiding a more comprehensive approach to politics; their rhetoric generally lacks phrases such as “the political system” and “political sectarianism.”

This approach also represented a move away from incorporating ideology into social movements and toward focusing on incremental reform moves, a shift from traditional political power to achieving “the possible.” Priorities were flexible; campaigners became specialized in certain issues or demands, in some cases focusing their efforts on a certain area for years instead of worrying about “reforming society” or “system change.” This type of approach has several benefits. First of all, it treats a given issue more explicitly, focuses attention on it through repeated initiatives, and might create a unified public position on the matter, transcending the many social and political divisions and conflicts within the ranks of the targeted groups, to the point that the legitimacy of the demand may, in some cases, appear eventually to be “above” discussion. Secondly, the leading proponents of this issue-based approach avoid becoming divided over larger political issues, which are kept separate from the movement's activities. Finally, they decline to take part in the struggle over political power, removing a

147 Karam Karam, 2006.

potential weapon that could be used against them by the authorities.

These campaigns featured a new approach and organizational background. They appeared to be truly “civil” in nature, i.e., independent of the actors of political society, and they focused on rights and avoided confrontations with the heads of other political groups, whose agenda went beyond demands and contained blanket condemnations of the “system” or the sociopolitical status or political behavior of another group. These civil campaigns received (varying) amounts of media coverage and attracted support from diverse groups. However, the critical mass of support was absent, and in some cases this included mass support from the groups that were supposedly implicated in the demand, such as the families of the wartime disappeared. While the only campaign that “succeeded” was the local election effort, these efforts nonetheless brought many new elements into the public domain, highlighting their civil character. They differed from the older political party models of political activism and mobilization and were characterized by maturity, flexibility, and diversity.

Despite the (well deserved) appreciation of their efforts, as reflected in the media coverage of the time, these groups were unable to withstand the rise of sectarian polarization at the end of the 1990s. In this sense, Karam's work appears to be an unintentional farewell to this healthy phenomenon, more than an evaluation leading to a more robust phase of activity. More recent studies have also noted the connection between these campaigns and the mass demonstration of March 14, 2005, in downtown Beirut that called for the immediate end of Syrian tutelage over Lebanon in the wake of Prime Minister al-Hariri's assassination. They noted the prominent role played by the leaders of these civil campaigns in this famous rally and the similarity between the current forms of the civil society movement and the rally's rhetoric. However, to move from such superficial features to an assumption of continuity would be, in my opinion, to go too far, given the solid hold of traditional political leadership on the March 14 phenomenon from the first moment. In other words, the failure of a post-March 14 movement reveals the intransigent elements around which the movement consolidated. It also exposed the relative abilities of campaigners who tried to undertake certain activities when the protests first began to mobilize. The meager attendance at the

funeral of activist and journalist Samir Kassir, a leading member of the civil society movement, was a case in point and only made his tragic assassination even more poignant.

The March 14 movement exhibited a “civil spirit” that was supposedly derived from the earlier campaigns of the 1990s, but was actually more of a “festival”-like celebration that was unsustainable. Not surprisingly, many chose to contrast between the “happier” 14 March and a more “solemn” 8 March demonstration. This exaggeration of March 14's civil aspect ignores the fact that the earlier campaigns were mobilized for a confrontation in defense of something they believed to be threatened, while the later ones were celebrating a great victory and convinced that the disparate groups of yesterday were now united. Ironically, a close parallel to the March 14 2005 spirit took place during the celebrations by southerners of the Israeli-occupied “security zone” during the liberation of May 24-25, 2000. There is no such close relationship between the March 14 and March 8 rallies of the Independence Intifada of 2005, even though the latter two followed one another in close succession.

Thus, the March 14 phenomenon should not be seen as an outgrowth of the civil campaigns of the 1990s. Instead, the pro-sovereignty movement of 2000-2005, which led to March 14, heralded the imminent end of the civil society movement. This movement continues to hold activities that protest the outbreak of renewed civil strife; despite the powerful expression of positions, such events remain modest in overall terms. During this five-year period, some prominent civil society activists have opted to stake out a place in the “system,” equipped with the legacy of their experience in these movements and other suitable tools for their new careers - these include MPs, ambassadors, experts and advisors, and others. The point here is not to cast blame; rather it is to point to the inherent weakness of civil society despite the critical need for it. The seriousness of the situation becomes clearer when the current conditions of the labor movement and professional unions, and their dominance by political/sectarian interests, is recalled, and when the meager presence of civil society activists in the social and cultural spheres is compared to that of political/sectarian groups. In the end, Lebanon's civil society is treading water: sources of funding remain available, but not progress or retreat, as no dramatic changes are seen. There is both great hope and considerable despair over its prospects.

X. THE ELECTORAL LAW

The electoral law is a launching-point for political reform in Lebanon. The country has long suffered from poor electoral laws and related problems and pressures that have reinforced a patron-client relationships and produce a political elite that co-opts its respective sects of geographic regions. This is due to the simple majority that is needed for victory in large electoral districts: the “winner take all” system means that in 1996, only 40 per cent of voters were represented by MPs they voted for, while 50 per cent were thus represented in 2000, and 60 per cent in 2005 (See Figure 3.21).¹⁴⁸ In addition, electoral districts have been modified all too frequently: in the first thirteen post-Independence parliamentary rounds, the Election Law's districting arrangements were changed nine times (see Annex 8). Electoral reform

has been advocated during the country's difficult and deepening political crisis as “medicine” for both the system and the country; the election law is important because it shapes the appearance of democratic political institutions of rule. However, in line with the Taif Accord, the parliamentary election law cannot treat the crisis properly if we lack another law, one that would establish an appointed senate. This body would distribute seats among the sects, with the details of the electoral process and the senate's prerogatives yet to be determined. Above all, the parliamentary election law will not achieve its goals unless parliament is freed of sectarian membership criteria. Such a move would generate citizenship-based participation, free from the hold of MPs and coercive electoral constituencies. Democratic systems, including the successful consociational ones, do not “capture” voters in such a fashion and few experts would consider such a phenomenon an example of democracy.¹⁴⁹

Box 3.19: The Political “Crisis” Reflected in Electoral Behavior

In any sociological study on electoral behavior, several factors influence the performance of voters, such as politics, class, culture, religion, and region. Also, there are factors connected to age, gender, profession, and specialization. While this applies to voters in Lebanon, other factors should be taken into consideration too, and these sometimes are the most important in explaining the electoral behavior of Lebanese “citizens.” These involve clientelism, which in turn is linked to sectarianism, which renders services, employment, and competition for *za'ama'* (local political leadership) in each sect and region the most important basis for widening mass electoral support, even if these methods involve corruption and the squandering public funds. This is largely due to an electoral law that uses a simple majority system in big districts. (1) In addition, some voting is based on religious legitimacy, which distinguishes Muslim electoral forces, whether Shi'a (Hizbullah) or Sunni (the Muslim Brotherhood and to a lesser extent the Society for Charitable Projects). This turns voting into a quasi-religious duty and renders the role of some clergymen and their institutions decisive in “conveying the truth” to voters about their “duty”. The same is true of certain institutions affiliated with Christian churches.

During the 1992-2000 rounds, the Syrian administration formed candidate lists, which could contain figures with contradictory socio-economic orientations; the only thing they agreed on was having Syrian officials as their reference-point. As a result, Lebanese voters exhibited diverse motives for voting. Some people wanted to vote for winning candidates, since they would win in any case thanks to local and regional support. Others voted for people who were strong enough to break the law with impunity, which reflects the culture of corruption that attracts people who see this illegality as protection, along perhaps with certain individual and sectarian benefits, against other corrupt individuals (usually representing the interests of sectarian competitors). Some groups strove to record a strong vote as a bloc (whether or not this leads to winning candidates) in order to prove that a certain group had a presence, or supported certain voluntary positions or “traditional” affiliations. Others engaged in cross-list voting, choosing candidates from competing lists, for various reasons. (2)

In 2005, we could add a new element, linked to the idea of laying the groundwork for a new political phase, as sectarian mobilization increased in influence. This involved an attempt to affirm the presence of the important Shi'a voting bloc on the eve of the formation of a new cabinet in Lebanon and the distribution of posts within this body based on shares of electoral weight that the Syrian authorities had ignored when designing the composition of governments and political alliances.

¹⁴⁸ This means that the rest were not represented in Parliament (60% in 1996, 50% in 2000, and 40% in 2005). The rise in the level of representation in the last round was due to sectarian polarization and broad-based alliances in some districts, where winning candidates scored huge victories over their opponents. Among these were the South, Nabatieh, Beirut, and some districts in Mount Lebanon (Maten, Kesrwan-Jbeil), the North (District One, i.e., Akkar-

Bsharre-Dennieh) and the Bekaa (Baalbek-Hermel). For more information, see Salam, Nawaf, “Reforming the Electoral Regime: A Comparative Look,” in *Lebanon's Options*, 2004, Beirut, Dar An-Nahar.

¹⁴⁹ See Rabbath, Edmond, 1970, *La Formation Historique du Liban politique et constitutionnel*, op. cit., p. 127, and also Rabbath 1982, *La Constitution Libanaise, Origines, Textes et Commentaire*, Beirut, Lebanese University, pp. 136-138.

As for the difference in electoral behavior in local as compared to parliamentary elections, precise conclusions are hard to come by, as the Lebanese have voted in these only twice in the last forty years and only three times in the capital in the last seventy, and four elsewhere. Nonetheless, it appears that voters make only a limited distinction between the development and services nature of local contests and the legislative and oversight duties of Parliament.

Over the last few decades, the MP's role has not been based on legislation and oversight of the government's performance; instead it has involved offering services, following up bureaucratic paperwork, representing the sect or doing the bidding of the "Syrian overlord." Thus clientelism and other mechanisms for linking voters to certain electoral behaviors appear in both local and parliamentary polls. Family-based units have also become more strident during local elections and play their part, along with factors such as political alliances and sectarian affiliation. This is due to the smaller size of the areas in which the elections take place.

During the last municipal (1998 and 2004) and parliamentary (2000 and 2005) elections, the lists in both cases saw, in most districts, battles based on the prevailing political divisions of the time. In addition, in local elections the choices are limited to large families that can dominate elections and sweep away opponents. In this sense, the 1998 municipal and 2000 parliamentary rounds resembled one another. They saw confrontations between lists allied with the Syrian system and those who opposed it in many Christian areas. They featured the beginning of a confrontation among the Future Movement and the Progressive Socialist Party, those Sunnis and Druze who were closer to the Syrian system, and the president of the Republic. (3) For the first time, we saw electoral competition, at local levels only, between two Syrian allies, Hizbullah and Amal, in areas with a Shi'a majority.

The 2004 municipal and 2005 parliamentary elections, however, saw open political confrontations, in which alliances shifted, according to the district in question. The 2004 local round of elections pitted the Future Movement, the PSP and Qornet Shehwan Christian politicians in mixed areas against those close to President Lahoud and supported by the Syrian system. In Mount Lebanon, we saw competition between Qornet Shehwan figures and Christian figures allied with Syria (sometimes supported by the Free Patriotic Movement). There have been confrontations between Amal and Hizbullah in Shi'a areas and between some "traditional" Christian families and the Lebanese Forces in parts of the North. In Beirut, Hizbullah joined the Future-PSP-Qornet Shehwan alliance, against its presumed allies.

The 2005 parliamentary round that marked the establishment of a new political phase in the country also featured interconnected alliances. The FPM allied with pro-Damascus Christian, Sunni, and Druze groups in the North, the Bekaa and Mount Lebanon (and also cooperated with Hizbullah in Zahle and Kesrwan-Jbeil). Meanwhile, Future, the PSP, Amal and Hizbullah, known as the Quadripartite Alliance, allied with Qornet Shehwan politicians in a number of districts in Beirut, the South, Mount Lebanon, the North, and Western Bekaa-Rashaya. In all of these rounds, most of the public followed the 'sectarian' options led by their leaders.

The culture of the political system in Lebanon, and the resulting loyalties that have been generated, appears to operate at a higher level than any of the political options and is very similar in local and parliamentary elections. While most countries see political affiliations expressed in local and national elections, the picture is confused by the sometimes contradictory alliances and statements, the impact of family loyalties, or the dominance of sectarian logic. There is no distinction between electoral behavior based on levels of representation or political demands themselves. Thus the big blocs of voters are not concerned with accountability and improving performance; they help, deliberately or not, to reproduce their political elite and the same political culture, albeit with a few amendments here and there; they do not radically affect the general democratic condition.

(1) A winning candidate or list in parliamentary elections does not currently require an absolute majority but merely a plurality. In a given district, a twenty-eight member list might receive 36 per cent of the votes, while the second list received 34 per cent and a third list 20 per cent, for example. The first list wins all of the seats (28 out of 28) while 64 per cent voted against it. This example applies in many districts and was even applied in smaller ones in 1972 (Baalbek-Hermel), when lists and individuals divided up the seats, although none received more than 25 per cent support. This may lead to the exclusion of certain political and social groups, even though these might be better represented among sects, if they are minorities in their region. This translates into sharp tension over unsound representation, which usually takes on regional or sectarian forms. A simple majority system is usually adopted in single-member districts. Even in these districts, the most democratic countries have adopted the principle of a second round of voting; the top vote getters in the first make it to this round, where one must win 50 per cent plus one in order to win.

(2) A statement such as "I formed my own candidate lists to secure my interests and satisfy my conscience" points to the choice of pro- and anti-government candidates at the same time; the first sentiment means voting on the basis of protecting or securing one's interests, while the second can be an implicit protest against the status quo, or a gesture of moral support for "respectable" politicians.

(3) Future and the PSP were not completely "divorced" from the Syrian system at the time, but upset with it and with one of its main allies in Lebanon, President Emile Lahoud.

For these reasons and more, electoral reform is considered fundamental to any political reform in the country. If parliament is freed of sectarian membership criteria, voters might leave behind their current electoral motives and use non-sectarian considerations, related to issues such as social policy, local development, or foreign affairs. A democratic society that protects citizens' rights, along with their civil and political freedoms, could be ensured by the following: a senate with defined prerogatives, oriented toward preventing discrimination and not distributing shares of power; a parliament based on proportional representation that guarantees a majority and minority in each district; a strict judicial deterrent to discrimination (this requires a new, higher body to be established); and an enhanced political and civil society, which includes civil rights groups, public opinion, and the media. Such a formula protects the letter of the constitution and does not require a renewal of negotiations over the Taif Accord. Some reform advocates support proportional representation in parliamentary elections as an alternative to the current winner-take-all system, but proportional representation will not end sectarianism in society or the actual politicization of sects, as long as political sectarianism remains a habit of the Lebanese. The country also requires a new law on political parties and a civil personal status code, and reform of the media, education, unions, and associations, among other things.

One concrete step to amend the parliamentary electoral law was recently put forward by the National Commission on the Parliamentary Election Law, which was appointed by the Cabinet on 8 August 2005 and completed its mission nine months later. The Commission proposed a draft law¹⁵⁰ that was superior in every way to earlier legislation. The draft law, which was accompanied by a report on the reasoning behind drafting its provisions; proposes a dual system: proportional representation in six big districts (the "historical" governorates, with Mount Lebanon divided into two), and a majoritarian system in the qadas or similar-sized districts (Beirut's three constituencies). It assigns fifty-one seats to the big districts and seventy-seven to the small ones, allowing people to vote where they reside and obliging candidates to declare in the location where their civil documents are registered. It permits Lebanese abroad to vote and requires the lists in big districts to have at least 30 per cent female membership, for three electoral rounds. It lowers the voting age to eighteen

¹⁵⁰ *The National Commission on a Parliamentary Election Law, Report and Draft Law*, Beirut, UNDP and the National Campaign for Electoral Reform, 2007. This includes a CD containing more

(addressing a perennial popular demand) and creates an independent electoral commission to oversee the polls, headed by judges. The entire process features oversight and other regulatory statutes on electoral spending, media and advertising, candidacy, list formation, voting, tabulation, the reading and announcement of the results, and so on.

The draft makes good use of advanced solutions and control mechanisms, presenting the "best possible" election law while retaining a sectarian parliament. Naturally, the Commission's mandate did not cover the issue of dropping sectarianism, but the body nevertheless expressed its hope that its draft would not work against the abolition of political sectarianism over stages, as called for by the constitution. The Commission said it believed that a dual electoral system "would both guarantee the representation of Lebanese through their various regions, and political choices, which might not necessarily have a regional or sectarian basis," while retaining the sectarian Parliament and "shares" reserved for sects. Without going into a detailed discussion of the draft, which represents a commendable achievement in light of the constraints set on the prerogatives of the Commission, we have deliberately ignored these constraints, since they represent a danger for the state and for the country during this latest phase of the history of sectarianism. A non-sectarian election law, in accordance with the Taif Accord and the constitution, has been outlined above. It adopts a unified proportional system - the constitution anyhow leaves the details of the electoral system to the new law - that employs a single electoral district, the governorate, after amending their current borders as needed. However, if we retain the sectarian principle in parliamentary elections, the Commission's proposal presents some key problems:

■ While the Commission's electoral formula may appear straightforward it is actually quite confusing and based to an unnecessary degree on sectarianism. It combines two electoral systems, two types of district, two votes for each voter, candidate lists for big districts and candidate lists for independent candidates in small districts, along with the distribution of seats within districts and among the sects. But more broadly, the public sees a huge and complex mechanism in which votes and candidates names enter, and MPs and losing candidates exit. Too many criteria and other details render the inner workings of the machine

than 100 draft laws and proposals that were sent to the Commission, as well as selected election laws that are in force in various countries.

opaque, and only “election insiders” will be able to fully understand it. The overwhelming majority of voters - and perhaps some candidates as well - will fail to grasp the technical processes and have to be content with having things “explained to them.” This is no simple matter, as it challenges the notion that the Commission's proposal liberates the will and choices of voters. In fact, the draft creates an equivalence between the situation of the majority of voters and an illiterate minority inside polling stations. Such a law would generate a new type of dependency, and not liberation. Upon further examination it becomes apparent that this complexity is created merely so as to retain the sectarian distribution of candidates and electorates and is thus unconnected to any other electoral or technical concerns. If this aspect, the sectarian distribution of seats, is discarded, the entire process becomes transparent. The only reason for the Commission's adoption of small districts with a winner-take-all system is to insure that members of the same sectarian community choose their own representatives and thus prevent any sect with numerical superiority in a given district from selecting the representatives of other sects. However, this fear of religious discrimination can be easily addressed if the Taif agreement is implemented and the senate composed of religious/sectarian leaders is created, coupled with the creation of an electoral law based on a proportional system for medium-size districts, many of which would retain some religious mix. These measures serve as important guarantees, along with others, for sects and the sectarians (in a system that is not technically sectarian to begin with). They will not ensure absolute numerical equity in representation (which is very difficult to attain under the existing system); instead, the bicameral form of political representation, along with other aspects, will deter discrimination.

■ Even if we return to the call for a combining of two electoral systems and districts, to allow Lebanese more varied choice, it is difficult to see how this will be carried out if the entire basis of the representational system rests on the principle of “guaranteed sectarian

shares” (of power) that include, parliamentary, ministerial, and other positions in the state and which prevent the allocation of any parliamentary seat to a non-sectarian entity. Not a single citizen will be exempt from the effects of “guaranteed shares” on his identity and self-image.

■ The draft law allows voters to vote where they reside, but candidates must stand in districts where their civil status records are registered. In most cases, this would presumably help voters avoid the trouble of going to polling stations that are distant from their place of residence. This represents a practical change for the better and not a political development. The Commission failed to adopt the more significant move, namely granting voters the right to change their registration to voter lists in districts where they reside, without having to transfer their civil registration. (The average resident of, for example, of the southern suburbs of Beirut, a largely Shi'a area, is registered as a voter in the Bekaa or South Lebanon, where his or her civil registration is located, based on the 1932 census). The draft law does not mention such a step, which would be “dangerous” because it would allow large numbers of citizens to change their place of voting. This would create chaos in the sectarian demographics of the elections and endanger the current method of allocating seats based on sect. This change should, however, be adopted, since the demographic considerations in question are a scandal; they anchor political representation to an ancient map of the country and not to the country's current residents, groups, and interests. As one observer put it, Lebanon's election demographics have been based for decades on a “geographical delusion.”¹⁵¹ Registering citizens in their villages of origin contributes to trapping people politically, based on the rural logic of “origin and kinship.” It renders cities large villages and isolates the political (and local) representation of citizens from their needs and daily lives. As a result Lebanese citizens have no voice in the locality where they live, only in the one where they will be buried.

Box 3.21 Administrative Decentralization

Administrative decentralization in Lebanon is connected to other key issues that enjoy a theoretical and political priority over it, such as: 1) the political unity of the state in its relationship with society, and the degree to which it should boost the independence of regional bureaucracy or maintain the control of central government and political authorities over regional administration; 2) balanced regional development and the appropriate administrative relationships between the center and the region undertaking this development, i.e., enhancing the selection of initiatives and projects, so that they are linked to real needs and their implementation and management are facilitated; 3) streamlining bureaucratic for-

151 The title of a book by Husni Zeyna.

malities so that citizens are not forced to travel to the capital or to governorate centers in search of signatures and stamps through the adoption of “administrative non-exclusivity”; and 4) corruption, a topic that has been raised forcefully in our society, and whether administrative decentralization will reduce this phenomenon (which is closely connected to the issue of political-sectarian protection for corrupt individuals) or increase it.

In addition, there are issues connected to political elites in Lebanon at the national level, which see decentralization and reform as direct threats to their interests and their continuing in power as *za'ims*, since their leadership is intimately linked to local politics and relies on a certain network of clientelist relations that extend from local to national levels; these want no part of political or administrative reform. Meanwhile, there are factors linked to the historical legacy, as a portion of the political elite fears that decentralization will enhance the local space, creating a confrontation with the state, which is what militias succeeded in doing during the civil war.

At times, the discussion of centralization versus decentralization in Lebanon involves a deeper debate about federalism and unity based on a central government. “The political and the administrative become intertwined in such a way that they cannot be separated; the need to build a politically unified state has also dragged policy-makers behind an administrative system that is excessively centralized...”¹⁵² This somewhat explains the centralizing tendency that the legislator expressed in 1989, in the Taif Accord and the Lebanese Constitution, as he focused on expanding the non-exclusive prerogatives of the authorities to the detriment of boosting administrative decentralization and noted that, “1) The Lebanese state is a single, unified state with a strong central authority.” He also called for 2) the prerogatives of governors and *qaimaqams* (heads of *qadas*) to be expanded and state institutions represented outside the capital to be regarded as representing the highest possible level, in order to facilitate people's bureaucratic paperwork and meet local needs; 3) the re-evaluation of administrative divisions in order to secure national cohesion, while preserving coexistence and the unity of land, people and institutions; 4) adopting expanded administrative decentralization at the level of small units (*qada* and lower) by electing a council for each *qada*, headed by the *qaimaqam*, to secure local participation; and 5) adopting a unified and comprehensive development plan that can develop Lebanon's regions in social and economic terms, enhance the resources of municipalities, unified municipalities and unions of municipalities by providing the necessary financial capabilities.” This also explains the dominance of non-exclusivity in various postwar proposals and draft legislation on decentralization (*), which have been unable to solve the issue of conflicting prerogatives at the three levels (municipality, *qada*, governorate) and the authorities that they represent.¹⁵³ Administrative decentralization is currently based in Lebanon on “a single level, that of the municipalities, and all other types of delegating authority are only a type of non-exclusivity.”¹⁵⁴ What is decentralization and how does it differ from non-exclusivity?

There are many, overlapping definitions of decentralization, as with other social science concepts. In general terms, it may be taken to be “any act undertaken by the central government to officially transfer authority or responsibility to actors and institutions at a lower level in the regional, administrative and political hierarchy.”¹⁵⁵ Meanwhile, “de-concentration” is a type of centralization, based on transferring some or all prerogatives of the administrative authorities in the capital to their representatives in the regions (...) and the difference between this and decentralization is clear and fundamental. Suffice it to say that the prerogatives of decision-making in de-concentrated administrative systems are granted to employees who are subject to the central government, and appointed by them, while these prerogatives in a decentralized system are given to locally-elected bodies that have a corporate personality and a degree of financial and administrative independence.”¹⁵⁶

We should be wary of paradoxes and implicit assumptions when debating this issue. It is not necessarily true that centralization will strengthen the state's political and social unity; the reverse is not necessarily the case either. The motives for corruption might differ in these two models, but not its actual level. Corruption arises through the facilitation of hard paperwork and the complication of easy paperwork if an employee can use his prerogatives accordingly, in isolation from suitable hierarchical oversight. Linkages should be established between political and administrative reform. Retaining an electoral system, for example, that strengthens the power of sectarian leaders in the regions is the first step toward seeing these regions subjected to the personal interests of the leader rather than those of the state. In principle, clientelism grows in the bureaucracy when decentralization is strong. As such, sound tools are needed to assess the potential impact of governance options in the various areas we have indicated, and perhaps in others as well. The Lebanese University is another example of this dialectical relationship between centralization and decentralization, revealing the difficulties and defects that should be corrected (see Box 3.14). Recently, the chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Justice and Administration, MP Robert Ghanem, completed a draft law on administrative decentralization that has been hailed as a serious effort to address some of these concerns.

(*) Most prominent here are the 1995 draft law by MP August Bakhous, the 1997 draft law by Parliament's Justice and Administration Committee, and the 1999 draft law by the government of Prime Minister Salim Hoss. The Justice and Administration Committee recently prepared a draft law on “Administrative Organization and Administrative Decentralization,” which tried to balance between de-concentration and decentralization by granting wider prerogatives to the proposed Governorate Councils (an example of de-concentration) and *qada* Councils (representing decentralization).

152 Salem, 1996, p.20

153 Mokheiber, 2005; Qabbani, 2005

154 Baroud, 2005, 139

155 Nasr and al-Masri, 2005,18

156 Qabbani, 2002, 27

Will the draft law's partially proportional system bring back to representational mechanisms and with them to the governance of the country (both of which are sectarian) some of the vitality and flexibility that was lost in the postwar period, which consecrated the leadership of a single, dominant za'im over most of the sects, belittling in the process other sects? The Commission's proposal assigns a small number of seats to MPs who are independent from the strictly-drawn sectarian blocs and will probably be elected as a minority in the fifty-one-seat, "bigger district" portion of Parliament. This arrangement will bring to parliament a handful of MPs who may have something new to say. No one should take such a forum lightly, if used well, and this is particularly true of parliamentary seats. However, this proposal will not liberate the political system (or the country) from its intractable crisis. Such are the limits to reform through a new electoral law that in the Lebanese case, has maintained the old way of doing things at the deeper and more fundamental level, namely, as a fundamental organizing principle for the country's political society and system. From this perspective, these most recent moves toward reforming the Election Law have proven disappointing, since they contain few signs of a radical and much-needed break with the past.

XI TOWARD A CITIZEN'S STATE

What this chapter has highlighted is the degree to which sectarianism has infiltrated every aspect of the political and civil life of the Lebanese. Politics has lost its meaning as issues are subsumed under a blatantly sectarian rhetoric. Internal state sovereignty has also diminished as it cedes more authority to individual communities. At the same time, despite its open and democratic system, the country suffers from considerable deficiencies in representative/active citizenship. Equity is undermined among citizens in a variety of ways.

Even though the constitution guarantees equity among citizens, the partial application of some articles of the Taif constitution and the misapplication of others mean that the relationship of Lebanese citizens to their state is "legally confessionalized." Sectarian communities strive to mediate the relationship between the state and "their" citizens, not only in practice but through the law as well. The selective interpretation of some articles of the constitution has also left the door wide open for an increasingly dysfunctional system. This is further bolstered by allocation of all personal status matters to each of the country's eighteen officially recognized religious sects. In the

absence of an optional civic status law, this situation ingrains inequity among citizens, consecrates gender discrimination on various issues, and undermines the relationship of, for example, children with their mothers. From this perspective, personal status laws have also become a source of political power over the various communities.

Institution building has also suffered tremendous setbacks as political/sectarian conflicts materialize in political deadlock. State institutions have turned into prime arenas of contestation between the main sectarian groups based on the projected "rights" of these groups, leading to a quasi-paralysis of all the reform efforts as well as some of the ordinary functions of the state. Among other issues, this is particularly evident in the negotiations over the appointments of civil servants as clientelism is camouflaged as the interests of sectarian communities. It is also apparent in the slow dismantling of the Lebanese University by these very same interests.

The electoral law, another sphere of contestation between religious communities, has changed nine times over the span of the thirteen parliamentary elections Lebanon has had since independence. As a result, and even though elections have taken place regularly (with the exception of the civil war period between 1975 and 1990), Lebanese citizens have had to rely on a deficient and unstable electoral system marked by constantly changing administrative divisions. The law has served to reproduce traditional power structures and hindered the emergence of new, independent political leadership. In this context, more recent attempts at electoral reform have been stifled by civil conflict and negotiations among leaders. The absence of laws guaranteeing national political parties has further hindered the ability of Lebanese society to produce new, "nationally oriented" leadership.

Addressing these issues and others means restoring meaning to politics and insuring that the different articles of the constitution are fully implemented. This is particularly important for it is only by ingraining equity among citizens and redirecting the relationship of citizens to their state that will Lebanon be able to move toward a citizen's state.

4



SOCIO-ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP AND THE STATE

CHAPTER FOUR

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP AND THE STATE

I. INTRODUCTION

Social citizenship refers to specific issues that may affect the potential of citizens to develop their capacities. Unlike other types of citizenship rights, social citizenship is not always guaranteed by the law. Often the acceptance of these rights is reflected in the number and type of international agreements and treaties that are adopted or endorsed by a particular state. Social citizenship rights are a fundamental component of integral citizenship and necessary for the full exercise of democratic citizenship and the expansion of people's capacities. The consensus reached on the basic components of citizenship considers the rights to education and health as crucial. Likewise, the elimination of elements that hinder the full integration and participation of individuals in society, such as unemployment, poverty, and inequality is considered basic to the practice of effective citizenship.¹⁵⁷

Social citizenship rights in Lebanon have a long and checkered history. The Lebanese state has been historically identified with a *laissez faire* economic approach where much is left to market forces. At the same time, this liberal and open economic system includes substantive investments in various social sectors such as health, education, and a wide range of social welfare and protection policies. Moreover, these rights as well other fundamental human rights are enshrined in the constitution. However, political and military instability, including a fifteen-year civil war and several invasions by Israel, along with other internal factors, have resulted in a muddled institutional context in which the state's capacity to lead the development process has been undermined. These factors include the intricate connections between public and private interests in the social service sectors, the consequent endorsement of overlapping and sometimes conflicting policies and projects, the conflation between social development, social protection, and social welfare policies outlined in the introduction to this report, and flawed policies resulting from the assumed convergence between distinct, if overlapping, social conditions, namely poverty, vulnerability,

Box 4.1: Dimensions of Social Citizenship

Dimensions	Components
Basic Needs	Health, Education
Social Integration	Employment, poverty, and inequality

Source: Source, UNDP, 2005a, p. 118

and social exclusion. As a result, the delivery of social services has been transformed into a web of interlocking interests and overlapping mandates. More critically, social development outcomes are not commensurate with social spending and social citizenship rights have been undermined.

This chapter will explore these issues from the perspective of equitable socio-economic citizenship rights. The basis of this chapter is that equal access to quality social services lies at the heart of social citizenship and that the guaranteed provision of protection and of benefits by the state is an the inherent right of each citizen rather than a form of assistance provided to specific social groups, especially the poor or vulnerable. The chapter will therefore argue that these rights in Lebanon must go beyond access to these rights and address opportunity or quality. To do so it will focus on three issues. First, the chapter will explore access to equitable social citizenship rights in a fragmented political system, such as Lebanon, where various entities, in particular religious groups and the state, are massively and heterogeneously implicated in producing, financing, and distributing social services. Second, it will try to assess the magnitude of social and economic issues faced by lower middle-income groups, issues which may have severe implications for political and economic stability, as well as for social citizenship rights. Third, the chapter will go beyond the basic components of social citizenship and social integration, health, education, and employment that affect large segments of the lower middle- and middle-income groups, to address questions of equity by focusing on specific population groups that are suffering from extreme poverty, vulnerability, and exclusion.

¹⁵⁷ See UNDP, 2005a, *Democracy in Latin America, Towards a Citizen's Democracy*, p. 118-129.

Section I presented a brief introduction to the issues. Section II of this chapter will present an overview of

social citizenship rights, from the perspective of social development, social services, and social outcomes. Section III will focus on the major pillars of social citizenship, specifically the rights to education, health, and work. The inter-relationship among these different rights on the one hand, and poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion on the other, will be highlighted whenever possible. Section IV will attempt to assess the scope and forms of severe vulnerability and exclusion to which specific groups of the population are subject, and analyze their implications for social citizenship. Section V will explore the role of the private sector and civil society in addressing some of the perceived needs and Section VI will present the main conclusions of this chapter.

II. EQUITY, SOCIAL PROVISION, AND SOCIAL RIGHTS: HOW RATHER THAN WHAT

2.1 Envisioning Social Rights and Social Development

Social citizenship rights were instituted during the French Mandate, when Lebanon was officially established as an independent nation state. Historically, the state was envisioned as playing a role parallel to that of the private sector in the provision of services in a free-market environment. Long-term macroeconomic stability (insignificant budget deficits or public debt, strong balance of payments, strong currency, and sustained capital availability) characterized Lebanon for its first forty years of existence. As Gaspard argues, these were not accompanied by economic growth or social equity.¹⁵⁸ Almost all socio-economic surveys that have been conducted since the 1960s onwards have indicated that around half of Lebanese households have lived poorly irrespective of how poverty is defined. Being poor roughly denotes that the household is unable to save, spends a relatively high share of its income on food, and is regularly in need of financial support.

Social citizenship rights among other rights were subsequently enshrined in the 1990 preamble of the constitution, which recognizes the International Declaration of Human Rights as a fundamental pillar

¹⁵⁸ Presentation to the socio-economic citizenship workshop organized for the NHDR, October 2007. For further details, see Gaspard, Toufic, 2004, *A Political Economy of Lebanon, 1948-2002: The Limits of Laissez-faire*, Leiden and Boston, Brill.

for all citizen rights (Box 4.2). The translation of these rights into laws and programs has been beset by a series of issues that feed off each other. A large number of these issues are related to the internal structure of Lebanese policy-making as well as the particularities of the Lebanese political system, where clientelist networks frequently overlap with sectarian identities hindering in the process the implementation or enactment of national policies seen to threaten the interests of particular groups.

One result has been the absence of a national framework for long term socio-economic development for the country and the continued neglect of proposed plans for its overall development, such as the IRFED plan of the 1960s or the more recent 2003 *Schéma d'Aménagement du Territoire Libanais*.¹⁵⁹ Other post-war reconstruction plans for the country were never adopted either.

In such a context, the state acts as a guarantor of social citizenship rights. The rationale and the scope of the relationship between the citizen and the state are based on the quantity of these services and, more importantly, on their quality. The better the access

Box 4.2: The Social Rights of Citizens: Selections from the Preamble of the Constitution

Select Articles from the preamble of the constitution:

[...]

b. Lebanon is of Arab affiliation and identity; it is a founding and active member of the Arab League and is bound by its charter; it is also a founding and active member of the United Nations and abides by its charter and by the International Declaration of Human Rights. The Lebanese state represents these principles in all rights and domains with no exception.

c. Lebanon is a democratic, parliamentary republic founded on the respect for public liberties, the foremost of which are freedom of opinion and belief; and on social justice and equality in rights and in duties among all citizens without discrimination or distinction.

[...]

f. The economic system is a liberal one that guarantees individual initiative and private ownership.

g. The balanced, cultural, social, and economic growth of the regions is a principal pillar of the unity of the state and of the stability of the system.

¹⁵⁹ CDR-IAURIF-Dar., 2003, *Schéma d'Aménagement du Territoire Libanais. Phase 1: Diagnostic et Problématiques*, Beyrouth.

Box 4.3: The Three Historical Eras of Social Development Strategies in Lebanon

Development policy in Lebanon can be divided into three main eras:

The Chehab Era (1959-1964)

The term of President General Fouad Chehab (1959-1964) saw the first attempt to articulate a more active role for the state in social and economic development and in addressing income and social disparities. Chehab believed that through better planning and a more rigorous promotion of economic parity his government could lay the basis for a less precarious national unity. The IRFED-Liban mission was asked to carry out the first comprehensive national analysis of Lebanon's needs and its social and economic development, with particular regard for social and regional disparities, inequities in wealth and income distribution, and the spread of poverty belts around the capital and urban areas, at a time when the country was growing. Based on its recommendations, the government launched a number of programs and interventions aimed at enhancing the country's socio-economic conditions. These efforts included the improvement of the public education system in terms of both quantity and quality, the founding of the Lebanese University, the first public institution of its kind, the construction and operation of public hospitals, and the establishment of the National Social Security Fund, as well as other institutions.

The reform efforts were also partly the result of the increasingly active public role of professional syndicates and other social, civil, and democratic movements. Such activism was mostly prevalent amongst workers, employees, farmers, and students and, in general, managed to make inroads among traditional religious and sectarian circles. The efforts of Chehab did not fully succeed, in part as a result of opposition of various groups fearful of losing their social privileges to a strong state; they were also undermined by his inability to tackle the chronic clientelism that permeated the Lebanese political system. Successive governments were also unable or unwilling to carry through with these reforms. The promising activities of the civil movements were also brought to an end by the civil war, which re-established sectarian affiliations and divisions.

The Civil War 1975–1990

In addition to the devastating destruction, losses in life, and huge declines in the GDP and growth levels, the bases for the social pillars that had been established in the previous period were ruptured. The Government continued to allocate funds to social issues in its budget throughout the war period, but the mismanagement of the funds of this sector led to a significant reduction in returns on expenditure. To cope with the devastation caused by the war and the territorial fragmentation of the country into opposing sides, the private sector and civil society, in addition to militias, began to offer some of the social services that the Government had ceased to provide. While the wartime economy did compensate, at least partially, for the state's retreat from social service provision, the overall cost to the country was quite high, due to the resulting losses to human capacities, infrastructure, and the environment.

The Post-War Period 1990–1997

With the end of the civil war and the signing of the Taif Accord, public spending was oriented primarily toward rebuilding physical infrastructure and strengthening state security organizations and the judicial sector. A number of social reform plans were elaborated but never fully implemented. The share of social spending as a percentage of total reconstruction remained limited and the implementation of social reform plans was rather slow. The neglect of social service provision was in part justified by acceptable economic growth rates. The assumed trickle down effect was seen as an effective substitute for the more risky and "bolder" social interventions in the medium term. This period set the stage for today's social and economic environment.

and opportunity provided by the state, the stronger the citizens' sense of belonging to this state. The major challenge here lies in determining the scope of state intervention in the provision of social services, setting targeting systems, fixing eligibility criteria, and so forth. In other words, the major concern is not just "what to do" but "how to do it."

160 This section and the two that follow are based on Chaaban, Jad and Salti, Nisreen, *Social Citizenship and the Economy: The Role of Sectarianism in the Allocation of Public Expenditure*, Background paper prepared for the Lebanon NHDR 2008-2009.

2.2 Balanced Development and Social Rights¹⁶⁰

The postwar period in Lebanon has seen a succession of governments that have viewed social rights as part of a larger discourse of balanced development and growth. Yet the disparities in growth and development across Lebanese regions, districts, and classes have grown over the last fifteen years. While it is in no way a foregone conclusion that it is government policy that is directly responsible for the exacerbated inequalities and

inequities, it remains an open question whether the allocation of public resources has, in fact, been guided by concerns for balanced capacity-building, or whether successive governments were only paying lip service to the idea of balanced growth while the channeling of public funds was in fact constrained by other political considerations having to do with sectarian balance, clientelism, and/or other factors.

Balanced development and capacity building has been the dominant paradigm in development thought for over a decade. The arguments in favor of making balanced growth a priority are numerous and range from the positive economic¹⁶¹ to the ethical¹⁶² and political.¹⁶³ Thus there are efficiency gains to balanced development having to do with higher marginal returns to investment in education and health in the peripheries, the costs of overcrowding urban centers, and increasing returns to balanced development because of possible complementarities between various regions.¹⁶⁴ Similarly, a “gains from trade” argument could be made in favor of developing regions according to their comparative advantage and reducing transport costs between them.¹⁶⁵ There is also evidence linking income and asset inequality to lower overall life expectancy¹⁶⁶ and lower overall growth rates.¹⁶⁷ The findings in the political economy literature relating inequality in income and development to greater violence¹⁶⁸ and political instability¹⁶⁹ also provide motivation for balanced growth.

While it is not difficult to define unbalanced development as development that does not benefit all population groups more or less equally or assures equitable levels of growth and prosperity, defining balanced development is more of a challenge because there are disparities across regions owing to intrinsic differences in

geographical and natural characteristics, population densities, agglomeration, and scale economies. In the case of Lebanon, sectarian composition constitutes an additional source of heterogeneity that may affect allocations of public spending and may, for political and historical reasons, supersede concerns of balanced growth based on socio-economic characteristics.

Targeting mechanisms are a major tool available to policy makers to achieve balanced development and poverty alleviation. These determine the allocation of public transfers and investments according to geographic location (geographic targeting), beneficiary characteristics (proxy means testing) or specific incidents (where beneficiaries are people adversely affected by a particular event). No targeting scheme is foolproof, and any mechanism suffers from inclusion errors, through leakages, and exclusion errors, through imperfect capture. Thus, while geographic targeting is indiscriminate within a targeted location, so that any claimant from a qualifying location is eligible, regardless of their characteristics, it is known to have fewer distorting behavioral effects or perverse incentives than proxy means testing. The latter presents the risk of inducing people to alter their behavior and characteristics in order to affect their eligibility, thus defeating the very purpose of targeting, at least among the population that lies in the proximity of the eligibility threshold. Finally, targeting schemes centered on particular incidents or the identities of beneficiaries are empirically known to be more prone to fraud and higher administration costs.¹⁷⁰

There has been little systematic targeting in existing programs in Lebanon. This has been compounded by

161 Andersen L., Mellor J., Milya J., 2004, *Income Inequality and Public Good Provision: An Experimental Analysis*, Working Paper #12, College of William and Mary

162 Sen, Amartya, 1993, *The Economics of Life and Death*, Scientific American, May: 40-47.

163 Alesina A., Baqir R., Easterly W., 1999, *Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions*, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume CXIV, Issue 4: 1243-1284

164 Thus evidence on decreasing marginal returns to investments in education and health would suggest that there are efficiency gains from increasing investment in education in underserved areas. Similarly, diminishing marginal gains from education and health notwithstanding, an allocation of development assistance that favors urban centers, which already receive a larger share of public spending, might carry additional costs of overcrowding urban centers. Finally there is reason to believe that there may be external gains from regional complementarities when development is more balanced so that the expansion of one region may have positive spillover effects on neighboring regions and a strategy of balanced development uses gains from these complementarities optimally.

165 Arguments about the efficiency gains from the lifting of trade barriers apply where infrastructure and telecommunication investments are expended that reduce transport costs, coupled with public social spending that is responsive to regional differences in provision costs.

166 Sen, *ibid.*; Rodgers, GB., 1979, “Income and Inequality as Determinants of Mortality: An International Cross-Section Analysis”, *Population Studies*; 33: 343-51

167 Deininger K., Squire L., 1997, “Economic Growth and Income Inequality: Reexamining the Links”, *Finance and Development*, Vol. 34, Issue 1: 38-41

168 Bourguignon, F., 1998, *Crime as a Social Cost of Poverty and Inequality: a review focusing on developing countries*, processed, DELTA, Paris. Fajnzylber P., Lederman D., Loayza N., 1998, *What causes violent crime?*, The World Bank, Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, processed.

169 Alesina A., Perotti R., 1996, “Income Distribution, Political Instability and Investment”, *European Economic Review*, Vol. 40, Issue 6: 1203-1228

170 The case of disaster relief, humanitarian crisis aid, and generous pension plans are illustrative of the extent of corruption and fraud in such targeting schemes. .

a deficiency in standard data on poverty and social indicators, weak coordination and overlapping mandates across different programs and weak safety nets that provide little shock absorption. Consequently, public sector spending has been effective neither at alleviating poverty, insuring equity and social development nor at providing the needed economic stimulation.¹⁷¹

2.3 Social Rights: Multiple Actors, Nebulous Boundaries

On the social front, Lebanon has been hampered by the absence of a social policy framework, weak coordination and governance, politically-influenced targeting of development aid and the paucity of reliable data for poverty and also for the outcomes of interventions, including post- project or crisis evaluations. Rather than a comprehensive vision/agenda, a piecemeal approach to social development was instituted. Furthermore, the involvement of alternate considerations in public allocations has undermined government delivery in the social sphere as well as in that of the connections between the state and its citizens, causing considerable inequity among citizens.

In the absence of this framework or vision, the direct provision of social services by different state- and non-state institutions has not been based on comprehensive needs assessments. Rather, the boundaries of state and non-state intervention have become blurred and the role of different public, private, and civil society stakeholders with respect to major public social services (health, education, social welfare) ill-defined. Like many other countries around the world the provision of social services in Lebanon is characterized by a multiplicity of stakeholders that includes a wide range of state institutions, international NGOs, family and communal organizations, and national NGOs, as well as private institutions. A large number of the latter two categories are directly affiliated with particular religious groups or specific political parties. Given the delicate sectarian balance required by the dominant political system this has led to a situation where vested political interests are closely intertwined with sectarian clientelist networks. Often the legacy and power of communitarian factions, in addition to their vested interests, tend to be stronger than those of the state itself.

This has a profound effect on the functioning of government and the equitable and adequate delivery of services.

¹⁷¹ One must keep in mind that the failure of an allocation of public expenditures to capture its target population does not constitute sufficient evidence that the targeting criteria are being subordinated to

Most decision making within government is subject to a process unrelated to the merits of the proposed policy at a national level. Rather, more often than not, discussion revolves around how the different private/sectarian interests might be affected. This negotiation takes place through the designated representatives of the different sects within government and in turn allows for the institutionalization of confession-al/clientelist networks within state institutions. This situation has generated considerable confusion in the 'social sphere' and transformed it into an arena of multiple and overlapping interventions marked by various forms of duplication, inefficiency, and cost overrun. Consequently, the distribution of social expenditures by governorates, to be demonstrated shortly, is not consistent with the regional share of deprived populations.

Other implicit factors also contribute to and sometimes determine such forms of involvement, among which are intra-sectarian and, more specifically, inter-sectarian considerations. Procedures and mechanisms of the decision-making process related to this issue are often subject to confusion and lack of transparency, and thus leave room for considerable questions such as: on what basis is the sectoral, and sub-sectoral allocation of direct social public investment decided? What is the rationale behind the geographic and spatial distribution of such investments? Which public entities should take charge of operating a "social service product" and ensuring its maintenance? To what extent are these investments subject to regular outcome evaluations that assess their impact on beneficiaries?

Essentially, these questions raise issues related to the public supply side, which is greatly affected by the entanglement of formal and informal decision-making processes for designing public social interventions, including those of the government, concerned ministries and/or public entities, donor countries or agencies, and CSOs, as well as national and international NGOs. The result has been a less than desirable outcome.

2.4 Public Expenditures: a Brief Overview

Following the end of the civil war in 1990, the Lebanese economy saw an unprecedented increase in government expenditures: spending expanded

other prerogatives, and may instead be an indication of inherent differences across regions that are difficult to overcome, or it could be the result of a weakness in the targeting scheme itself.

from US\$1.3 billion in 1992 to above US\$7 billion in 2003, an almost threefold increase in real terms. According to the World Bank (2005), between 1990 and 2005 a total amount of US\$10.3 billion was spent on capital expenditures (equivalent to US\$643 million per year), US\$67.5 billion was spent on current expenditures (or US\$4.2 billion per year), and cumulated public debt reached US\$38.4 billion (US\$2.4 billion per year).

Yet the effectiveness of public spending has been widely contested, since the surge in expenditures during the reconstruction period has not yielded the expected results in terms of socio-economic development. Even though, as we shall see shortly, most of the Unmet Basic Needs (UBN) indicators improved, regional disparities have been accentuated, project quality has deteriorated, and the public deficit has worsened. One can even argue that in the absence of effective control and supervision, public goods provision in Lebanon has become a tool for nepotism and rent-seeking. Checks and balances are replaced with reciprocal political consent and toleration by politicians of each other's misdeeds. Moreover, corruption in the provision of public goods and services has been facilitated by the scale of the projects involved the large number of intermediaries and the numerous stages of execution.¹⁷²

Public goods provision has also been characterized by inefficiency. As was made evident in the Paris III Social Action plan, overlapping mandates and duplication characterize the work of several social sector ministries. The central government plays a key role in social policies through two main channels: 1) the office of the prime minister and six key ministries (Health, Education, Social Affairs, Labor, the Interior, and the Displaced), cabinets which are directly related to social development and welfare, and 2) public entities attached to them with a variety of activities and mandates. Institutions with a direct social mandate in particular are especially prone to redundancy. Indeed, many such government bodies (Council of Development and Reconstruction (CDR), Council of the South, and Central Fund for the Displaced, and so on.) share common goals and purposes, and without coordination among them much of the work that these various government institutions do will be duplicated.

172 Adwan, C., 2005, 'Corruption in Reconstruction: The Cost of National Consensus in Post-War Lebanon' in *Corruption in Postwar Reconstruction*, Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA). Adwan provides a rare overview of corruption cases in postwar reconstruction in Lebanon.

173 The World Bank (2005) states that the official government budget, prepared by Ministry of Finance and approved by

Furthermore, transparency in public operations is compromised because large portions of public investments are off-budget and expenditure ceilings voted by parliament are not binding because of the ability to carry over budget appropriations indefinitely. According to World Bank estimates, 19 percent of public spending is outside of the regular budget, including the foreign-financed portion of the public investments executed by the CDR and ministries. The budget law also does not cover the activities of publicly-owned autonomous agencies such as EdL, although EdL's deficit is covered by government revenue. Unification of the entire budget is required if the government is to effectively control public revenues and expenditures, maintain its social services and improve its financial relations with public utilities.¹⁷³

2.5 Social Sector: Spending versus Outcomes

Social sector spending in Lebanon is high, in nominal terms and as a proportion of GDP, with more than 70 percent of that spending coming from the private sector. According to the World Bank (2005), the sum of public and private social spending stood at approximately 21 percent of GDP in 2004, of which 15 percent was supplied by the private sector. The Ministry of Finance estimates that public social expenditures (defined by the operations of the ministries of Education, Health, and Social Affairs and expenditures channeled through related agencies) stood at 6.75 percent of GDP in 2006, which represents 35 percent of primary expenditures in 2006. When public pensions and end-of-service indemnities are also taken into account, total social expenditures rise to 8.32 percent of GDP, with public social expenditures representing more than 25 percent of government primary expenditures in 2006.¹⁷⁴

This high social spending is not commensurate with outcomes. A comparative study undertaken by Herrera and Pang (2005), estimates that input efficiency—that is excess public input for a given level of public and private output—is of the order of 79-87 percent for education¹⁷⁵ and 71-75 percent for health.¹⁷⁶

parliament only covers central government spending as executed by twenty-nine first-line entities and seventy-six second-line entities. Foreign Financed Investments (FFI) under the purview of the CDR and a number of other public autonomous entities operate outside of the regular budget. These include Électricité du Liban (EdL), the National Social Security Fund, Banque du Liban (BdL), the National Archives Agency, four consolidated water authorities, public hospitals, and over sixty other entities.

174 Ministry of Finance.

175 As measured by net primary and secondary school enrolment.

176 Life and life disability-adjusted expectancy at birth and immunization rates (DPT and measles).

In other words, Lebanon uses at least 25 percent more inputs (public spending) to produce the same health outcomes as best practices countries¹⁷⁷ and at least 13 percent more inputs for education. And this does not account for the fact that Lebanon's share of private spending in total social spending, at least for health – but probably also for education— is much higher than most of the 180 countries considered in this study.¹⁷⁸ These issues will be elaborated shortly.

Between 1995 and 2005, total public spending on infrastructure related to social outcomes totaled more than US\$ 4.4 billion.¹⁷⁹ As can be seen from the table below, the allocation of this spending did not match the distribution of poverty (measured by the low satisfaction of basic needs index) in 1995: Beirut received 16 per cent of total public investment spending while it only had 8 per

cent of total households with low satisfaction of basic needs in 1995. Nabatieh was home in 1995 to 11 per cent of the households with low basic needs satisfaction; however it received during the next 10 years only 1 per cent of total public spending.

In the education sector for example, data across governorates shows that the supply of public education (proxied through school capacity created per 10,000 students) was not commensurate with the variance in school dropout rates. In fact, the North received much less new school capacity than the Bekaa and the South, yet this region had the highest school dropout rates in 2004. The situation is quite similar in the health sector. Regional variability in the supply of public hospitals was inefficient in targeting the regions with the highest health needs (these needs are proxied by using the percentage of individuals with at least one chronic illness) (Table 4.2).

Table 4.1: Public Expenditure, Poverty, and Basic Needs

Mohafaza	Total public investment expenditure (Million US\$) 1995-2005	Poverty incidence (%) 2004*	Allocation of public investment expenditure	Distribution of low satisfaction of basic needs 1995**	Distribution of poverty 2004*
Beirut	734	5.85	16	8	2
Mount Lebanon	1,111	19.56	25	30	27
North	1,415	52.57	32	26	38
Bekaa	247	29.36	6	15	13
South	918	42.21	21	10	16
Nabatieh	42	52.57	1	11	4
Total	4,467	28.55	100%	100%	100%

Source: MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2008a, *Poverty Growth and Income Distribution in Lebanon*

** Compiled from UNDP, 2007b, *Progress in Mapping of Living Conditions in Lebanon between 1995 and 2004*

Table 4.2: Supply versus Need

Mohafaza	School capacity per 10,000 students 1995-2005	School Drop out rates (%) 2004	New Hospital Beds per 10,000 persons 1995-2005	Population with at least one chronic illness (%) 2004
Beirut	55	6	5	25
Mount Lebanon	76	7	3	16
North	91	11	2	13
Bekaa	158	7	6	13
South	189	10	4	19
Nabatieh	25	9	9	17
Total	99	8	4	17

Source: Chaaban and Salti, *Social Citizenship and the Economy: The Role of Sectarianism in the Allocation of Public Expenditure*, Background paper prepared for the Lebanon NHDR 2008-2009. Author computations based on data from the CDR, UNDP and MoSA.

177 These countries are Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Mauritius, Kuwait, and Chile.
178 Private spending on health over GDP averages 2.3 per cent for the 187 countries sampled - to be compared with 10.2 per cent in Lebanon. There is no similar figure for private education.

Public education spending averages 4.5 percent of GDP for 166 countries sampled.

179 Total spending by the CDR excludes projects that are national by nature such as airports, highways, and the Lebanese University.

2.6 Public Financing of Social Services Produced by the Private Sector

While inter-sectarian considerations strongly influence the scope and profile of the public provision of social services (such as the decisions to establish a public school, a university branch, or a hospital in this or that area), the state also indirectly generates public services through the conduit of non-state actors. This public financing of services produced by the private sector appears to be governed by two different processes.

Sectarian institutions and other NGOs performing these services directly initiate the first process. They usually target poor and vulnerable groups with services such as free private education, medical centers, orphanages, and elderly care, irrespective of how efficient the end results may be. For example, the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) mostly provides support to unemployables (orphans, the elderly, the handicapped, and so on), encompassing on average 35,000 cases per year, through transfers to non-governmental organizations.¹⁸⁰ In addition, it supports the creation and development of social development centers, as well as social and health centers run in partnership with NGOs. A total of 360,000 individuals benefited from these services in 1998, but the regional balance appears uneven, as most of the beneficiaries are from the relatively wealthier region of Beirut. Based on the living conditions index from MOSA-UNDP, the World Bank (2005) estimates that

10 percent of the poor benefited from MOSA services in Beirut, in contrast to a fraction of less than 2 percent in the Nabatieh and North Lebanon regions. There were respectively 4.1 and 3.6 social and health centers per 10,000 poor in the regions of South Lebanon and Beirut, but only 1.4 and 1.6 in the Bekaa and North Lebanon regions (Table 4.3). Another program which has a social assistance component is the producers' subsidy for certain crops (wheat, sugar beet, tobacco). In total, it is believed that around 60,000 small farmers, mostly from the Bekaa Valley and the South, benefit from such assistance.

The second strategy involves the pursuit of an economic logic that is almost completely engineered by social service providers who seek to maximize profits. Consequently, one of the singular characteristics of state-financed social services provided by the civil or private sector is an excess in supply. We see this in the health sector, for example, where Lebanon's hospitalization rate, consumption of pharmaceuticals, and general per capita health expenditures subsidized by the state are noticeably higher than in other countries in the region. Instead of a lean health sector, thanks to non-state participation and competitive pressures, demand is artificially stimulated, leading to an excess in supply. A lack of government oversight and inspection is one reason for this deficiency. In general, public policies have failed to either determine the exact scope of services that should be contracted with private providers or adequately to control the quantity, quality, and costs of these services.

Table 4.3: Beneficiaries Allocation among Governorates

Governorate	Population with low satisfaction of basic needs (poor)		Beneficiaries of social assistance	
	Share in Governorate	Total	Total	Share in poor
Beirut	19.2	78,221	8,211	10.5
Mount Lebanon	26.0	297,819	16,608	5.6
North Lebanon	48.9	327,928	5,555	1.7
South Lebanon	39.0	110,392	6,621	6.0
Bekaa	43.8	175,152	4,934	2.8
Nabatieh	51.4	105,581	1,832	1.7
All Lebanon	35.2	1,095,363	43,761	4.0

Source: World Bank, 2005

Box 4.4: Principal Conclusions from Section II

In Brief...

- The lack of a long term social development vision
- A highly politicized sphere of social goods and services
- A multiplicity of players in this sphere, and an absence of a well defined lines of demarcation between the roles of those players.

¹⁸⁰ The Ministry of Social Affairs' annual budget is US\$60 million, of which 80 per cent is spent on the care of 30,000 children, most

of them through NGOs (Social Welfare Institutions) under contract with the government. Their number came to 156 in 2005.

- Large distortions in the public financing schemes for social services
- Obsolete and ambiguous jurisdictions
- A surplus in the private supply of social services, couple with relatively high costs
- Spending is not commensurate with outcomes

... Are some of the major obstacles that currently prevent social citizenship ideals from being concretized.

III. THE PILLARS OF SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP

The weak capacity of Lebanese citizens to directly secure their social citizenship rights in education, health, and the right to employment raises a series of crucial questions such as: What conditions shape the specific domains of these different rights? What are the strengths and weaknesses of these rights in terms of efficiency and equity? What is the potential for reform? Finally, what impact does this have on Lebanon's different population groups, in particular on the poor, the vulnerable, and the socially excluded?

3.1 The Right to Education

The right to education is enshrined in Lebanon's constitution. Similarly, the Lebanese government is committed to providing full access to basic education for all Lebanese citizens. The government has also taken responsibility for offering quality education, not only by enacting numerous domestic laws on education, but also by committing itself to the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and several international and Arab agreements pertaining to education-related issues. Moreover, Lebanon is close to fulfilling the second Millennium Development Goal related to education (See MDG table in Indicators section).

Debates on the role of the state in the provision of education date back to the mid-1920s when Lebanon was established as an independent nation-state under French mandate. At the time, schools in Lebanon were mostly private and religious in character. Arguments for the role of the state in paving the way for a more secular citizenship through a state-sponsored educational system were passionately made by various parliamentarians at the time.¹⁸¹ However, despite the expansion of education during this period, coverage remained limited until the mid-1960s and 1970s, when public education developed significantly and was able to attract relatively high administrative and educational skills. Public education became a true "success story" that competed with private sector institutions. Following the devastation of fifteen years

of civil war, the educational sectors witnessed a chaotic "boom" in various kinds of private institutions. In 1991-1992 there were around eighteen higher-education institutions. By 2006, this number had risen to thirty-eight accredited universities.¹⁸² Criteria for their accreditation has never been clarified

As a result, the Lebanese educational system has turned progressively into a "dual system," in which private education has been sought mostly by the middle- and upper middle-income groups - with the exception of free private education, which is focused on the very poor - while public education has attracted lower middle-income and poor social groups.

3.1.1 Situation Analysis

The education system in Lebanon has fallen short of the two principles of access and quality. While close to 98 per cent of students have access to basic education, this figure is significantly lower for intermediate and secondary level schooling. Moreover, the quality of education varies among schools within the public sector as well as between public and private sector schools. These deficiencies are caused by a number of issues. The government's scope of coverage of educational needs is one problem; another is the lack of specific strategic management approaches to mobilizing human resources (both quantitative and qualitative) and to capital investments as well as oversight of methods of operation and maintenance. This can be attributed to the frequent change in governments and the different strategies employed by each.

Major Public Expenditure Indicators (2005-2006)

Per capita expenditure	\$1,926
Total expenditures	\$6.1 Bn
Expenditures as a percentage of GDP	3.0 %

¹⁸¹ See parliamentary minutes.

¹⁸² CERD, *Public Planning Statistics, Academic Year 1991-1992*.

Officials did elaborate a National Education Strategy in 2007 and this was sent to the cabinet for endorsement in September of that year. The National Education Strategy takes its cue from the Lebanese constitution, the Document of National Accord (the Taif Accord), and laws and regulations governing educational matters. These emphasize the freedom of and right to education and the ensuring of access, equal opportunity, and the requirements of education to all. The National Education Strategy aims to ensure that education is of good quality and contributes to building an information society, social integration, and economic development. However, the intricate conflicts of interest between various public and private stakeholders in the education “business” have tended to complicate and/or postpone the implementation of this national strategy.

Today, the educational sector is characterized by the following:

3.1.1.1 High Expenditure Levels Leading to Few Tangible Improvements

Relatively high levels of spending on education have not produced major improvements in the public sector educational system, either in quality or capacity. For example, a study conducted in 2001 indicated that even though the share of public funding increased from 29 per cent in 1973 to 39 per cent in 2001, the number of children enrolled in public schools remained practically unchanged during this period, representing around 40 per cent¹⁸³ of the total num-

ber of students. In other words, the public sector's increased financial involvement has not helped improve its “market share” in terms of number of students. This is in part due to the fact that the investments made did not attempt to improve the quality of the educational services and were not based on needs assessments.

The stagnation in the public education system prompted many households to resort to private schooling even if it implied a significant increase in their level of expenditure on education. Current levels of expenditures on both public and private education out of GDP confirm this phenomenon, since the figure reached around 11.4 per cent¹⁸⁴ of GDP in 2005-2006. Of this percentage, the government's share was only 4.4 per cent and the larger part of the burden was borne by households (7.0 per cent). Household expenditure on education reached as much as 13 per cent of total expenses in 2001 (compared to 8 per cent in 1966).¹⁸⁵ The high level of household expenditure on education in Lebanon, as compared to other countries (refer to Table 4.4 below) may be attributed to the considerable importance given to education. Many families are willing to provide children with a good quality of education, even if high costs are involved.

3.1.1.2 Creating Market Distortions and Inequity

As a result, the cost of education in Lebanon tends to be higher than its true market value, in part due to the government's funding of education allowances, which are mostly channelled to private schools. Similarly, the high market share and profit margins of private schools

Table 4.4: Comparison of Expenditure on Education with Other Countries

Benchmark Analysis with Other Countries			
Country	Public Expenditures (%)	Private Expenditures (%)	Total Expenditure (%)
Japan	3.6	1.2	4.8
Korea	3.8	2.8	6.6
Mexico	4.2	0.8	5.0
USA	4.9	2.2	7.1
France	5.8	0.4	6.2
Lebanon	4.4	7.0	11.4

Public expenditure: World Bank, 2004; Private expenditure: OECD, 2003. The figures for Mexico are for 1998.

183 CRI calculations based on CERD data.

184 CRI, 2005b, Development Program: Horizon 2006-2009, Final report for the CDR, Beirut, Lebanon

185 CAS, 1997b, Budget des Ménages en 1997, Beyrouth, Liban

is funded to a certain extent through public funds. As both the provider of public educational services and a source of financing for part of the private sector system, the government is creating market distortions. In 2007, as many as 90 per cent¹⁸⁶ of the children of civil servants, whose education is financed by the government, attended private schools. Up to 19 per cent¹⁸⁷ of public spending on education was channelled through scholarships to these children.

In addition, this system is generating inequity among citizens. Although lower middle-income and poor segments are the main beneficiaries of public education, the related expenditures favor relatively higher-income households. Figure 4.1 below, prepared by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education, shows the distribution of the government's cash grants as a percentage of public resources across households of different incomes. Thirty percent of Lebanon's students are in households with monthly incomes that are less than LL 600,000, but this group of students receives only 9.6 per cent of public support. On the other hand, as the income brackets of households rise, the level of public support also increases.

3.1.2 Equity and Efficiency Issues

Ideally, all citizens should have access to educational opportunities irrespective of their geographic location, social status, gender, or religious affiliation. In this regard, Lebanon's educational system is far from equitable. Enrollment rates, success, retardation, and drop-out


rates, vary considerably among geographic regions and social and economic groups, and between students enrolled in private versus those in public schools. These disparities reflect problems of equity and efficiency.

3.1.2.1 Private Education: Better Conditions and Better Outcomes

Private and public education exhibit significant differences when it comes to quality. A study on "Free Compulsory Education in Lebanon"¹⁸⁸ shows that nine out of 1,000 students from public schools obtain the baccalaureate without having to repeat one or more years, while as many as 255 out of 1,000 from private schools reach this level. Therefore, the overall performance of the private sector regarding the optimization of resources, both human and physical, is considerably higher than the public sector. This is not to say that all private schools are superior to public ones, as there are differences in the quality of education provided by private institutions as well. In response, civil society has stepped in either in the form of direct partnerships between schools where, for example, some private schools are providing support to public school students in Beirut, (Box 4.5) or as partnerships between the MEHE and NGOs whereby two large initiatives were carried out in the North and in the South under the title of *I Have a Right to Learn*.

Table 4.5 below shows that the ratios of students per class and students per teacher in public schools fall below international standards, while private schools

Figure 4.1: Distribution of Children and Public Support to Households for Education, by Household Income



Source: MEHE, 2004, *Survey Report, Rationalizing the Education System's Financing*, Education Development Project (EDP)

186 Ministry of Finance, 2007, *Public Services and Support: Outreach and Gaps*.
187 Ibid.

188 MEHE, CRI, 2000, *Compulsory Education in Lebanon; The Need for Public Education*, Final report for the CERD, Beirut, Lebanon

Box 4.5: Supporting Public Schools (101 Stories to tell)

Armed with a belief in equitable access to education and social development, Ghada Feghali, a teacher at the International College, convinced the Education Committee of the Women's Renaissance Gathering to support public school students and teachers in dealing with the newly introduced curricula. After an agreement with the principal of the Ras Beirut school, Duha Salim, the project, Support Public Schools, was submitted to the minister of education, along with a working paper by the Gathering's Education Committee, which laid out the objectives, incentives, and mechanisms for implementation.

The project began in 2000 with ninth-grade students in basic education at the Ras Beirut School. Volunteer teachers from private schools taught children after class in subjects like physics, chemistry, life science, and mathematics. The support continued from November to June, when teachers gave practical courses on the "how" and "why" of the new methodology. By the end of the year, all of the ninth graders at the Ras Beirut School passed the end-of-year exams for the first time, after disappointing results in the past. This experience has been extended to a larger number of public schools.

record a more acceptable level. In addition, the quality of teachers (educational attainment, average age, competence in their subject, and so on.) has been lower in public schools, especially pre-secondary schools. For instance, one-third of the teachers in public schools have, at the most, a baccalaureate degree. The table also shows that 32.1 per cent of teachers in public schools were above fifty-one years of age, while this percentage in private schools stood at only 14.9 per cent. Private schools seem to be attracting the younger generation of teachers who are entering the market, since 62 per cent of their teachers are below the age of forty, while only 43.9 per cent of public school faculty fall within this age bracket.

3.1.2.2 State Funding for Private Institutions

A good portion of the private educational institutions are politically and religiously affiliated. Many of these institutions provide education primarily to their supporters, thus reinforcing the allegiance of citizens to their closed community or religious sect, while weakening the bond between the citizens and their state.

Intriguingly, many of these private institutions are being indirectly funded by the Government. In 2008 the GOL spent LL 45 billion, or 5 per cent of the total general education budget¹⁸⁹ (see indicators section for social expenditures) on free private schools.¹⁹⁰ These consist of 379 free private schools that cater to kindergarten cycles 1 and 2 that are almost entirely funded by the government. They include more than 124,000 students-almost the same number as those in public schools-at the rate of around LL 480, 000 per student (or 160 per cent of the minimum wage). The number of students in these schools is on the rise. However, those who enroll their children in such schools may be unaware that it is the government that is funding them and not the private institution or the religious sect that claims to be doing so. More critically, a large number of these schools are affiliated with various religious organizations (see governorate indicators in statistical annex for regional and religious distribution of schools). It is important to note that even schools designated as private may also be affiliated with religious organizations, even if they do not officially declare this affiliation.

Inefficiencies and sectarian-based interference also extends to higher education as is evident in the situation

Table 4.5: Input Indicators by Sector, 2006-2007

	Public Schools	"Free" Private Schools	Private Schools
Number of teachers	39,945	6,626	41,186
Number of students	326,503	124,281	467,093
Number of schools	1,393	379	1,040
Ratio of students per class	19	24	21
Ratio of students per teacher	8.2	18.8	11.3
Breakdown of teachers by age (%):			
<30 years	19.9	37.6	32.1
31-40 years	23.3	30.9	30.7
41-50 years	24.7	20.3	23.2
51-60 years	27.6	8.9	11.2
61 years and older	4.5	2.3	3.7
Total	100	100	100

Source: CERD 2006 - 2007

189 Excluding university or vocational and technical education.

190 MEHE, Budget 2008.


of the Lebanese University. The only state-sponsored university in the country and once the pride of the academic community, the LU has been beset by a series of issues in the war and postwar period that have weakened its status as a bastion of learning and undermined its characterization as a melting pot for Lebanese of all walks of life (Box 4.6).

3.1.2.3 Rural Disadvantages in Relation to Access to Quality Education

Like many developing countries, Lebanon is characterized by regional disparities in educational attainment levels. Illiteracy rates are higher in the more socio-economically deprived regions, reaching their highest levels in the Bekaa (14.45 per cent), followed by South Lebanon (12.42 per cent). North Lebanon has the highest concentration of students who finish elementary education and then drop out of school (43.22 per cent). Meanwhile, Beirut and Mount Lebanon exhibit the highest ratios of university education attainment,

as the ratios stand at 25.77 per cent and 17.06 per cent, respectively.

Figure 4.2: Educational Attainment by Region (%)



Source: MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006a, *Living Conditions of Households: the National Survey of Household Living Conditions 2004*.

Central urban areas also have better results in terms of educational attainment, as well as better outcomes in terms of success rates. Table 4.6 below presents the results from the “Free Compulsory Education in Lebanon” study of 2000, which shows that the urban regions in Beirut and Mount Lebanon graduate a significantly higher number of students without repetition than the more peripheral and less-developed regions.

Box 4.6: The Lebanese University: Sectarian Inefficiency

Despite the presence of many universities and institutes (some of which have only recently become accredited), the Lebanese University provides places for about 45 per cent¹⁹¹ of the total number of university students. However, LU suffers from a number of serious problems.

- The complex political and confessional considerations involved in the relationship of the LU with the various political parties and authorities have harmed the institution's independence and the overall quality of education provided. They have also undermined its academic integrity and paralyzed decision-making processes within its walls.
- Multiple branches for the same discipline were created to satisfy the regional/sectarian demands of different groups. For instance, the Faculty of Law and Political Science has five branches, the Engineering Faculty three, and the Faculty of Art four.
- The excessive number of literature and law majors, which is out of line with market needs. For example 31.1 per cent of students are in Arts and Sciences and 11 per cent in Law and Political Science, as opposed to around 11 per cent in economics and management sciences.¹⁹²

As a result, the LU is failing to produce graduates who can be quickly integrated into the labor market. At most, they can take up positions in the fields of academia, administration, and other social and law-related fields, many of which are currently overstaffed.

Table 4.6: Graduating School Students by Region

Governorate	No. of students who graduate without repetition out of 1,000
Beirut	161
Mount Lebanon	154
North	44
South	48
Bekaa	24

Source: MEHE, CRI, 2000


A lack of schools is not the cause for these regional disparities in educational attainment. In fact, existing studies suggest that almost all parts of the country enjoy a sufficient number of schools and in some cases there is even a surplus.¹⁹³ However, the quality of education among these schools, particularly between schools of the public and private sectors, varies. Many of the latter are concentrated mainly in and around the capital Beirut or in other central cities in the regions. As the ratio of public to private school students by governorate indicates, central urban areas, which have better success rates and higher educational attainment levels, exhibit higher private-to-public attendance ratios (Figure 4.3).

191 CERD, 2006 - 2007.

192 Ibid.

193 CRI, 2005b

Figure 4.3: Ratio of Private to Public School Students by Governorate



Source: MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006a

These discrepancies are generated by a combination of dire socio-economic conditions, the inclination of students in more peripheral areas to drop out of school in order to work, and the low-quality education in rural public schools. Many students in these areas believe that they are receiving lower quality education and thus prefer to voluntarily drop out of school early since the trade off between the opportunity cost of this education and the value added is significantly low. In other words, they believe that they will occupy the same jobs regardless of the level of education that

they attain. From this perspective any attempt to increase educational attainment in rural areas should concentrate on quality-oriented strategies that aim to enhance the quality of education and spread public awareness about the importance of education and its potential ability to boost people's standard of living. Civil society and the private sector have paved the way as they try to improve the access of citizens in remote areas to the knowledge economy (Box 4.5 and 4.7).

3.1.2.4 Gender Balance in Education but Not the Labor Market

Lebanon has come a long way toward achieving equity in opportunity between males and females in access to education and educational attainment at all stages. The gender gap that was evident in the 1970s has been almost eliminated and even surpassed to the advantage of females in secondary and tertiary level education. Along with a decrease in overall illiteracy rates from 11.6 per cent¹⁹⁴ to 8.8 per cent¹⁹⁵ between 1997 and 2004, female illiteracy rates dropped from 16 per cent in 1997 to 11.8 per cent in 2004. As Figure 4.4 below indicates, the percentage of enrolled females between the ages of five and twenty-nine and has reached 61.8 per cent, which is slightly higher than that

Box 4.7: From the Lebanese-Syrian Border to Maroun al-Ras: Crossing the Boundaries of Literacy and IT (101 Stories to Tell)

"Iqra Group" (Majmu'at Iqra')

The children gather around and listen closely to Mrs. Maryam Mobasseleh, her features changing as she tells her story. It is not just a scene from a classroom, but a new world that has been created by the sixty women of Iqra in public schools around the country. Armed with nothing but a book, they have turned more than eighty public elementary schools in Lebanon into places where students take refuge in a world of imagination and wonder.

The Iqra Group was born in 1996 as a non-profit NGO when four friends reacted to a 1994 report stating that only 3 per cent of Lebanese read books. Starting with fourteen participating schools in 1996 today, they provide participating schools with appropriate reading materials. To insure a fun experience for the children, Iqra organized training workshops for more than 1,000 teachers and association members on how to develop children's reading abilities. The "Adults Reading to Children" project was launched, in partnership with the Educational Center for Research and Development. To encourage writing, Iqra also launched a contest called the Arab Young Person's Book in 2006, inviting amateur children's storywriters to take part. The response was impressive. To date, more than 900 youngsters have participated in these programs.

PiPOP - Access to Knowledge

While the internet era and rapid ICT progress have taken much of the world by storm, many parts of Lebanon remains isolated from this new digital world. In parallel with ICT developments, the Professional Computer Association of Lebanon was established in 1996, in an initiative by managers of Lebanese IT and telecommunications companies, who came together to protect their interests and develop the sector.

To bridge the knowledge divide and facilitate internet access to remote regions the PiPOP project (PCA Internet Point of Presence) was established. PiPOP centers are communal centers that give citizens access to the knowledge economy and allow them to participate in today's world. Six years after their launch, PiPOP centers have spread and now number fifty throughout the country, in Abbadieh, Baalbek, Marjaayoun, Rashaya al-Fakhar, Halba (Akkar), Qana, Ras al-Maten, Tannourine, Sarafand, Shehim, Nabatieh, and Mukhtara. They are usually located in municipality buildings or in premises offered by the municipalities for the PiPOP center.


194 CAS, 1998b, *Living Conditions in Lebanon in 1997*, Beirut, Lebanon

195 MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006

of males (60.6 per cent). This in part may be explained by the tendency of young males to drop out of school earlier so as to join the labor force. For example, for the fifteen-nineteen age group, female enrollment stood at 73.6 per cent as compared to 68.7 per cent for males.

However, these high levels of educational achievement for females are not being translated into higher female participation in the labor force. Only 19.6 per cent of females aged fifteen to sixty-four are working, while 58.4 per cent¹⁹⁶ are considered housewives. This can be attributed in part to cultural beliefs regarding the role of women as solely reproductive and related to child-rearing. Such perceptions are also inevitably accompanied by family-imposed restrictions exerted mainly by the husband and/or father (see Chapter Two) These prevailing societal values are also reinforced through the value system promoted by the current educational system, which tends to reproduce the same limited pattern of gender roles. For example, an examination of the current civic and history text books taught in all schools found that women are portrayed only in traditional gender roles while all leadership roles are relegated to males.¹⁹⁷ In addition, employed women face wage discrimination; the 1997 national household survey estimated the wage disparity between female and male wage earners to be around 22 per cent, while the ratio of estimated female to male earned income was 0.31 in 2004.¹⁹⁸

Figure 4.4: Enrollment Rates of Males and Females by Age Group, 2004 (%)



Source: MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006a

Despite these conditions, the number of female-owned enterprises is on the rise for middle and upper middle-income groups (see Indicators on the Status of Women) while a large number of lower-income

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ CRDP, UNESCO, PNUD, 2002, *Programme d'Appui à la Réforme du Système Educatif Libanais* - LEB/96/005

¹⁹⁸ The 1997 data is the only data available on this issue. The household survey of 2004 does not include such information.

women are turning to small scale enterprises and micro-credit programs. For example, of the approximate 10,000 clients of Al Majmoua, a micro-credit NGO, 50 per cent are women from different regions in the country.

3.1.2.5 People with Disabilities Remain Segregated from Mainstream Schools

High illiteracy rates (38.2 per cent) and low rates of secondary- and university-level achievement are evident among people with disabilities (Table 4.7 below). This is primarily due to the failure to integrate the disabled successfully in mainstream schools.

Table 4.7: Educational Attainment of PWD ¹⁹⁹

Educational attainment	Percentage
Illiterate	38.2
Able to read and write	10.2
Pre-school	1.7
Elementary	25.1
Intermediate	12.6
Secondary	5.0
University	2.9
Vocational intermediate	2.7
Below school age	1.6
Total	100

Source: Ibid.

Lebanon has enacted laws pertaining to the rights of disabled individuals to accommodate their integration in society. These laws legislate the right of the disabled to quality education in a barrier-free environment. In addition, the National Education Strategy stresses that “the state should give access to public education to all including learners with special needs, and provide equal opportunities for enrollment, educational continuation, and success”.²⁰⁰ However, the law and the National Strategy remain unimplemented. A study conducted in 2007²⁰¹ estimated the cost of creating a barrier-free environment in all public schools. If the Government were to equip all public schools within a six-year plan, the yearly cost would not exceed 1 per cent of the MEHE's budget. Moreover, given the continuous construction of schools, delays in applying the barrier-free environment plan will result in higher future accumulated costs.

¹⁹⁹ People with disabilities.

²⁰⁰ MEHE

²⁰¹ CRI, October 2007, *Towards an Accessible Environment: An Architectural and Budgetary Approach*

Box 4.8: Principal Conclusions Pertaining to Education

In Brief...

- Lebanon's dual educational system is not functioning efficiently; the private and public sectors are working in parallel rather than in synergy.
- High levels of Government spending on education are not improving the quality of public education.
- Households bear a high portion of the cost of education.
- The private sector, despite its internal disparities, provides a higher quality of education than the public sector.
- Educational achievement practically lacks gender disparities; however, females still face difficulties in translating this achievement into higher participation in the labor force.
- Vast regional disparities in educational attainment are due to the low quality of education provided in the rural and remote areas, and not to a shortfall in the number of schools.
- People with disabilities are not being successfully integrated into mainstream education although there are laws ensuring their right to quality education within an enabling environment.

3.2 The Right to Health

Health is a right, not a service or charity. It is enshrined in the various international conventions that Lebanon has ratified, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which addresses equitable access to food; the reduction of infant and child mortality; the improvement of environmental and industrial hygiene; the prevention, treatment, and control of epidemics and endemic occupational and other diseases; and the creation of conditions that guarantee all individuals medical attention in the event of sickness. In addition, Lebanon is committed to implementing the Millennium Development Goals (MDG).

The right to health in Lebanon today has effectively been transformed into a right to medical coverage and assistance. In other words, rather than focus on the necessary pre-emptive care that guarantees a long and healthy life, far more attention and resources have been allocated to costly after-the-fact health care or what is often labeled as curative health care.

²⁰² WHO, 2007, *National Health Accounts Series*-, http://www.who.int/whosis/database/core/core_select_process.cfm?country=lb&indicators=nha (Last accessed January 2007)

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ These are estimated to represent 35 per cent of public spending on health in 2005, *ibid.*

3.2.1 Situation Analysis

In 2005, per capita expenditure on health in Lebanon was US\$ 693,²⁰² while total health care expenditures amounted to US\$ 2.49 billion. In terms of percentage figures, total expenditures on health represented 11.2 per cent in 2005,²⁰³ the highest among all countries of the Eastern Mediterranean region. Although many European countries spend a comparable percentage of GDP on health care, the value for money (in terms of quality of care and extent of coverage) is indeed far superior to that in Lebanon.

Major Expenditure Indicators, 2005

Per capita expenditure	US\$ 693
Total expenditures	US\$ 2.5 Bn
Expenditures as percentage of GDP	11.2%

These figures suggest low returns on health spending in Lebanon. Although Lebanon exhibits acceptable percentages on major health indicators, the latter are not notably higher than those of neighboring countries that may spend less on this sector. This is in part due to the sector's inefficiencies. The relatively high per capita expenditure on health, which is a national average, does not adequately reflect the unequal access to health care by poor and vulnerable social groups (see table D3 in Statistical Compendium).

Furthermore, the state's role and involvement in the health sector is generally weak in many respects. The government paid 28.3 per cent of the healthcare bill in 2005, a figure that is far lower than that of developed countries, where public involvement reaches more than three-quarters of total health expenditures.²⁰⁴ If NSSF expenditures²⁰⁵ are removed from the government's contribution, the above figure of 28.3 per cent would drop to 18.5 per cent, indicating an even lower

Table 4.8: Health Spending in OECD Countries, 2004

HDI Rank		Public expenditure on health (% of GDP) 2004	Private expenditure on health (% of GDP) 2004
7	Switzerland	6.7	4.8
10	France	8.2	2.3
12	United States	6.9	8.5
22	Germany	8.2	2.4
88	Lebanon	3.2	8.4

Source: UNDP, 2007a, HDR 2007-2008, *Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World*

contribution by the public sector and a greater burden on the private sector, particularly households, when it comes to healthcare financing. The major disparities here involve the regional distribution of health services, target groups (beneficiaries), and most importantly, the degree and quality of coverage.

Like the education sector, part of this burden is carried by the numerous political and religious parties that provide sizeable assistance in a direct or in an informal manner to their different constituents. In the absence of needs assessments, this process artificially expands their clientele base and distorts market needs, since many of these services are meant to serve specific political considerations.

3.2.1.1 Health Financing

The Lebanese health care system features four major types of financing agents (two public and two private). Health insurance in Lebanon is highly fragmented, as the public sector alone contains six different programs, as per the classification employed in Figure 4.5 below.


Despite the numerous state programs, the state has fallen short when it comes to expanding its contributions to the total healthcare bill. For example, the multiplicity of providers of health financing plans reflects disparities in terms of eligibility criteria, target groups (different demographic and social characteristics), degree and quality of coverage, beneficiary contributions, and subscription conditions. A variety of security funds, most of which are private, provide sickness and maternity insurance policies, family allowances, and end-of-service indemnity. Private funds provide total or partial insurance coverage to about 9 per cent of the population. One semi-public fund, the National

Social Security Fund, covers about 32 per cent of the population by providing insurance mainly to employees in the formal sector and contracted staff in the public sector. The geographical coverage of these funds is uneven as the majority of the beneficiaries live in Beirut and Mount Lebanon. Based on surveys conducted in 2004, and as will be discussed further in section III, there is some evidence to suggest that the uninsured are more likely to be elderly, unemployed, or from low-income districts.

Moreover, and as can be seen from Table 4.9 below, the share of government contribution varies among coverage schemes offered by various government institutions. Each program has a separate targeting system even though most of the funds are aimed at public employees. Moreover, each program is quite free to select its own service provider.

Similarly, the eligibility criteria pertaining to each insurance plan are also often incoherent. This can be attributed mainly to the intertwined political interests of public sector stakeholders and private and sectarian players, which repeatedly frustrate the possibility of identifying consistent eligibility criteria despite considerable technical inefficiencies and leakage in resources. Procedures, tariffs, contracts, and monitoring are not standardized even though around 95 per cent of service providers are private. Contract conditions are negotiated directly by the private sector with the respective state fund, thus giving private interests considerable leverage and say over public funds. In this context, insurance schemes are mushrooming haphazardly across the country. In addition to its inefficiencies, this situation generates considerable inequity among civil servants, who are offered significantly different coverage even though they are employees of the same entity. At the same time, more than half the Lebanese are not insured.

Figure 4.5: Insurance Programs in Lebanon



Source: UNICEF, 1999, *The Impact of Health Cost on the Right to Health Care in Lebanon*.

* This category includes Army, Internal Security Forces, General Security, and State Security

Table 4.9: Fragmented Financing of Health Insurance Systems

Insurer	Percentage Of Population	Share Of Government Contribution
Ministry Of Public Health	37.7	100
National Social Security Fund - Maternity And Sickness Fund	32	25 +
Presidency Of The Council Of Ministers - Civil Servants Cooperatives	6.7	85 (Direct) ²⁰⁶
Presidency Of The Council Of Ministers - State Security Fund	0.2	100
Armed Forces Fund	8.1	100
Ministry Of The Interior		
A. Internal Security Fund	3.2	
B General Security Fund	0.5	100
Mutual Funds	2.3	25
Private Insurance	9.3	0
Total	100	

Source: Compiled by the Ministry of Finance based on their own data as well as figures from the NSSF, COOP, Internal Security, General Security, and *Living Conditions of Households 2004*.

3.2.1.3 Big Ministry of Health Deficits

The Ministry of Health (MoH) is responsible for insuring individuals who are not covered by any insurance plan, whether public or private, irrespective of their income and asset status. It covers costly health services that the private sector often tends to avoid, such as the treatment of acute and chronic diseases or cases such as open-heart surgery, kidney dialysis, and cancer treatment. In 2007, this focus on hospitalization, associated with covering theoretically around half of the population, consumed most of the MoPH's expenditures, while the remaining components, namely salaries and pharmaceuticals, did not exceed 30 per cent.²⁰⁷

The ministry depends on three sources for its financing: (a) the state's budget, (b) beneficiaries, and (c) grants. The first is the ministry's main source of funding and forms about 3 per cent of the total state budget. Beneficiaries of health services also contribute to a limited extent, as they pay 15 per cent of hospitalization bills. However, patients very often pay more than the agreed-upon share due to the inclusion of extra fees or the (non-declared) exclusion of certain services from the scope of coverage. These practices result from a lack of monitoring and clear, unified standards for the sector's services. Several sources indicate that the MoH is running on deficits since their actual or effective rate of expenditures exceed budgeted levels.²⁰⁸ The pressure on expenditures arises mainly from:

- The ministry's growing commitments to covering costly health services.
- Increasing hospitalization rate, as poor and lower-middle-income patients tend to resort to hospital services instead of out-patient services because of the latter's high out-of-pocket expenses. The ministry's significant coverage of hospitalization fees is also creating a high degree of dependency with official sources estimating the MoPH's hospitalization rate at 13 per cent.
- The MoPH's inability to curb hospital costs has come about mainly because it rarely has any power or control over hospitals. In other words, hospitals tend to price their own services and require the MoPH to cover the costs according to their set price-list.

In fact, these deficits mostly affect health providers (hospitals), while the MoPH responds to these deficits by delaying due payments. As a result its obligations accumulate over the years. For example, the NSSF currently owes private hospitals and outpatient facilities a total of LL 500 billion.²⁰⁹ Payment of this money continues to be deferred indefinitely.

3.2.2 Equity and Efficiency Issues

3.2.2.1 Multiple Stakeholders and Overlapping Boundaries

Lebanon's hospital sector is saturated. It is also dominated by the private sector. The public sector accounted for only 11.5 per cent of hospitals and 7.7 per cent of beds in 2001-02.²¹⁰ Even if the former figure

²⁰⁶ The remaining 15 per cent comes from public employee contributions.

²⁰⁷ Ministry of Finance (MoF), 2007, *Public Services and Support: Outreach and Gaps*.

²⁰⁸ MoPH, 2000, *Lebanon National Health Accounts*; WHO, 2007
²⁰⁹ World Bank, 2008, *Towards Financial Equilibrium in the Sickness and Maternity Branch of the NSSF*.

²¹⁰ MoSA, UNDP, FAFO, 2004b, *The Social and Economic Situation in Lebanon: Facts and Perspectives*, Beirut, Lebanon

has risen since then to around 15 per cent, it remains relatively low. At the same time, the ratio of hospital beds to 1,000 individuals is one of the highest in the Middle East, reaching 2.88 in 2007.²¹¹

Hospitals in Lebanon are generally small, particularly in the public sector, with an average of fifty-four beds per hospital as compared to eighty-four in the private sector. This hinders the process of appropriate quality management and the benefits of economies of scale. Hospital occupancy rate is also low, not exceeding 60 per cent²¹² for both private and public hospitals. This figure, which is much lower than the OECD norm of 80-85 per cent, can be attributed to one or both of the following reasons:

■ Several public hospitals have been constructed and equipped for operation but divergent political interests or bureaucratic reasons have delayed their opening, effectively wasting the huge investments made in these facilities.

■ Many religious/political groups find it easier and more profitable to construct and run new tailor-made hospitals than to operate existing non-functioning ones. Encouraged by current public health financing plans, these groups usually develop private hospitals and realize their profits from surrounding social clusters. Although existing financing plans have recently encouraged establishing small hospitals, especially in peripheral regions, the actual quality of health services remains marginal partly as a result of the government's weak regulatory role.

3.2.2.2 In-Hospital Medication Dominates Total NSSF In-Hospital Coverage

The NSSF divides its in-hospital services into three different types: (1) delivery, (2) surgery, and (3) in-hospital medication. The third component involves a high share of in-hospital medication cases out of the total NSSF in-hospital cases. In 2004, it reached a national average of 63 per cent.²¹³ There are major regional variations in the share of in-hospital medication. Higher percentages can be found in peripheral regions that are characterized by higher poverty rates, smaller hospitals, and minimal government oversight. This figure is high according to international comparisons, as it does not exceed 45 per cent in European countries. In fact, Lebanon used to have similar, lower ratios prior to the civil war.

211 MoF, 2007

212 CRI, 2005b

213 National Social Security Fund

This phenomenon not only reflects the curative nature of health care in Lebanon, but also suggests irregular medical practices, low hospital occupancy rates, and a large supply of hospital beds. On the demand side, patients seeking medical consultations in clinics pay for doctors, drugs, and medical tests. If these paid fees equal those set by the NSSF, patients receive 80 per cent of the total amount paid, but not before five or six months have gone by. In practice, patients often pay much more than the NSSF-set prices for medical services, leading to a total actual compensation of less than 80 per cent. The high costs, low return rate, and long delays represent biased practices, especially against the poor. Thus, patients prefer to be admitted to a hospital even when their minor illness does not necessitate it; they pay a small share (10 per cent) of the total bill and the hospital reimburses NSSF on its own.

On the supply side, some hospitals respond to their low occupancy rates by trying to lure in patients through various arrangements. Hospitals admit patients (even if their condition does not require hospital admission) and provide them with consultations, drugs, and medical tests that they would have otherwise sought elsewhere. In these cases, hospitals end up raising the utilization rate of their beds as well as their rate of compensation by the NSSF and other public and para-public coverage plans (sometimes according to inflated bills), while patients evade the high costs and long delays in receiving their compensation.

Box 4.9: Heart Beat (101 Stories to tell)

Combining a unique talent for music, singing and surgery, Heart Beat was founded in 2005 by a group of surgeons. They organize and perform in fundraising concerts for children who suffer from heart disease but whose families cannot afford the costs of treatment. The same doctors and support staff also go on to perform these life saving procedures free of charge. Heart Beat also partners with private sector entities over specific activities. In addition to various public and private benefactors, concerts are their window onto the world. Their first Deir al-Qamar, concert supported three operations, the 4,000-person concert in Biel in 2006 funded seventy operations, and the Faqra concert in the summer of the same year gave another 135 children a second chance at life. Their most recent 2008 concert at the Casino du Liban was a raging two-day success and will fund another 100 or so surgeries.

Heartbeat is not the only one. Braveheart is another NGOs established by parents whose children were born with this disease.


3.2.2.3 Households Bear High Levels of Out-of-Pocket Expenditures

Weak Government intervention has a higher relative impact on the poorer segments of society. The Government's limited contribution to the total health care bill forces households to rely on their own resources to secure medical care. Out-of-pocket spending is quite high reaching about 60 per cent of total health care expenditure, equivalent to about 82 per cent of total private expenditures.²¹⁴ On average, a Lebanese household spends LL2.609 million²¹⁵ per year on health care, which equals 14.1 per cent of total household yearly expenditures, or more than eight times the official minimum wage. Moreover, the burden of out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures (as a proportion of household expenditures) is not equitably distributed, since poorer families spend a relatively larger portion of their income on healthcare services than higher-income families. For example, individuals belonging to the LL300,000 to LL500,000 per month income group spend as much as 17 per cent of its expenditures on health services as opposed to a 14.1 per cent national average. This declines to 8.1 per cent for the highest income group, who make more than LL 5 million per month.

3.2.2.4 More than Half the Lebanese Lack Health Insurance

More than half of Lebanese citizens (53.3 percent) do not enjoy any form of health insurance, whether public or private.²¹⁶ The Ministry of Health (MoH) is responsible for insuring these individuals. The NSSF technically covers the remaining insured population which accounts for about one-quarter of the total population and about one-half of the total insured.²¹⁷ The degree of coverage poses an equity issue in and of itself, while the regional disparities are also noteworthy. Beirut and Mount Lebanon enjoy the highest percentage of insured individuals (59.1 per cent and 53.8 per cent respectively), while Nabatieh has the lowest, at less than one-third (31.5 per cent). Although the NSSF accounts for the highest share of insured population, coverage varies by region, depending on the relative

Figure 4.6: Types of Health Insurance




Source: MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006a

weight of declared wage earners out of the total labor force. Many NGOs, whether civic or affiliated with political parties, have stepped in to cover disparities in insurance coverage or to supplement them (Box 4.9).

3.2.2.5 Higher Poverty Levels Accompanied by Lower Levels of Health Insurance

Lack of health coverage is directly correlated with income and poverty levels. The National Household Health Expenditures and Utilization Survey of 2001 indicated that about 29 per cent of the population with a monthly household income of LL300,000 to LL500,000 was insured, compared to 75.1 per cent of those with a monthly household income higher than LL5,000,000. Moreover, the recent MoSA-UNDP study indicates that of the total 8 per cent very poor individuals in the country, only 16 per cent have insurance. This figure increases to 25 per cent among the relatively poor, i.e., those who fall between the lower and upper poverty lines.²¹⁸

Figure 4.7: Health Insurance Coverage and Poverty



Source: MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2008a

Box 4.10: Principal Conclusions Pertaining to Health

In Brief...

- The health insurance system in Lebanon is highly fragmented.

214 WHO, 2007

215 MoPH, 2001, *National Household Health Expenditures and Utilization Survey*

216 MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006a

217 The NSSF states that about one third of the population is eligible for its services, translating into a figure of about 1.2

million individuals. However, various field based studies, such as the *Living Conditions of Households 2004* and the *National Household Health Expenditures and Utilization Survey* indicate that the NSSF covers around 880,000 individuals.

218 MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2008a

- There are multiple schemes financing coverage and disparities in eligibility criteria/benefits.
- Returns on health expenditures are relatively low.
- The role of the government is weak, which allows political and religious parties to provide health services through their own channels.
- Out-of-pocket spending on the health care bill is high.
- The share of in-hospital medication cases out of total NSSF in-hospital cases is quite high.
- More than half (55 per cent) of the population does not have any type of health insurance.
- There is a negative correlation between poverty and insurance coverage.

3.3 The Right to Work

The right to decent work is guaranteed by the more than fifty treaties that Lebanon has ratified, among which are seven principle agreements. However, the absence of a modern institutional framework for the Lebanese labor market and the persistent application of long-outdated labor laws have hindered the implementation of these treaties. This situation has also delayed the ratification of other treaties including those related to child labor (below age fifteen) and to syndicate rights for specific workers such as those employed in the civil and agriculture sectors as well as foreign labor. A new labor law was proposed by the Ministry of Labor over ten years ago and several versions of it have been discussed, yet it remains unratified by Parliament. Other proposals to upgrade the legislative framework for the labor market have suffered a similar fate. This situation has aggravated existing problems in the labor market with negative economic and social repercussions that affect poor and middle-income groups in particular.

3.3.1 Situation Analysis

The economically active population, which amounted to almost 1.2 million people in 2004, accounted for 44 per cent of all residents in the country. The global rate of economic activity in Lebanon is lower than that of other developing countries for several reasons: (1) rising emigration by males of different age categories, (2) weak participation of women in the economic sector, and (3) under-declaration of female labor in the agricultural and the rural labor sectors.

There is a significant gender gap in the rates of economic activity. Although women form roughly 50 per cent of Lebanon's total population, their representation in the total labor force does not exceed 21.5 per cent.²¹⁹ The rate of economic activity within the fifteen to sixty-four age group is 76 per cent for men, compared to 25 per cent for women. Two out of every three women work in administration or education, com-

pared to one out of every four men. These differences tend to be more pronounced in the private sector than in the public sector, as well as in the agricultural sector.

Today's labor force is younger, due to demographic shifts since the 1970s. The rate of economic activity peaked in the 25-29 age group (61.4 per cent in 2004), due to the increase in female economic activity within this age group from 20.2 per cent in 1970 to 37.3 per cent in 2004. Existing data confirms that higher education is one of the key factors for female entry into the labor market. The percentage of female employees with a university diploma or higher has reached 34.1 per cent, as compared to only 15.9 per cent of males.

The concentration of labor has shifted. The city of Beirut's share of the total workforce fell from 25.4 per cent in 1970 to 13.1 per cent in 2004. Comparatively, the share of the labor force in Beirut's suburbs and the surrounding areas of Mount Lebanon increased from 40 per cent in 1970 to 44.1 per cent in 2004. Similarly, the share of the labor markets in the governorates of South Lebanon and Nabatieh rose from 11.9 per cent to 14.4 per cent in the same period, while those in the governorate of North Lebanon rose from 14.4 per cent to 17.5 per cent. The latter rates are comparatively higher than that of the Bekaa, which went from 8.4 per cent to 10.9 per cent during the same period.

Table 4.10: Distribution of the Labor Force in the Different Lebanese Governorates (%)

Area	1970	2001	2004
Administrative Beirut	33.5	9.3	13.1
Mount Lebanon - suburbs	12.2	28.4	44.1
Mount Lebanon excluding suburbs	13%	17.9	—
South	10.2	14.6	14.4
North	12	18.8	17.5
Bekaa	7.7	11	10.9

Source: 1970 data: Direction Centrale de la Statistique, 1970, *Population active au Liban*, p.126 ; 2001 data : USJ, 2001, *L'entrée des jeunes Libanais dans la vie active et l'emigration*, p. 151 ; 2004 data : MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006a

²¹⁹ MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006a

3.3.1.1 Changes in the Labor Market

The transformation in the labor market increasingly shows that the active population in Lebanon is shifting from a production-driven market to a services-driven one. Between 1970 and 2004, the number of laborers in the agricultural sector fell from 18.9 per cent to 8 per cent, while the percentage of laborers in the industrial sector fell from 18.8 per cent to 15 per cent. This is in comparison to the rise in the share of service sector workers to approximately half the total labor force, just as the construction industry has risen from 6.5 per cent to 9 per cent. Other phenomena include a rise in the percentage of independent self-employed workers (from 25 per cent in 1997 to 28.5 per cent in 2004) accompanied by a fall in the share of salaried employees in the total labor force (around 67 per cent to 64 per cent).

3.3.1.2 The Gap between Supply and Demand

Due to Lebanon's changing (and younger) demographics, the supply side of the labor market adds throngs of new laborers to the market every year. At the same time, labor demand has fallen with the economic downturn of recent years, especially since 2005. In 2001 the unemployment rate stood at 11.5 per cent. By 2004, it fell to roughly 8 per cent. However, after the July War of 2006, the unemployment rate returned to its 2001 level.²²⁰ This latter rate of unemployment would have been even higher, were it not for the high levels

of emigration of recent years. Unofficial estimates suggest that close to 60,000 individuals have emigrated from Lebanon in the last three years, most of them younger professionals in search of better and more stable employment opportunities elsewhere.

3.3.1.3 Foreign Labor and Refugees

The labor market in Lebanon is characterized by the presence of large numbers of formal and informal foreign laborers and domestic workers. No official data is available for the total size of the foreign labor force in Lebanon and most of the available estimates have a high tendency to be politicized, especially with regard to the number of Syrian workers in the country. Data is available only when foreign employees are formally registered with work and residence permits. As such, the figures issued in the monthly bulletin of the Central Administration for Statistics represent the numbers of work permits renewed and issued in that year. However, these figures do not reflect the actual size of the country's foreign labor pool. For instance, low-skilled labor, mainly Syrian and Asian, are not included in national employment surveys and are thus under-declared. Unofficial estimates suggest that there are 100,000-150,000 Syrian construction workers alone. In addition the tens of thousands of legal domestic workers, mainly from countries of Asia, face a significant amount of discrimination that needs to be addressed in one form or the other.²²¹

Box 4.11: Palestinian Refugees in Lebanese Labor Laws

Six decades after the emergence of the Palestinian refugee question in the region, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are still considered resident foreigners with no special attention to their refugee status. Researchers examining the legal conditions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon agree that two principal legal elements lead to the marginalization of Palestinians in the Lebanese labor market. The first is the legal categorization of Palestinian refugees as foreigners under the definition in the 1964 Law on Foreigners that states that “foreigner is understood to mean, in this law, any natural or juridical person who is not a Lebanese citizen.”²²²

The other legislative item that limits the access of Palestinians to the Lebanese labor market is their exclusion even from the category of “foreigner” by the legal concept of reciprocity, which holds that favors, benefits, or penalties that are granted by one state to the citizens or legal entities of another should be repaid in kind. In Lebanese labor laws, foreigners are granted work permits only if their country of origin grants Lebanese citizens work permits. The dilemma that Palestinians face in Lebanon is two-fold. Not only are they treated as foreigners but they also fail to meet the concept of reciprocity, as they do not belong to any recognized state. Palestinians therefore fall into a de facto category of “stateless foreigner” which has not been addressed in Lebanese legislation.²²³

Recently, the Lebanese government has ratified a new law which permits Palestinians to be employed in seventy-two new professions.

220 InfoPro, 2006b, *Economic Impact of the July 06 War and Steps Towards Recovery*, Beirut.

221 ILO, 2001, *Women Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon*, Beirut, Lebanon.

222 Al-Natur, Suheil, “Munaqasha filastiniyya li-qarar al-haqq bil-

'amal” (A Palestinian Discussion of the “Right to Work” Memorandum), An-Nahar newspaper 7 July 2005, Beirut.

223 Shatawi, Khalil, “Al-filastiniyuun wa haqq al-'amal” (Palestinians and the Right to Work), As-Safir newspaper, 2 July 2005, Beirut.

Another source of informal labor is Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. Palestinian refugees who fled war and massacres in their hometowns in Palestine in 1948, the year the Israeli state was established, and in 1967 following the Arab Israeli war, have lived in Lebanon for the past sixty years or so, mainly in camps in the country's major cities. Despite their decades-long existence on Lebanese soil, these refugees continue to lack basic civil and social rights, including rights to basic work. Iraqi refugees, many of whom fled to Lebanon in the last decade, also lack these rights. Both of these populations form active pools of informal workers (see Tables B.15 in the Statistical Compendium for population characteristics).

3.3.2 Equity and Efficiency Issues

Several structural imbalances have hindered people's ability to secure their right to work and have generated different forms of vulnerability and exclusion. The major reasons behind these imbalances are presented below.

3.3.2.1 Sharp Disparities between the Structures of Supply and Demand

The supply side of labor is influenced primarily by the outputs of the university and the technical/vocational educational systems. Higher education produces a large number of graduates from the faculties of literature, law and the social sciences, while a smaller number of graduates come from the more specialized schools of engineering, medicine, and economics (see box 4.6 on the Lebanese University). In addition, the number of graduates produced by formal and informal vocational institutions nearly equals those of higher education institutions.

These outputs are not commensurate with market demands. The demand side of the market is generated mainly by private firms and reflects the weaknesses of this sector. More than 88 per cent of businesses in Lebanon have fewer than five employees. These businesses usually perform simple functions and their ability to expand their employee base is rather limited. In larger institutions, characterized mainly by an oligarchic structure,²²⁴ the quantity and quality of job opportunities is failing to absorb the yearly flow of highly-skilled and competent graduates with competitive and technical areas of expertise.

3.3.2.2 Weak Ties between Educational and Vocational Institutions and the Business Community

This weak relationship has negatively impacted the performance of the labor market. Training, orientation and

preparation of students prior to graduation is absent in Lebanon and takes place very rarely in subsequent phases of employees' careers. Many institutions (more than 87 per cent) have declared that they do not need to train their employees.²²⁵ Consequently, the vast majority of institutions do not allocate budgets for training.

3.3.2.3 Weak Wage Structure

The weakness in the structure of wages, especially in the private sector, can be explained by the deterioration in the current conditions of enterprises (informal ones in particular). The average wage is low when compared to the cost of living and there has been no official wage adjustment in the private sector since 1996, while the general consumer price index rose roughly 58 per cent²²⁶ during 1996-2007. Based on National Accounts records, wages in both the private and public sectors represented 35 per cent of GDP in 1997, while wage earners in that year represented 64 per cent of the total labor force.

3.3.2.4 Problematic Retirement and Pension Plan Systems

The right to a pension system for retirees has been affirmed in legislation, constitutions, and international agreements under the purview of the International Labor Organization. However, translating this right into a reality on the ground has presented a challenge.

To date, Lebanon lacks a pension system law for the private sector work force. Such a draft law was put forward to the government by the Ministry of Labor two years ago, but remains in parliament awaiting ratification. In the MENA region, Lebanon is singular in the multiplicity of its retirement systems. In the public sector, there are two systems of retirement, one for the armed forces and one for civil servants, both funded on a pay-as-you-go basis. Private sector workers participate in an end-of-service retirement scheme, which is financed on a "principal funding" system. According to the available statistics,²²⁷ the two official retirement schemes managed by the Ministry of Finance cover approximately 6 per cent of the labor force and are worth 2.7 per cent of GDP annually. Neither has an independent reserve, in contrast to the private sector's end-of-service system, which has a cash reserve of around 15 per cent of GDP. This system, which is administered by the NSSF, covers roughly 20 per cent of the total labor force and its average annual expenditures account for less than 1 per cent of GDP. In short, the three retirement plans

²²⁴ CRI, 2003, *Competition in the Lebanese Economy: A Background Report for a Competition Law for Lebanon*, Beirut, Lebanon.

²²⁵ National Institute for Labor, UNDP, 1997, *A Study of the Labor*

Market: Results of the Statistical Investigation on Institutions, Beirut.

²²⁶ Consumer Price Index (CPI), CAS-CRI

²²⁷ World Bank, 2008b, *Regaining Fiscal Sustainability in Lebanon*.

Box 4.12: Lebanon's Retirement and Pension Plans - Current Status

The system suffers from an equity problem among the three existing pension plans- the private sector end-of-service indemnity as part of the NSSF, the military personnel plan, and the civil servants' plan-as well within each plan.

- Equity disparities among the three systems: The rate of return differs from one system to another, as the pension is a function of the years of service and the last salary paid - the longer the duration of work and the faster the increase in salary, the higher the return.
- Equity disparities within each plan: Since no ceiling is imposed on the covered wage within the same plan, a problem of inequity emerges within the same plan.
 - The current private pension plan (NSSF) restricts labor mobility, since employees must settle their end-of-service indemnity upon moving to another employer
 - The civil servants and military pension plans are pay-as-you-go schemes, i.e., they accumulate no reserves and impose a heavy burden on the Government budget, which in 2005 reached approximately LL 864 billion, or 2.6 per cent of GDP. The implicit pension debt is estimated at 55-60 percent of GDP (implicit debt is calculated to be the present value of future payments to all those who have acquired rights until now).
 - The NSSF-EOSI plan is a capitalization scheme, at least theoretically. The employer's contribution is accumulated in a reserve, invested mainly in Lebanese treasury bills or bank deposits. Upon reaching the retirement age or quitting one's job, the employee's accumulated contributions with interest are paid as lump sums. The difference between what the employee is entitled to earn as lump sum and the EOSI-calculated amount is settled by the employer. The formula for calculation takes into consideration the years of service with the current employer and the salary is reduced by a certain factor, in the event the years of service amount to fewer than twenty (ranging between 15 and 50 per cent).
 - The expenditure of the NSSF-EOSI system was estimated at 0.7 percent of GDP in 2003. The implicit debt of the system ranges between 7 and 25 per cent.

Box 4.13: Principal Conclusions Pertaining to Employment

In Brief...

- Vast disparities exist between the structures of labor supply and demand.
- Females still register low economic activity and are not being effectively integrated into the labor force.
- Wage levels remain low and are not in accordance with the rising cost of living.
- The multiplicity of retirement/end-of-service systems in the public and private sectors.
- Retirees from the private sector receive a lump sum "end-of-service indemnity" amount, which does not cover 30-35 per cent of their last wage earned.
- The two government retirement systems are more generous to their retirees, but those systems suffer from cash reserve problems and are negatively affected by the government's fiscal constraints.

cover less than 40 per cent of the labor force, while salaried workers make up more than 60 per cent²²⁸ of this total.

IV. POVERTY, VULNERABILITY, AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION

Deficiencies in basic social citizenship rights adversely affect the most vulnerable population groups, whether defined by income or by other group characteristics. Lack of access to service or to quality opportunity aggravates the conditions of impoverished populations and accentuates different forms of societal exclusion.

Poverty, vulnerability, and social exclusion are closely interrelated even though they do not necessarily have a causal relationship. Each of these conditions has specific characteristics and requires particular sets of interventions. Social exclusion as compared to poverty and vulnerability is intended to focus more on structural bottlenecks to equity and social injustice. It is related to specific attributes and psycho-behavioral issues and concerns. Individuals and groups may be excluded in more than one sphere of activity at different levels but this does not necessarily imply that they are poor. Those who are excluded from certain sectors of activity, especially economic activity, however, have a tendency to become vulnerable or even fall into poverty.

228 MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006a

Table 4.11: Poverty, Vulnerability and Social Exclusion

	Poverty	Vulnerability	Exclusion
Unit	Individual/group	Individual/group	Individual/ group/community
Method of assessment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Income poverty - Food, lower and upper poverty lines (quantitative) ■ Unsatisfied Basic Needs method (qualitative) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Risk assessment at an individual level for pre-identified (by MoSA) vulnerable groups ■ Risk assessment of groups that are subject to external shocks and that lie just above the upper poverty line 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Process analysis ■ Structural analysis for specific groups (Palestinians and unskilled foreign labor)
Focus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Basic needs satisfaction addressing the different aspects of poverty 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Probability of household, individual, or social group consumption level falling below the poverty line 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Assessment of opportunity (quality of social services) ■ Assessment of access in certain limited fields ■ Power relationships and placement at an unfair disadvantage
Approach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ For lower/extreme poverty: cash transfers ■ For upper poverty and people at risk: pro-poor growth and social development strategies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Extreme cases: Cash and in-kind transfers ■ Social groups: Integrated social policies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Strategic, institutional and social legal reforms
Areas of convergence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Deprivation, transient and chronic conditions, multi-dimensional 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Deprivation, natural and man-made shocks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Deprivation, relational approach to deprivation including legal, cultural, and social aspects

Source: UNDP, 2007c, Ghana NHDR 2007, adapted by CRI for the Lebanon NHDR.

Here, we should emphasize that social inequities, which are often nourished by - and correlated with - the existence of poverty, vulnerability, and social exclusion, tend to be aggravated in the absence of adequate targeting. When addressing the issues of availability, accessibility, and quality of social services, however, one should differentiate between their implications and impact on the various segments of the population that are poor, vulnerable, and socially excluded. This differentiation should take into consideration the following:

- Poverty, vulnerability, and social exclusion are often closely correlated even though one does not necessarily lead to the other. For example, vulnerability does not necessarily imply poverty. Moreover, while poverty may either cause social exclusion or be caused by it, social exclusion is not necessarily determined by poverty. In fact, each of these phenomena has its own determinants, specificities, and manifestations.

Poverty is a major social concern in Lebanon. However, extreme poverty was limited to 8 per cent of residents in 2004.²²⁹ The more pressing issue is the high risk of falling into poverty faced by lower middle-income groups, particularly the 28 per cent of the

population whose income lies between the lower and the upper poverty lines. Both categories represent around one-third of the resident population and are mainly concentrated in the peripheral areas of the country, especially the north.

- Vulnerability concerns segments of the population that are at risk. Unlike poverty, it is a transversal phenomenon that appears among different social groups. In addition to specific vulnerable groups such as people with disabilities, orphans, working children, female heads of households, etc., vulnerability exists primarily among social segments that lie immediately above the upper poverty line, representing around one-third of the resident population (32 per cent of households have a total monthly revenue less than 1.5 times the upper poverty line).²³⁰ This group is prone to falling into poverty in the event of an internal or external shock. Providing these groups with their fundamental social rights will reduce their vulnerability and stabilize their long-term economic and social status.

- Social exclusion is to some extent distinct from poverty and vulnerability, even though these two phenomena can sometimes lead to the exclusion of some

229 Ibid.

230 MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2008a

groups access to a decent quality of social services. While the majority of Lebanese citizens do not face systematic deprivation of social rights, exclusion does exist. As will be evident shortly, vulnerable lower middle-income groups as well as the poor in Lebanon tend to be excluded not from access, but from opportunity. The flaws in the state's social services delivery systems (mainly education and health), the impact of sectarian divisions on social service provision and labor mechanisms, and the uncoordinated involvement of the private sector in the social sector, all contribute to the creation of an inequitable and inefficient mechanism for social service provision. As a result, some groups tend to be “left out” and are thus subject to one form of exclusion or another. It should be noted that long-time resident Palestinian refugees, Iraqi and other refugees, and foreign labor have faced a form of exclusion not witnessed by Lebanese citizens.

4.1 Analysis of Poverty in Lebanon

The latest studies on poverty in Lebanon show that 7.9 per cent²³¹ of the population lives in extreme poverty, i.e., below the lower poverty line, which is equivalent to US\$2.4 per capita per day. This portion of the population, which numbers about 300,000 people, cannot meet their most basic needs for survival. Using the upper poverty line²³² of US\$4 per capita per day, increases those affected by poverty to 28.5 per cent of the population. Therefore, 20.5 per cent of Lebanese live between the lower and upper poverty lines.

The poverty gap index measures the mean distance below the lower poverty line as a proportion of the poverty line. Therefore, it depicts the mean shortfall from the poverty line (counting the non-poor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. The overall poverty gap index in Lebanon


was measured at 8.1 per cent,²³³ which means that a large segment of the poor are far below the upper poverty line. This makes them highly prone to falling into extreme poverty if they are subjected to an external shock. Since Lebanon faces a high risk of such political or military shocks, the possibility of falling into severe poverty is quite high for many of those currently considered in the “near poor” segment of the population.

4.1.1 Striking Regional and Inter-Regional Disparities in Terms of Poverty Incidence

As discussed in Chapter Two, vast regional disparities characterize the incidence of poverty in Lebanon. As shown by Figure 4.8, poverty levels are least significant in Beirut, where extreme poverty stands at 0.67 per cent of the population and overall poverty at 5.18 per cent. However, in the governorate of North Lebanon extreme poverty levels are as high as 17.75 per cent and overall poverty reaches 52.27 per cent, while there are disparities between urban and rural areas of this region. The North registers the country's highest levels of poverty constituting a potential source of social and political instability. The South, which includes two major urban areas (the cities of Sidon and Tyre), is the second poorest governorate in the country, with an extreme poverty rate of 11.64 per cent and overall poverty of 42.21 per cent.

Disparities are observed not only between regions but within the same region as well. There are some significant differences in poverty between specific socio-economic strata within each governorate. This implies that both inter- and intra-regional differences should be taken into consideration when enhancing social rights and designing poverty reduction policies aimed at achieving regional balance. As is evident in the Figure 4.9, for example, the Akkar area suffers the

Figure 4.8: Distribution of Extreme Poverty and Overall Poverty by Governorate, 2005 (%)



Source: Ibid.


²³¹ Ibid

²³² The upper poverty line estimates the non-food component of the poverty line as the non-food expenditure of house-

holds whose food expenditure is equal to the food poverty line.

²³³ Ibid.

Figure 4.9: Inter-Regional Disparities



Source: Ibid.

highest percentage of lower and upper poverty lines (20 per cent and 62 per cent respectively) as compared to Koura/Zghourta area whose poverty rates are 4 per cent and 25 per cent respectively.

4.1.2 Different Methods of Poverty Measurement Lead to Similar Overall Results

Both qualitative and quantitative methods for measuring poverty have been used to determine the main characteristics of poverty in Lebanon. While the quantitative approach measures income related poverty, the qualitative approach, relied on the “Unsatisfied Basic Needs” (UBN) methodology. It was undertaken in both 1995 and 2004. Details on the exact means for calculating UBN and the results that were obtained are presented Chapter Two.


What is evident from both approaches and as indicated by Figure 4.10 below which measures the overall poverty headcount at the strata level against the Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN) index, these different measures lead to similar conclusions. The areas located in the upper right quadrant of the figure are

the worst off, i.e., they have a high rate of poverty and a low UBN score. Both approaches reflect similar results regarding the levels of deprivation in the different areas of the country. Thus, there is a high degree of compatibility between the monetary and non-monetary measurement of poverty in Lebanon. However, there are a few exceptions, such as the Nabatieh region, which registered a high UBN score and a low level of poverty headcount. This is in part due to the large number of emigrants from this area who have maintained very close relations with their home villages and towns and continue to send significant amounts in remittances each year. This tends to improve the income of resident households and prevent a significant number of people from falling under the poverty line. However, these funds are mostly used for daily consumption or the construction of new houses and do not play a significant role in improving the overall living conditions of the household (hence the high UBN scores).

4.2 Poverty Correlates and Exclusion


An analysis of the profiles of poor groups in society may depict the impact of poverty on their standards of living

Figure 4.10: UBN and Overall Headcount Poverty, 2004-2005



Source: Ibid.

Figure 4.11: Male and Female Unemployment Rates, 2004- 2005



Source: Ibid.

Table 4.12: Agricultural Employment and Poverty

Qada	Active population	Active agricultural population	Percentage of agricultural population of total active population	Head count poverty index
Akkar	65,582	12,171	18.6	19.4
Minieh	35,851	7,531	21.0	14.7
Baalbek	67,329	13,151	19.5	21.8
Hermel	10,654	3,524	33.1	22.2
Tyre	59,796	13,803	23.1	14.9
Batroun	16,331	1,561	9.6	11.9
Total Qada	255,543	51,742	20.2	18.0
Total Lebanon	1,362,238	108,757	8.0	7.1

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, 1997, *General Agriculture Census*; CAS, 1998b, *Living Conditions in Lebanon in 1997*; CRI estimates, 2001.

and identify the links between poverty and their access to basic rights such as work, education, health, and other vital needs. Such an analysis also exposes areas of social exclusion that are correlated with poverty in Lebanon.

4.2.1 The Vicious Circle of Unemployment and Poverty

Unemployment rates are closely correlated with poverty. Thus the poorer you are, especially if female, the more likely you are to be officially unemployed. As shown in Figure 4.11, the total percentage of unemployment among the poor is 14.9 per cent, and 14 per cent among the near poor, falling to 6.7 per cent for the better-off portion of the population. Poor females register an unemployment rate of 26.6 per cent, while only 8.2 per cent of better-off females are unemployed. Unemployment among better-off females is lower than the national average of female unemployment (9.4 per cent).

Among the employed, non-salaried workers, especially those in the agriculture and construction sectors,

face a high risk of falling into poverty. Data at the qada (district) level shows that the qadas exhibiting a high concentration of agricultural employment are in fact the ones where the incidence of poverty is the highest. Table 4.12 above includes the *qadas* with the highest poverty headcount ratios in the country which are also the ones that have the highest level of agricultural activity. The population involved in agricultural activity ranges between 33.1 per cent in Hermel and 18 per cent in Akkar (with the exception of Batroun), while the national average is 8 per cent.²³⁴

In addition, the phenomenon of unemployment among educated young people is a source of great concern, as highlighted by recent social instability. The unemployment rate among young people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four is 20 per cent, and is measurably higher among the poor. For every two poor young people holding a high school diploma, one is facing the prospect of unemployment. As for poor youth with university diplomas, one out of three is unemployed, compared to one out of five

among non-poor university graduates. In such a context it is not sufficient for poor young people to receive higher education to break the vicious cycle of poverty. Other solutions need to be provided, ones that deal with the very structure of the labor market

and economic enterprises. The role of non-governmental organizations here has been quite critical in providing economic support and training to poor individuals as well as students from across Lebanon's socio-economic spectrum (Box 4.14).

Box 4.14: Developing Creativity and Economic Capacity (101 Stories)

A Small Loan for Big Dreams: Al Majmoua

Leila did not know what the future would hold. For years her ambitions were limited to helping her husband to provide for their family through her old sewing machine. In 1995, she participated in a communal loan with a group of women from her village. "The idea of getting a loan through a collective guarantee to four women in the village seemed quite strange. Banks, if they agree to see someone poor like me, would request impossible guarantees." Leila now runs a small sewing factory that employs eight women and she owns twelve sewing machines. When asked about her family, she replies, "Thanks to God and the support of al Majmoua, my son graduated from university recently, my other children are in school, and we are saving for the marriage of our eldest daughter."

The Lebanese Association for Development - Al Majmoua, an independent, apolitical, non-profit Lebanese Non Governmental Organization is one of the leading micro finance agencies in Lebanon whose aim is to contribute to national welfare through the promotion of equitable and sustainable development. Given that the informal sector is the backbone of the Lebanese economy, Al Majmoua's core business is to provide "micro" loans to individuals who have limited or no access to formal lending channels. They target the poor in general and focus on women micro-entrepreneurs. Al Majmoua is active across Lebanon, including the Palestinian camps through a main office and a network of nine sub-offices: three in Beirut and Mount Lebanon (Beirut - Bourj Barajneh - Aley), four in the South (Tyre - Nabatieh - Saida - Bint Jbeil), one Baalback, and one in Tripoli. These branches allow Al Majmoua to be present in the communities it serves and remain tuned to the particular requests of micro-entrepreneurs. To date, Al Majmoua has disbursed 90,000 loans for a total amount of US\$ 85 millions and offered non-financial services to more than 2,500 women. It currently has 11,500 active beneficiaries, including more than 5,000 women, for a total outstanding portfolio of US\$ 8.25 million. In addition to loans, beneficiaries receive other non-financial capacity building services and community development and socially oriented activities to better serve their interests. Many of these activities are specially designed for women to provide ongoing business support.

Made up of ninety highly motivated, skilled, dedicated full-time staff, who come from different socio-economic, religious, regional, and cultural backgrounds, the institution's activities have had a tangible effect on the life of a large number of beneficiaries. Changes observed are not only related to economic variables such as the increase in revenue or better business sustainability, they also relate to social changes such as women's economic empowerment and the general improvement of their life conditions. Al Majmoua has directly impacted, till date, more than 20,000 households not only economically or socially but also emotionally. Al Majmoua's partners include a wide spectrum of international and regional donors.


Achieving Your Dreams: Injaz

"Today I'm a stronger person... thank you Injaz." This is what Mohammed Joud Charafeddine told the Arab public in May 2007, from a Jordanian forum, speaking on behalf of 20,000 students from Lebanese schools. The Beirut middle-schooler didn't imagine that he would become the director of a company at his age and take decisions on labeling, manufacturing, and sales. It was no imaginary firm, since B.com produces actual goods and spends and collects real money.

In Lebanon, there are 20,000 such stories, whose heroes are students in more than sixty private and public schools, from the north to the south of the country. In each of those 20,000 stories we find the name Injaz, in cooperation with various private sector firms. In 2001, Injaz, an international association, that works with high school students, active in more than 100 countries, was adopted in Lebanon by members of the Metn Rotary Club Kamal Katra and Ronald Farra along with seven other founding members. In 2005, four years later, the program years was turned over to an executive committee. Today, from their office in Hazmieh, Injaz's seven employees pay attention to the unique nature of each student and try to develop his or her capacities, through a variety of programs including the "Successful Skills Program," that trains students on how to work as part of a team; the "My Environment and I" program, to build young people's self-confidence through communications skills, and a "Day with a Worker," that allows students to spend the day with a person who practices the profession that they dream of taking up in the future. To emphasize the importance of individual initiative in making a difference, Injaz also created a program entitled "How Can I be a Pioneer in my Society?" Among many stories, the program prompted students at a participating school in Nabatieh, to make traffic signals and install them in the city, in a bid to limit road accidents. In Tripoli, students carried out a full-blown environmental awareness campaign in Latifa Street in the neighborhood of Zahirieh and convinced eighty-six residents of the street to take part in the clean-up.

The costs of this program are astonishingly low. During the 2006-2007 academic year, Injaz spent \$50 for each of the 6,030 students benefiting from the program. Funding was received from contributions made by individuals, private companies and a fundraising campaign, and through the efforts of its seven employees and its network of some 600 volunteers who have been making the rounds of Lebanese schools with the support of 150 companies, to offer six programs, each covering a different age group.

Figure 4.12: Educational Attainment and Poverty, 2004 (%)



Source: MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2008a

4.2.2 Low Educational Levels and Poverty

Education is strongly associated with the incidence of poverty. Due to deficiencies in the public educational system, many low-income individuals are denied a quality education. Many drop out of school and join the labor force at an earlier age, or may never enroll in school. Being illiterate or having below-standard educational attainment decreases people's access to good work opportunities and contributes to increasing their level of poverty. As Figure 4.12 above indicates, there is a negative correlation between educational attainment and poverty for individuals above the age of ten in Lebanon. The distribution of better-off individuals across the various levels of education is similar to the national averages. However, the poorer an individual is, the lower the level of education s/he is likely to have achieved. A total of 15 per cent of the poor are illiterate and 6.44 per cent are barely able to read and write, while 43.62 per cent have only reached elementary level schooling. Similarly 18.63 per cent of better-off individuals have a university level education as compared to only 3.24 per cent of the poor. Many studies suggest that even a moderate improvement in the quality of education could contribute to a significant reduction in poverty.

4.3 Vulnerable Groups and Exclusion

Vulnerability in its broad sense is considered to be a transversal phenomenon rather than a clearly defined category, such as lower or upper poverty. In other words, it might affect several groups belonging to different

broader social categories. All of these segments are at risk and are thus potentially threatened by different forms of deprivation and precariousness in the event that they are subjected to internal or external shocks. These kinds of unexpected threats cover not only the extreme poor and the poor, but also a relatively large proportion of those who are living immediately above the upper poverty line. This latter group represents more or less one-third of the total population, highlighting the true magnitude as well as the potential scope of the problem.

Taken in a narrower sense, vulnerability is mainly perceived as a well-defined phenomenon concerning specific social groups that share certain similar characteristics and attributes. The various regions of Lebanon, whether or not they are classified as poor, have concentrations of such specific social groups, which are deprived, marginalized, and face common problems and threats. The official definition of vulnerability set by MoSA encompasses some of these vulnerable groups, as detailed in Table 4.13 below (see Section D in the Statistical Compendium for a detailed breakdown of key characteristics of the main vulnerable groups)

4.3.1 Female Heads of Households Face a High Risk of Poverty

Female-headed households in Lebanon represent 14.2 per cent of total heads of households. More than three-quarters of female headed household are widows. The rest are either single (13 per cent), divorced, or their husbands have emigrated, abandoned the

Table 4.13: Identified Vulnerable Groups in Lebanon

Vulnerable group	Profile	Estimated number	Major characteristics
Female heads of households	Financially responsible for their families	More than 12,000 (14.2 % of total heads of households) of which 3,500 are very poor	More liable to experience poor living conditions and deprivation
Working children	Working children between 10 and 19 years of age	76,000 (10 % of total children in this age group)	Low education levels (high drop-out rates) Work under hazardous conditions
The elderly	Residents 65 years and older	277,000 (7.5 % of Lebanon's total population)	Low economic activity Prevalence of diseases Low coverage by the NSSF
The disabled	People with partial or complete inability to perform one or more major activities in daily life	75,000 (More than 25 % of the disabled are 64 years and older)	Low economic activity High levels of illiteracy Prevalence of inequality at many levels, including social and legal
Agricultural workers	Labor involving plant cultivation as a source of income	More than 80,000 (7.5 % of the total economically active population)	Small-sized farmers Limited diversity and volume of production Mostly wholesale High investment costs
Fishermen	Labor involving fishing activities as a source of income	More than 6,000	Seasonal work No protection benefits Mostly wholesale Limited jobs
The unemployed	Individuals not working but actively looking for a job	More than 90,000	Competition from foreign labor

Source: CRI, 2007b, *Post Conflict Rapid Social and Livelihood Assessment in Lebanon*, for World Bank and MOSA

family, or are in prison. One third of these women is illiterate and close to 60 per cent are without health coverage. This group is classified as vulnerable due to the high prevalence of poverty among this group as well as other factors, such as reduced economic activity, low-income levels, and old age. Close to 40 per cent suffer from low and very low UBN and more than 50 per cent make less than US\$400 a month.

4.3.2 Working Children: Poverty or an Inefficient Educational System

The number of working children between the ages of ten and nineteen is estimated to be around 45,000. This figure exhibits regional disparities, as the largest number of working children is in the North, namely Minieh and Tripoli, where poverty headcounts are also the highest. Close to 80 per cent are male and more than 88 per cent of these children are 15-19 years of age. Working children face various difficulties, particularly when it comes to their education and health conditions. Around 77 per cent have no medical insurance, and almost half have elementary school education and another 30 per cent have secondary school education. More than 44 per cent of those report psychological pressures as a result of work

conditions and another 45 per cent work long hours in adverse in environmental conditions. Despite the adverse effects associated with this phenomenon, the number of working children remains high in Lebanon, driven especially by tight economic conditions and the weak performance of the educational system.

4.3.3 Half of the Elderly Do Not Benefit from Social Security

The elderly are defined as the segment of residents who are aged sixty-five and above.²³⁵ The “Mapping of Living Conditions 2004” states that the elderly constitute 7.5 per cent of the total Lebanese population, translating into a figure of 277,000. This group faces several problems; primarily, the unfairness of the social security system, since fewer than half of the elderly benefit from medical insurance even though close to half suffer from one to two chronic diseases, as well as their limited economic activity, which makes them dependent on others (mainly their children) for support. Around 40 per cent are illiterate and close to 50 per cent have a monthly income of less than US\$400.

²³⁵ Some sources classify the elderly as those above seventy years of age.

Box 4.15: Poverty and Social Exclusion: Stories of hope (101 Stories to tell)

The Eyes of Women from Rajm Hussein

Three kilometers might appear to be a difficult distance to travel on foot, but not for an illiterate woman who makes the trip every day to learn how to read and write. Asaad al-Hassan recognized this need in the eyes and words of the women of his village of Rajm Hussein, one of the twenty-one villages in the Wadi Khaled region of Akkar, long known for its high levels of deprivation. He started a literacy class in a room in his home for the women of his village.

"I wish I knew how to read," were the words from one of the older women of his village that prompted him to try and make inroads into a condition that has afflicted generations from his area. Rajm Hussein is not the only victim of illiteracy; the entire Wadi Khaled region suffers from the problem. It affects older

A Trip of a Hundred Smiles

Bassma (Smile) is an NGO established in November 2002 to help the most impoverished and marginalized members of society. Since their establishment, they have helped 135 families to access different kinds of assistance. Bassma acts as a support group for these families as they help make their way from assistance to economic empowerment and sustainability. Take Georgette, for example; an unemployed mother who is raising four boys between the ages of twelve and sixteen on her own. One of her sons suffers from a physical and mental disability, which means that she usually has to carry him. Over the last four years, Bassma has helped with their tuition and schoolbooks, as well as private tutorials. Two of her other sons have found jobs thanks to Bassma and a bank account was opened for the third, to help him organize his finances. The "Integrated Smile Basket" is an essential component of the organization's activities. It includes traditional assistance (food, cleaning materials, clothing, and medicine) worth LL 75,000 while the "Bassma Kitchen" in the Beirut suburb of Sin al-Fil offers free lunches cooked at the Metropolitan Hotel to 100 families a week. Finally, the "Bassma Workshop" lets some families produce handcrafts for sale. It is a long journey to independence and sustainability but it starts with a smile.

4.3.4 The Lack of a Barrier-free Environment for People with Disabilities

Approximately 75,000 citizens (about 2 per cent of the Lebanese resident population) are disabled, of whom 84.8 per cent suffer from one disability, 10.5 per cent from two disabilities and 4.7 per cent from three or more. In addition, more than one quarter (27.3 per cent) of the disabled is above the age of 64. Close to 70 per cent do not have medical insurance and 38 per cent are illiterate. More than 55 per cent survive on less than US\$400 a month. Of those 21 per cent have a monthly income of US\$266. According to MoSA's "Rights and Access Program," there are around 61,000 disabled citizens, a figure based on the number of holders of the individual disability card, issued starting in mid-2007.²³⁶

This group is defined by two principle features: the inability to work and illiteracy. In addition, people with disabilities suffer from inequalities at many social, legal, and service provision levels. Various institutions pay considerable attention to integrating the disabled into society, i.e., into schools and the labor market, rather than seeing them lead a parallel life. Here, the concept of inclusion entails designing and eventually creating a disabled-friendly or barrier-free environment.

²³⁶ The figures in this section have been taken from CRI, 2007a, the final report for the Lebanese Physical Handicapped Union (LPHU).

4.3.5 Agricultural Workers and Fishermen

Agricultural workers make up an estimated 7.5 per cent²³⁷ of the total active population, and huge regional disparities affect this population group. Many farming operations are small-sized, which limits the volume and diversity of production and hence depresses revenues. According to the Mapping of Living Conditions of 2004, most individuals working in the "agriculture, hunting, and forestry sector" fall into the low satisfaction category. This finding covers both skilled and unskilled labor, though deprivation is most strongly felt by unskilled farmers and fishermen.

Although the fishing sector is small-scale and limited to certain geographical regions, it provides an important source of employment in the coastal areas. There were an estimated 6,550 fishermen in 2004, as per the "Poverty Mapping and Profiles,"²³⁸ with a ratio of 2.62 fishermen for each boat. Fishermen earn little revenue and face high, usually intangible associated costs. The entire process is quite tedious and highly susceptible to the impact of seasonality. It is not often rewarded, especially when fishermen sell their merchandise at wholesale prices to retailers, producing further downward pressure on the delivery price.

²³⁷ MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006a

²³⁸ CDR, ESFD, 2004b, *Poverty Mapping and Profiles*, Volume 2, Beirut, Lebanon

Close to 67 per cent of agricultural workers and fishermen are over the age of 50 and almost 80 per cent do not have health insurance. One third is illiterate and another third has only elementary school education. Today civil society organizations through different NGOs and a broad spectrum of projects play a very active role in supporting the work of framers, helping improve their skills and promoting their produce both within Lebanon and abroad. Two examples are included in Box 4.16.

Box 4.16: Supporting Lebanese Farmers, from the Land to the Market (101 Stories)

Agricultural workers are amongst the poorest population segments and considered one of the country's vulnerable groups. They also face high unemployment or seasonal employment with limited if any safety nets. Below are two civic initiatives to empower this population group.

“Made in Lebanon”

In 2005, a local branch of Fair Trade, an international NGO promoting the idea that every farmer or producer should have the opportunity to market his or her products in the international market without middleman. Using it as a mechanism to empower local farmers and address rampant poverty in areas previously occupied by Israel, the NGO focused on training farmers in environmentally friendly farming methods and guaranteed an outlet for their products. In parallel, farmers were trained on the principle and goals of fair trade and high-quality production. As they saw their products pass various tests, they started to enter European markets under newly designed labels. Since then, Fair Trade in Lebanon has been active helping small agricultural workers across the country and in areas as diverse as Rashaya (Muhaydetheh), to the Bekaa (Torbol), the North (Bsharr), and the South (Dibl, Ayn Ibl, Houla, Aytaroun, Marjayoun), as well as Sidon (Mimas, al-Zahrani).

Land and People

“Land and People” was launched following the end of the July 2006 war to help people in the southern villages that bore the brunt of the damage and destruction. In cooperation with the Union of Tyre Municipalities (fifty-seven southern municipalities), an agricultural clinic was established. It toured the area to treat fields afflicted by Israeli bombs and train farmers in modern agricultural practices. It also offered advice and the possibility of conducting the necessary laboratory tests, donated by students at the American University.

These field visits helped southerners realize the value and uniqueness of their agricultural products. The program monitored these promising products and focused on those threatened with extinction and facilitated bank loans for a small group of agricultural workers. The project mentored the farmer from processing to production, and even marketing, for which they created a Land and People section at the weekly organic market in Beirut, Souq al-Tayyeb. At Souq al-Tayyeb market, one finds wild thyme from the village of Zawtar, the bay leaf soap, of Aita Shaab as well as other traditional foods.

4.3.6 High and Fluctuating Levels of Unemployment

The unemployment rate is defined as the percentage of unemployed individuals out of the total labor force. According to a study conducted by the Université Saint Joseph (USJ),²³⁹ the national unemployment rate stood at 11.5 per cent in 2001. This figure rises to 15.2 per cent when assessing youth unemployment (the 18-35 age group) and exhibits gender disparities. More recent figures indicate that unemployment was 7.9 per cent in 2004.²⁴⁰ However, in the aftermath of the assassination of Prime Minister al-Hariri, the July war on Lebanon, and the subsequent political and military instability, these figures have probably risen. During the July 2006 war, employment dropped notably, as several businesses were brought to a halt for a full month. A study of the impact of war on medium-sized enterprises (MSEs) published by UNDP shows that employment decreased around 11 per cent during the conflict (July/August) and unemployment levels rose to around 15 per cent.²⁴¹ Within two months of the end of the conflict, however, employment levels began to regain their pre-war status.²⁴² However these levels have been tempered by increasing demands for skilled human resources in the Gulf region. Given the more recent global crisis and the estimated return of Lebanese expatriates, unemployment may rise once more.

In most cases, unemployment and low levels of education are highly correlated with extreme poverty. More specifically, the urban poor are vulnerable to unemployment due to regional and domestic turmoil, accompanied by competition from low-wage immigrant laborers. The unemployed today are predominantly poorly educated youth, of whom 28 per cent have attained elementary level education and 25 per cent secondary level education. Around 17 per cent are between ages 15-19, 30 per cent are 20-24, and 16 per cent are ages 25-29. Around 40 per cent report low levels of satisfaction on the living conditions index.

4.3.7 Institutionalized Children

Residential care, or the institutionalization of children, is limited to orphaned children deprived of parental care or those at risk of abuse or neglect. In Lebanon, most children placed in residential care institutions, however, come from poor families that cannot support them, especially when it comes to providing

239 USJ, 2001, *L'entrée des jeunes Libanais dans la vie active et l'émigration*
240 MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006a

241 InfoPro, 2006b

242 UNDP, 2007b, *Conflict of 2006 and MSEs in Lebanon: Assessing Impact and Roadmap to Recovery*, Beirut, Lebanon

them with education. There are currently 23,463²⁴³ institutionalized children below the age of eighteen, which represents 1.92 per cent²⁴⁴ of all children in the same age group in Lebanon. In the absence of

alternative non-residential institutional care, institutionalization is not being adopted as a last resort but is instead being relied on to alleviate economic rather than family-related problems.

Box 4.17: Principal Conclusions Pertaining to Poverty, Vulnerability, and Exclusion

In Brief...

- Around 8 per cent of the Lebanese population lives in extreme poverty and another 20.5 per cent live between the upper and lower poverty lines.
- Disparities in poverty levels across the different regions in the country are very high.
- Both money-metric and qualitative measures have reached similar results in determining poverty levels and their distribution.
- Agricultural workers face a very high incidence of poverty.
- Educated poor young people are unable to use their education to join the labor market.
- Identified vulnerable groups are: female heads of households, working children, the elderly, people with disabilities, agricultural workers, fishermen, and the unemployed. These face profound exclusion from basic social rights and from various spheres of life.

V. THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Citizenship is not simply about the role of the state in ensuring citizen rights. It is also about the partnerships and the initiatives that citizens undertake to improve their lives and the lives of those around them. These may be initiated as individual initiatives, as part of the efforts undertaken by particular civil society organizations or leaders in the private sector.

In Lebanon, civil society organizations and the private sector have played and continue to play a considerable role in addressing some of the adverse outcomes of the economic crisis. Civil society organizations do so as part of their daily mandates while businesses in the private sector undertake such activity as part of specialized programs and often in partnership with local or international NGOs. Collectively, it is difficult to assess the reach and impact of these initiatives on development for a variety of reasons. First, given the fragmented nature of these initiatives, it is complicated to estimate the exact dollar figure being spent by these organizations and assess their outcomes. Second, no monitoring and evaluation scheme exists that can assess the effectiveness of these interventions and whether they reached their target populations and stated aims. Third and most importantly, in the absence of a larger framework for development, many initiatives end up duplicating each other.

243 MoSA, UNICEF, 2007, *Children Deprived of Family Care in Lebanon*, Beirut, Lebanon

244 Ibid.

CIVIL SOCIETY


Lebanon boasts a large network of civil society organizations classified as non-governmental organizations, family based associations, or religious organizations. The majority of these organizations, as evidenced in the figure below, are considered general NGOs that offer a wide range of services. At the same time, family associations seem to be more numerous in the Mohafazat of the South, Nabatieh, and Mount Lebanon—the same areas where a large number of religious organizations are based.

Further analysis indicates that on a national level close to 21 per cent of these NGOs have a self-declared religious affiliation. As the figure below indicates the highest percentage are in Mount Lebanon and Nabatieh followed by the Bekaa (see Indicators for the sectarian breakdown of these NGOs).

Despite the differences between these types of organizations, they have played and continue to play an important role in alleviating some of the social and economic outcomes of the ongoing crisis. The variety of services that these organizations offer is quite considerable and ranges from the artistic and cultural to socio-economic development and advocacy work.

Even though impossible to quantify in terms of scope, outreach, and efficacy, the impact that some of these organizations are having on the ground is evident in the work that they undertake and the diverse sectors and regions they cover. It is also evidence by their individual stories. The NHDR's 101 Stories to Tell documented a fraction of these initiatives, many of which have been

Figure 4.13: Character of NGOs




Source: MoSA, CDR, 2008, *Evaluation of the Non-Governmental Organisations National Survey: A Community Development Project of the Council of Reconstruction and Development*, Draft report prepared by Karin Seyfert based on field work implemented by Etudes et Consultations Economiques (ECE) in association with PADECO Co. Ltd.

Figure 4.14: NGOs with Self-Declared Sectarian Affiliation



Source: Ibid.

Figure 4.15: NGO Services (%)



Source: Ibid.

included throughout the Report (see boxes 4.5, 4.7, 4.9, 4.15, 4.16, 4.17, 4.20 in this chapter for some socio-economic initiatives).

Historically, professional syndicates also played a significant role in the development of the country. During the 1960s and 1970s reform attempts of state institutions and systems of governance were in part taken as a result of pressure from labor unions and different syndicates. Widespread movements by civic and social organizations, particularly among laborers, agricultural workers and students, prompted government reconsideration of a large array of policies. In other words, social gains were in part the result of class-based social movements as they were of sectarian or

elite-based struggles. In the postwar period, syndicates became increasingly politicized and their role as agents of change has diminished considerably. Electoral campaigns are focused on political positioning rather than reform programs addressing the needs of their membership. Given the nature of Lebanese society and the makeup of its political parties as described in Chapter One, this politicization carries overt sectarian overtones.

PRIVATE SECTOR

The Lebanese private sector has demonstrated a strong commitment to addressing key issues that inhibit socio-economic development. Through various

internal measures and external outreach, it is playing a vital role in enhancing economic development and in addressing some of the chronic problems facing different communities. In part this is evident in some

of the initiatives that key members of the business community have undertaken to support innovative development and entrepreneurship skills among the Lebanese youth in particular (Box 4.18).

Box 4.18: Pioneers of Development and Change (101 Stories to Tell)

“Pioneers of Development”

The Entrepreneurial Development Foundation (EDF) was launched in 1999 with the aim of involving the private sector in the economic rejuvenation of Lebanon and its small business sectors. The launch of the association was based on two programs. The first involved training sessions and the second provided loans. At the outset, the association focused on the former program, which grouped people from villages for training sessions conducted by professionals on business management; each participant was encouraged to create a work plan for his or her project. If the project concept and plan were viable, the EDF provided a loan that would help make the idea become a reality. The loans covered agricultural, commercial, tourism, and industrial sectors and ranged between LL3-10 million, for three years with a six-month grace period. To overcome the problem of financing, a partnership agreement with banks was reached. The interest was divided between the association and the banks, which would secure continuity for the association. In the process a tripartite partnership was formed between civil society (EDF), the private sector (banks and commercial institutions), and the public sector (the Central Bank). The Central Bank put 1 per cent of the compulsory reserve at the disposal of the commercial banks at no interest, provided that the money was used for development projects. Since its establishment, EDF has granted 750-800 small loans for small-scale projects and has created job opportunities for countless others.

“Take the Initiative, Don't Emigrate”

“Take the Initiative” (Bader) is a non-profit organization established at the end of 2005, by forty young male and female professionals in various sectors. The twin aim was to help aspiring business men and women, particularly youth, develop their projects; and promote economic growth in the country. During its first two years of operation, Bader launched an investment fund of US\$17 million for small- and medium-scale projects. It has just adopted its first project. At the same time, Bader has also focused on education and communications networks. It partnered with the MIT Enterprise Forum-Arab Region (affiliated with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) on the first MIT Arab Business Plan Competition, where two young Lebanese entrepreneurs won \$50,000 in seed money for their project on education. MIT professors were also invited to conduct training workshops. At the same time, the Irshad Program was launched whereby four talented young people from the fields of fashion, technology, agricultural nutrition, and design were selected to be mentored by Bader members. Ramzi Jalbout who was selected for the program's agriculture category saw his crocus project rapidly become reality.

The efforts of the private sector are also evident in the range of initiatives that have been undertaken by large and small businesses to address perceived needs. Among others, these include partnerships with a variety of NGOs to rehabilitate and beautify postwar Beirut; efforts to address regional disparities in literacy and access to IT, a media program to generate national and communal solidarity and help those in need, and a variety of projects for environmental sustainability as well as small grants programs to small-scale entrepreneurs in various regions (Box 4.20). In the absence of a survey documenting the efforts of private enterprises, a large portion of the activities reported by businesses can be categorized as voluntary projects that are philanthropic in nature. In other words most of the work undertaken by these businesses are not linked to core business operations. As a result, many of these business undertake similar projects in their different communities, including:

- Subsidizing children's education
- Reconstruction and rehabilitation
- Sponsoring reading campaigns or sponsoring public libraries
- Establishing, renovating and/or equipping hospitals and clinics in impoverished areas or sponsoring specialized medical units within key hospitals
- Offering and supporting literacy classes
- Offering and supporting IT programs/classes
- Distributing meals and food products during religious occasions or festivals
- Building mosques/churches or supporting religious organizations
- Establishing charitable foundations

Despite the range of these efforts, pro-development activities are still viewed mainly as voluntary or 'add-on' activities rather than a tool with which the private sector can cooperate with others to advocate for change

Box 4.19: Business for Development: the Private Sector

SNA-Help Lebanon

The Société Nationale D'Assurances (SNA), is a private insurance agency operating in corporate partnership with Assurances Générales de France (AGF) and Allianz. Since 1963, SNA has actively supported the Lebanese community through a wide range of projects promoting art and culture, environmental awareness, assistance for the disabled and children's education. In brief, these initiatives have supported civic action whilst trying to promote Lebanon's image both locally and globally. One of its prime projects is its 1998 SNA partnership with the Help Lebanon NGO to remove traces of the civil war and beautify the streets of Beirut. The project began with the modest aim of rehabilitating bridges, tunnels, and buildings damaged by war and grew to encompass poor urban neighborhoods or previous war zones in and around Beirut. By providing facelifts to these areas, the project was able to enhance the local environment and the pride of its residents in their local community. Since then, and with support from a large number of additional private sector donors, SNA and Help Lebanon have fundraised hundreds of thousands of dollars to rehabilitate buildings in some of the capital's most impoverished areas.

LBC: We Are for Each Other

The Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC), a private TV channel, has dedicated two hours of programming each week to a program entitled "We Stand by Each Other." Begun the day after the July 2006 war ended, the aim of the program was to garner assistance, whether material, in-kind, or psychological, for ordinary citizens. In each episode, host Maggie Aoun, with the help of guests, often the subject of the episode, relays the hardships that ordinary citizens face while viewers call in with donations and other kinds of support. Even though the war has long ended, LBC has decided to continue with the program. To this day, close to 500 families have been helped. Through this program, LBC has paved the way for other Lebanese stations to be agents of social change.

Saradar Bank Foundation and UN - ESCWA

Among the various community development initiatives of the Saradar foundation, an affiliate of the Saradar Bank that recently merged with Audi Bank, is the E-Caravan-Phœnix; a fully equipped mobile computer and internet school. The aim of this project, which replaced the earlier E-caravan project destroyed during on 29 July 2006, during an Israeli attack on the intermediary school of Ayta al-Shaab, is to empower local communities in the formerly occupied areas of South Lebanon by teaching computer and IT skills. This area has around 70,000 inhabitants, around a quarter of whom have a monthly income of less than US\$300. The program especially targets youth, women, and persons with disabilities.

The new E-Caravan is equipped with a network of ten PCs with flat screens, one laser printer, and one LCD projector with screen, two satellite connection modems, an air-conditioning system, and other accessories and is accessible to the physically disabled. Training in IT is carried out based on the needs of specific communities/groups. The courses range from ones specifically for beginners to courses for future trainers and for small and medium enterprises. The project is implemented in partnership with UNESCWA, the Canada Fund, and the Italian Cooperation and is sponsored by a series of private companies. It is executed in collaboration with the concerned municipal councils, existing local and UN agencies.

in ways that can have long term impact on the development of the country and thus on their own businesses. Many of the efforts by different private sector organizations have yet to move beyond voluntary philanthropic contributions to become more structured community investments with proactive management. Moreover, in spite of the growing practice of philanthropy and corporate social responsibility, the efforts of the private sector are scattered and fragmented, with limited investments in partnership toward development.

PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

In addition to these efforts, a variety of public/private initiatives were launched to address tangible needs in the social field. These are evident in a variety of stories where this partnership for example succeeded in addressing a particular need such as re-inserting children who had dropped out back into their schools or addressing the technical divide among intermediate and secondary school teachers (Box 4.20). It was also evident in the role that the private sector played in the reconstruction of destroyed and damaged bridges following the 2006 Israeli war against Lebanon.

Box 4.20: Partnerships for Lebanon: Finding a Path to Stability and Economic Growth

Partnership for Lebanon (PFL) was initiated following the 2006 war by private sector organizations-preeminently Cisco, Ghafari, Intel, Microsoft and OXY - in partnership with the office of the Prime Minister, other governmental organizations, and NGOs. The PFL has defined its long-term goal to enhance stability and economic growth by implementing several projects in five major work streams. From September 2006 till September 2008, PFL focused on the immediate needs of crisis relief and response to war damaged areas in collaboration with established NGOs. This included the establishment of ten IT centers and vocational centers, training and support of twelve underserved public schools, design and architectural assistance to 560 families in the reconstruction of their homes and the sponsorship of three dogs for landmine detection.

To help Lebanon compete in the twenty-first century knowledge economy through a modern ICT Infrastructure, the PFL developed a National Broadband Strategy that included a vision, roadmap, policy and regulatory framework, network architecture, and business case for private investment in infrastructure, established the first internet exchange point in Lebanon, the second in the region and donated two high-end communication routers to Ogero in order to set up a state of the art International Internet Gateway.

To address workforce training and education, the PFL placed twenty-five Lebanese youth interns in top businesses abroad. These subsequently found jobs in Lebanon while another forty are currently completing internships in Lebanon. The PFL has extended the Cisco Networking Academy to community centers and secondary schools with the opening of sixteen IT Essentials academies, and has expanded the Microsoft IT Academy to the Lebanese Universities, donated twenty-five PC's to the Burj el Barajneh High School and trained 375 teachers under the Intel Teach program.

In the private sector, the Partnership is working to create jobs and develop key industries by identifying finance capital or matchmaking opportunities for promising Lebanese business projects. One million dollars was invested in the Beytech investment fund for the support of small and medium ICT enterprises. The Partnership has also facilitated several US trade missions to Lebanon.

To connect communities, the PFL has supported the establishment of five community centers in war damaged areas (Nabatieh, Alma Al Chaab, Bint Jbeil, Burj Brajneeh, and Baalbeck), implemented local ICT projects, and increased technical training and support for a Telemedicine program linking the American University of Beirut Medical Center (AUBMC) to the Nabatieh Governmental Hospital.

Box 4.21: Principle Conclusions from Section V

In Brief...

- Lebanon has a very active civil society, particularly NGOs. These play a critical role in the provision of social services to various groups and individuals. However these efforts are uncoordinated and often overlap.
- Syndicates have been neutralized by excessive politicization at the expense of substantive issues.
- The private sector is playing an active role in social support and development. However a larger portion of these activities are viewed as ad hoc and add on activities and not as reflective of core values and business practices. These activities are also piecemeal and vary from project to project.

VI. TOWARD SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS

Addressing the range of issues discussed in this chapter requires the initiation of a comprehensive social development plan that considers equity and justice as key principles for the long term sustainable growth of the country and its progress toward a brighter future. In this regard, social citizenship rights are integral to democratic citizenship. The process of reform must therefore begin at the level of addressing key imbalances in sectoral policies such as in the access to quality of education, preventive health care,

or employment opportunities. Addressing these imbalances requires the political will to initiate the institutional reforms needed for better targeting and efficiency, and improved coordination among state institutions and between the government and national and international agencies. It also necessitates more active support and encouragement to civil society initiatives, which, as we saw, have been key to alleviating some of the problems related to poverty and its subsequent manifestations. The steps recommended for achieving some of these goals will be elaborated upon in Chapter Six of this report. They are to be considered part of a larger and comprehensive package necessary for the move toward a citizen's state.

5



CULTURE AND THE QUESTION OF CITIZENSHIP

CHAPTER FIVE

CULTURE AND THE QUESTION OF CITIZENSHIP

I. INTRODUCTION

Citizenship is, above all, a culture; it is the culture of the state and the culture of society. In terms of political authority, the law, culture and lifestyle, the common point in a society is certainly the space allotted for citizenship, no matter how divided this society is. And this space may not always be visible to us.

The borders of modern Lebanon do not conform to what the word “Lebanon” has signified throughout history. But they have not been imposed on the groups that make up this country, as each group in Lebanon has its own history, and struggle - according to Ahmad Beydoun - for the history of Lebanon. Each group usually claims that it is the one that “created” the country, but most parts of these conflicting histories take place within today's Lebanon.²⁴⁵ Whatever the truth behind these narratives, they have ended up accepting the country's existence and its current borders. This demonstrates that the notion of a Lebanese “collage” of different religious communities brought together through an accident of history, is no more artificial than the “collage” that is the Arab world or Greater Syria. The histories of these groups are spread throughout all parts of what became Lebanon, and each found that its history (and those of others) contained periods of alliance, conflict, and dependency. Perhaps not all of these groups saw Lebanon as their ultimate aspiration; perhaps some saw it as a country, not a nation. However, even in the aspirations that go beyond today's Lebanon, the country was neither unknown nor imposed.²⁴⁶ Despite the turbulent history of these groups' assimilation and competition, Lebanon has lacked a significant separatist faction, especially among those who considered themselves “added” to the country (the North, the Bekaa and the

²⁴⁵ Beydoun, 1989

²⁴⁶ Muslim minorities are usually described as rejecting the creation of modern Lebanon, but a more precise investigation reveals that Muslims had a larger role than Christians in creating the “Lebanese formula.” The recurrent talk of separatism in Tripoli and Jabal 'Amil is not precise either; there were individual incidents but nothing that led to a general orientation. We should recall some of the speeches of Tripoli's Abd al-Hamid Karami, commenting on Riad Solh and on intellectuals from the Jabal 'Amil region, in order to deduce that Syrian or Arab unity was an aspiration but not an actual program of action for the future; it did not eliminate the existence of Lebanon.

South), and this is notable. No separatist movement appeared in the Muslim communities, whether Sunni or Shi'a. What appeared to be a pro-partition trend among the Christians did not endure, even though Lebanese nationalism was the “supra-nationalism” (*qawmiyya*) of a part of Christian Lebanese, in opposition to the Arab-nationalist “supra-nationalism” of Arab Muslims. However, the divide between parochial Lebanese nationalism and supra-nationalism (*wataniyya* versus *qawmiyya*) was like the divide between country and nation; in both cases, the two ideas are not ultimately antagonistic to each other.

Nevertheless, Lebanon's political struggle never ceased, under varying and disparate slogans. The struggle between Lebanese nationalism and wider, supra-national identities became confused with sectarian and group chauvinism. Lebanese society expressed itself through division, which attracted and took possession of social dynamism; however, the overarching claims and pretensions quickly revealed their sectarian foundations. The conflict, which took place at different levels (parochial and supra-nationalisms, sects, regions of Lebanon), has weakened the rise of a middle space or spaces. There has been a slow but certain coming together and participation, but it has had few significant results in the face of the conflicts and confrontations that mobilized people on the basis of division. The process of participation has social, cultural, and historical foundations; the violent conflicts have taught people lessons while Lebanese society has grown, moving since independence toward increasing cultural and social homogeneity, with a prosperous middle class. Civil society has also grown and developed. This growth in both Lebanese and civil society would not have taken place without their offering the general goals of unifying society, offering a peaceful direction for conflict, and insinuating an “implicit” society that transcends chronic divisions that have no easy or immediate solution. A peaceful coming together is a slow process: it may be affected by many things at times, and nearly comes to a halt at others, but it continues nonetheless.

This implicit society, which moves us in the direction of having a state, laws, human rights, individual responsibility, and social peace, is not a predetermined

concept. It represents only a partial liberation from the division that plagues Lebanon and constitutes only a margin. It does not involve any inclusive direction, agreed-upon reference-points, or political or social legitimacy. Thus we are talking about a type of alienation or of a parallel society, if not a background. However, this is not a peripheral group of actors, judging from the examples of some young people in the post-civil war period, along with some intellectuals and environmental, cultural, and other associations. The problem is that these groups remain dispersed, having yet to discover a way to come together. During the conflict-ridden history of modern Lebanon, the post-Independence state has been based on disparity and division; the state itself has become transformed into a framework for conflict and the generation of conflict. The state was thus unable to become relatively independent of society, which continued to engage in struggles over it. This conflict or division is reproduced in “the system,” or the Lebanese “formula” for the division of power²⁴⁷ in the founding charter and National Pact of this new political entity. From the beginning, the system and the “formula” have opposed the state, which found itself imprisoned by legal scaffolding that organizes society on a sectarian basis, unable to intervene or control its movement. Lebanon was the only Arab state in which unity did not come from “the top,” and the price of recognizing the country’s divisions was to remain a prisoner of them. However, giving priority to division meant that the cultural or political-cultural struggle was “elastic” or chameleon-like. Anything that does not serve the struggle appears to be peripheral, meaning that the culture of citizenship is not very effective. Just because we advocate the concept of citizenship does not mean that it will come to pass. Clearly, each call for unity is accepted only on the basis of future calculations, and until this future comes to pass, we are left with a surplus of utopian sentiments.

The rhetoric of division often camouflages itself by calling for “unity.” This turns the “culture of the struggle,” into a form of deception. As citizens concerned with the culture of our society, we have the right to ask whether the culture we see around us, which may not be written down, is not actually one of division. It is certainly not one of equality, or rights that are common to all citizens. It is not about the law, or public spaces. On the contrary, it may be a culture of disparity one of violation of the law, of what is public, and of what is common to all. Clearly, the state is the victim

of this implicit culture, which transforms it from a regulator of conflict into an arena for conflict, from a guarantee of equality into a place of disparity, from a pillar of the law to a target for mafia-like violations of the law. However, it is actually more complicated than this. Division is the basis of a system that does not see it as its end-point; division is the basis of a formula that cannot be permanently contested with the state. Weakening the state is the natural result of the system, and our history has confirmed this to us on a regular basis. But the state is not a utopia; it is a reality, and an administrative apparatus. It cannot serve sectarian division forever. Over time, the struggle over the state becomes an open challenge to the most basic foundations of the state, and this can only, over time, become a provocation to any person with a certain level of awareness.

We do not doubt the abeyance of this awareness, but at the same time this awareness has a history. It predates independence, and we can witness it in the Lebanese literature of the period. There were ideas that expressed a single culture, namely liberation from the landowners and tribes, a movement toward free choices, and an affirmation of the rights and opinion of the individual. These ideas appeared nearly a century ago and they continue today. The lessons of conflict and wars all teach that the only solution is equal rights for individuals, a legal system that guarantees them, and a system that transcends sects and clans. This is nothing more than an awareness, but it is one to which there is no alternative. In a sense, Lebanon’s wars are in part the result of the struggle between the system and the state, and between sects and social equality, revealing the reality of the feudal, racist, and tribal underpinnings of society. This Report will show that despite the real and public erosion of Lebanese society or even history, there is always an implicit counter-awareness of an alternative that is inevitable. It has become increasingly well-rooted as elite culture, and with time should become effective, turning the notions of equality, citizenship, and individual choice into a social force and a set of public values. In one sense, Lebanon’s wars have been the painful birth of a historical process, whose sole positive point is a dynamism that ends up exposing the growing contradiction between a sect-based system and the historical horizon. The wars have highlighted the system’s backward and backward-thinking nature as it confronts a society that is increasingly engaged in globalization and the modern age. These are dynamic contradictions, and this report will show that we are not facing historical stagnation but a process of rapid action, which, while it may appear violent and reckless

247 For more information about the Lebanese formula see chapter three of this report.

nevertheless will inevitably at certain lessons, and a consciousness, that in the end are the outcomes of this history. This is not an optimistic view, but rather one that stems from the problematic and its construction. If Lebanon is experiencing painful birth pangs this is because a historical process is occurring, and because something is being born.

II. CONCEPTS

There are three levels or issues involved when we talk about culture and its relationship to citizenship. The first is culture as a program for citizenship. That is to say, we are speaking of that culture that is no longer nor has never been secondary to or in conformity with one of the partisan groups. This kind of culture can afford to present itself as beyond division, and seek to rid itself of calls to conflict since it part of a more universal agenda. To critique group fanaticism is to plant the seeds of citizenship, even if it has not yet taken a political form. Lebanon, for example, was not present in the political mind of Gibran Kahlil Gibran. However, his literature contained a project for building citizenship, without this specification. The second is the culture of citizenship, by which mean a system of values or common denominators defining the borders of citizenship, which are not erased just because disputes take place. Later on, these values constitute a framework for treating and solving these disputes. Sectarianism, for example, is one of the essential points on which the Lebanese elite can agree, even if this appears as a theoretical rather than a practical or pressing dimension. We can refer to democracy or the drive toward state-formation in the same way. There is certainly a huge gulf between these theoretical borders and the reality of wars and obsessions, but we still find the components of a citizen-based culture, which might be referred to as “joint culture.” Even if this culture's political translation is stalled, it is the only direction that can be taken by the elites, the state, and overt discourse. The third level is that of a culture of struggle in the defense of citizenship. This is connected to the existence of “pro-citizen” forces, which remain weak today. Clearly, conflict is to be seen in Lebanese society and there is little room for goals that can withstand the calls for division and partition, and of course, there is an educated segment of society that engages in such a struggle, but this group's influence should be noted here; it is an influence that ebbs and flows and disappears altogether when clashes break out and division grows.

248 See, for example, UNDP, 2005a

However, the consciousness of citizenship in a country like Lebanon is not far from the concept of democratic consciousness. Sub-national identities compete ferociously with the state that does not believe in political and legal equality. On the one hand, they struggle over special privileges, and on the other they tamper with the law and institutions. Sub-national identities are locked in a struggle with democratic consciousness and always try to monopolize power and limit identity to the level of families, practicing “terror” within a single tribe against any appearance of individualism. Any conflict with other groups is raised to the level of an existential battle over identity. Society and its conflicts penetrate the state and the law and violate common and public spaces.

We cannot talk about democracy in Lebanon without talking about sectarian balance. To do otherwise would be to choose a non-democratic path for the organization of society's political and social struggles and relationships. As shown by many examples in the world, citizenship certainly moves in parallel with democracy.²⁴⁸ A greater awareness of legal equality, state independence, and state neutrality in these struggles, seeing identity leave behind the scope of the family or clan, solving disputes through dialogue and not “existential battles,” allowing individuals to organize and express themselves—these are the principles that should constitute an effective foundation for the culture of citizens. The region might have experienced “national authoritarianism” and placed democracy in conflict with citizenship, but this model cannot apply to Lebanon, where it is hard to imagine national hegemony without one group dominating the others. Thus the deepening of Lebanese democracy is also a deepening of citizenship. In any case, democracy is the future of Lebanese citizenship, and the notions of equality, the state, and dialogue make up both citizen-based consciousness and democratic consciousness.

III. DEMOCRACY, SECTARIANISM, AND VIOLENCE

Lebanon's sects, which have become incorporated into the state, are fed by the struggle over the state. The sects render the state hollow, destroying its institutions and turning them into centers for the abuse of the law. They are states within the state, or attempts to form a state within a state. Sects have their own policies, foreign alliances, civil society, and alternative authorities. They can easily set up a deterrent force that demonstrates that the law and state are unable to

absorb a domestic struggle, which then quickly takes a violent form and escapes the limits of both state and law. There are of course disparities among the sects; the ones with the greatest strength and preparedness control the others. The sects concentrated in mountainous areas can control those in urban areas; strong sects can overcome the state's weak security organizations; groups that are better organized can dominate those that are divided.

Violence is the very fabric of the Lebanese system, and it is always threatening to get out of hand. Moral or symbolic force is sometimes useless and deserving of ridicule, while the entire social system is subject to the priorities and methods of violence. The system is one of aggression, not equality; it is one of enforced hierarchies and authoritarianism, and violence against the state because it brings into being relations and hierarchies that are not related to the state. Over time,

violence becomes the basic engine and sets up a system that is parallel to the legitimate one, which is then weakened and co-opted. The system of violence, even if it claims to represent a common or citizen-based ideology, is one of discrimination by a group or sect. Whatever a dominant sect might claim, relations of dependency and subordination are the law of this system. In short, citizenship has no space in a sectarian system, and it is certainly out of luck when violence and sectarian mobilization are on the rise.

3.1 Violence and Private Space

Violence takes various forms: it can be direct or indirect, overt or organized. It can be likely to break out, or less likely to break out. Violence is not limited to the sect and the state, but appears in other arenas, such as the private space of the individual. There is family violence, or violence directed at women, and this has become part

Box 5.1: A Step Away (101 Stories to Tell)

We are a step away from the progress we want. We are a step away from success, from the other, from communicating. What if this communication was expressed through art? And who better than young people to carry out such a step?

A Step Away is an NGO that was established in 2002 by a group of young people who believe that art can overcome stereotypes. They seek to develop an equitable form of democracy and achieve this through artistic projects that focus on youth. To represent the "step" separating individuals, the group launched a project entitled "The Other," which sought to expand dialogue among young people from various social and cultural backgrounds and affiliations.

The project was aimed at private and public high schools. It wasn't easy at first, since the country's deteriorating security conditions discouraged many from participating. However, A Step Away persisted and in the summer of 2005, it established its first summer camp, at Notre Dame du Mont (in Adma, Kesrwan), which brought together students from forty-five schools from Lebanon's six governorates.

During the first phase, students took part in discussion groups to get to know each other. In the second phase they received training from specialists in producing short films, learning about their history, how to write scripts and compose narratives. The project resulted in the production of seven short films, which reflected views of the other, with help from a team of young specialists.

"The Other" analyzed the various forms of stereotyping and discrimination in Lebanon (gender, sect, ethnicity) in its first phase, which was followed by the development of the students' talents, in the form of short films. Around 100 students benefited from this successful project in 2005-2007, and some 500 individuals are expected to benefit in 2009.

A Step Away's plans do not come to an end in 2009, unlike the financing that has been provided by the Afkar program, supported by the European Union. The association is pursuing its goals of developing society and boosting dialogue and participation, and launched a new program in the summer of 2007 entitled "From Insularity to Effective Citizenship," in which forty tenth grade students from various schools took part in a work shop to strengthen citizenship and become acquainted with the values of diversity and non-discrimination. The association is also trying to have the same group take part in another workshop during the 2007-2008 academic year that will train them in designing and managing and marketing a website.

Perhaps the determination of A Step Away has helped the group overcome the country's difficult situation and arrive at successful results. We make reality ourselves, through art, short films, writings; these represent our accomplishments and our decision to achieve progress, which is a step away, whether we move forward...or backward.

of public culture and the current system of values and behavior. The state refrains from regulating and managing citizens' personal status affairs, and Lebanon lacks a civil code for all its people. Personal status codes guarantee the authority of men inside the family, which discriminates against women. Without going into the details of marriage, divorce, and inheritance matters (which constitute the basis of discrimination against women), we can say that the home is where physical, psychological and legal violence against women takes place and spreads²⁴⁹ (see Box 5.2).

Box 5.2: Enough! Injustice and Exploitation (101 Stories to Tell)

He killed his sister because he couldn't stand the idea of people condemning her for getting divorced. A witness who had lunch with the family the day she was killed said that "things were normal," and that he had said to her, "You're not the first woman to get divorced."

Neighbors tried to put out the fire but it had gone too far. The husband didn't try to put the fire out, fearful that the problem could implicate him as well. In fact, he screamed at her when she came out, asking for help, and told her that she should return to the house "and not cause a scandal."

The association "Enough!" (Kafal) is more than a scream - it's a belief manifested today in a non-profit organization that seeks to reduce violence and exploitation against women and move toward a society governed by social justice, democracy, gender equality, and non-violence. Since 2005, Enough! has worked on achieving its goals by focusing on violence against women. It has organized a number of public awareness campaigns on violence against women and children. In 2006, it launched the Silent Witness program, part of an international campaign that is being carried out for the first time in Lebanon. It consists of an exhibition containing the wooden likenesses of forty-five women in Lebanon who have been killed in incidents of domestic violence, each one telling her story.

The first study on sexual molestation of children in Lebanon was done by Enough! and showed that 16.1 per cent of children in Lebanon are subjected to at least one type of sexual molestation. Based on this study, a national plan to fight sexual molestation in Lebanon is being prepared, in partnership with the Ministry of Social Affairs. In March 2008, a campaign to promote a law on protecting women from domestic violence was launched; a draft law was authored and sent to lawyers, judges, MPs, and media professionals to gain their support. There was also a study on seventy-five cases of violence against women that have been brought before the judiciary looking from a sociological perspective at the way judges have dealt with these cases.

249 Zalzal, 2007. See also chapter three on Political Citizenship and the Statistical Compendium for information on honor crimes.

As Lebanon lacks a law and legal reference-points for dealing with family violence, the "special nature" of the sectarian system and each sect becomes the excuse for not seeing a unified social movement to confront the problem. Discrimination against women still exists in some legislation and in cultural values and behavior. Perhaps "honor crimes" and the Penal Code provide the most telling examples of this phenomenon, along with disparities in wages, social security, and stereotypes in school textbooks, and so on (see Box 5.3).

Box 5.3: Capital Punishment: The Penal Code versus Tribal Justice

Nearly fifty executions have been carried out in the period 1947-2007 according to the records, which also show that there have been no women among them. This is not a call to execute women; wide segments of the public oppose this punishment and activists have demanded its abolition. Murder is a crime that might lead to the death penalty, but not for women. For this to happen, a special decision based on special authority, and for special crimes, is required.

Women are executed within the family and the tribe, in the name of honor, via an interpretation of the law that grants the murderer extenuating circumstances. If we compare the rate of these extrajudicial executions of women to that of men executed by the judiciary, we are surprised to find that while six executions were carried out in 1995-1998, during the same period thirty-six "honor crimes" were committed against women. The figure of thirty-six is not necessarily accurate, since there are high rates of suicide, death by poisoning or sudden death in certain areas that cannot be explained otherwise. This reinforces the belief that such women have been murdered, and the crimes covered up by those concerned. This represents collusion between the authority of the state and of the tribe as part of an age-old formula, child of an era that no longer exists.

3.2 "Roles," Images, and Equal Opportunity

Despite its positive intentions reform of the educational curricula undertaken by the MEHE highlights inadequately the problems related to society's view of women and their roles. A study analyzing reading and civic education curricula in elementary schools showed that discrimination in "roles," "images," "language," and "expectations" continued to form the theoretical basis of the gender division of roles in Lebanon. Serious work by women's associations to promote female participation in decision-making, which picked up noticeably

after the Beijing Conference, is a good example of the women's movement's belief that amending the law is not enough; efforts at spreading cultural awareness-education should be made in parallel.²⁵⁰

This means that we lack the process in which changing the image and roles of women in curricula is a prelude to seeing these roles change in public life. Stereotyped gender roles remain prevalent and changing these images requires interventionist measures, most importantly incorporating gender balance into the country's textbooks on a gender-neutral theoretical and philosophical basis that treats men and women in balanced fashion (see Box 5.4).

Box 5.4: Equal Opportunity

Seventy to eighty per cent of the students participating in the Education and Citizenship study agreed that women should have the same opportunities as men, especially in politics (parliamentary seats, cabinet posts, general rights, political action, equal wages, passing on nationality to children). The support for equality is greatest on wages (89 per cent) and falls to 70 per cent for politics. This appears in the following item: "Men are more qualified than women to become political leaders," to which 51 per cent of the students agreed. When the students were asked, "When job opportunities decrease, men should be given priority to obtain available jobs," only 46 per cent of the students agreed. This shows that the support for equality is somewhat theoretical or external, meaning that it has not become a firmly-held value based on conviction, which can turn into a solid form of behavior. Meanwhile, 50 per cent of the students believe that the opportunities of the poor to obtain a good high school education are less than the children of the rich, which is a modest rate. Compared to a number of countries with available data, it appears that Lebanon scores lower on gender equality-related items.

Various examples from the media also render this clear. The language used to refer to female characteristics and behavior - whether in print, radio, or television - continues to be influenced by patriarchal and traditional forms of social and family life. Women are also marginalized in decision-making, especially political decision-making. The percentage of female MPs in parliament is one of the lowest in the world (4.7 per cent) and women have only entered the executive branch recently, in 2004. In administrative decision-

making, it is the same story, whether among Grade One civil servants, ambassadors, governors, or mayors²⁵⁰ (see Indicators Section).

This data, as per Dr. Charafeddine, the author of one of the studies, shows that the generally favorable educational situation of women is not translated into an improvement in their professional situation. One reason for this is that patriarchy and a system of related educational values have prevented any progress, whether in the law or elsewhere. The situation requires bold measures, at all levels, and this means an agreement between the authorities and society. The time has come to affirm this agreement and translate it into a general awareness and will to change. A culture of gender, racial, religious, and sectarian equality should become the foundation of social culture and a plainly-evident basis of laws and legislation.

The gains made by women during their persistent and exhausting struggle for equality continue to be at risk, if we compare them with the state's actual commitment to them. Lebanon ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women on April 21, 1997, though MPs had reservations about some of its provisions (Article 9, on nationality; Article 16, on equality in personal status codes; Article 29, on solving disputes with regard to interpretation and implementation). However, there were no reservations to Article 15, on gender equality in civil matters,²⁵² nor to Article 2, which obliges the State Party to the agreement to adopt a policy that ends all forms of discrimination against women. Civil society organizations used the agreement as an opportunity to push for removing these reservations and continuing to amend laws in order to achieve full equality; however, the cabinet has not signed this non-binding protocol.²⁵³

251 Charafeddine, Fahmiyya, 2006b, *Gender and Decision-Making*, report submitted to the Arab Women's Center for Training and Research (KAWTHAR), in print.

252 Article 15 of the agreement states the following: "States Parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law. States Parties shall accord to women, in civil matters, a legal capacity identical to that of men and the same opportunities to exercise that capacity. In particular, they shall give women equal rights to conclude contracts and to administer property and shall treat them equally in all stages of procedure in courts and tribunals. States Parties agree that all contracts and all other private instruments of any kind with a legal effect which is directed at restricting the legal capacity of women shall be deemed null and void. States Parties shall accord to men and women the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile."

253 See Zalzal, *ibid*.

250 Charafeddine, Fahmiyya, 2006a, *Toward a National Plan to Promote Women*, paper prepared for the National Human Rights Plan in Lebanon, UNDP, Lebanese Parliament, and Human Rights Committee.

IV. SECONDARY CULTURES AND HIGH CULTURE

The question we face in Lebanon is not where these secondary cultures intertwine and interact, but rather the following: Will one of these domains become transformed into a “high culture,” whether of a national or central nature?

Among these “lower” cultures, that of the Christians, centered round the Maronites, has exhibited the most dynamism. In the nineteenth century, peasant revolts liberated the community from domination by landlords, releasing a class-based and democratic dynamism. The introduction of intensive education in many languages under the influence of foreign missionaries, the Church as a pillar of civil society, commercial agents for foreign firms, and external trade all helped institutionalize the comprador economic center with an administrative tradition centered in the Church, managers, and clerks. During the twentieth century, these factors made of the Christians, and especially the Maronites, a community tending toward congruence between sectarian group, state, and nation.

Knowing a foreign language (usually French) and being acquainted with European literature were covert, yet strict conditions imposed on intellectuals from Muslim sects which isolated them from their communities. At the same time, this condition was an aspect of the “Christian” nature of culture, freed of traditional and conservative milieus. The result was a move away from the harsh weight of the past and toward a freer role, even in criticizing religious authorities.

At the same time there was also an implacable patriotism that expressed itself in nostalgia for Lebanon's mountains, with the cedars naturally standing as its symbol. It was a narrative of the “Christian” mountain and the nation, which generated longing among the authors and writers of the literary school known as the Diaspora. The village, whose demise caused anxiety in Lebanese culture at the time, was a Christian (or Maronite) one, which feared the loss of its myths. Folk song is, of course, the singing of the mountains. The first wave that liberated literature from the past was that of Shidyah, al-Bustani and al-Yaziji the younger, and, of course, Christian, given that it did not arise in a vacuum, but resulted from authentic accumulation over the years. Thus, the culture that was more capable of becoming a high culture was Christian; the others remained mere “dialects” or “milieus.”

In Lebanon, Christians formed the majority of those writing in Arabic, and not just French; Christian education was focused on Arabic and mastery of it. The translation of the Bible by Jesuits and Protestants was not only an event in Arabic letters, but a tremendous test of this language and the beginning of a debate about its abilities and susceptibility to challenge. The Christians did not behave like an ethnic-linguistic minority or take a minority position in culture and language; they adopted Arabic as a mother tongue and excelled in it, along with other Arabs, leaving their stamp on it and creating their own rhetorical style.

This culture, which from its beginning contained a humanistic and national discourse despite the vagueness of who was expressing it, was characterized by its transcendence of the parochial pulls of dialect and an obsession with the mountain,. Perhaps this is because this culture was actually obsessed with deserving the name “culture” and leaving behind the local, rural environment. Contact with the west and accumulated literary and culture experience led to a concept of culture that did not match the needs of sectarianism. Universal concepts and modernism required that writers from around the world take the same path, and for the same objective. Gibran, Rihani, and Nuaymeh each put forward a universal project; Maroun Abboud was writing to all Arabs - these writers all found no contradiction in praising both Lebanon and its diversity. This dichotomy characterized the appearance of this culture, as it was Lebanese but not local. It assigned the local to literature of another kind, namely folklore and zajal (traditional rural rhymed verse). This required elevating Lebanon to a utopian level and praising a lost Ithaca, or higher idea. The longing for Lebanon was a constant feature of the poetry of the Diaspora. Even when the criticism of feudal and clerical despotism in the writings of Gibran, Rihani and Abboud was tense and bitter, this literature did not fall into narrow, local concerns; it raised criticism to a universal, humanistic level. The writings of Rihani and Gibran contained no Third World inferiority complexes, or feelings of distance from the contemporary moment.

This Lebanese literature and its aspirations elevated Lebanon itself to its own level, the country's position, dual linguistic character and non-Islamic religious affiliation probably seducing the writers of the day. They rendered their small country a part of a myth that went beyond its borders, sectarian history, and civil conflicts. Strangely, this strife is largely absent in their works; there is no clear reference to the battles of 1860 in the works of these Diaspora writers. They

spoke of the domination of the Church and the landowners, but their historical novels could not tolerate the stain of the civil war of the nineteenth century. They wrote about oppression and hegemony, but could not acknowledge their country's divisions and group fanaticism.

Perhaps a “fear of the local” is not an accurate rendering of a literature that gave precedence to social and cultural struggles (tradition and modernity) over sectarian ones, since it considered the former part of a universal context, while it considered the latter a disturbing form of localism. Over time, this literary genre became a model for Lebanon to follow and a cover up for its deficiencies. Gibran, Rihani, and Abboud ignored the sectarian battles, which were also left out of the writings of their successors. An even higher level of abandonment was to follow. In the writing of Salah Labaki, for example, Lebanon becomes a historical myth²⁵⁴ and Tawfiq Awwad presents his nationalistic and chivalry-laden myth as a return to Ottoman history.²⁵⁵ Elias Abou Chabke sung the praises of the Lebanese peasant,²⁵⁶ while Said Aql would come to elevate this mythologizing to its apex; Lebanon for him becomes intellect, dream, and glory, with no realistic basis. Myth consumes and despises reality, so that it becomes vulgar to inquire about it. The epic, legendary nature of Lebanon is the price paid for this abandonment of reality and willful amnesia about what Lebanon actually represents, fear of the local thus becoming a fear of reality. This mixture of a concern with the universal and the mythologizing of nationalism have placed Lebanese literature before permanently receding aspirations.

In the Lebanese case, the concern with universal values more closely resembles cleverness and imitation than authenticity. We can talk about international “models” or “brands,” the methodization of cubism, surrealism, Picasso, Matisse and Dali, or even the methodization of “snobbery,” which might have a commercial aspect but it is the phenomenon of rapid exchange that governs here, although snobbery works against the narrowness of sectarian insularity and against an imagined authenticity that takes the place of kinship and patriarchy. This has allowed the Lebanese to become cosmopolitan citizens who can easily adjust to different worlds and conditions. It is the opposite of insu-

larity and the ghetto, or the other facet of “the Lebanese nature.”

Gibran, Abboud, and Nuaymeh did more than criticize religious authority; religion itself - Christianity and the life of Christ - also had to be criticized, albeit obliquely. Loud criticism was heard, but the Diaspora writers clung to this path. They did not continue to criticize Christianity, but in practical terms left it behind. The three turned away from a special religious project: Rihani's religion, which was closer to politics, education, and the economy, was reformist and secular, camouflaged in a utopian, spiritual dimension, while Gibran's *The Prophet* made the entire world holy. They and Abboud incorporated reincarnation into their new doctrine; Gibran called his prophet Mustafa, and Rihani's was Khaled, in a type of acceptance of Islam. This alternative, inclusive religion abandoned the traditional forms of religion. If we remember the French Revolution and its positing of an alternative (civic) religion, we will recognize that this is how the democratic revolution reached its intellectual apex.

The magazine *Shi'r* (Poetry) was established just prior to the civil war of 1958 and was a part of the climate of the time. However, the elite nature of this magazine and its founders' self-described incendiary, subversive statements were a reflection of the mass-based politics of the day. The magazine certainly struggled against populist pan-Arabism and the concept of political struggle. Nonetheless, the “black literature” that followed 1958 is even more surprising. In *I Will Never Forget*, Unsi al-Hajj proclaims “I stitch the flag of my country with my soul,” but this appears to mock and commit sacrilege against Lebanese aesthetics with its arrogant eloquence, ethical model, and windy rhetoric. *I Will Never Forget* may be the first black result of this suppressed explosion. Part of *Shi'r's* content involved provoking the pan-Arabist culture, with its eloquence, and the fable of Lebanese nationalism. However, the magazine was a modernist and extremist statement that attached itself to the international, with no local or nationalist reservations of any kind. Thus did the “internationalist” trend reach its apex.

4.1 Born during Wartime

Lebanon would have to await the civil war for a return to the purely domestic, but in different ways. The war was a dramatic event that compensated for the implicit idea that Lebanon lacked a “reality” or was somehow always transcending this reality. The war

254 Labaki, Salah, 1988, *Poetic Lebanon*, Sadir, Beirut; 1988, *From the Depths of the Mountain*, Beirut, Sadir.

255 'Awwad, Tawfiq Youssef, 2002, *The Mills of Beirut*, Lebanon Publishers' Library, Beirut.

256 Abou Chabke, Elias, *The Complete Poetry*, Dar al-'Awda, Beirut.

was a double dose of reality, and the tidal wave of incident made it impossible to return to the old songs of the past. In effect, a hellish lower reality had burst open that did not suit national or internationalist rhetoric; it was the magma of a volcano that respected no borders. In comparison, Said Aql-like enthusiasm and Matisse-like decoration were no match for the reality, and even the artistry of the Rahbani family appeared to be behind the times. It was time for a new beginning, for a harsh, shameful literature, free of delusions.

Some people say that the new Lebanese novel was born in the war. While this appears to deny the heritage of earlier writers, it is true that a new culture was launched by the war. This culture freed itself of propheticism, absolutism, and ironic (in the Platonic sense) language. Lebanon was no longer only an idea and a message, but became also what it actually was: a small, surrounded country, at the mercy of others, full of division, and threatened by upheaval. Thus, culture had to descend from the heights and become a recording, or a field-level documentation and linear analysis. It had to get involved in details, as well as the lower levels, and the social depths. A quasi-archival culture was born, along with a literature that was dark and scandalous. It was a literature of shame, and a music of cynicism. A critical, mocking, violent intellect was born, with an insufficient level of belief, and no lessons. It was an interruption in Lebanese culture, since we can speak of prewar and postwar phases, and the intellectual and artistic endeavors from the new period exhibited a disparity. There are names from this experience that resonate today: Waddah Sharara, Ahmad Beydoun, Elias Khoury, Hassan Daoud, Mohammed Abi Samra, Huda Barakat, Najwa Barakat, Hanan Sheikh, Alawiyya Sobh, Wadih Saade, Mohammed Rawwas, the painter Joseph Harb, Roger Assaf, Rabih Mroue, Elie Karam, Lina Sayegh, Issam Bou Khaled; they are examples of this new direction and are not alone, but constitute a wide range of figures who moved culture from the heavens to the earth, using violence, exposure, and cynicism in place of utopianism, folklore songs, and abstraction.

This move would signal the end of the rural dream in Lebanese culture and literature; nostalgia for the family and village would be no more. The countryside would end as a source of family imagination that saw only an assumed solidarity and unity. Artists and writers who had no alternative certainly lamented the demise of the rural; for Fuad Suleiman, the village was a cracked mirror, but this did not mean it was abandoned;

instead, it was mourned and longed for. The broken mirror was the only thing that remained, as Sulayman and others saw only their faces in it.²⁵⁷ Charles Malik, in *The Introduction*, praised the values of the village as the primordial model for society, without concern for what had befallen these values or historical sense. The presumed village, with its changes and its reality, remained a primordial model. We can locate the countryside in the novels of Tawfiq Youssef Awwad, the poetry of Elias Abou Chabke, and some of the Rahbanis' works. The countryside is not only a subject; it is a vision, imagination, and language. It is a quasi-religious time of praise, sweet words, and simple pieties, besides being the blessing of unity and solidarity.²⁵⁸ The war did away with this imaginative past, which appeared fabricated and false. The war's displacement did away with spatial borders, rendering the division between city and countryside an illusion, as society became mixed as never before. But in terms of geography, the war was urban more than rural; nothing remained of the myth of the countryside. The city was the only possible arena, and the rest was for literature and art. The countryside was no longer the only source of visions and language, as over time the cities found their tongue. With the city, the tense of literature changed as well, becoming fragmented and dynamic. The visions moved from optimistic and certain to skeptical, cynical, and quasi-nihilistic. Language changed, from praise and the incarnation of nature to nakedness and harshness. Literature has become urban, expressing a mixing of people and the details of daily life; it represents a difficult incorporation, a search for the present and for a language of the present.

In the first place, this produced a moving away from abstraction and a return to realism and personification in art. This art is not "dependent," but relies on free experimentation, harshness, the use of non-artistic materials, and the move beyond the confines of the canvas; there is television as well, along with conceptual and performance art, which renews the ties to a world without schools or major artistic trends. It is also a return to the "ego," which is disturbed, and present in the moment; this is a chief concern of photography, for example.

The theater of the absurd was too tame for the absurdity of violence in Lebanon, while more traditional theater also disappeared. It was time to re-consider

²⁵⁷ Sulayman, Fu'ad, 1995, *The Moon Road*, International Book Company, Beirut.

²⁵⁸ See Trablousi, Fawwaz, *Fairuz and the Rahbanis, Theater of the Strange, Treasure and Marvel*, Riad al-Rayyes Books, Beirut.

reality, which was boiling and chaotic, and more fertile than any imported literary model. The rediscovery of reality, along with the gathering and recording of its various elements, if not the “archiving” them, was a fundamental need. The play *Ayyam al-Khiyam (The Days of the Tents)* by Roger Assaf, was an attempt of this kind, while *al-Jaras (The Bell)* by Rafiq Ali Ahmad treated this issue as well, even if in semi-folkloric fashion.

In music, we can note Ziad Rahbani, who continues the earlier Rahbani generation's mixture of the local and international, but transcends it in mocking and deliberate fashion, as evidenced by his play *Shi Fashil (A Flop)*. The younger Rahbani centers his critique of the elder Rahbanis on their rural and utopian nostalgia, and the “Lebanese dream.” Ziad has stood against anything smacking of ornamentation, whether in written form or music. Economy, directness, and naked speech are what concern him, as he rejects the sugar-coated promises and rural utopianism of the past. Ziad seeks sarcastic irony and to expose language as an arena for verbal maneuvering; he champions daily life against a utopia. The music of the Rahbanis is urban par excellence, while Ziad constructs special rhythms and language for the city. He is also postwar Lebanon, where the countryside and its utopia have become false memories.²⁵⁹

In his plays and songs, Ziad Rahbani brings together the expressions and vocabulary of urban colloquial. The imagined ties of blood and origin, and their social expressions, do not monopolize the scene; instead, they enter a network in which place and interests rule. Waddah Sharara's book *Beirut: Detained City*, simplifies this struggle and interaction during a dynamic moment from the civil war. Ahmad Beydoun sums it up as a struggle over Lebanese history, while Fawwaz Traboulsi speaks of the Lebanese ideology.²⁶⁰ These are two attempts to locate a theory of Lebanese history and political economy, despite the intertwining of sectarianism and local regionalism and the entailing conflict, but they create a “floor” in the building, above sectarianism. Thus, we can talk about Lebanese political thought, about a theory of the state and history. It means we are talking about what is Lebanese, and about Lebanon as a state and a nation. All of this discussion of Lebanese conflict

259 See Ziad Rahbani's plays *The American Motion Picture and A Flop*, and cassettes *I'm Not an Infidel, Relative Calm*, and *Mono-dose*.

260 Beydoun 1989; Sharara, Waddah, *Detained City*, Dar al-Arz, Beirut; Traboulsi, Fawwaz, 1999, *No Connecting Links: Michel Chiha and the Lebanese Ideology*, Riad al-Rayyes Books, Beirut.

means we are moving toward locating a Lebanese dimension that transcends the country's conflict.

4.2 Sub-Heading

Lebanon has continued to be a capital of publishing, even under the worst of conditions. Translation has been the most important engine of publishing, after a period during the first two-thirds of the twentieth century when our knowledge of the world was obstructed. In the final third, we moved along all levels, from publishing that re-joined us to contemporary European and American literature to political thought and philosophy. Translation appeared to be the most experimental and creative. It is difficult work, but takes place with a degree of regularity, which is influenced by the (positive) support from foreign institutions. Translation means talking about the Other as it is received by the Lebanese, but also as the Lebanese present him or her to the Arab Other. Translation is simply the relaying of the Other to our language, not only by accepting him, but by explaining him to ourselves, with our own vocabulary. This means his insertion, which means the translation of the Lebanese into to a disparate number of Others, in which, in all probability, he is indeed present. The Lebanese is always oriented toward the local, Arab, and foreign Other, in a process that involves a continuing translation. Translation certainly makes a Lebanese more Arab and international than local. It is not easy to translate the Other into one's own vocabulary, and translate one's self into the Other. Nevertheless, this field may constitute a future for citizenship that is comprehensive in its scope.

Thus, we can say that Lebanese culture, and especially in its literary and artistic domains, continues to experience the painful labor pains of giving birth to Lebanon. The rural myth-based Lebanon no longer exists; today's Lebanon is one in which neighborhoods, regions, sects, groups, and secondary cultures are named. Even though sectarian divisions cannot be dealt with explicitly, we find names, dialects, and places that refer to the special characteristics of each region. There is no praise; we usually see ironic cynicism and a tough-minded dealing with the crisis-filled real world. Literature, art, and culture have, in general, succeeded in producing what we can call a “high Lebanese culture” as distinguished from the secondary cultures, which are both covert and overt.

Arabic continues to be the leading language of culture

and art, and this does not imply any nationalist chauvinism. Besides being a mother tongue, Arabic is also an inclusive language. We cannot engage in linguistic division if we want to build a single Lebanon. This language is connected to all the history that the Lebanese have experienced together, and even though this history is a painful one, it can only become more expansive over time.

Postwar culture is one of returning to the Lebanese reality. At first, Lebanon was an idea and a utopia that were stripped of their context in time and place. The war took Lebanese intellectuals back to local conditions; literature and art returned to the details of Lebanese life. Lebanon might mean contradiction and crisis, as well as standing for a truth and a fertile vitality. This recognition of Lebanon is a recognition of the Lebanese individual. Lebanese culture should not only affirm Lebanon but also make way for a future based on dialogue among the Lebanese. In this culture, we find all of the elements of the future debate over history, political thought, identity, relations with the world, current events, and the region; these elements, under cohesive conditions, can create a national culture and the foundations of Lebanese citizenship.

V. LEBANON AS A FUTURE PROJECT: TOWARD A CITIZENSHIP COMMON TO ALL

Many Lebanese agree that their country's crisis is actually a crisis of loyalty. It has become common to say that a Lebanese is not loyal to his country or state but to family and sect. It has also become common to say that a Lebanese is loyal to himself, first and foremost, and does not concern himself so much with public affairs as with private ones. Thus, we are talking about awareness, education, and priorities. Lebanon's civil wars during the twentieth century did not erupt due to local economic factors. The civil war of 1958 took place after Egypt and Syria declared unity and formed the United Arab Republic. At the time, Lebanon, and especially Beirut, experienced the consequences of political and economic transformations in the Arab world, from the fall of Palestine and discovery of oil to the rise of socialist-nationalist dictatorships in a number of countries. In addition to these factors, Lebanon enjoyed a significant geographical position and a level of services and educational institutions. These produced cadres and a climate conducive to action, thanks to Lebanon's flexi-

ble social relations and linguistic diversity, as well as an Arab banking capital and center for foreign firms, a major transit center, and an intermediary between the Arab world and the west. Lebanon's period of prosperity did not see a tax system that engaged in fair re-distribution; the economic growth covered the entirety of society, but not equally.

This prosperity, however, failed to prevent civil war, which erupted on two occasions. The rapid movement in society and the economy came to a halt only during the second conflict, during the 1980s. Economic growth, and not recession alone, might have been a factor in this war. Economic growth is distributed unevenly among the sects, but covers all of them. Closing the gaps and contributing to a feeling of equality is no longer accepted easily, due to the disparities in political power and the near-monopolistic control of power by a single group. Perhaps we can say that economic prosperity was at its height when the war broke out in 1975, and once again prosperity may be a factor in any renewed eruption. The Shehabist era brought prosperity to the fringes of society, which enjoyed a level of services and public sector education. The country was unified, and the peripheral areas enjoyed an influence that they had lacked in the past. Economic prosperity brought a measure of equality, which made the country's sects more sensitive to the political privileges of the Christians, and particularly the Maronites. This is why Palestinian fighters were received and relied on to address the imbalance, which ushered in the long civil war, which featured both domestic and foreign factors. The war led to the collapse of society and the state, which have yet to recover. Once again, prosperity and growth, more than class disparities and poverty, helped ignite the conflict.

Economic prosperity, however, also has cultural ramifications. Making education available to all, and the rise of elites from major religious groups unified the country, and allowed peripheral regions to become more integrated into the political process. There was a growing consciousness of political and social disparities, and an awareness of equality, which took different forms. There was increased contact with the Arab world, engagement in the region's political movements, and interaction with its various divisions, as well as engagement in the international division represented by the Cold War. In other words, an international consciousness arose, and all of these factors were reflected in culture. If the war resulted from economic growth and not stagnation, it also resulted from a growth in this awareness, and not a retreat, and

from a unification of the country that allowed peripheral socio-political groups to enter the political game. These factors locate the roots of the country's political crisis as much in awareness as in interests; indeed, we may speak of a growing and ever more complex awareness, one that transcended its original subject. For Lebanon to become a byword for regional-international conflict, an arena of war with Israel and confrontation with America, not only exceeds its circumstances and capacities but makes it the prisoner of a consciousness that suffers from a permanent dichotomy between what is and what can be or between the symbol and reality. Or, to put it differently, we may find ourselves before two discourses, that of consciousness and that of the objective reality, and each may lead to different outcomes. In the end, the Lebanese crisis in one sense reflects this crisis of consciousness; it is its cultural manifestation and we cannot explore this crisis if we do not refer to it.

Few Lebanese, whatever their orientation, have thought that the country's political crisis was merely one of sects. Few Lebanese political groups have declared that their objective is sectarian, or that they support a sectarian political vision. In the country's political dictionary the word "sectarian" is a mark of shame and a curse. This did not come about because of one single event. It reflects the impact of educated elites on political discourse, without their enjoying a similar impact on political life; it also reflects a sensitivity that is not lost on the average Lebanese, vis-à-vis (sectarian) Lebanese coexistence. There is a reason for this custom. It has to do with the composite Lebanese personality, which has a globalized, cosmopolitan aspect as one of the "floors" making up its edifice. There are also apparent contradictions to this international dimension. Being ashamed of sectarianism is not just pretense, but the result of liberal and humanistic values. As Michel Chiha says, it is the face of Lebanon that looks to the Mediterranean, while there are also other faces, which might not look toward Mount Lebanon, as Chiha says, but toward the harsh desert. Being ashamed of sectarianism, even if this is only a verbal accomplishment, is something positive; those who were astonished by the mass political actions following al-Hariri's assassination and their support of coexistence and freedom missed this aspect of the Lebanese character. Even though these inclusive movements quickly disappeared, they indicated the "latent liberalism" of Lebanese, which has yet to become a truly solid course of political action.

This embarrassment over sectarianism represented a

significant component of culture in Lebanon. We can talk about its beginnings in negative terms: the Lebanese novel, for example, avoided the word "sectarian" as an intolerable mark of shame. Sectarianism appeared in the novel *The Two Victims*, by George Masroua, but this Syrian Social Nationalist Party writer was taking direct aim at his target (the target of his fiercely secular party as well).²⁶¹ But in most cases, the Lebanese novel avoided the topic, as well as the use of place names and locations that could signify one's sectarian affiliation or environment. Sectarianism was considered a "cultural colloquial" language that had no place in the internationalist-flavored literature of the day. It appeared in the final novel by Tawfiq Youssef Awwad, *Tawahin Beirut (The Mills of Beirut)*, which was published on the eve of the civil war in 1975, while being completely absent from the debate that dominated the trilogy by Youssef Habshi al-Ashqar. Sectarianism could have appeared in less "lofty" works, such as the Rahbanis, for example, which were quite removed from reality, yet they succeeded in the difficult formula that infused Lebanese and Mediterranean Arab life with exceptional sensitivity and longing. On the eve of the civil war, the Rahbanis' play *Jisr al-Qamar (Bridge of the Moon)* ignored neither sectarianism nor its bloody promises, but the poetry and song rendered the work into an anthem of tolerance. Kamal Youssef al-Hajj²⁶² defended sectarianism, but with a "sculptured" language that did not serve the cause.

The embarrassment over sectarianism was also a matter for politicians, and even the wartime sectarian leaders. Even at the war's height, such individuals did not employ open calls for sectarianism. Some among them used terms such as "the Christian community" or "the security of the Christian community," but they did not move from this rhetoric to overt sectarian incitement against others. Practically speaking, the atrocities of the war - murdering people from different sects at checkpoints or from the rooftops of buildings, mass liquidation of another group, and other outrages - did not find their way into the rhetoric of the time. "Sectarian" awareness" would not have appeared if it only meant such practices; it would have been put forward as merely an additional pretext. We can ignore for now the smaller groups that practiced purely religious and sectarian incitement and rhetoric, since

261 Masroua, George, *The Two Victims*.

262 Kamal Youssef al-Hajj was a philosopher and university professor who defended Lebanese nationalism and considered sectarianism something positive; he was assassinated in his village of al-Shababiyyeh in 1977 in the wake of the civil war and sectarian struggle that had erupted.

these have always been peripheral to the general public discourse. We can say, however, that the religious or sectarian element has become a prominent part of the discourse of political parties that are increasingly claiming a nationalist and liberation agenda for themselves. This heightened sectarian discourse increases the deeper these groups immerse themselves in the domestic Lebanese scene. A purely sectarian rhetoric is the opposite of a cultural tradition; it remains “secret” and a sign of a lower culture, based on oral communication, rumors, and jokes. But these elements do not rise to the surface or dominate the overt level of rhetoric. The publicly-expressed political discourse, whether during the civil war or today, contains an element of “exchange.” Political groups use the same clichés and it is difficult to distinguish the various political lines. In this kind of discourse, reality can be set aside and everything turns out equal in the end.

Today's political debate is another example of this. It is warlike in tone, and allows all sides to make accusations of treason, sectarian incitement, monopolization of power and obstruction of society and the state. Putting aside the minor details of language, we find that all sides share the same type of rhetoric. This robs us of actual debate and discussion, and produces an audience that is trained to hear coded language. Nonetheless, even if the speeches respect a certain level of morality, this does not prevent them from evolving, and clashing, and having a direct impact. In the end, the producers and consumers of this rhetoric might consciously reject the idea of partition or division in their words, even though they practice it under a different name.

Lebanese might call this “the lies of politicians,” but it is naïve to demand honesty in their place, since this ignores the fact that this duality also has its foundations in reality. Doing away with the rhetorical schizophrenia and calling for “the truth” does not do away with the fact that the dichotomy itself contains more truth than the call for its elimination.

5.1 Lebanese Patriotism

Lebanese patriotism (*wataniyya*) in the local parlance is not so much an affiliation as a value. Politicians claim Lebanese patriotism, which goes beyond sect and region, as a virtue. This patriotism satisfies the need for glorification in the popular political consciousness. It contains already-constructed answers and names that have value and enjoy stature in and of themselves. Despite the fetishism of this

consciousness, it also represents a limit to political practice; since this consciousness continues to exist, it signals that there is a ceiling to political practice, which is only destroyed at times of crisis. Examples of this are the war-time slogans of “the rights of Muslims,” “the security of the Christian community,” “federalism,” and “the rights of Christians,” but these all had limited impact and reach, and rarely did they destroy the entire basis of this consciousness. The guarantee that was supposedly present in this mummified discourse was not a serious one, and clearly the same discourse had reduced effectiveness. But because it remains, there is still a ceiling, or a limit.

Jean Mourad of the Université St. Joseph carried out a study in 2004²⁶³ on affiliation and identity among Lebanese, prior to the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri the following year. Much has changed since then to the extent that the figures sighted below may no longer be valid with regard to the current situation. These figures and percentages may nonetheless are somewhat suspiring:

Table 5.1: Identity and Affiliation among Lebanese Citizens, 2004

	Per cent
Family	97.6
National identity	77.5
Religion	63.1
Sect	36.3
Tribe	17.6
Other	1.4
No Response	6.4

The study gathered data from 2004 and 2005 Mourad. Have things changed since then? The family remains in the number one spot with regard to affiliation, nearly unanimously (97.6per cent), while national affiliation comes second, with a large percentage (77.5per cent), only a small percentage (13.5per cent) considering it more important than family. These rates are similar among Lebanon's different sects, begging the question of why only 17.73 per cent of Muslims, 8.43 per cent of Christians, and 16 per cent of Druze give precedence to national affiliation. However, this figure gets confused with the 47.7 per cent that place national identity at the bottom of the scale, and the 16.4 per cent who believe that Lebanon is a temporary homeland. This figures become even stranger when put in the context of another series, that of the 20 per cent of Christians, 20 per cent of Druze and 10 per

263 Mourad, Jean, Novembre 2006, *Les Sentiments d'appartenance: la Sociabilité*, Université Saint Joseph, Beyrouth.

cent of Muslims who want a federation between Lebanon and another country. These figures clash with each other, to the degree that 20 per cent of Christians supporting merger with another country surprises Mourad, treating it as an expression of cynicism and despair.

We should not conclude things too hastily from this study. But some figures and percentages are significant. Like Mourad, we consider some of the data to be unrealistic, and find some of the answers to be suspect. If these really are the answers, we can consider them a type of consciously (or subconsciously) traditional response, an answer reflecting how they think they should respond. It is not strange for national affiliation to come in second, but we have no single reading of why 47 per cent place it at the bottom of the scale and 20 per cent want to unite with another country. There is another contradiction with 20 per cent of Christians wanting to merge with another country and a low 7 per cent that put national affiliation first. Moreover, if religion came third for 63 per cent of respondents, that is indeed a low score, given the levels of religious and sectarian partisanship.

However, these figures are from 2004 and as such any reading of them should bear in mind that much has changed since then; the current polarization between

the Shi'a and Sunni sects had not yet emerged, while Christian sectarianism was not then as sharp.

If we were to conduct the study once again, the changes in the results might not be radical. This means that the divided Lebanese consciousness is what rules; a test of one's beliefs is different from a test of one's daily behavior. A Lebanese has two answers to the same question; his or her political consciousness is hidden and mechanical, and he or she might not even be aware of the contradictions. There is a legitimacy involved in speech, and a legitimacy in action and behavior. The ideological cover for sectarian demands rarely acknowledges this fact, and it might appear under a "patriotic" or nationalistic slogan. During the long civil war, the demands by Muslims were couched in nationalistic and democratic terms, often with a leftist coloring. The Christian confrontation also had Lebanese and national rhetorical elements, often with a right-wing coloration. Today, the situation has changed dramatically as calls to restore "the rights of Christians," are not seen as having a bearing on the national balance of power, but as being part of the Lebanese mutual understanding and not as in conflict with support for resistance and opposition to imperialism. In other words, they completely transcend sectarianism and their Christian nature does not constitute an embarrassment for them at this level (Box 5.5).

Box 5.5: Social Cohesion

The issue of social cohesion is both important and complicated, and is linked to the domestic conflict that has raged for more than thirty years, since the eruption of the civil war in 1975. The war had strong external dimensions, but took place among Lebanese factions, based on agendas related to the country's political system and the division of power. It is complicated because it deals with all aspects of the system, and because political discourse on sectarianism, coexistence, and the building of the state is somewhat superficial, with the warring sides sharing the same pro-state slogans. Thus it is difficult to differentiate between the rhetoric of cohesion and that of disintegration, meaning that a precise evaluation of the situation is surrounded by dangers.

The questions used in the Education and Citizenship study revealed three assumptions: 1) A discourse of "dismantling" considers the group (the sect) and its men (*za'ims* and clergy) to be the point of reference for securing public services and political stances, while a discourse of "cohesiveness" believes that the state is that ultimate authority, and that the individual can exercise his or her options. 2) The "dismantling" discourse believes that the state is, or should, consist of areas of influence that are distributed, or disaggregated, among groups and/or their leaders. The discourse of cohesiveness does not deny the plurality of affiliation; it rejects the distribution of influence and considers the state an independent, authority of a civil nature. 3) The discourse of dismantling is reflected in social relations and affiliations that are limited to groups or regions of the same sectarian background while the discourse of "cohesiveness" seeks to set up mixed social areas, with diverse affiliations.

As for the first dimension, the results showed that one third of the students agreed that candidacy and voting should be supported by clergymen, while one quarter of them said that elections should be based on families. Meanwhile, 98 per cent supported the state's granting of educational scholarships to the needy, and 64 per cent believed that each sect should be concerned with educating its members and providing scholarships, which indicate the power of the group as a reference-point for both services and political positions.

With regard to the second dimension, the dismantling of the state among sects and their leaders, 73 per cent agreed that ministers and state posts should be distributed equally among the *za'ims*. A total of 58 per cent said that the top three state positions in Lebanon should be distributed among the top three sects. Meanwhile, 80 per cent said that “Lebanese should preserve public and government buildings and see that they not be used for private ends,” 20 per cent said that “people should be able to use public parks in the manner they wish,” and 54 per cent said that “the owners of cafes should not be allowed to place tables on the sidewalk and use this space for their own benefit.” This data tells us that the concept of state, as separate from the influence of groups, is not mature in the minds of our students, and that the concept of public space is much clearer, but still a bit confused.

As for the third dimension, on social mixing, the study showed that 84 per cent said that “it is necessary to set up schools that hold joint activities with other schools that do not resemble ours,” while 70 per cent did not like education in school to be with students who are all from the same religion. This tendency toward mixed education, which covers more than two-thirds of the students, drops to 56 per cent when the matter concerns marrying people from a different religion, and 65 per cent if it involves marrying someone from a different sect of the same religion.

This camouflaged ideological discourse is not completely fabricated; sectarian polarization among the Lebanese has never been pure, and has always included a mixed bag of factors that go beyond its boundaries to embrace public and national political options. There was a Muslim objection to Christian monopolization of political power, met by a Christian objection to the Muslims' collusion with the armed Palestinians during the civil war era. This destroyed the unity of the state and society. The Muslims' welcoming of Palestinian arms involved a reliance on a foreign party, but the June 1967 War, the Arab defeat by Israel and the Palestinian issue, are sectarian pretexts, but go further than this. Likewise, the supranational tendency among Christians is not only sectarian camouflage. The intersection between the sectarian and the nationalist and the intermingling of sectarianism with strategic choices for Lebanon is not easy to dismantle. Nothing has changed today with regard to this issue. The opposition has inherited the pan-Arab and pro-liberation tendency, while the March 14 coalition has taken on the “Lebanese” direction. Today, as in the past, the issue starts at the general level, then quickly dissolves into sectarian dichotomy. These conflicts appear latent, and await an external stimulus. Today's opposition Christian political factions resort to demands for Christian rights, even though they began from a different position. One could argue here that perhaps internal Christian tussles led these factions to positions that seem at odds with their long history. The two Muslim political trends appear content with their sectarian hegemony; there is less resort to direct sectarian incitement and more preparedness to make sectarian concessions. We can say that sectarian divisions always have political equivalents, and usually constitute a coherent nexus. Political sectarianism has always been this nexus, but never its sole expression. The nexus is not an invention. As everyone knows, it is based on actual conditions in

the country and the region. The political comes first, but the sectarian is what eventually rules. The sectarian requires an element of assistance from the outside world to mobilize itself, but the political is not always authentic; it also requires a spark, perhaps in the form of fuel from the outside world. The political vindicates the sectarian, and the sectarian gets out of control, but the two do not arise completely by themselves; they must have an external catalyst.

5.2 The Discourse of Dependency

This does not at all mean that dependency should be blamed on the outside world, as is prevalent in Lebanon today. The political-sectarian dichotomy mentioned above is matched by the foreign-local dichotomy. But the discourse of dependency sees the local as having no power, will, or initiative; accusations that the other side is “working as a foreign agent” are used to explain the situation. Thus, there is no issue or cause at stake, the political struggle is merely a game, in which it would be best to follow conditions in geopolitics and the calculations of regional players. A view such as this could be considered hegemonic, as well as “nihilistic” in political terms; all sides are equally dependent on foreign powers and national issues and causes disappear. In cultural terms, such a view is the equivalent of denying the reality and *raison d'être* of Lebanon. This “ontological” view is complex, and is what distinguishes the Lebanese political mind. It is a kind of self-doubt and assumption of permanent deficiency that leads to considering Lebanon permanently unable to build a state, society, and politics. Unfortunately, such a view always finds more evidence that it exists. In this analysis, Lebanon's reliance on regional and western mediation is proof of this absolute dependency, while the failure of this mediation is not taken as a sign of the harsh domestic struggle.

As for the dichotomy and interaction between the political and the sectarian, it is unclear which renders the struggle so decidedly radical. It is likely that political radicalism follows a sharp sectarian division—the pro-union radicalism against the Baghdad Pact in 1958, the radical Palestinian option versus the Lebanese option in 1975, the radicalism of military liberation versus the support of peaceful solutions. Most of the time, we see widely divergent political options that cannot be reconciled. Political radicalism is built on top of sectarian division, and this division feeds off political radicalism. Despite the many crises, there is no such thing as an inevitable division, even though Lebanon's political body is certainly susceptible to the cancerous growth of division. The rapid outbreak of conflict is evidence that an intensive incitement of sects and partisan groups has already been underway.

Such groups in society are ready to be mobilized because they lack a sufficient social safety network, and suffer from political and economic stagnation. They can be mobilized by the usual eloquence about injustice and oppression, which allows the state to be taken over and political gains divided up; it also appears that a bit of exploitation is taking place. Many people might see that the readiness to act in sectarian terms is a natural one, which means it cannot be resisted. But there is a counter-readiness, which is just as normal for Lebanese: to seek accountability, make a living, earn money, and enjoy stability. For the Lebanese, the experience of the state is a relatively short one, and not isolated from division; in fact, this experience has been the prime mover in re-producing division.

If division is the natural state of affairs, it is not difficult to provoke and incite people. If the person doing the inciting has influence, the act takes place; if it takes place and is successful, many others copy this type of behavior. But the concept of “rights” is also important in politics; it is not limited to the sect, but is a public option. In the end, it involves the state, political participation, the law, and reform. Thus, we can say that on the surface, sectarian division is wrapped in a rhetoric of pro-unity, and society's readiness to accept such calls indicates how neglected and marginalized this society is, with its lack of frameworks of inclusion.

The pro-unity nature of such rhetoric also indicates a common culture among Lebanese, and no matters how elitists or ideological this rhetoric may sound, indicates the existence of a common culture that considers the state, the law, and coexistence among sects as basic parameters for the country. This is cer-

tainly a drive toward unity; this space for agreement and consensus is agreed to by both sides, as represented today by the March 14 and March 8 coalitions. Each side has set forth items such as the state, independence, sovereignty unity, reform, and even peace, as its goal. Different groups with similar political objectives might not be surprising, but Lebanon is a country on the brink of war and has suffered from a war whose “borders” were not that different from today's lines of tension. The country's political groups compete against each other in championing the same slogans. Each group accuses the other of lying to it, and about what it represents. Public debate suffers, as there is a disconnect between the rhetoric and actual programs of these groups. The opposition wants to share power so that it can strengthen state authority, but is suspected of seeking enough power to obstruct that authority. There are doubts that the majority can practice a type of politics that is different, and even more doubts when the matter comes to independence and peace. While the two sides might have similar rhetoric, this appears to be a type of political deception, and represent contempt for serious political debate.

Nonetheless, there is a political ceiling that no one dares breach. Talk against the state, independence, peace, or separatist rhetoric is condemned, and considered a crime against a common pact of coexistence. One may argue that this is simply rhetoric and that the condemnation will never move from words to action, or even consider it a way to camouflage issues that are very much a part of popular culture today. For example, the state is constantly under attack for failing to deliver, yet paranoia about the state is so staple a part of popular culture that it sometimes seems as if they want the state to deliver services but not rule. Nonetheless, it appears today that everyone wants to see a state. The consensus over having a state is generally ineffective, however, as political practice around the division and the appropriation of the prerogatives of the state.

While this consensus around the existence of the state cannot be expected to protect it from these violations of its rights and responsibilities, it is nonetheless significant, as it indicates a common conceptualization, and the common denominators that form the foundation of a culture that are shared by all. This was not the case during the civil war, when the conflict over the state, the country, and the future was clearer and more strident. Back then, the state was the state of others, the country was artificial, independence was suspicious, and the future was

contested. We do not face a similar conflict today, and at times we have to ask what the conflict is actually about, despite its profound nature and the difficulty of finding a solution. Analyzing the public statements of each side does not help us in understanding the content of this conflict. But as each side tries to show it is more pro-unity, pro-state and pro-independence, the public has accepted these goals, which form at least a superficial set of borders for politics. This assumes that there is a single public, a single political program, and a single set of political values.

The civil war did not greatly differ from today's conflict. It began over roughly the same issues: the resistance, the legitimacy of the resistance, the Lebanese debt to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Lebanon's late reckoning after its long avoidance of that conflict. The Palestinian resistance was able to dismantle this situation and pose once again the issue of sectarian division of spoils. Today, the resistance is Lebanese, and Lebanon's position in the Arab-Israeli struggle is being discussed again, and amid the current dismantlement, the question of sectarian division of spoils is raised once again. There is no great difference between yesterday and today, and we might claim that the Lebanese tragedy is being repeated. At first glance, it appears that the war has not ended, and has not left behind a clear lesson. The Taif Accord did not succeed in finding a way out. However, though it is tempting to draw such a conclusion, if we believe the two situations resemble one another we will see that this expresses a basic "Lebanese principle." Lebanon cannot escape its geographic location, the Arab-Israeli conflict is imposed on the country, and Lebanon must now pay its debt, with interest due.

The situation has changed since the mid-1970s. Today, Lebanon is not catching up in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is alone, along with the Palestinians, in the arena, and there is no debt left to pay. The system is not neutral, even though a faction supports this. And the sectarian division of spoils has become so strongly anchored that no one today is calling for its elimination.

The country also suffered from the civil war and the period of Syrian tutelage, which affected both Christians and Muslims, albeit to different degrees. This means that a joint consciousness is no mere cultural tradition. The timid way that Lebanese talk about other sects is not new, as it is part of a cultural tradition that seeks to be regional and international without getting into local details or adding them to the idea of the nation. The notions of the state and independence were not forged from consensus, however,

but from war. The war had its lessons, and all Lebanese ended up agreed on their Lebanese affiliation, as well as on the state and independence. Thus post-war culture was one of a joint consciousness and was capable of truly establishing an inclusive culture. The Lebanese had arrived at common denominators that were sufficient to consolidate the situation. The issue of identity, one of the conflict-laden aspects of independence, was now settled. The issue of the state was also settled; it was no longer the enemy of society, but its objective. These two pillars were sufficient to see a new social contract, and it was one of the few times these two issues have been settled in an Arab country. This could have set down a limit to civil strife and point the way toward building a state and society. Contrary to many viewpoints, one can say that war reached an objective ending. We have not agreed on the history of this war, but it is not necessary to do that in such a short period of time, and no sufficient cause remains for the continuation of the war. The important thing is that the conflict over Lebanon's identity ended, and the entire society sought to become incorporated into the state. These choices were voluntary and conscious, and the result of a long history of experimentation and suffering. Importantly, peace became a priority and everything would be measured on this basis. This means that we no longer had a settlement, but an agreement about the future, with the Taif Accord serving as its legal formula.

VI. A SUSPENDED NEW CONTRACT

Syria's tutelage over Lebanon did not safeguard the Taif Accord, but acted as its antithesis. How could there be an agreement over the issue of Lebanon's identity and its state in the presence of a tutelary power, which was a partner in the struggle over identity, while constituting an authority that was above the Lebanese state? The long period (fifteen years) of Syrian tutelage over Lebanon was a reason for blocking the Taif Accord and emptying it of its content. It was a type of political management that traded peace for civil conflict, which was still fresh in people's minds. As a result the new social contract between the Lebanese was suspended and willingness to implement it weakened. The state represented these divisions, and thus it could neither play the role of structure, nor mediator and with its absence the entire political scaffolding disappeared as well.

This period of political amnesia saw constant, merciless conflict over the spoils of political influence, as well as permanent attacks and counter-attacks by the political forces involved. It may be said that these

elements remained after the Syrian withdrawal in 2005 as a reminder and exposure of the deterioration of political life. Thus, the Taif Accord was frustrated, the lessons of the war wasted, and the new contract suspended and made hollow. The exit of Syrian forces was insufficient to cause the subsequent explosion of division: independence was not a matter of debate, and nor were the state, or civil peace of course, despite the tense atmosphere. This conflict was not destined to take place, and Lebanese are still agreed about their identity and their state, and naturally no one is calling for war. Thus, the war has not continued, but the agreement to end it has been suspended. Meanwhile, there are political groups engaged in incitement and mobilization, to move the situation to the edge of the abyss, and create a situation for which there is “no solution.”

Meanwhile, the various communal groups have made considerable efforts to use the media and other forms of public discourse to fashion “epic” stories for consumption by the masses and that have slowly but surely moved the Lebanese toward civil conflict. The ability to play with the facts is truly incredible. “Issues” arise in random fashion, along with attempts to mobilize, using dramatic rhetoric. This is evident in speeches, television programs, rumors, public and private celebrations, and at funerals, all of which work to create a climate of tension. The public fictions are of such magnitude that they cannot be reined in. The public is swayed in different ways by this verbal pomposity, which ends up creating fictitious “floors” in the country’s political edifice amid endless debate and discussion. An entire reality is created and fabricated by this talk; the country is taken up with interpreting this political rhetoric and philosophizing. An overwhelming type of politicized culture and education are being formed, as the reality is created by discourse and cultural practices.

Media outlets play a key role here. Lebanon has enjoyed a high level of public freedoms (opinion, expression, and the media). Activists and émigrés from neighboring countries have flocked to Lebanon to escape the restraints on them at home, but this does not mean that Lebanon’s record on public freedoms is spotless or conforms to international norms and human rights charters, whether in terms of legislation or actual policy. This poses a number of challenges and difficulties, and we should study how to confront these problems.

The media plays an important role in shaping and manufacturing public opinion under these conditions

of sharp political-sectarian polarization. Public opinion is the result of a mass, interactive process; it is influenced by a country’s political-economic structures and its prevailing system of values, as well as by personal and common experiences, from the present and the past. Media professionals and the media play a leading role in shaping public opinion and directing it in certain ways, especially in countries with a weakly-rooted democracy and strong government control of the media sector. However, while some researchers acknowledge that the media plays a fundamental role in forming public opinion they also contend that this role has been exaggerated, which is particularly the fault of media professionals themselves. Some argue the media is more a reflection of society than an influence on it (Pintak, 2006; Khoury, 2006). Moreover, the media by itself is incapable of manufacturing public opinion that holds rulers accountable and acts to bring about change; to do this, it must cooperate with public civil society institutions such as schools, universities, political parties, and associations. While these other groups may also take part in shaping public opinion, the media relays its message more quickly, widely and comprehensively, especially during the current telecommunications and satellite television revolution. In divided societies, the media plays a key role in forming a communal culture of respect for “the other” and promoting peaceful methods of solving disputes, based on political, cultural, and intellectual pluralism. It also seeks to allow all members and segments of society to express their views and aspirations.

Lebanon’s media, which has had a long and rich history, in the realm of print media and later the audiovisual sector, features several positive aspects. The media is diverse and exhibits vitality and renewal, reflecting society as well as its political and other affiliations and divisions. It is also privately owned and has a margin of independence from the political establishment. The media enjoys considerable freedom of expression and opinion compared to other Arab media, even though it has deviated from and violated these same principles on occasion. Eight terrestrial stations operate in Lebanon, in addition to the state-run Tele-Liban; seven of these broadcast on satellite. There are thirteen Category One (political) radio stations, which broadcast news bulletins and programs, and about as many Category Two (non-political) outlets (Abbas, 2002). Finally, there are fourteen daily political newspapers. But despite all these positive traits of diversity and independence, several elements have prevented Lebanon’s media from playing a leading role in society. Among them are political divisions, which have a direct impact on the media.

The multiplicity of media in Lebanon creates the false impression that we are witnessing true democracy. In fact, political and sectarian division prevails amid this diversity. Media outlets have their own goals and objectives, whether ideological, sectarian, party-based or commercial, but they are unconcerned with public policy or participatory culture. Political items and programs are merely a way to “defuse the political tension” of viewers; they cannot create a public opinion that supports questioning and accountability. Journalist Rami Khoury has noted “one of the problems is the dual role played by political talk shows, which give viewers the impression that they are involved in accountability, while their discussions, which feature different points of view, are in fact limited to serving as political entertainment. While this is certainly an important role, it differs radically from political accountability in the precise sense of the word.”²⁶⁴

Box 5.6: The Story of MTV ²⁶⁵

The case of MTV illustrates the problems associated with implementing laws governing the media in an “exceptional” or arbitrary way. The station was closed in 2002 during a parliamentary by-election in the district of the Maten, by a decision from the Court of Publications, based on Article 68 of the Election Law. This provision “prohibits audiovisual media from broadcasting electoral advertising during the campaign, under the threat of closure,” following a decision that involves no litigation procedures, i.e. the right to confront one’s accuser. The radio station Mount Lebanon was also singled out for closure, despite the many violations committed by the media in general, as acknowledged by the National Audiovisual Media Council. These closures were part of the political confrontation between the authorities and the opposition, between the government and its critics, and between society and security organizations.

The media has become more polarized since 2005 and this is particularly true in the television sector. Stations have become an extension of political and sectarian parties, as well as fundamental tools in the struggle, consecrating the vertical division of society. Meanwhile, political division is directly connected to

who funds the media, since - according to journalist George Nassif - there is a sharp convergence between political loyalties and the sources of funding. This damages the public’s chances of seeing “a calm and objective bias-free voice that seeks reform without vengeance.” The political or politicized wins out in a media with limited space for serious discussions and debates of public policies in the formation of public opinion.²⁶⁶ This is confirmed by television anchorman George Ghanem, who says that “in politics, some stations directly promote and glorify a political leader; this turns media outlets into propaganda tools for those who finance them.” There are also journalists who crave fame or use their public status as a springboard to politics or business, “as if the media were a space where its practitioners could voice their opinions rather than a professional space in which to ply their trade.”²⁶⁷

This problematic relationship between the media and various influential groups has become even more confused since 2005 and has exposed media coverage to significant scrutiny. During this period, there have been critical studies and analysis of the media’s performance²⁶⁸ in covering a series of events: the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri and MP Basil Fleihan and twenty other civilians; the eruption of the Independence Intifada; a string of subsequent assassinations; the national dialogue; Israel’s July 2006 war against Lebanon; the domestic political crisis that followed this conflict; and the Lebanese Army’s war against the jihadist group Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp in North Lebanon in 2007. The bloody events of Mar Mikhael in February 2008, during a stand-off between Amal and Hizbullah supporters and the state, prompted some media professionals to raise the issue of the media’s role in stoking the fires that erupted that Sunday, both prior to and following the event.²⁶⁹ The “mini-civil war” that followed these events in May 2008 (and continues to rage in certain areas) included aggression against the media outlets and professionals.²⁷⁰

and the media have generated many studies, see for example Riashi, Melhem, 2007, pp.73-75, as has the domestic crisis following the war. See Rammal, Ali, 2007, pp.85-100; al-Abdullah, May, 2007, pp.34-44. The Army’s war against Fath al-Islam, which broke out in May 2007, launched a discussion of the media’s role. see “Media Coverage of the Battle of Nahr al-Bared: A Finger on the Trigger, and Another on the Wound” available on www.menassat.com, Abu Najm, Michel, “Observations on the Media’s Treatment of the Nahr al-Bared Events: The Army’s Lost Image?,” An-Nahar newspaper 9 July 2007, and Abu Khalil, As’ad, “The Rapid Fall of Lebanese Media: ‘al-Bared’ as a Model”, Al-Akhbar newspaper 9 July 2007. 269 An-Nahar newspaper, 20 February 2008. 270 Al-Atassi, Muhammad Ali, An-Nahar newspaper, 28 May 2008.

264 Khoury, Rami, 2006, pp. 61-62.

265 For further info see Saqr, Marwan, 2005, pp. 192-193; Morqos, Paul, 2006; and Chaoul, Melhem, 2008.

266 Nassif, George, 1999, pp. 146-48.

267 Al-Jacques, Sana’, 2006.

268 On the role of the media in following the events of 2005, see: Usher, Sebastian, 2006, pp.169-186; Khalifa, Paul, 2006, pp.187-198; and Haddad, Scarlett, 2006, pp.199-214, followed by other studies on the role of “The Lebanese Media’s Role during the Periods of Dialogue and Consultation”. The 2006 war

This analysis by Lebanese media professionals indicates that the media has failed to play its potentially inclusive role in a diverse yet divided society and shirked its responsibilities in the face of growing crises and threats to civil peace and stability. In this context, where the overlap between ownership of media outlets and political/sectarian parties is close, the ability of the media to play a role in shaping public

opinion on the basis of the common interests of all citizens and to promote national unity and civil peace is limited. This situation also sheds light on the media's legal and institutional structural problems. Various studies have demonstrated the negative role played by the media in spreading sectarian incitement, particularly in the last three years (see Chapter Three).

Box 5.7: Freedom of Expression, Opinion, and the Media: the Situation Today ²⁷¹

Despite some recent positive developments in freedom of expression, opinion, and the media,²⁷² Lebanon continues to suffer from restrictions on these freedoms.²⁷³

Lebanon was ranked one hundred and eighth in the 2005 annual report by Reporters Without Borders. The report said that Lebanon had historically led Arab countries in the freedom of the press, but had dropped in the last two years sixty places due to the assassinations of journalists in 2005, which prompted many to leave the country out of fear of being murdered.²⁷⁴

In addition, the regulatory legislation governing the media sector has been applied selectively. The leading example here is MTV and Radio Mont-Liban, among others, which were referred to the Publications Court despite various infractions committed by other media, as acknowledged by the National Audiovisual Media Council. The latter has requested the punishment of certain media, such as LBCI, after it broadcast an episode of the comedy program, *Basmat Watan*, as mentioned above. The judiciary has also moved recently to halt a political program and try journalists who have dealt with corruption in the judiciary,²⁷⁵ and the president of the Republic,²⁷⁶ while arbitrarily detaining journalists and accusing them of collaborating with the enemy because they oppose the authorities and security organizations.

Media freedom has suffered in the last decade. This period saw the banning of news and political programs in the audio-visual media, the awarding of broadcast licenses to politically influential figures, the banning of political interviews with anti-regime figures, the prosecution of newspapers²⁷⁷ and journalists, and acts of violence against them,²⁷⁸ and the banning of satellite broadcasts. An interview with an anti-regime figure is prohibited one day, but on another we see him appear on television. A license is awarded to a station one day, but withheld from another. Then, a decision to close unlicensed media is issued, but applied selectively. Some media are awarded satellite broadcasting licenses, then a censorship committee is established; the stations later halt operations and the licenses are revoked. Finally, security organizations ban the distribution of books and magazines with anti-regime content, or ban artistic events and plays that are deemed to harm religious feelings.²⁷⁹

However, we do note that a more liberated direction was taken in dealing in a civilized manner with members of the media in 2005, and quickly expanded the following year. For example, the creators and director of *Basmat Watan*, Charbel Khalil, was not attacked on LBCI, and did not appear before the security authorities, despite having been summoned, because of the insistence by the minister of information that the case be dealt with according to the law.²⁸⁰

271 From the study by Morqos, Paul, 2006, *Freedom of Expression, Opinion and the Media*, paper prepared for the National Human Rights Plan in Lebanon, UNDP, Lebanese Parliament, and Human Rights Committee.

272 Such as abolishing the preventative detention of journalists a few years ago, legally regulating telephone surveillance.... This limited improvement is a new element, in contrast to previous reports in recent years by international organizations, such as Amnesty International, An-Nahar newspaper, 27 May 27 2004.

273 See the report by Reporters Sans Frontiers on Lebanon, available on www.rsf.org.

274 Journalists Samir Kassir and Gebran Tuani were assassinated and an attempt against the life of May Chidiac failed.

275 Such as Ghada Eid, the host of New TV's program "Corruption"; see An-Nahar newspaper, 14 March 2006.

276 Journalist Fares Khashan, see An-Nahar newspaper 14 March 2006.

277 For example, some five lawsuits against An-Nahar newspaper and its journalists in 1997.

278 For example, journalist Pierre Atallah, who fled to France after being severely beaten in 1997.

279 University professor Adonis 'Akra, after his detention, was prevented from signing his book of memoirs of prison; the publisher, Dar al-Tali'a, was ordered closed. See Amnesty International's 2004 report, available on www.amnesty.org/report2004/lbn-summary-arawwww.amnesty.org/report2004/lbn-summary-ara. In addition, the musician Marcel Khalifeh was prosecuted for singing the verse "I am Youssef, My Father" by Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, then cleared by a Beirut judge on December 14, 1999. The films *The Da Vinci Code* and *Jesus of Nazareth* were also banned.

280 LBCI's program *Basmat Watan* of June 1, 2006; see An-Nahar's headline of 3 June 2006, "Resorting to the Law as Arbitrator and Rejecting Summons by the Sureté Général".

As for freedom of opinion, 2005 and the first half of 2006 saw a noticeable improvement, especially in terms of the media's daring and popularity in criticizing foreign rulers and armies in Lebanon, something which had not been possible in the past. Despite the improvement, freedom of expression, opinion and the media continues to confront noticeable challenges and difficulties in Lebanon, unlike more advanced countries. These problems should not be addressed all together, lest none of them be realized at all.

VII. CONTENDING IDENTITIES OR LOYALTIES?

We do not require a single narrative of its history in order for us to comprehend that the civil war has ended and benefit from its lessons. Today, we are experiencing a suspended peace, or project for civil peace, and not the continuation of a war that never ended. But the war is invoked as a threat, to maintain the country's paralysis. Whenever there is a move toward reforming the country in the direction of peace, state, and democracy, the ghost of the war is brought out of the closet. There are of course domestic factors that obstruct progress; Lebanon lacks the political elites and other forces that can oversee such a transformation. A pro-peace platform exists in the joint consciousness of the Lebanese, but we struggle over what is private and ignore what is public and common. The struggle for peace, democracy, and independence takes place in the context of sectarian groups. For the most part, the state is too abstract and general to be the object of a true struggle.

Today's division involves both political and sectarian factors. The March 14 and March 8 camps are confusingly identified as being Sunni and Shi'a, respectively, but it is more complicated than this. One camp comprises the Sunnis, the Druze, and part of the Christians, while the other comprises the Shi'a and a part of the Christians. Both political and sectarian elements are at play. The two camps advocate opposing political programs, which do not conform to a given sect. The two camps also comprise sectarian groups that do not share the same histories and memories vis-à-vis the leading political issues. Furthermore, the historical mythologies of sects have experienced significant changes in a relatively short time. The war put many of the issues related to identity to the test

At first, the war appeared to be over identities—Arabism and Lebanese nationalism, or east and west. The ability of different groups to produce conflicting identities was always an issue. This is no longer apparent. Perhaps one can conclude that identity is a very dynamic concept. The war ultimately granted the same legitimacy to all nationalism and identities, in a

process of exchange and integration, as sects moved from one position to another. The acceptance of Arabism by the Christians led them to move far from their initial positions; acknowledgement by the Sunnis of a limited Lebanon has taken them far beyond theirs, while the Shi'a embraced a succession of identities as if they were all equal. Are we facing a moment of ideological and nationalist equivalence which neither unifies nor is able to prevent division and conflict? Are we to understand that the ideological cover built on the identity has weakened? It is sufficient to say at this point that the present moment has rendered all discussion of identity suspect and that there is much that leads us to think that identity is just a political and ideological cover whose secondary and temporary nature is rarely denied by the various parties. However, it cannot be argued that identity is irrelevant either.

In fact, this equivalence between identities has been unmasked by the war. For if identity lost some of its grounding during the war, the conflict was also one over ideas, and ideas that may be unifying or temporary or justificatory can at certain times take on a significant momentum and become entrenched and unmovable. The notion of equality of identities is not precise. The war did not render these identities equal; it made some of them partial, and recognized their cohabitation, but not on an equal basis. Certainly, the civil war anchored the country's "Lebanese-ness," which became final and complete; Lebanese nationalism defeated other postwar discourses, and the appearance of other identities will not undermine its predominance.

7.1 Ratios of Politics and Sectarianism

The war united two identities, Lebanese and Arab. They have reconciled, but are not equal. Lebanese is the basis, and Arab is secondary. The country has become the basic criterion and source of action, which is not denied by the pro-liberation type of discourse. The war also apparently "removed the mask" of the other, sectarian identity, which is no longer embarrassed about itself and has declined to secure any type of ideological or practical assistance to camouflage itself. The sect was revealed as a prime source

of the struggle. Some believe this to be a negative development; they prefer being more circumspect about sectarian matters. It is difficult to judge this view against the backdrop of current events, as some equate the sharpness of the current struggle with the sectarian frankness in putting forward purely sectarian demands. Others believe that this uncovering of sectarian identity is positive; sectarian resentment is worse when feelings are bottled up and coded language is used. This openly sectarian discourse still involves latent conflict, while on the surface it is supposedly the product of reconciliation.

Sectarian chauvinism appears to be the fixed element in all of this. Political life can be made completely hollow by this chauvinism, with its lies and rumors, and we are led to ask how much of our “political reality” is purely fabricated, made up of various assumptions, and rarely subjected to careful analysis. In the end, however, we cannot remove politics from the policies of the two rival camps in Lebanon today, and there is confusion between the political and the sectarian at each moment. The ratio of the political to the sectarian can rise, but this takes time. The Christian community is experiencing some of this slow movement today, for example where there is a constant revision of past policies. The sectarian element has easily overcome the political, because the postwar period involved a political vacuum caused by the war and Syrian tutelage; in effect, politics was suspended for a period of thirty years, as organized political relations were destroyed. The sectarian won out over the political and went as far as it could, as meaningful political debate was halted and the system failed to keep up with new developments. Without predicting whether another civil war will break out, we can expect growing desperation about the situation of sectarian fanaticism and growing anxiety about where it might lead. When sectarianism expresses itself openly, with no cover, we also witness its popular shame, or sub-national culture, which is full of myths and legends and talk of past achievements. This attracts the masses and some of the elite, as folklore and legends are transformed into final and insurmountable differences between Lebanon's sects.

It is easy to find examples of this. Wars have always provoked the need of sects and religions to have their own “special culture,” with wildly rhetorical and traditional flourishes. This is dangerous if the country's inclusive culture begins to disappear and take on a different meaning. Inclusive culture has no primordial group to defend it, and sometimes its defenders are few. We should worry about such a possibility, but the

likelihood that sub-national cultures will become dominant is also an exaggeration. Wartime conditions might allow these sub-national cultures to mobilize people, but they appear to recede when the need for them does; we can expect sectarian polarization to end and its pull over the masses gradually to decline. Feeling themselves under pressure, the sects lack mass enthusiasm and are thus handicapped in trying to mobilize people. This movement is extremely slow and difficult to observe. It has begun in the Christian community, while a general withdrawal from public life appears to be underway in other sects. Emigration is one form of this withdrawal, and those who remain in the country practice it in other forms.

After thirty years of war and Syrian tutelage, Lebanese society is experiencing a historic transformation. The calcification we see today is not eternal, as long as the share of the political increases in the ratio of the struggle. The rights of sects, for example, do not exist independently; they are confused with the two major political currents and appear in their contending visions. Sectarian mobilization drowns the political struggle but does not eliminate it, and the political sides know this. They spare no effort to win this struggle and speed up its conclusion. Building a public politics and society are not accomplished quickly, despite the urgent need for them, and the task is not impossible. Meanwhile, in a period of relative peace, we can see economic and cultural growth. A civil war might prompt many to opt out of sectarian mobilization and we hope that this mobilization is subjected to greater oversight. The sectarian “share” of politics will remain at its height, even in the policies of the same parties. The “political” struggle will continue, and overcome any tendency toward national suicide. As this long, arduous battle continues, we hope that it will finally produce new elites, new visions, and a new culture of political life. One can remain “authentic” while also, from within the smaller group, adopting a public choice.

7.2 A Single Version of History is Not Necessary

There is no single narrative of the war and this is not a necessary condition today, since we continue to lack a single narrative of Lebanese history. It has become common to say that we will not arrive at citizenship without this single narrative. The multiple and contending narratives of the sects in one sense, all counter and decry the most exemplary of them - the Maronite narrative. But they all have things in com-

mon as well. As Ahmad Beydoun says, the narratives struggle for Lebanon's history and the conflict heats up when the groups interact. The narratives have exposed the Maronite myth about Lebanese independence throughout history, an earlier existence of the Lebanese state, and the long experience of "the building of Lebanon with Maronite hands." This rarely leads to building a counter-narrative, as much as it remains a uniquely complete and integrated model. But a counter-model appears, depending on the pace of socio-political developments, created from another narrative. The recent book by Saadoun Hamadeh, *The History of the Shi'a in Lebanon*, is an example of this.²⁸¹ The struggle over Lebanon means that other narratives weaken this prior existence of Lebanon and the Lebanese state. The Druze, the Shi'a, and the Sunnis, like the Maronites, say, in one sense, that they are the ones who built or created Lebanon. Lebanon is Sunni thanks to its coasts, Druze thanks to the Maanid Emirate, and Shi'a from the age of the Mamlukes and the early Ottoman era. Of course, the Maronites have the emirate of Bashir Jumblat. Each sect has built Lebanon and is its subject. One group's narrative provokes the other groups, not just against the narrative but the group itself, and whether it is sufficiently "patriotic" enough. Can Lebanon experience national unification without a single, unified history? As Adnan al-Amin says, rearing people on sectarianism should be blamed on the home more than the school.²⁸² Thus, we cannot expect schoolbooks to solve the problem, unless they have political and ideological support, as in totalitarian states. In fact, schools are tasked with this type of education, in totally innocent fashion, but this is unacceptable given what we know about the roles of teachers in civil wars. We should not illogically attribute division to its consequences, as if it were the product of historical narratives and political parties, while in fact it is the other way around.

First, we should ask if it is truly possible to arrive at a single narrative of Lebanon's history. Earlier historians did not waste this opportunity, as some tried to construct an integrated model based on the Maronite myth; this was rejected because it provoked other groups and not because the version was unsound *per se*. Can we create such a single narrative? Will it resemble a mosaic of state institutions or a coming-together of various narratives, with the same compromises and "dividing up influence" that is seen in the political sphere? Such an attempt could prove to be blatantly

artificial and relay today's disputes back into the past. We should not assign to the Emir Fakhreddine, for example, the same importance that the French give Napoleon Bonaparte. The mentality behind a call for a single history is actually inclusive, and a diverse number of Lebanese nationalisms have arisen based on this mentality, which seeks to meld these diverse groups into a single unity and turn history into a single narrative. They have sought the merger of ethnic and sectarian minorities into a single group, the merger of society into the state, and the merger of Lebanon into a pan-Arab entity. These nationalisms were unable to perform this task themselves although they had no objection to seeing it take place. One aspect of the civil war involves this attempt to unify by force, usually based on the group in power at the time. This effort to clamp down on diversity, chaos, and weakness and produce a single version and single national will is not only fascist, and present in all nationalisms, but represents a drive by the dominant group to rid itself of all partners and competitors in the political process.

Meanwhile, democracy and the struggle to achieve it have been absent from the agenda of the small Lebanese groups. Democracy has been a sign of weakness, fragile balance, and the state's inability to act independently; instead the state has relied on communal groups, religious legislation, and a dichotomy of (public and private) laws. The various Lebanese nationalisms have not made ending such a situation a priority; instead, they have focused on merging society into the state, in an authoritarian process, unconcerned about ethnic or sectarian equality. What is the problem if there is no single narrative of Lebanese history? These narratives do not divide the country, but act as a type of museum for the imagination of Lebanese history. While these narratives could not form a unified history, they are capable of becoming a pool of stories, which in times of social richness may form a diverse folklore or a basis for a popular memory. They do not object to contradiction or diversity, and in fact tell tales that are contradictory.²⁸³ Why can't we envision diversity as belonging to the past as well? In the end, these narratives reconcile with each other and complement each other, and their diverse elements - time, place, dialect, and so forth - make their way throughout the population.

A single narrative usually belongs to the "official" authorities, and it can take a long time to coalesce. It

281 Hamadeh, Saadoun, *The History of the Shi'a in Lebanon*.

282 See also UNDP, MEHE, CDR, 2008; CERD, UNESCO, PNUD, 2002.

283 See for example, Mahanna, Abed A., *Abul-Faraj al-Isfahani, Songs, an Investigation*, Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya.

results from the reconciliation among various narratives, which is sometimes artificial, and it can appear to lack a foundation if it is not accepted by these contending narratives. It will be the version of the authorities, and will only abandon its “central” aspect if it becomes a narrative that is shared by all. In any case, the requirements of education might stipulate that the country have a single history book. It might require an agreement in principle on the narratives of Lebanese division, which could render this division and ideological mobilization part of the country's official heritage. But this common awareness could be the springboard for re-drafting Lebanon's history. Today, there is a Lebanese consensus on identity, the state, and sovereignty, and these are not trivial matters, and they might form the basis of a sound, and common, history. The struggle over Lebanon is not one of mere sectarian incitement and mobilization, since independence, the state, and unity have become general goals. Lebanon's political identity has always been bound up with contradictions (belonging to both the Arab world and the “modern world,” whose nucleus is the

west), which means that this composite nature of Lebanese society to be considered authentic, and not an impasse. This is not a utopian perspective when what is being advocated is the view that Lebanon was born from a conflict and struggle and it is now possible to rationalize this struggle. This does not mean managing the diverse narratives by waving a single baton, but by locating the areas in which these narratives intersect. The clash of these groups over Lebanon also means that they share the same space, and thus share a history. Rationalizing past division will not be easy, but we should accelerate this process. Writing a common history will not take place overnight, but it could end up giving the country a history in the end. Perhaps this process could also be added to that history, it being also a legendary endeavor that can result only from a deliberate process of creation. Inventing a Lebanon means inventing many things for Lebanon, and Lebanese citizenship should be at the top of the list. This is no random task, but requires the work of elites, to which the call will no doubt one day come.

Box 5.8: Loving One's Country

The study “Education and Citizenship” shows that Lebanese students suffer from obvious confusion when it comes to the country's historical reference-points and the identity of friends and enemies, while no politician enjoys consensus support. These results, which are known to those concerned with public affairs, are critically important vis-à-vis citizenship, especially if they are included in the gross results relating to knowledge and attitudes.

Students have a very high nationalist inclination, with 93 per cent saying they were proud of the Lebanese flag, and 92 per cent saying they had a great love for Lebanon; these rates are higher than in the UK and the US. The students also said they would not prefer to live in another country, as their elders would. But they broke rank when it came to the following item: “There is very little to be proud of in Lebanon.” Half supported this idea and 41 per cent did not, and the situation here is not clear, since 86 per cent said also that “Lebanon should be proud of what it has accomplished.”

The other side of this nationalist inclination involves relations with other countries and “foreigners.” Students exhibit strong protectionist and pro-sovereignty sentiments; 89 per cent of them agreed with the statement “Other countries should be prevented from affecting political decisions in Lebanon,” while 79 per cent agreed with “putting a limit to the influence of foreigners on Lebanon's culture and traditions.” The similar type of support indicates an exaggerated or excessive surface nationalism, as the questions have multiple dimensions. The fundamental sovereignty-related question lies in the fourth item, “Countries that threaten Lebanon's political independence should always be confronted.” How can we read this question and a similar one supporting local industry, which obtained the same levels of support? “In order to protect jobs in Lebanon, we should purchase the products of Lebanese industry.” Is there an active movement underway in society to protect industry, as reflected clearly by students today? The students' answers are a complex mix of things that “should be said,” a common political culture with a chauvinistic, anti-foreigner tinge, and the pro-sovereignty feelings that have grown in Lebanon in recent years.

A comparison with selected countries reveals that Lebanon exhibits the highest rates of support for confrontation with states that want to influence its political decisions, and the lowest in terms of questioning its history, highlighting the protectionist and nationalist tendency in the country. This tendency is probably a common expression of varying understandings of sovereignty and the state, and of the states alluded to when referring to intervention in the country's affairs. This complicated mixture dissolves into various cohesive groups if we examine answers to the following four questions: one's preferred political leader, one's preferred historical leader, which country is an enemy and with is a friend. We

should clarify that this was not a professional opinion poll, and that high school and university students have been asked similar questions in a series of sociological studies dating back to 1959, the names, of course, changing from one era to another. What remains is the context of sectarian polarization,²⁸⁵ and the weak common national and historical reference-points among students in Lebanon. This has been confirmed once again in 2008.

Regarding their preferred political leader, student answers revolved around six well-known figures, while the question on preferred historical leader created confusion, since it includes answers that appear in the previous question. Historic figures cited included Napoleon, Fakhreddine, Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi, Gamal Abdel-Nasser, Che Guevara, Gandhi, Imam Musa Sadr, and Rafiq al-Hariri - and only one of those- Fakhreddine- (who scored only 6.5 per cent support) is directly linked to Lebanon's history. The rest are either related to Lebanon's post independence history or are from international, Arab or Islamic history, and each obtained support of 2-3 per cent. Many more names were mentioned by the students, but it is not possible to group these in clear categories. In general, the students preferred to answer "other," at 34 per cent, while 35 per cent said they had no preference. These results lead to the conclusion that there is no figure that represents the past in Lebanese national identity, unlike the case with preferred political leaders: in other words, there is no ancestor for Lebanese political consciousness that is common to all.

As for friendly and enemy states, the students once again form clear blocs. Friendly states are France (20 per cent), Iran (13 per cent), Syria (10 per cent), Saudi Arabia (10 per cent) and the US (6 per cent), along with "none" (35 per cent). Enemy states are Israel (42.5 per cent), Syria (24 per cent) and the US (17 per cent). The percentage of "none" dropped to 9 per cent. The one obvious enemy is Israel, but the other two countries involve confusion, since they are friendly states to some students and enemies to others.

This lack of vision has a particularly strong impact on Lebanese young people. The study "Education and Citizenship," carried out by the UNDP National Human Development Report, showed that among ninth grade students, there is no common denominator in the matter of historical or political leader. This has an impact on young people's knowledge and opinions today, as well as their sense of history and national belonging. It is critically important to note, for example, that they have confused ideas about the history of Lebanon, that they were unable to name a single historical leader of Lebanon, that they long for the past, and that they have a low level of participation in public activities. These results coincide with those of an analysis carried out by the Project to Support Education in Lebanon, which revealed a fundamental difference in political culture with regard to ancestors (historical figures, whether good or bad) and to Lebanon's geopolitical environment (identifying certain countries as either friends or enemies).²⁸⁴ Failing to settle the dispute over history leaves the country open to re-interpretations based on various ideologies and political agendas. The division in Lebanese society serves as the basis for this approach, which is not confronted by any alternatives that might help students to develop the analytical and critical skills to let them form studied opinions and combat the popular stereotypes they encounter in

daily life. This approach also deepens the differences among schools with regard to what they know about the nation, identity, and civil values.

7.3 Ideology of Loyalty

The Lebanese are often asked about to whom they are loyal; the answer is expected to involve putting one's family, tribe, sect, religion, region or political *za'im* before loyalty to the nation, and the statistics confirm this. The study conducted by the USJ showed that the family received 97.6 per cent support in this regard, compared to 77.5 per cent for national identity, and sect only 36.5 per cent. Meanwhile, religion received 63.1 per cent. This study was conducted prior to 2005, and the question of national identity was ambiguous and did not produced any evidence of specific attachments; had it done so, the percentage of those whose primary affiliation was to their religion might perhaps have dropped to below 63 per cent, and national identity would not remain in second place. As for sect and religion the concepts differ among Christians and Muslims, as the former appear to use the word "*din*" (religion) while the latter use "*madhab*" or school (of jurisprudence). The statistics somewhat confirm the presumed answer to the question of where one places one's loyalty, but the problem is the concept itself. Would an Englishman or a Frenchman, for example, be made to answer such a question? One study drew a distinction between loyalty to a nation or national identity. Does this identity

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ See the review of these studies and the consequences from 1998 in al-Amin and Fa'ur, 1998.

assume defending the nation? This is linked to another question on loyalty to a nation versus national identity, with regard to an individual's readiness to join the army if the country is exposed to danger, as opposed to joining the resistance. Does national loyalty mean raising the national flag or preferring the discourse of the president to that of the Maronite patriarch or the mufti? It could be a case of eliminating other loyalties, as one sides with the state and denies family, sect, and religion, as many did when they removed their sect from their national identity cards.

Those who answered the question about national identity had no specific obligation in mind, and did not consider it opposed to sectarian or religious loyalty. These loyalties did not differ from each other, but involved varying degrees of commitment and special requirements from their followers. Loyalty cannot be granted to more than one party; loyalty to the nation cancels loyalty to religion, family, or sect or is in conflict with it. The respondents believe that family or sectarian loyalty cannot be combined with national loyalty, and that national loyalty enjoys a higher status.

People believe this to different degrees and are thus unequal in this regard. Nationalism means very different things to people, who are very different. People may boast of being "patriotic," as politicians do, or see their patriotism questioned, as happens during political heckling. It is the first step to calling someone a collaborator, and perhaps a spy. In this mentality, national loyalty is a loyalty like any other, it is pure and fixed, and cannot be divided. Those who believe this ignore the question of why someone whose patriotism is not questioned is unwilling to defend his nation or join the national army. It is difficult to imagine a patriot who does not love his country and not prefer it to others. It is difficult to imagine a patriot who does not much like his country's literature, language, music, arts, and natural beauty; does not appreciate its history and heritage, or does not praise his country in front of foreigners. Nationalism and citizenship (belonging to a national identity) are a loyalty in which other loyalties are dissolved and rejected. It involves total bias toward one's country, and another country may not share in this or oppose it. Those who posed the question did not realize that there is another aspect to national identity; it did not occur to them that national affiliation is merely a participation in public space and an adherence to protecting it or repairing it, merely a conviction that the law is supreme and forms the framework of the relations of state and society. Apart from that, one may or may not love one's country, or its language, music and art.

VIII. THE SEEDS OF A COUNTER-REALITY

Over the last three decades, Lebanon has attracted attention only when armed conflict, political wrangling, or foreign tutelage is involved. These aspects are treated as if they have no long-term consequences, but in fact Lebanon suffered from a process of being "hollowed out," on various fronts. The process acted as a long suspension, or postponement, to which everything- the state, unions, political parties, classes, universities, and culture-all fell victim. With the collapse of the state, the modern society that arose in its margins collapsed as well. Political parties became totally marginalized, their place taken by sectarian blocs that sometimes passed themselves off as political parties. The national currency stopped falling, but the country lived with a huge political (and financial) debt. Syrian tutelage continued to destroy Lebanon's political, cultural, and economic foundations in the face of weak resistance or collusion by many in society. This froze everything and eliminated any thinking about the future, due to the impossible situation that was being confronted at the time. Today, this legacy appears to be quite heavy, and some might think that nothing is changing. Perhaps some have been surprised by how quickly "the barricades" were rebuilt and the country returned to its historic divisions in the last few years. Some might think that Lebanon gained nothing during this period, except systematic destruction of everything that had been accomplished in the past. It is difficult to erase such an impression when we see today's young people, who did not experience the civil war, become involved in quasi-military organizations that prepare themselves for a confrontation and pay no attention to the lessons of the past.

At the same time, many people ignore the developments that have actually taken place. Tens of thousands of students received generous grants to pursue graduate study in Europe, thanks to the Hariri Foundation; this must have helped re-establish Lebanon as a source of professionals of all types, while consolidating the country's threatened middle class. Educated society moved from a linguistic dichotomy (French-Arabic) and added English to its repertoire. Social taboos have fallen, as free love has become acceptable, while cohabitation before marriage has increased. Internet usage has spread and contacts have been re-established with western developments in music, cinema, the plastic arts, literature, and thought. The former front lines of the civil war are now centers of noisy nightlife. The capital's downtown has become a magnet for banks, restaurants, and cafes. Young people are forming musical groups in huge

numbers, while there are new, young, writers for the theater and the cinema, not to mention writers. The middle class has been “renovated” in relative terms; incomes have improved compared to the conditions of economic collapse in 1984-1985. Critical art and thought arose during the civil war and have continued in subsequent decades.

This means that the last three decades have not been a total loss. The notion of individualism has been consolidated and private life has gained a degree of independence and private life has become relatively independent of social pressures. Contact has been reestablished with the modern era and with the West. These are new spaces, distant from the wide divisions in society and signaling the formation of an “implicit society.” While this progress remains incomplete, it does point to a sort of side bar to the Lebanese reality to which insufficient attention has been paid, thanks to the commotion of daily political life. It existed in the heart of Lebanese life and in its limbs and guts and to rose to the surface due to the shock of the assassination of al-Hariri, which prompted all of society to take to the street. In the mass protests that erupted, one could clearly see the participation by young people who were largely free of party or militia aspects and determined to display their humor and playfulness: music, improvised songs, clothing free of social restrictions, sarcastic banners and cartoons, honking car horns, etc. These were not expressions of rigid political or party traditions and their heavy, “life-or-death” rhetoric and slogans, but a more free-flowing mix of politics and daily life. Liberated from a desire to monopolize politics, this phenomenon was about political interaction with others and in the end resembled a festival or carnival more than a battle or struggle.

While the last three decades have appeared “hollow,” not everything has been in hibernation. The situation of the middle class has improved, along with education, while reconstruction and economic revival have taken place, despite the disparities. Daily life has been re-organized on the basis of a situation of suspended peace. There are signs that a counter-society has begun to arise, as official politics remained hollow and superficial. Some young people have turned to leader-worship, political pieties, and military obedience, while others have moved in the other direction, toward liberation from traditional politics and morals. They have moved toward having freer bodies and opinions, and moved away from the pack, toward a peaceful practice of life. This means a move toward consolidating the individual, so that a Lebanese might now defend the independence and sovereignty of his

country as well as his diverse lifestyle and values. Citizenship then becomes a participation in how life is perceived and lived. Citizens will be born not from history and counter-histories, national and pan-national battles, lofty and arrogant “higher principles,” or authoritarian politics that sacrifice individuals, but from a desire to liberate one's self from such practices and traditions.

8.1 An Exhausted System

If we return to the study by the USJ, we find that a reasonable majority (57.2 per cent) believe that Lebanon's sectarian diversity is a positive factor (36.7 per cent had no answer, which is also significant). However, it is surprising to find that less than 15 per cent believe that diversity is a source of richness, while slightly more than 15 per cent believe that a diverse society should be strengthened and defended. Even more surprisingly, less than 20 per cent believe that such a society is bound to quickly disintegrate, while less than 15 per cent believe that such society would be accepting of authority. The figures indicate different, contradictory trends: diversity is positive but should not be defended; we are not afraid that power is difficult to control or that society will be dragged toward disintegration. This indicates that the Lebanese suffer from confusion about the “big” issues that will affect their future. The attitude of young people toward the parliamentary system reveals this as well. A small majority (52 per cent) support it, while less than 20 per cent support a secular system, and even fewer want a sectarian system. It is difficult to reconcile this support for a parliamentary system with an inability to define its form. This confusion prevents Lebanese from agreeing on secularism, relations with Syria, relations with foreign states, and the concepts of sovereignty, human rights, and democracy. To this is added the lack of trust by Lebanese in their state institutions (70.6 per cent), while the judiciary does not inspire much more confidence. Even more Lebanese (76 per cent) lack confidence in parliament, even though most support a parliamentary system. Only the army and security forces enjoy the confidence of high levels of respondents (85 per cent for the army and 60 per cent for the security forces). The figures reveal confusion about the political system and the future and a lack of confidence in state institutions, with the above mentioned exceptions.

Lebanese lack a clear concept of their preferred political system: they want a parliamentary system but do not trust Parliament. They want diversity, but have not

settled whether this should be secular or sectarian. They accept diversity but do not deem it worthy of being defended or supported. In the end, state institutions are suspect and Lebanese cannot fight the delusion that their existence on earth is at stake, that they are being oppressed, or that they are potential victims of oppression. According to the same study by the USJ, only a small minority of Lebanese accept the interference of religious institutions in their private decisions, or resort to such institutions as public officials; religious affiliation placed third in the same study. They are believers more than practitioners of religion; they are not full members of these religious communities but have their own, private lives, outside the scope of these institutions. They are individuals, but quickly form into sectarian blocs when they are told that their existence is threatened. Lebanese are hesitant about whether the country should be secular or sectarian, or democratic or quasi-democratic, and about its relationship to the outside world, the state, the economy, human rights, and so on. These issues enjoy passive support, as people have opinions but do not defend them. Since the nebulous state, divided civil society, and weak class-based groups cannot mobilize people, the public is left with its sectarian groupings as frameworks for organization. Lebanese are born under crisis conditions and they return to their primordial groups under such conditions, to defend their existence.

The hesitancy of the Lebanese over such matters is as old as his history with the state. The latter was founded on sectarian balance and has been unable to break away from this legacy. Michel Chiha spoke of the federalism of sects, but no suitable form or system has been put forward for this idea. The state has suffered from the relationship between the central authorities and the sects, and this has often led to crisis, awaiting a foreign party to detonate the situation. The state was not, at the beginning, a target for the Lebanese, who probably saw it as an irrelevant, external force that would not protect their interests. He also probably hated the state for offering back to him this image of himself and his society. And this hatred of the state, by itself, appeared to cost him virtually nothing. This hatred did not involve a political viewpoint or plan for the future. The proposals to eliminate political sectarianism or cronyism have not mobilized many people. Instead, every disturbance has been accompanied by acts of aggression against the state, and not just the authorities; land registration offices and government buildings that provide services such as electricity and mail have been attacked or set alight during such incidents.

This aggression against the state is as old as the history of aggression against the law. The family-like structure of Lebanon's social groups has a nucleus, or the readiness to become a nucleus of mafia-like behavior, based primarily on breaking the law. In the eyes of the group, plundering state resources is merely an act of "claiming one's share." Lebanon's wars have seen wars against the state and state institutions, reflecting the aspirations of certain groups. The institutions that do not belong to any particular group - the army, security forces, public money, and services - are all permissible targets for sectarian groups, which see this as a case of securing people's rights for them. Nonetheless, the experience of the civil war indicates that no situation remains static, but can lead to a new crisis. Problems such as cronyism, authoritarianism, and disparity have an impact on people and they cannot be attributed to an external force or considered mere abstractions. This time, they are dividing and directly threatening society. Disparity and cronyism have a negative impact on society, and the harm they leave behind does not disappear easily. The demand for a properly functioning state in the aftermath of the civil war was a result of this experience with cronyism and disparity. The local influence-peddler felt the crisis acutely enough to agree to a return of the state, but to one that conformed even more to the sectarian system, a federation of sects, and a communal society. Nevertheless, the state does not conform to a single group and is not under the control of the communities. Over time, it can constitute a framework of equality in rights and opportunities, and a framework for citizenship.

8.2 Intellectuals

Amid these conditions of crisis, what have Lebanon's intellectuals been doing? If we understand intellectuals to be those with higher degrees, the country's dense educational system means that we are talking about a wide segment of society, as well as positions of influence in the state, civil society, the economy, and politics. Following Gramsci, we can call this group the "officers of society." There are many of them and they can be strong if they are united; naturally, they do not unite. On the contrary, many of them are "officers of division." During times of crisis, they feel acute danger to themselves, due to their positions inside and outside the state. Wars of status concern them more than others, since their status derives from the group. Of course, there are young educated people who are less linked to the state, and status. Usually, such people consider emigration or a similar alternative as a first option. For them, the country is used up.

From their time in university, these people learn that there is no place for them in the state, and perhaps in the entire country. They plan their future based on the needs of the outside world, in the Gulf, the US, Australia, and elsewhere. This group has a cosmopolitan personality; this is reflected in their lifestyles, tastes, and relations with their country. These traits are not purely Lebanese and are somewhat separate from politics - meaning sectarian politics - and they are attracted by public goals. They take part in demonstrations, but disappear from one such event to the next.

We should also consider the case of intellectuals who are involved in the current struggle, usually from outside their sects or against them, based on a general analysis and appraisal of the country's future and the tasks at hand. This group suffers from being ostracized, but not physically harmed, by their sects. However, this group does enjoy a certain moral standing, as some see its members as representing the country's conscience, while in a certain sense they also function as its mind. This group can be elitist and operate in a limited scope. Do intellectuals just wait, then, and is their waiting one of desperation? Earlier in the country's history, the same type of educational system produced the foundations of the democratic movements. If education recovers its former standing, which appeared to be the case prior to the most recent crisis, it should have an impact. An elite that speaks three languages will not find it easy to become involved in sectarian systems that in the long run bring only paralysis and wars. Setting aside totally foreign factors, we find that sectarian systems suffer from exhaustion and chronic agitation, which render them empty during wars and public crises. An elite that speaks three languages will not easily stomach the idea of sectarian systems whose impotence is becoming clearer and clearer. Sectarian groups forget that their strength is the state's strength, and that by harming and demeaning the state they are also hurting themselves and paving the way for the exposure of their weakness. The ideas produced by elites outside their sects might be "ahead of their time" and only gain recognition long afterward,; but they will be all the ammunition we have left, and perhaps our intellectual treasure. Meanwhile, the officers of division became one with their sects during times of crisis, before experiencing crisis with these groups and their leaders.

Intellectuals do not always benefit when sectarian groups are beset by social upheaval. Such upheavals may benefit their lowest rungs, producing from their

ranks a new sectarian leadership. But upheaval does not serve the interests of higher segments to the same degree; competition over status undermines them and makes them feel unappreciated. They may find themselves hemmed in when it comes to their advancement, and unable to rise easily. They might make a lot of noise, but it is usually hollow. This resembles their own situation, since they have been "emptied of content" during such difficult times and have little left to give. We do not place much hope on the future impact of intellectuals, but we hope they will gain an awareness of past experience, which will place them clearly in conflict with the closed sectarian system and its resistance to reform. Without such a development, we cannot look forward to a social loosening up that will allow the question of citizenship to be posed once more. However ineffectual intellectuals might appear to be, their large-scale participation in creating a debate with sectarian depth will give the debate firmness and credibility. If the intellectuals leave this "game," it will be even more difficult to end social tension, which is required to halt today's civil war (even if only verbally) and use common elements to move toward a different type of political and social consciousness.

8.3 Education

Is education in Lebanon is a tool of division or a means to create two different types of awareness and sharp cultural distinction in a single culture? Is it the unified history book, or a diverse narrative of history? Do national civics classes fail to play a unifying role, or does the entire educational system reflect communal society? Studies have shown that people do not "learn sectarianism" in schools, where textbooks cannot confront the sectarian feelings that students bring with them from their homes and environments. We should not forget that Lebanon's educational standing means that democratic action also has a high standing, and education continues to be key in any future Lebanese role. Many people do not assign much importance to unifying the education system and believe its diversity renders it more flourishing and democratic. In fact, unifying the educational system has tragic precedents in dictatorships, which only sabotage education and educational standards. While Lebanon's political authorities do not have to become directly involved in education, we should not be seduced by the ideology of equality, which ends up producing similar results among students. A unified history book will be useful if we can produce a unified narrative, which is a difficult task during current con-

ditions. We are in conflict over the present as much as the past, and will not find much to agree on. But is it not also possible that unification is under way, at the level of the educational institution itself? There are schools in all parts of the country and everyone has universities, which are moving toward modernizing themselves, whether in curricula or teaching methods. Perhaps instruction, which is the basis of education, will be a means to impose an ideology, and the best thing may be to let students search for themselves and form their own convictions.

At present, it is difficult to create a single narrative of history. If this happens, it will involve mutual omissions by the various sides, which will produce a weak book that sparks ridicule among teachers and students. Not to undertake such a work may be the best option for all, since a superficial effort will only complicate the situation. Why should we not involve students in the process of researching Lebanon's history and writing up the dispute in the form of questions, leaving students to provide the answers themselves? In this way, the conflict over history that is already underway in the classrooms may be contained and transformed into material for new consciousness of the Other. This proposal is utopian under current conditions, and will not be possible until those change. Until then, we can be content with a summary of history upon which everyone agrees. The Civic Education curriculum might be useful if it is written up in an investigative fashion. It would be useful to direct students toward conducting research about their society's ills and proposed remedies. It would be useful to establish concepts of citizenship, the law, human rights, the state and the environment; and to rely on interactive methods of teaching rather than the current techniques of indoctrination. In the final analysis, education has a fundamental role in the process of national unification. We must recover educational standards, which have influenced the current political developments. Education is clearly a primary engine of society; education and other areas are necessary for the rebuilding of Lebanon. Bringing people together as a nation cannot be based on further poverty, educational deterioration, unemployment, and emigration. Such factors turn social malaise into fertile ground for all sorts of evils, and sabotage any attempt to rebuild. An effective debate cannot take place without modernization and an upgrading of standards, throughout the country. Education based on free and critical thought makes it easier to produce a different type of awareness, one that is critical, and one that we need before we can begin any thinking.

8.4 Human Rights

Does someone who is part of a sectarian group possess free will and a private opinion? Is this person aware that people are equal in rights and duties, which includes the right to an opinion that one desires and that expresses one's views? Does this person respect the law, which sets down borders between him and others? Sectarian partisanship does not appear to suit human rights; sectarian individuals have relinquished these rights and left them to the "tribal" leader or leaders to decide for him and the rest of the group. Such a person does not enjoy free will and does not want others to have it either. For this person, people are identified as being from a sect or group and are not considered as individuals. Such a mentality does not generate individuals, since the group holds sway. Groups and alliances of groups are hostile to each other, and there is no room for nuances or difference. The sectarian mentality thus distinguishes among people based on their sects, and this sense of difference sometimes takes the form of one group feeling superior to others. Sects are not equal; each sees itself as more deserving or better than others of "lower" origin or status. Equality is not a priority for sects; some of them do not demand it for themselves or others. Instead, they want to monopolize what can be monopolized, secure the biggest share, enjoy privileges, rise higher than other groups, and receive what others do not receive. Naturally, sects do not respect what is public and common. Anything that belongs to all does not concern sectarians; the state is something to be plundered and seizing public money is permissible. Public spaces can be destroyed and the state is often the leading target in such situations. Sectarians do not want equality with others, even if this takes place at the expense of the law and justice. They want to exploit public facilities to their own ends and when they occupy such institutions, treat them like private property and throw them open to their group while preventing others from benefiting.

Freedoms are not the concern of sectarian partisans, at least not the freedoms of others. The ideas and opinions of others are considered treason, conspiracy, and subservience to foreigners and enemies, i.e., an evil that should be destroyed. Whether war is overt or covert, it brings these sectarians together, and there is no path to true dialogue in such a situation. The situation might force the players to accept a settlement, which is full of suspicion and caution, and it is not long before the arrangement appears to be worn out, or merely a short-term device. Today, we face a revolt against the Taif Accord, even though the actors

involved do not call it that. It is clear that political settlements during a permanent crisis of “dividing up the spoils” do not last long and the political demands that we hear, which usually go beyond the borders of the country, demand privileges (such as representing state sovereignty) that cannot be accepted under the terms of any settlement. The acquisition of certain privileges is replacing the acquisition of shares of power; the dispute is about these privileges, and not rights. We cannot speak of equality in such a climate; instead, inequality appears to be the rule.

We cannot talk of human rights in a struggle among sects, although the fragile balance has generated a type of democracy that is partially based on unequally-distributed political privileges. The wars have leveled things out a bit, but arriving at complete equality is illogical, since it would eliminate the system of privileges. Clearly, the country is not ready for such a step. Human rights are threatened by such a conflict, which involves a return to the pre-Taif era. It is an attempt to enshrine the country's major sects and do away with the smaller ones, which appear to have no voice in the struggle, while no one inside or outside the country is concerned with their rights. The struggle absorbs everything and there is no room for other battles, whether to prevent civil war or to consolidate democracy and the rights of groups. The media is concerned with the dominant political struggle and forgets other battles. The majority of Lebanese certainly oppose a civil war and everyone knows that it will benefit no one; nevertheless, the climate of conflict is growing tense. A culture of hatred and mobilization dominates, allowing the spread of incitement and slander. The threat of war might spark Lebanese to rally around something or find another way to confront the situation. Naturally, this is difficult, time-consuming, and practically impossible, but we have done nothing about it. Perhaps we need to form a body, made up of the media, civil society, and other groups, to work for this objective. It will begin small, but it may evolve and have an impact.

8.5 The Environment

In Lebanon, the environment, the state, and the law are practically the same thing. They are public spaces in a divided country in which people pay attention to what is closest to them, while being hostile to, if not violating, anything that is common and public or not connected to them personally. The Lebanese war was an assault against both people and the environment. Trees were cut down, forests burned and only a small

percentage of the country's green spaces remained. The Horsh Beirut public park was destroyed and the capital deprived of this breathing-place. People rushed to seize it and build on it, in the absence of the law. People violated public property and effectively destroyed gardens and playgrounds, while the capital and cities were surrounded by unregulated construction. In times of crisis, people attack state buildings and the same happened to trees, electricity poles, and public facilities; people treated the environment the same way they treated the law and the state. The result was an ugly and polluted environment, and this open war continues today. When there is no society or state, the environment is absent from people's minds. It is significant to note that a court has awarded financial compensation to an MP who owns a quarry that was shut down by the state equal to the budget of a small country. Clearly, the judiciary has not recognized that a polluter is responsible for his actions, or that people are responsible to the environment. In such a climate, it is difficult to talk of rules for protecting against pollution. Certainly, factory owners seem unconcerned with this issue.

In this environment citizens continue to deal with the environment as if it were a brand name signaling modernization; that it is enough to advocate environmental protection without doing anything about it. The legislation is present but insufficient and requires further substantive work. Actions are taking place but the tools to create substantive impact on the ground are lacking. With the retreat of the state and the increasing balance between “state authorities” and “anti-authorities” the concepts of law and authority themselves becoming a zero sum game. . No public space can be protected under such conditions; the environment requires that people be sensitive to the need to protect it and public spaces. In such a situation, it is absurd to talk about endangered species. Our memory is lacking when it comes to the environment, and asking about what has survived and what has become extinct become pure guesswork. This is not to say that no work on the environment is being carried out. Various individuals and organizations have established environmental associations and are conducting environmental awareness campaigns as well as research into the natural history of the country. International assistance has certainly supported such efforts, but the results are meager in a society concerned with political clichés and dismissive of standard-of-living issues. It will probably take a while as the current political conflict and cold civil war fill the political arena and leave little room for an alternative path. The conflict absorbs all efforts and there is no

room for anything else. The question of the environment in Lebanon is connected to the return of the state and the re-foundation of society, which do not appear to be imminent. In this current, frozen situation, environmental degradation proceeds apace. Will reform come, or have things gone too far? Nature is the first victim of Lebanon's wars and conflicts, and a nearly forgotten one; being aware of this is a sign that the time of "nature" has ended.

IX. SUMMARY

A comprehensive project of salvation for Lebanon hangs suspended. The capabilities for carrying out such a project are also frozen, by force, and arbitrarily. More than fifteen years have passed since the end of the civil war, and the establishment of a comprehensive agreement to end it. The Lebanese were not given the chance to learn from the lessons of the war. On the contrary, over this same period we have witnessed the progressive dismantling of society and the exponential corruption of social relations. In time the country's elites were progressively stifled and communal groups rendered dependent. Debate became a farce. With everyone locked in conflict, raw hatred was openly reflected in group fanaticism and solidarity. Nonetheless, a counter-culture, a plan of salvation, and new elites continue to exist. The process may take a long time, but Lebanese groups, who will in time tire of their conflicts, can only return to the same project and the same lessons, which were left to atrophy but were not denied. This optimism comes not only from politics, where the state and citizenship remain a hope for the future, but from outside politics, from education, linguistic diversity, personal freedoms, and a concern with producing individual citizens and not just members of a larger community. The hope is that these wars and conflicts represent a serious step in a process of growth toward a unique model for the state, democracy, and citizenship in the region. Lebanon will always be a project for the future.

It is difficult to produce recommendations when the political and social groups that may advocate for them are not relatively small. However, some groups have yet to get involved and we do not know how effective they will be. At the current moment of political and military tension, there is paralysis, and there are phenomena whose end results are difficult to predict. In any case, even dispersed minorities can begin somewhere despite the huge size of the obstacles to achieving these goals.

to the state needs to be repositioned so that it confronts both a system that opposes it and the sectarian struggle over it. At the moment, things are moving in reverse. However, the country's legislation contains a basis of support, even if theoretical. The Taif Accord, which is the basis of the historic settlement to end the civil war, deems it urgent to elect a senate, made up of the sects, to which we the country's sectarian debate may be confined. The document also proposes the formation of a committee to gradually eliminate political sectarianism. However, the country lacks a statist model for exercising power. It seems likely this type of political practice, under the current conditions of conflict over the state, lacks any control mechanism; what is evident today is open plundering and trafficking in state assets. It is possible to provoke different groups into putting forward a different model, that does not undermine sectarian representation, but links it to competence. President Fuad Shehab's attempt in this regard can be taken as a practical example of an alternative way of managing and exercising power. The starting-point for this process is, education. However, education, in Lebanon subdivides the different communal groups between schools and universities, along Lebanese group lines leading to a cultural distinction among the sects. The school may not be the first source of cultural division. The home usually is. But schools and universities certainly consolidate this division, giving it theoretical cover. If schools and universities want to generate an opposing system of values, then the educational system will face a true test. Schools and universities could advocate for common values that oppose those that Lebanese citizens receive from their sub-national, sectarian, and local cultures. Even if they cannot produce a single historical narrative for Lebanon, they can agree on a suitable way out for disputed and contested areas and topics. Such a narrative could serve as training for the production of a history that is not identified with a single group, and is neutral toward all groups. The school and the university are not the only places of education; the media is becoming increasingly important and is feeding the polarization between communities. What is required is true oversight, real pressure, clear regulations, and a moral commitment to see the media remain at a professional and political distance from the country's struggle.

*The Lebanese seem to have a democracy without democrats, a republic without republicans: this is not because such forces are weak in impact and number, but because they are dispersed, and perhaps because the country lacks a tradition of struggling for democracy, republican values, and citizenship. If intel-

lectuals, young people, and civil society groups could gather themselves in a single alliance, they may turn into an organized pressure group? The question to ask is what would happen if universities, newspapers, radios, televisions, associations, writers, and artists became organized in an inclusive framework? What would occur if centers to regularly monitor and expose sectarian incitement in political and cultural life were established? What if these groups condemned any gathering with racist, anti-democratic, or authoritarian tones? What if they discussed the lack democratic practices in the country? What if they vowed to reveal on a regular basis the policies of apportioning influence and their consequences? Perhaps this could serve as a model for a new type of media practice.

CHAPTER SIX

TOWARD A CITIZEN'S STATE

I. A CITIZEN'S DEMOCRACY

Moving toward a citizen's democracy requires concerted efforts on several fronts. This chapter will review the broad principles necessary for this move in Lebanon and make a series of short and medium term policy recommendations fundamental to this process. These will follow the outline of an agenda presented in the first chapter of the Report.

The implication and scope of these recommendations is that they are the outcome of three converging factors; a specific understanding of citizenship in relation to democracy that goes beyond rights and responsibilities; analysis of the particular context of Lebanon and empirical findings from data generated by the NHDR and others. The question to be asking is what mix of policies will strengthen democratic traditions and insure equity, fortify our dynamic market, lead to widespread economic and social security, and encourage entrepreneurial innovation and upward mobility, while insuring long lasting peace and stability. Some of these recommendations are also necessary to strengthen the allegiance of citizens to their state and to each other as citizens.

The principle idea that governs these recommendations is that achieving a citizen's state requires a change in values and a change in policy. In other words, achieving a citizen's state will require government action as well as cultural transformation. The protection of ethnic and religious identities and of minorities in a country with eighteen different religious sects can only take place by ingraining equity among all citizens. At the same time, instating the different policy changes and reforms needed also requires a new social contract between the state, the private sector, and civil society. This contract needs to be based on a consensus if the country is indeed to move toward a citizen's state. From this perspective these recommendations should be considered as a package deal and not as piecemeal efforts at reform.

II. BRINGING MEANING BACK TO POLITICAL DEBATE

Politics is the cornerstone of the democratic process. It identifies the common objectives of hundreds of thousands of citizens; gives them the power to choose between different electoral alternatives, results in public policies that impact our lives, produces the politicians that promote these and other interests, and creates the public power necessary to move forward.²⁸⁶

Political discourse and political processes are in crisis in Lebanon today. The constitution has been subjected to widely varied "interpretations" of its clauses based on the interests of different political groups and not those of the larger polity. The readings of renowned constitutional experts, whose judgment in the past would have been considered final, have been accepted and rejected based on partial interests. Much of the public debate has centered on the "rights" of individual communities rather than the institutional reform needed or the socio-economic choices that have to be made to promote justice, equity, growth, and human development for all. This rights discourse is more often than not embedded in a larger regional power struggle that has little to do with the actual citizenship rights of the communities they are said to represent or even with any concept of a national good. Similarly, the parliamentary process, the bedrock of democracy, has been paralyzed. Parliament was closed for a year and a half by political deadlock between groups that have competing visions for Lebanon, parliamentary oversight over executive power is inadequate, and national issues are used by parliamentarians and political parties as tools for political grandstanding outside parliament, mainly in the national media. Furthermore, more often than not, political "debate" on any policy proposal or recommendation takes place through the narrow lens of sectarian/communal interests with respect to that particular policy irrespective of its general impact on the nation as a whole.

Discussion must now focus on how to remedy this situation, which not only threatens the democratic system but undermines representation as well. Such a debate

²⁸⁶ UNDP, 2005a, *Democracy in Latin America*

must of necessity identify an accepted vision for Lebanon and the means to achieve it. In the process, it must focus on how to reform institutions to make them more effective, equitable, and transparent and how to promote responsible political parties and practices. This would also include parliamentary reform as well as electoral reform.

This debate also needs to address the specific characteristics of consociational democracy in Lebanon. As practiced in Lebanon today, consociational democracy has become a tool that contradicts fundamental tenants of democracy such as transparency and promotion of public over private good. It establishes a ruling cartel that could potentially increase the risk of greater societal conflict through its neglect of social and economic issues vital to the everyday lives of individuals. In this the Lebanese experience is similar to that of Venezuela and Austria where political participation effectively became the political distribution of state institutions among key groups.²⁸⁷

This process also requires that the Lebanese regain confidence in themselves and in their ability to get through this and achieve the vision they see for their country.

2.1 Vision for Lebanon and Role of the State

A central component of the revival of the relevance of the political process is a national debate on the vision that the Lebanese have for their country. Such a debate needs to respond to the question of what makes Lebanon a nation and how it can achieve a balance between the rights of individual citizens and those of sectarian communities, or more broadly between the demands of citizenship and sectarian pluralism. In such a context sectarianism is a form of political ideology that is only possible within the state and not outside of it. The political role of sectarianism is its most important role and the one that allows its reproduction at different levels of society and in other arenas.

In a sense two philosophical traditions have governed Lebanon; the first a form of pluralism that advocates consensus between the major confessional groups (consociational democracy)²⁸⁸ and the second a universalism that supports the rights of individuals as individuals and not as members of a community. The Taif Accord tried to reconcile these two strands by

including articles that guaranteed the rights of communities as well as individuals in the political process and thus address issues that had been profoundly divisive, had facilitated external intervention in Lebanese affairs, and had in part led to the fifteen-year civil war. These revisions of the Taif Accord were based on the premise that pluralism in the full sense of the word (and not just sectarian pluralism) is only possible in a civic state. In other words, democratic citizenship rights are what make pluralism possible. However, the partial implementation of the Taif Accord, the contradictions among some of its articles, and political/sectarian interference in the process of institutional reform and in the justice system have all undermined civic state building in the last eighteen years.

What has become clear is that even though the Lebanese agree that the country is suffering from a severe political and national crisis they do not agree on the means to emerge from this crisis. In this respect there are two main tendencies:

A constitutional-legal-civic approach that believes institution building and equity among citizens are the only way out of this crisis. In the main, this position appeals to non-sectarian political parties, professional associations, and youth and considers the plural identities of the Lebanese as much more than their religious affiliation. It also includes ideas and ideologies that are non-religious. Lebanon's true role for those who adopt this approach is as an emblem of inter-religious coexistence and tolerance. Only through de-confessionalizing the system can Lebanon live up to this role.

A sectarian-pact approach that considers Lebanon to be composed of religious minorities coexisting within the framework of the state. The National Pact between the main religious groups is what insures peaceful coexistence among communities and as such is the best entry point from which to address the ongoing Lebanese crisis. Here the rights of individuals are assumed to be the same as those of their communities; thus by guaranteeing the rights of all religious communities, the rights of individuals are secured. In other words, for advocates of this position, ignoring the sectarian reality of Lebanon is a jump into the unknown, even if many of them agree that Lebanon needs to go beyond attempts to sustain a delicate balance between its different sub-components. This is particularly the case since multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-religious societies have become a staple element for many communities looking to renew themselves within the purview of ongoing debates on identity.

287 El Solh, Raghid, 2007, *Consociational Democracy in Lebanon*, UNDP and the Parliament of Lebanon.

288 Ibid.

Of note is that these positions do not correspond to the political divisions in the country as proponents of both positions cross over the current political divide. At the same time, advocates of the first position are considerably weaker politically and are unable to force a political discourse that can identify ways out of this crisis and the means to implement them. Consequently, this paralysis has emptied political discourse from content and stripped down its relevance.

This leads us to the fundamental question of whether the Lebanese can achieve consensus between citizenship (as equal rights, obligations, and opportunities) and political sectarianism or between their civic and political identity and their societal or communal/sectarian identity. In other words, can they live together as both equal and different? Responding to this question and thus identifying a vision for Lebanon that moves toward a citizen's state presupposes a more basic discussion of a series of interconnected questions that have had and will have a determining impact on any vision for Lebanon and on the role of its state and citizens. Among these are:

- Is Lebanese society composed of individuals with no consideration for communities or communities with no consideration for individuals? Or is it a social construct seeking to establish different ways of being that do not necessarily eliminate each other?
- Should state/citizen relations be governed by the constitution or by the national pact? Or should it be governed by both in such a way that the constitution frames the relationship of the state to individuals and the National Pact to communities? What are the lessons to be learnt from the civil war and more recent civil conflict?
- In this regard, what are the determinants of democracy in Lebanon? To what extent are political practices common to the country since independence effective in sustaining democracy in Lebanon? If Lebanon is to adhere to the current consociational model, then what are the pitfalls that need to be addressed?
- What is the role of the state in this context? The state, as outlined in Chapter One of this report is both the outcome of societal struggles (be they economic, religious, or other) and the site of that struggle and negotiation. In such a context, is the state a tool in the distribution of power among confessions, as is the case today, and thus unconcerned with citizens as individuals? Or should the state be focused on the rights and obligations of its citizens irrespective of their multiple identities. The rights of communities in this latter perspective are limited to a freedom of existence and expression that is binding for both state

and religious communities.

- What are the specific social and economic rights associated with each of these choices? Who controls the instruments of force and monopolizes the means of violence?
- What role is Lebanon to play in the region? Is Lebanon to be the bridge between differing groups? Is it to offer a message of peaceful coexistence? Is it to work on bridging differences among others? Or is it to be the stage upon which regional conflicts are played out? What is the role of the state in this process and what are the roles of the different communities and political parties?

2.2 Political Culture

An informed public is a key constituent of democratic systems. Citizens play a critical role in overseeing the action of their state and holding their public officials accountable. In Lebanon, and despite the high levels of societal politicization, political culture is considerably weak. In this regard, a concerted and sustained effort is necessary for the enhancement of political culture in Lebanon around key themes generally accepted as fundamental to the Lebanese polity. These include the constitution, particularly the preamble and its commitment to the International Declaration of Human Rights, the First Ministerial Declaration which, as discussed in Chapter One is different from the National Pact and the Taif Accord.

This debate would have to take place on several fronts, including education, the parliament, civil society, and the media.

- **Education:** The Ministry of Education and Higher Education can integrate these issues into educational curricula (civic education, history) in a systematic and comprehensive manner.
- **Parliament:** The Lebanese parliament can work toward the creation of an institution whose role is to enhance and improve political culture among the public and political elite. The role of such an institution would be to act as a conduit for partnership with civil society, to provide policy direction and research on democratic governance in Lebanon to parliamentarians, and to publicize the work of parliament to the public at large.
- **Civil Society:** Civil society organizations (NGOs, political parties, syndicates, and so on) can play an active role in spreading these principles across all sectors of society. This can take place through:
 - Organization of local grass root workshops on democratic governance and the meanings of citizenship. By necessity these would

include discussions of the rights and obligations of citizenship and the role of citizens in a democratic context.

- Partnerships with advertising agencies and different media outlets to promote the main articles of these texts and make them available to as wide a public as possible.
- Partnerships with parliamentarians and other stakeholders to enhance civic oversight over state performance in the areas of human rights. The aim would be to build partnerships between parliamentarians and international and national organizations working on human rights issues. Specific indicators that would measure performance on these issues could be established. These would also help ingrain international human rights and democratic standards into everyday practices.

III. ESTABLISHING IRREVERSIBLE EQUITY

Clearly, a debate on the vision for Lebanon will impact the role of the state in all sectors. However, given the succession of events in the more recent past and the progressive polarization of all institutions, a move toward a citizen's state is necessary for Lebanon to move out of its current quagmire. This means that state/citizen relations need to be redefined on the basis of equity, justice, and sustainability, which in turn requires a reformed constitutional/legislative framework. This would include a civil personal status law, an electoral law that allows non-sectarian representation, and a focus on quality rather than access in social and economic reform. All of these are based on the current constitutional rights guaranteed to Lebanese citizens.

3.1 Political Rights and Public Office

The political rights of citizenship extend beyond the electoral process and encompass a range of other rights that include the right to fair and equal treatment and to accurate representation. As discussed in Chapter Three, the rampant spread of political sectarianism and clientelism has greatly impacted these rights. Restoring some balance to state-citizen relations requires a change in values and culture or a move from a logic of sectarian subdivision of state institutions to instituting guarantees for sects and minorities that they will not be discriminated against.

To aid this process the following actions need to be taken:

- A new citizenship law should be created; one that grants expatriates the rights to Lebanese citizenship if they meet a collective set of criteria (such as having been born in Lebanon, having lived in Lebanon for a set number of years, having a permanent residence, and so forth). Under this new law, Lebanese women would also be granted the right to pass on their nationality to foreign-born spouses and children. In parallel, a revision of procedures granting large groups Lebanese citizenship in the early 1990s should be undertaken to make sure they meet with the new criteria. Following the passage of this law, a population census should be undertaken. It would be the first since 1932.

- Full implementation of the Taif Accord in particular the clause related to the establishment of a senate composed of religious leaders followed by a de-confessionalization of all public offices.

- Implementing the recently established criteria for the selection of public sector employees, which are based on professional merit. This process includes the vetting of applicants anonymously and through selection committees of qualified and non-partisan individuals. The selection process must be transparent and open to public scrutiny. The Council of Ministers should be required to implement the recommendations of the selection committee.

- Creation of a new law for political parties that encourages the establishment of inter-sectarian parties. Such a law should also subject these parties to close public scrutiny.

- Reinforcing the judicial system in ways that guarantee its independence and its oversight over executive power.

- Revision of the electoral laws is perhaps the most important of these reforms. The right to vote, to run for a public office, and to representation are inherent rights of citizenship. In Lebanon, as discussed in Chapter Two, these have been undermined by an unstable electoral law that has changed nine times in the thirteen elections since independence and by an insistence on applying a law that considers communal representation only. Furthermore, requiring citizens to vote from village of origin rather than place of residence, undermines their ability to influence their immediate environments.

In parallel, the non-implementation of the Taif Accord in the form of establishing a senate of religious leaders as a first step to de-confessionalizing parliament has undermined the civic status of citizens and imprisoned them within predetermined units and identities. It is only by de-confessionalizing parliament that the non-sectarian considerations for the election of candidates will come into play and meaning will be restored to politics and the political process.

At this stage, such a revision entails the passing of the Botrous law, despite some of its shortcomings, as a package deal and not in a piecemeal manner. This should be considered a first step toward the full de-confessionalization of parliament. The law's proposed dual voting system insures that a little less than half the parliament is elected based on the principle of non-sectarian representation in the six historic districts of Lebanon, while the rest are elected through majoritarian voting based on the smaller regions. In this, the Botrous law encapsulates the two opposing directions that the Lebanese polity is pursuing. It tries to marry two voting systems with the dual identity of voters as citizens and as members of specific religious communities or geographic regions. Moreover, it does not reflect the current demographic and geographic distribution of the population. By keeping citizens connected to their places of origin it reinforces their primal loyalties. The proposed law also includes other reforms such as lowering the voting age to eighteen, placing controls over campaign funding and spending, and so forth. Recently, single elements of this law have been passed by parliament whilst its primary goal which was to de-confessionalize parliament has been ignored.

3.2 Personal Status Laws

The 1990 Lebanese constitution redefined the role of the state to some degree in that it enshrined the state's positive neutrality toward all religious communities while at the same time establishing the international declaration of human rights as a fundamental principle of Lebanese policy-making, thus recognizing the rights of individuals as individuals separate from their communities. However, the current organization of personal status laws relegates control of all personal and family matters to the eighteen officially recognized religious sects in Lebanon. This creates substantial inequity among citizens on a wide variety of matters including divorce, child custody, inheritance, and so forth. Critically, it is also used as an argument for the continued denial of Lebanese women's right to grant Lebanese citizenship to their non-Lebanese

spouses or to children born to non-Lebanese fathers. To achieve equity among citizens on this front and thus meet the standards required by the Lebanese constitution, the following legislative and judicial changes should be undertaken. Even though some of these proposals enjoy considerable support from a substantial part of the Lebanese population, implementing them will require considerable political will and consensus building efforts particularly among the different religious leaders.²⁸⁹

CIVIC LAWS

■ Create a **family court system** that has legal jurisdiction over family matters including child custody and alimony as well as the power to protect women and minors in cases of domestic or child abuse. It would include social specialists and doctors amongst other human resources needed for it to function. In the process the minimum age for child custody should be increased and unified while alimony may be connected to an objective norm or standard such as the minimum wage.

■ Implement an **optional civic status law**. Such a law would uphold the freedom of choice for Lebanese citizens whilst maintaining the integrity of the different religious communities. The need for such a law is evident in the considerable inequity among citizens in personal status matters and the increasing number of civil marriages that are taking place outside of Lebanon. From a legal perspective, the establishment of such a law is a necessary step to insure the coherence of the Lebanese legal system on family and personal matters. As it is right now, and to quote Judge John Kazzi, the Lebanese system “pits Lebanese judges against the world” as they find themselves forced to become experts in the legal systems where civil marriages are conducted. It is also paramount for the establishment of a common ground of civic action for Lebanese citizens and to undermine the hold of political sectarianism and its divisive and violent results over the country.

Such a law would also institute equity with regard to personal matters both between the genders and between individuals of different religious denominations. For women, this is critical since the current laws rob females of their independence by requiring a guardian, who is usually a male member of the family, with regard to specific issues. It undermines their relationship with their

²⁸⁹ See Beydoun, Ahmad, 1999, *Nineteen Surviving Sects: The Lebanese and the Battle for Civil Marriage*, for details on the varied positions of the different religious leaders on the question of civil marriage.

children particularly in situations of conflict and places them at the mercy of others on issues of inheritance, in some cases even sanctifying the culturally based crime of honor killing, among other forms of violence. In effect, sectarian violence often has a gender component.

- Grant citizens the **right to resort to the constitutional court**.
- Grant **women the right to pass on their citizenship** to non-Lebanese spouses and children.
- Establish a Judicial Observatory as a partnership between the Ministry of Justice, international organizations, and civil society. The role of such an observatory would be to monitor progress on personal status laws, document and publicize new rulings on various issues, and, in the process, cultivate a culture of precedent and cumulative work.

RELIGIOUS COURTS

- Alter Article 63 of the legal system so as to **strengthen judicial oversight over the proceedings of religious courts**. This would give the General Commission for the Court of Cassation the right to verify that the various sectarian laws are being applied equitably by the religious courts. At the same time, the jurisdiction of this court also needs to be expanded to insure that all laws respect international human rights, particularly on the issue of family violence.
- **Unify court fees** between the different sectarian courts.
- **Publicize the rulings of the different religious courts** (after removing the names of those involved to protect their anonymity) so that these rulings can be a matter of public debate and discussion especially among experts and policy makers

3.3 Social Citizenship

On the social front, investment in integrated social development is an investment in stability. By reinforcing the direct relationship between state and citizen and embedding equity, citizens gain the opportunity to redefine their relationship with each other on a new, more universalistic and humane basis. This implies an approach that goes beyond access to basic services to include opportunity and quality, or what Sen calls the capability approach. It means expanding people's capacities through investments in their health, education, and ability to manage risks.

Such an approach has dual implications. On the one hand, it necessitates a new social contract that would govern the relationship of the state, private sector, and employees. It also assumes that social policy cannot substitute for development. In Lebanon, this would need to occur on several parallel tracks that include rethinking social rights from three interrelated perspectives:

- **Equity and cohesion** of service standards that would include the integration of marginalized and vulnerable groups
- **Coordination and efficient targeting** of social delivery services that in turn improve social outcomes
- An integrated social development approach would need to **maintain fiscal sustainability** and avoid possible adverse effects such as high inflation and lower growth rates. Here there is a need to include pro-poor growth policies and partnerships with the private sector particularly with regards to higher education, vocational training, and employment and job creation issues.

With this in mind, the policy recommendations below also have the twin aims of 1) enhancing socio-economic equity among citizens and 2) reinforcing the direct relationship of the state to citizen, as well as improving transparent and democratic governance modalities. They rest on the assumption that the state's role is to guarantee these rights, provide the regulatory environment for the different stakeholders and insure the implementation of all legislative decisions taken in that respect. At the same time, as a provider of some of these services, the performance of state institutions needs to be improved with the aim of achieving greater efficiency in the allocation of resources and in social outcomes. The purpose is to enhance the quality of public education, replace the various health insurance funds with one unified health care insurance system that covers the entire population, develop an efficient and equitable pension scheme and follow a national pro-poor growth strategy. While these are not comprehensive, they create a roadmap of sorts for generating greater socio-economic equity among citizens and in the long run improving economic productivity.

However, prior to the implementation of sector specific strategies, loopholes at the macro level of decision-making, social service delivery, and implementation must also be taken into account. This includes some of the overlap between ministries in different areas of service provision and which has begun to be addressed

through the inter-Ministerial Social Action Plan committee. Further support to this committee should be extended to insure the full implementation of its proposed course of action. There is also a need for greater regulation and clearer partnership criteria between state agencies and NGOs. The basis on which NGOs are allocated funding is murky at best and even though many services provided by them are funded by the government, this is rarely evident in their outreach programs. In other words, they appear to be the direct service providers for services that are in reality government-based. Given that a large portion of those NGOs are affiliated with a political or religious entity, this process further undermines trust in state institutions whilst making these groups the natural conduit for access of citizens to their state. A project to regulate this relationship was undertaken by MoSA but has since been neglected.

3.3.1 Education

The right to education should be about opportunity as well as access. Improving the educational system can have a significant impact on building human capital, insuring an effective and well trained labor force and in the process decreasing poverty. The major challenge facing the Lebanese educational system is not access, which as discussed is guaranteed by the Lebanese constitution but quality, particularly of the public school system. In what follows are a series of policy proposals that aim to strengthen the regulatory role of the state, improve the efficiency of the current system as well as its effectiveness so as to foster civic attitudes and values among students, strengthen state/citizen relations and improve access/opportunity. Some of these proposals may also be a catalyst for fostering a more tolerant society and help build a more lasting civil peace.

To be effective these proposals should be taken as a comprehensive package. Many build up or include proposals made by other stakeholders including the Educational Development Program (EDP) at the MEHE. In addition to basic education, these policy recommendations also address vocational training and higher education. The underlying principle is that school education should also prepare students to be responsible and active citizens of the future while vocational and university education should give them the tools needed to be productive.

A. Improving access as a basic right

- Insure the implementation of the free and compulsory

primary education law and extend it to become a Universal Basic Education (UBE) for ages 6 to 15.

- Insure access of excluded groups, such as the disabled through educational grants or making schools access friendly. Special measures to address the needs of learning challenged children including school counselors and supplementary classes should be encouraged at the school level. Given the over staffing of the educational system a number of those teachers can be retrained to act in this capacity.

B. Enhancing opportunity: Improving the pedagogical environment

- **Enhance the quality of education:** develop a new curriculum based on analysis of Learning Achievement, build an Examination Management System, generate automated official exams based on a developed Question Bank System, introduce a drop-out prevention program, unify and standardize psycho-social assistance, and introduce a school rating system to monitor the quality of education.

- **Improve effectiveness and competence of Public School Principals** by ensuring that public school principals undertake a leadership development program. **Provide additional training** on participatory methods of decision making and on ways to increase the involvement of parent councils in schools.

- Promote the professional development of teachers through additional training. This includes **training for civic education and other teachers on** participatory rather than indoctrination teaching techniques. Such training should also include suggestions for teachers on how to create low budget extra curricular activities related to the curricula that enhance the civic values and social solidarity among students.

- Review the History and **Civic Education Curricula** to address the gaps identified in the Education and Citizenship Survey. Addressing gaps in the history curricula is central to establishing a unified platform from which to discuss national issues while addressing identified gaps among other issues in the civic education curricula is instrumental for fostering communal coexistence, democratic participation and long term peace. In the case of the History curricula, such a history book could conceivably include alternate points of view of troubled periods in Lebanon's contemporary history.

- Work with international and other civil society

organizations to undertake **extra curricular activities** that encourage civic values and attitudes among citizens.

- Establishment of an **Education and Citizenship Observatory** to monitor the impact of education on civic values, generate requisite studies on the matter and provide policy recommendations for necessary change. The observatory would also conduct a communication and outreach program to sensitize the public on the importance of these issues.

- Interventions at the level of **higher education to enhance opportunity** should focus on reform of the Lebanese University which guarantees universal access to all Lebanese citizens at minimal costs. This university has been beset by a series of issues, many of which are stemming from political/sectarian interference in its operations and the clientelist networks they generate. These have undermined its position as a bastion of higher education and have badly impacted its administrative and pedagogical value. From this perspective, the autonomy of the university needs to be affirmed. Merging the different branches into 3 or 3 major campuses may be a first step in this direction and would allow the University to re-occupy its pre-war role as a space that brings together students of different political affiliations, sectarian backgrounds, and regional difference. Another step in enhancing student opportunity is to improve academics by encouraging research and quality publications. Raising promotion criteria for professors in terms of their research activities would also advance this goal. A third step would be to reconsider some of its academic programs in an effort to meet market demand. This will be elaborated upon further.

3.3.2 Health

Like education, reform of the health sector needs a change of focus. Stark differences in health outcomes between the regions and groups reflect disparities in access to information, facilities with reasonable standards and protection from risks. Such inequity in turn leads to vastly different opportunities in life. From this perspective, in addition to coverage and assistance, the right to health should be considered as a right to preventive rather than curative care. This would not only enhance the general health and longevity of the population but would also improve the efficiency and equity of the system. As such a revised health care sector should focus on expanded knowledge, access and financing of affordable care. This would entail the following:

- Finalize **the reform strategy** that strengthens the regulatory role of the state its capacity to implement all legislative decisions, defines the role of the different public and private stakeholders, monitors their performance and the financing of health services. National Health accounts should also be updated.

- Review the **current geographic mapping of hospitals and primary health** care centers. The aim is to avoid construction of new facilities in areas that are over served and directing donor investments towards primary health care. Such a mapping exercise would also allow decision makers to consider needs based on population size, geographic location and the optimal size of necessary hospitals in order to improve health and equity outcomes..

- To insure citizen access to adequate health care and reinforce the regulatory role of the state, the **accreditation program** proposed by the MoPH should be implemented in full. This program emphasized a broader multidimensional approach that included managerial processes, and clinical outcomes. Based on a new interpretation of an existing legislation, the accreditation standards were developed using international standards with the aim of strengthening quality assurance.

- **Develop a unified health care insurance scheme** that is to be financed through tax reforms. Such a scheme should replace all existing schemes and cover resident populations in Lebanon. Based on a suitable management information system, such a proposal would harmonize costs, prices and quality of health services whilst insuring transparency of the system. This approach would also need to take into account ongoing studies for reform of the NSSF.²⁹⁰ These will include proposals for improving the administrative and technical efficiency as well as ensuring the NSSF's financial sustainability.

- **Strengthen primary health care (PHC) facilities and expand their scope** by increasing their geographic distribution. This would also guarantee access of citizens in rural areas to immediate health care when needed whilst reducing the need for curative health care procedures and their associated costs. The current hospital accreditation system should also be expanded to PAC facilities. At the same time, the distribution of drugs/medicine in Primary Health Care Centers (most

²⁹⁰ In collaboration with the World Bank, the NSSF is undertaking a study entitled "Reforming the NSSF Health Insurance Branch: How to Provide High Quality Health Services in a Sustainable and Equitable Way".

of which are contracted by NGOs) should also be regulated and free citizen access to these drugs insured.

■ **Expand knowledge of health care** among the population at large through outreach programs, public information campaigns and partnerships with civil society organizations. Lack of knowledge leads to underinvestment in health care as well as payments for inappropriate health care. Community based health personnel can provide cost effective instruction in disease prevention and healthy behavior particularly to mothers.

3.3.3 Beyond basic needs: The right to social integration

Social Citizenship rights, as outlined in chapter four extends beyond basic needs to include the right to social integration in its various dimensions of employment, and freedom from poverty and vulnerability.

EMPLOYMENT

As outlined in chapter four of the report, the right to employment and thus decent living is a fundamental citizenship right. Like many other countries around the world, access to labor markets- both formal and informal- determine economic opportunities for a large segment of the population. The functioning of this market, wages and employment conditions, deeply impacts the quality of life for workers and their families as well as equity across workers and between workers and employers. Imperfections in the labor markets can lead to inefficient and often unfair outcomes affecting economic growth and productivity.

Addressing the deficiencies in the right to employment and thus lead to significant equity gains and improve market outcomes requires public intervention in the labor market, that would take shape through the

■ **Instigation of a tripartite dialogue** between representatives of governments, employers and workers to jointly shape labor standards, policies and programs. The aim would be to address the current imbalances that limit regulations and standards to formal sector workers thus leaving a large segment of the labor force unprotected. By necessity such an approach requires a fundamental shift in values by making sure that the informal economy is regarded as a fundamental and complementary (some would even say entrepreneurial) part of the formal economy. The informal sector here includes different income groups and individuals who chose to be there voluntarily such as young professionals and

others who are there by necessity such as seasonal agricultural workers.

In this regard, the goal of this commission would also be curb unemployment and facilitate citizen access to labor markets by addressing legislative bottlenecks that hinder employment for various categories of the population. The challenge here is to design programs that balance equity and efficiency. More critically, it requires a comprehensive a consistent and coherent policy package that may include macro-economic reforms and adjustments such as (1) improving the overall investment climate, (2) developing well-defined sectoral policies, and (3) reassessing fiscal and monetary policies.

■ **Addressing the gap between supply and demand** in labor markets is also a key cornerstone in facilitating the right to employment for citizens. This implies addressing the shortcomings in vocational and technical education system and higher education curricula. Vocational training programs are key for the economic sustainability of many industries in the country. If implemented, the following measures can improve vocational training and in the process insure their effectiveness in meeting market demands. These include:

■ **Rationalize Vocational and Technical Education (VTE) system** by revising school distribution, upgrading curriculum, teaching methods, and learning assessment tools, and recruiting competent human resources based on VTE system needs.

■ **Restructure** VTE programs based on an assessment of current and future market demand and collaborate with business owners to redefine the VTE program framework credential levels and demands. Programs that have very low or no demand should be eliminated and new programs created that cater to new labor market demand based on new technologies, Additional retraining programs for specific sectors where new technologies are constantly developing (the printing houses sector for example) should also be implemented.

■ **Develop** a more market-oriented curricula at the Lebanese University by focusing on the introduction and development of more applied and technology-related majors and specializations. Liaising with private sector and key economic sector representatives in the process would aid in reorienting the necessary programs.

■ **Establish an intermediary matchmaking entity** between employers and employees. Several stakeholders such

as associations and unions, the National Employment Office (NEO) and the Directorate General for Vocational and Training Education (DGVTE) can play such a role. The role of this entity is to insure that the labor force is being trained based on contemporary market need. It would also investments in new industries and by extension job creation in fields that currently lack the necessary human resources.

■ The creation of an unemployment fund is an integral part of social contracts, particularly in the context of heightened political uncertainty. This fund would build on existing background documents and legislation such as the background documents of the law for the creation of the National Social Security Office in the mid-1960s that explicitly raised the possibility of broadening the scope of this law to include an unemployment insurance branch. Unfortunately, several factors have delayed the implementation of this scheme (1) the outbreak of the civil war in the mid-1970s, (2) the huge economic and social costs resulting from the war, and the (3) different priorities set in the post-war reconstruction agenda.

Implementing an unemployment fund also requires an accurate and updated database, an institutional framework, and relevant human and administrative resources responsible for following-up, monitoring and assessing the impact of the goals of the unemployment fund. Conditions, regulations, eligibility criteria and sound financial regulations should be determined. It is also important to consider the successive phases and time frame required for the policy's implementation with adequate time for concerned stakeholders (employers, employees, the Government, etc.) to prepare for its implementation.

SOCIAL INTEGRATION AND FREEDOM FROM POVERTY

Addressing disparity, inequity, poverty and social integration through social protection and pro-poor policies are also central principles of socio-economic citizenship rights. Social protection policies present a crucial opportunity-enhancing role for the poor and vulnerable. They help families avoid hardship whilst expanding their opportunities and giving societies the ability to embark on the necessary reforms, especially ones intended to have beneficial impacts on the government's fiscal position. Moreover, such social protection programs, if properly defined and implemented can eliminate the need for special compensatory programs each time reform is instigated.

■ In such a context the first step to be taken is **the establishment of a long-term social development strategy** that includes short and medium term goals with a related working plan to reduce poverty that complement ongoing efforts by the GoL to expand existing safety nets to vulnerable populations and create new ones. This strategy should involve all stakeholders including institutions (local and national), international and national organizations and NGOs, local communities and members of civil society. In the process it would also strengthen coordination among all these actors particularly in the fields of education and health. It should also include a communication and outreach program in partnership with various media outlets. It would also establish an efficient mechanism to measure poverty using both money metric indicators and the Unsatisfied Basic Needs approach on regular basis in order to be able to carefully assess the impact of economic and social policies and reforms (such as increase in VAT, reform of NSSF, increase in fuel prices, reform in social ministries etc.) on poverty and inequality.

■ In addition to poverty reduction and sectoral enhancement measures the aim of this strategy would also be to devise and implement a **job creation policy** focusing on empowering and enhancing productive sectors. This would follow the outcomes of the social dialogue on employment issues and reform of the vocational training curricula. Access to employment through community development programs is an important pillar in this process. It would:

- Devise a **sound targeting mechanism** that would insure both geographic and population targeting. Such a mechanism would give **priority** to addressing **regional disparity and the needs of identified vulnerable groups**. In this context, special attention should be given to peripheral regions such as Akkar, Bint Jbeil, Ba'alabak, Hermel, etc. and specific poverty pockets within these regions including urban poverty zones as well as specific vulnerable groups such as female heads of households, elderly, unskilled laborers, farmers, etc. Use **public works programs** where possible to support the working poor or the unemployed.
- **Involve municipalities** in the implementation of interventions. This would insure the sustainability and institutionalization of these initiatives. In this regard, some capacity building for local municipalities will need to be carried out.

■ **Managing life risks** is also key to preventing individuals and families from falling into destitution. In this context,

there is a need to **accelerate the implementation of the new pension program law**, whose aim is to replace the three existing funds.²⁹¹ This program should also include mechanisms for the protection of low-income earners by proposing a better balance in their retirement schemes.

The proposed system consists of integrating the three existing public and private schemes into one modern fully funded defined-contribution scheme. The primary implications of implementing this scheme are that it shifts the burden on the budget imposed by pension payments in the long run, extends social protection to workers currently not covered and promote equity among public and private sector workers in terms of income replacement. Focusing on defined contributions instead of benefits insures the long term financial sustainability of the system. However, the new system is also less generous than the schemes it is replacing particularly with regards to the joint lump sum pension payments that is currently offered to military and civil servants. Moreover, the transition period from the old system to the new system will incur high costs for both the public and private sector since employers will have to liquidate their employees' rights to date and transfer them to the new scheme. Some creative solutions could be proposed such as making the transfer to the new system optional or restricted to certain age brackets (usually young) or issuing bonds that mature upon the entitlement of the employee to retirement.

■ A key node in any socio-economic strategy that aims at greater equity in rights and in access is a pro-poor growth development strategy. This includes giving special priority and focus to the economic and fiscal policies that serve to reduce poverty and that ensure pro-poor economic interventions. This should include tax and wage reform plan especially since the minimum wage remains below the poverty line. It can also include support for small and medium enterprises (SME's that dominate the Lebanese economy and generate the majority of employment opportunities in Lebanon. Such support may increase their access to financial resources, particularly female led enterprises, support the regularization of landownership in rural areas and facilitate the bureaucratic procedures associated with the formal registration of such enterprises.

²⁹¹ The private sector end-of-services indemnity, the Civil Servants Cooperative (CSC), and the Security Forces Fund are the current sources of retirement pensions.

IV. DEMOCRACY AND PROMOTION OF CIVIC CULTURE

The move toward a citizen's state is not possible without the promotion a civic culture through education and the work of civil society.

To address the lapses identified in the Education and Citizenship survey, the following actions need to be undertaken:

■ Improving students' Knowledge, Concepts, Attitudes, and Actions in the area of citizenship needs greater attention at the educational level. Contradictory answers in various areas and the mismatch between concepts, attitudes, and actions indicate that in various instances students, teachers, and school principals respond to certain questions in an academic manner (i.e., the way they think they should respond) whereas current or intended actions fall within a different sphere of their value system.

■ The prevalence of social variables over educational variables, which may at the present time be attributed in part to the political tension in Lebanon, points to a general weakness of the educational system and in embedding civic knowledge and values among students. Addressing these weaknesses in the educational system requires a comprehensive review of the educational context and of the Civic Education curriculum. Such a review would also need to encourage students (as well as teachers and principals) to communicate their opinions with greater freedom and transparency and to provide them with the tools to express themselves without concern for what should be said.

■ Of all the apparent educational variables, the educational environment (student activities, elections, etc.) seems to be extremely important for the development of citizenship education among students. Specific efforts to cultivate these values need to be undertaken. Here teachers may be trained to develop extracurricular activities that address perceived gaps in the curricula or that engage students further in more abstract concepts.

■ Revision of the educational context should address both the legislative framework that guides teaching practices, the revision of the existing Civic Education and general school curricula, as well as teaching methods and training of teachers.

■ The creation of an Education and Citizenship observatory, in conjunction with the Ministry of Education and Higher Education should be pursued. The role of this observatory would be to conduct annual or bi-annual evaluations of progress in citizenship education and the promotion of civic values among Lebanese students.

■ On the media front, access to knowledge is a fundamental right to citizenship, enshrined in the Lebanese constitution. At the same time the media plays a critical role in the formation of public opinion. The following are some of the steps that may be taken to address shortcomings in the right of access to knowledge and in the development of an informed public.

■ Elimination of the distinction between the political and non-political press. This distinction opens the media to political manipulation, particularly given that there is no set interpretation of what “political” means.

■ Penalties for media outlets should be related to the nature of the accusation and not a general temporary closure of the outlet as is the case now. Journalists should also be given some legal protection when reporting on a story related to persons bearing diplomatic immunity.

■ Preparation of a law that supports investigative journalism with the aim of combating corruption and promoting greater transparency in public life.

■ Censorship by the internal security services of artistic and literary works should be cancelled. A new law should be drafted through a committee composed of members of civil society, particularly artists, writers, play writers, Civic Education teachers and leading intellectuals whose role is to monitor the post-production impact of works of art based on clearly identified criteria. All decisions made by this committee should be considered temporary pending their revisions by the judicial system. In this regard, a special court for cultural and artistic work should be created, similar to the court specializing in printed media.

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toward a citizen's state



background papers
and references

BACKGROUND PAPERS AND PRESENTATIONS

An Overview

	Paper Topic	Author	Type
1	Measuring Democracy: Electoral Law and Political Participation	Ziad Majed	Paper
2	Public Identities and Private Selves: Role of the State and Personal Status Laws	Marie-Rose Zalzal	Paper
3	History, Law and National Identity and Citizenship	Ahmad Beydoun	Paper
4	Democracy, Citizenship & the Media	Melhem Chaoul	Paper
5	Sectarianism, Civil Society and citizenship values	Karam Karam	Paper
6	Sectarianism, Public Expenditures & social outcomes	Jad Chaaban/Nisreen Salti	Paper
7	Global and Regional Influences on the role of the state & citizenship	Wissam Saade	Paper
8	Economic Justice and Social Inclusion	Jad Chaaban and Bashshar Haidar	Presentation/roundtable
9	Public Employment and Sectarianism: Article 95	Samer Frangieh	Paper
10	Role of the State in Social Sectors	Kamal Hamdan	Paper
11	Economic growth and social equity: a case of contradictions?	Toufic Gaspard	Presentation/roundtable
12	Identity, Citizenship and Lebanese Art and Literature	Abbas Beydoun	Paper
13	Education and the promotion of citizenship values	Adnan el Amine	Report on Survey
14	Practices of Citizenship in Schools	Makram Oueiss	Paper
15	Cultural Values amongst Lebanese	Jean Mourad	Presentation of USJ study-survey results
16	Lebanese opinions and attitudes on coexistence	Theodore Hanf	Presentation of FIS study-survey results

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Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA)
Central Administration for Statistics (CAS)
Recovery and Reconstruction Cell, Office of the Prime Minister
League of Arab States
The World Bank

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Lebanon National Human Development Report

toward a citizen's state



statistical compendium



Lebanon **2008 - 2009**

The National Human

Development Report

toward a citizen's state



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Introduction

Toward a Citizen's State is aiming to assess where we are on key issues of citizenship and map out their impact on human development in Lebanon. To achieve this end the report tried to capture different facets of development beyond what is provided by calculating the Human Development Indicators (HDIs). For this NHDR new ground was broken on several fronts:

1. Using raw and/or unpublished data several **new indicators** were produced. These included:

A gender based HDI

To capture gender inequity in human development, a gender based HDI was calculated using the estimated earned income rather than GDP per capita (which is unavailable by gender). This pointed to considerable discrepancy between Male and Female development status, mainly as a result of substantially different earnings.

An HPI-2 for Lebanon

An HPI-2, designed for OECD countries to measure social exclusion, was also calculated for Lebanon. The main impetus for this is that Lebanon suffers from opportunity and not access. In other words, large numbers are excluded from quality services and not from access to them. Given that Lebanon did not participate in the Functional Literacy survey, we assumed that anyone with an elementary education and below was most likely suffering from functional literacy defined as the ability to understand and use printed information in daily activities at home, at work and in the community. Using the raw data of the multi-purpose household survey literacy level was also cross tabulated with a question on internet usage and reading newspapers and books once a week. As expected positive results were almost non-existent.

Gender empowerment index

For the first time in 10 years, the Gender Empowerment Index was also calculated. Like the gender based HDI, it highlighted some of the obstacles facing female empowerment at the economic and decision making levels.

Regional development indicators

To gain a better perspective of developments at the governorate levels a disaggregated HDI, HPI were produced. Available variables for the HPI-2, GDI and GEM were also provided. Unfortunately the paucity of data on life expectancies and survival rates at the governorate level prevented us from producing a more accurate regional development picture and from calculating the disaggregated GDI and HPI-2. For the same reasons, it was impossible to calculate these indices at the *gada* level and which would have given a more accurate picture of intra-regional disparity and poverty pockets.

2. An **updated MDG's** sheet was also produced based on the most recent and available data. It confirmed the findings of the calculated indices and highlighted additional new issues.

3. To supplement these, and cover **political and civil issues** not addressed an additional set of indicators were included. These came from two distinct sources: the NHDR survey on education and citizenship that covered 3111 9th grade students in 113 private and public schools in the 6 Mohafazat of Lebanon, and studies and opinion polls on identity and belonging issues, undertaken by reputable private institutions. These highlight the paradoxes of difference and belonging in a multi-cultural and multi-religious setting as the one in Lebanon and their impact on civic values and behavior.

Data Sources and Challenges

1. Sources of Data

To produce the indicators and indices at national and governorate levels, different data sets were used. These included:

Household-based surveys: Raw data

- 1996, Housing & Population Database Survey, MOSA, UNFPA
- 2004-2005 Household Survey, Living Conditions of Households, CAS, MoSA, UNDP
- 2004-2005 Household Expenditure Survey, CAS, MoSA, UNDP

- Pan Arab Family Health Survey, 2004, League of Arab States, MOSA, CAS, Beirut
- Consumer Price Index (CPI), CAS, CRI

Survey undertaken by the NHDR

- 2007-2008 Education and Citizenship Survey, UNDP-NHDR. This was carried out on 3111 9th grade students in 113 public and private schools in Lebanon. It included close to 200 questions for students on citizenship and democracy as well as a shorter questionnaire for civic education teachers and school principals. Since this study was based on the IAE CivEd survey, these results are comparable to 28 other countries.

National data produced by different ministries and public institutions

- Ministry of Environment
- Ministry of Finance
- Ministry of Education
- Ministry of Health
- Ministry of Social Affairs
- Ministry of Interior and Municipalities
- Ministry of Justice
- CDR
- Recovery and Reconstruction Unit, Office of the Prime Minister

Data generated by international organizations

- World Bank
- IMF
- Order of Physicians, Lebanon and the North
- UNICEF
- WHO
- ILO

Opinion polls and identity related surveys by universities and reputable entities

- Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and International Centre for Human Sciences, 2006, *Lebanese opinions and attitudes on coexistence*
- Université St. Joseph, November, Jean Mrad, 2006, *Les Sentiments d'appartenance*, Unpublished Report
- Lebanese Opinion Advisory Committee; www.lebaneseopinion.org
- Azza Charara Beydoun & KAFA, 2008, Honor crimes in Lebanon (Beirut)

All sources used in compiling the data and indicators are listed whenever used. A comprehensive list of references is available at the end of the report

2. Challenges Faced in Data Collection and Analysis

Several difficulties were encountered while compiling data and establishing indicators needed for this National Human Development Report. The main difficulties can be summarized as follows:

1. The unavailability of a population census in Lebanon means that there are several estimates of Lebanon's resident population depending on the institution and method of data collection. In many instances it means that existing surveys are simply pointing to trends rather reflecting actual conditions on the ground.

2. The absence of a national strategic framework/approach for data collection and reporting often leads to conflicting results. Inconsistent and uncoordinated data collection practices, including varying methodologies, sampling techniques and definitions of indicators among the different stakeholders means that statistical outputs are not necessarily compatible. Results should therefore be interpreted with caution.

3. Lack of consensus on the definitions to be used for specific kinds of data collection (for example age groups to be used when assessing economically active populations).

4. The lack of access to raw data for researchers and policy makers in general. For this report access could only be arranged to two data sets; the 1996 Population and Housing survey and the 2004 Living conditions survey both under-

taken by the Central Administration of Statistics with MoSA and UNDP. Some raw data for specific variables in the PAP-FAM study undertaken by MoSA, UNFPA and the League of Arab States, were also made available through the office of League of Arab States in Egypt.

5. Some indicators are only available at the national level and not at the governorates' level.

Technical notes: Methodology for Calculating the HDI's¹

1. The Human Development Index (HDI)

The HDI is based on three indices:

- Life expectancy at birth index
- Educational attainment index, measured by a combination of adult literacy (two thirds weight) and the combined gross primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratio (one-third weight);
- Standard of living, as measured by real GDP per capita (PPP\$).

Calculating the three indices:

- To construct each index, fixed minimum and maximum values have been established for each of these indicators:

Indicator	Minimum value	Maximum value
Life expectancy at birth	25 years	85 years
Adult literacy rate	0%	100%
Combined gross enrolment ratio	0%	100%
Real GDP per capita (PPP\$)	\$100	\$40,000

- For any component of the HDI individual indices can be computed according to the general formula:

$$\text{Index} = ((\text{Actual } x_i \text{ value} - \text{Minimum } x_i \text{ value}) / (\text{Maximum } x_i \text{ value} - \text{Minimum } x_i \text{ value}))$$

Accordingly:

- Life expectancy index = (Actual x_i value - 25)/(85-25)
- Adult literacy index = (Actual x_i value - 0)/(100-0)
- Combined gross enrolment ratio index = (Actual x_i value - 0)/(100-0)
- Education attainment index $2/3$ (Adult literacy index) + $1/3$ (Combined gross enrolment ratio index)

Calculating the income index:

- Income enters into the HDI as a surrogate for all the dimensions of human development not reflected in a long and healthy life and in knowledge; it is a proxy for a decent standard of living.
- Income is treated using the following formula: $W(\gamma) = \frac{\log \gamma - \log \gamma_{\min}}{\log \gamma_{\max} - \log \gamma_{\min}}$
- Income index (log (income per capita (US\$) - log 100) / (log 40,000 - log 100))

Calculating the human development Index HDI:

$$\text{HDI} = ((\text{Life expectancy index}) + (\text{Education index}) + (\text{Income index})) / 3$$

¹ The methodology for calculating the HDI's is based on the technical note of: UNDP 2007, *Fighting Climate Change; Human Solidarity in a Divided World*. New York.

Calculating the HDI at the level of governorates:

- The same steps are repeated using data at the governorates' level to obtain an HDI value for each governorate separately.
- However, the lack of more recent life expectancy data at the governorate level forced us to rely on figures calculated for the 1998 NHDR. GDP per capita at the governorate level was replaced with real per capita expenditures recently made available through the *Poverty and Income Distribution* report produced by UNDP.

Calculating the HDI by gender:

- The same steps are repeated using data disaggregated by gender. In this case we substituted estimated earned income for GDP per capita which is not available by gender.

2. The Human Poverty Index (HPI-1)

The human poverty index (HPI-1) measures deprivation in three areas:

- A long and healthy life, measured by Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40.
- Knowledge, measured by illiteracy rate for people aged 15 years and above.
- A decent standard of living, measured by percentage of population not using an improved source of water and percentage of underweight children for age.

Calculating the HPI-1:

$$\text{HPI-1} = [1/3 (p1^\alpha + p2^\alpha + p3)]^{1/\alpha}$$

Where:

- P1= Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 (times 100)
- P2= Adult illiteracy rate (aged 15 and above)
- P3= Deprivation in a decent standard of living = 1/2 [population not using an improved water source] + 1/2 [children underweight for age]
- $\alpha = 3$

Calculating the HPI-1 at the level of governorates:

- The same steps are repeated using data at the governorates' level to obtain an HPI-1 value for each governorate separately.
- However, the lack of more recent data on survival beyond age 40 and under 5 mortality rates at the governorate level meant that this report had to rely on figures calculated for the 1998 NHDR. No adjustments were carried out to these values as they were meant to identify regional disparities rather than depict an accurate HPI figure for the regions. Moreover any life table projections to measure life expectancy will not take into account the difference that investments in the health sector over the last 10 years may have made to mortality rates. Similarly available 2004 data for under-weight children were not used since they seem to be over reported for Beirut and under reported for the regions; the South and North in particular.

It is noted that the results of these calculations are not strictly comparable with the results of the national HPI cited in the report because of differences in some indicator values.

3. The Human Poverty Index (HPI-2)

The human poverty index (HPI-2) measures the same deprivations measured by HPI-1 but adds an indicator on social exclusion. The HPI-2 is based on four indicators:

- A long and healthy life, measured by Probability at birth of not surviving to age 60.
- Knowledge, measured by percentage of people lacking functional literacy skills (% aged 16-65)

- A decent standard of living, measured by percentage of people living below 50% of median income
- Social exclusion, measured by rate of long unemployment.

Calculating the HPI-2:

$$\text{HPI-2} = [1/3 (P1 + P2 + P3) + P4^\alpha]^{1/\alpha}$$

Where:

- P1 = Probability at birth of not surviving to age 60 (times 100)
- P2 = percentage of people lacking functional literacy skills (aged 16-65)
- P3= percentage of people living below 50% of median income
- P4= unemployment rate
- $\alpha = 3$

Calculating the HPI-2 at the level of governorates:

- The same steps are repeated using data at the governorates' level to obtain a HPI-2 value for each governorate separately. However the lack of available data on expectations of survival beyond age 60 prevented us from calculating a regional HPI-2.

4. The Gender-Related Development Index (GDI)

The GDI uses the same variables as the HDI. The difference is that the GDI adjusts the average achievement of each country in life expectancy, educational attainment and income in accordance with the disparity in achievement between women and men.

Accordingly, four indices are calculated for each sex separately to obtain the following:

For females:

- Life expectancy index for females = (Actual x value for females -25)/(85-25)
- Adult literacy index for females =(Actual x value for females -0) / (100-0)
- Combined gross enrolment ratio index for females= (Actual x value for females -0)/(100-0)
- Education attainment index for females =2/3 (Adult literacy index for females) + 1/3 (Combined gross enrolment ratio index for females)
- Income index for females (log (income per capita for females (US\$) - log100)/ (log 40,000 - log100)
- Share of females in population = [total number of females / total number of population]

For males:

- Life expectancy index for males = (Actual xi value for males -25)/(85-25)
- Adult literacy index for males =(Actual xi value for males -0) / (100-0)
- Combined gross enrolment ratio index for males= (Actual xi value for males -0)/(100-0)
- Education attainment index for males =2/3 (Adult literacy index for males) + 1/3 (Combined gross enrolment ratio index for males)
- Income index for males (log (income per capita for males (US\$) - log100)/ (log 40,000 - log100)
- Share of males in population = [total number of males / total number of population]

After that, an equally distributed index is calculated for each index as follow:

- Equally distributed life index = {[female population share x (female life expectancy index)⁻¹] + [male population share x (male life expectancy index)⁻¹]}⁻¹
Equally distributed educational index = {[female population share x (educational attainment index for females)⁻¹] + [male population share x(educational attainment index for males)⁻¹]}⁻¹
- Equally distributed income index = {[female population share x (adjusted female per capita PPP\$ GDP)⁻¹] + [male population share x (adjusted male per capita PPP\$ GDP)⁻¹]}⁻¹

Calculating the Gender-related development index (GDI):

- $GDI = ((\text{Equally distributed life index}) + (\text{Equally distributed educational index}) + (\text{Equally distributed income index})) / 3$

5. The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)

- The Gender Empowerment measure focuses on the women's opportunities through the following dimensions:
- Political participation, measured by the share of women and men in parliament.
Economic participation, measured by two indicators: the share of women and men as legislators, senior officials and managers; and the percentage of women and men working as professional and technical workers.
- Power over economic resources, measured by the estimated earned income for both women and men.
For each of these three dimensions, an equally distributed equivalent percentage (EDEP) is calculated, according to the following formula:

$$EDEP = \{[\text{female population share (female index)}^{-1}] + [\text{male population share (male index)}^{-1}]\}^{-1}$$

Calculating the gender empowerment measure (GEM):

$$GEM = ((EDEP \text{ for parliament participation}) + (EDEP \text{ for economic participation}) + (EDEP \text{ for income})) / 3$$

Definitions of Technical Terms

Adult literacy*

Refers to the number of people aged 15 years and above who are literate, expressed as a percentage of the total population aged 15 years and above. For statistical purposes, a person is literate who can with understanding both read and write a short simple statement on his/her everyday life.

Functional literacy

The IALS reports on three areas of literacy:

- *Prose literacy*: The knowledge and skills needed to understand and use information from texts, including editorials, news stories, poems and fiction.
- *Document literacy*: The knowledge and skills required to locate and use information in different formats, including maps, graphs, tables, payroll forms, job applications and transportation schedules.
- *Quantitative literacy*: The knowledge and skills required to apply arithmetic operations to numbers in printed materials, such as balancing a cheque book, figuring out a tip, completing an order form or determining the amount of interest on a loan from an advertisement.

Combined gross enrolment ratios *

Refers to the number of students enrolled in primary, secondary, post secondary and tertiary levels of education, regardless of age, as a percentage of the population of theoretical school age for the given levels. Education levels are categorized as pre-primary, primary, secondary, post-secondary and tertiary in accordance with the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).

GDP per capita (PPP US\$) *

GDP per capita in local currency are from national accounts data. In comparing standards of living across countries, economic statistics must be converted into Purchasing Power Parities to eliminate differences in national price levels. The GDP per capita (2006 constant PPP US\$) data used to calculate the HDI for Lebanon are provided by the World Bank. For the 174 countries whose GDP per capita is compiled by the World Bank, their figures are based on price data from the latest International Comparison Program (ICP) surveys conducted in 2005.

Life expectancy at birth*

Life expectancy at birth estimates for Lebanon are from the 2006 Revision of World Population Prospects. These are prepared every two years by the Population Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs using data from national vital registration systems, population censuses and surveys.

Population with sustainable access to improved water source

The share of the population with reasonable access to any of the following types of water supply for drinking: household connections, public standpipes, boreholes, protected dug wells, protected springs and rainwater collection. Reasonable access is defined as the availability of at least 20 liters a person per day from a source within 1 kilometer of the user's dwelling.

Population without sustainable access to improved water source

Calculated as 100 minus the percentage of the population with sustainable access to an improved water source. Unimproved sources include vendors, bottled water, tanker trucks and unprotected wells and springs. See water source, improved, population with sustainable access to.

The head count index (P0)**

A measure of the prevalence of poverty. It denotes the percentage of households that are poor [as defined by the poverty line] as a proportion of total population. This measure however, is insensitive to the distribution of the poor below the poverty line. It is captured by the following two indices, P1 and P2.

The poverty gap index (P1)**

A measure of the depth of poverty and denotes the gap between the observed expenditure levels of poor households and the poverty line. Assuming perfect targeting, the poverty gap index indicates the amount of resources (transfers) needed to bring all poor households up to the poverty line.

The poverty severity index (P2)**

Measures the degree of inequality in distribution below the poverty line and gives greater weight to households at the bottom of the income (or expenditure) distribution.

Sources: All definitions of statistical terms were obtained from www.hdr.undp.org/statistics/. Definition marked with (*) were obtained from: UNDP, 2008, *HDR, A statistical update*. Definitions marked with (**) were obtained from: UNDP, MOSA, 2008, *Poverty, Growth and Income Distribution in Lebanon* (Beirut, Lebanon).

B.1 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Human Development Indices

Human Development Index (HDI)

	Human development index (HDI) value	Life expectancy at birth (years)	Adult literacy rate (aged 15 and above) (%)	Combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary education (%)	GDP per capita (PPP US\$)	Life expectancy index	Education index	GDP index
2007-2008	0.791	71.7	88.5	73.4	9,561	0.778	0.835	0.761
2001	0.739	71.3	86.4	67.6	4,705	0.772	0.801	0.643
1998	0.782	71.3	84.7	67.6	5,094	0.772	0.801	0.542

Human Development Index (HDI) by Gender

	Human development index (HDI) value	Life expectancy at birth (years)	Adult literacy rate (aged 15 and above) (%)	Combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary education (%)	GDP per capita (PPP US\$)	Life expectancy index	Education index	GDP index
Females	0.752	73.7	83.9	74.2	4,537	0.812	0.807	0.637
Males	0.817	69.4	93.3	72.6	15,942	0.740	0.864	0.846

Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) Value

	Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) value	Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 (% of cohort), 2000 ^a	Adult illiteracy rate (aged 15 and above), 2004 (%)	Population not using improved water sources 2004 (%)	Under-weight children under age five 2004 (%)
2007-2008	7.4	6.3	9.9	0.0	3.9
2001		5.0	13.6	4.7	3.1
1998	10.863	5.45	11.6	6.0	3.0

Human Poverty Index (HPI-2) Value

	Human Poverty Index (HPI-2) value	Probability at birth of not surviving to age 60 (% of cohort) ^a	People lacking functional literacy skills (% aged 16-65)	Long-term unemployment (as % of labor force)	Population living below 50% of median income
2007-2008	23.6	8.9	36.5	2.9	14.4

Gender-Related Development Index (GDI)

	Gender -related Development Index (GDI) value	Life expectancy at birth (years)		Adult literacy rate (aged 15 and above)(%)		Combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary education (%)		Estimated earned income (PPP US \$)	
		Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
2007-2008	0.779	73.7	69.4	84	93.3	74.2	72.6	4537	15942
1998	0.659	72.0	69.0	80.0	89.7	68.4	66.9		

Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)

	Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) value	Seats in parliament held by women (% of total)	Female legislators, senior officials and managers (% of total)	Female professional and technical workers (% of total)	Ratio of estimated female to male earned income
2007-2008	0.349	4.7	11.2	46.0	0.29
1998	0.269	2.3	8.4	45.4	78.90

Trends in Human Development

Life expectancy				
	1996 ^k			71.3
	2005 ^l			71.5
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births)				
	2000 ^d			27.0
	2004 ⁱ			16.1
Total fertility rate (average number of live births)				
	1970 ⁿ			5.1
	1990 ⁿ			3.1
	2004 ⁱ			1.9
	2006 ⁿ			2.2
Illiteracy rate (10 yrs +) (%)				
	1996 ^k			13.6
	2004 - 2005 ^a			8.8
Age-grade delay in level of schooling (%)				
		Elementary	Intermediate	Secondary
	1997 - 1998 ^l	33.8	49.9	45.5
	2000 - 2001 ^m	35.8	54.8	55.7
	2004 - 2005 ^a	11.2	23.1	26.5

Profile of Human Deprivation

Individuals without any form of insurance, 2004 - 2005 ^a (%)	53.3	
Population without access to service water network 2004 ^{a1} (%)	1.5	
Child mortality rate (under five years old, per 1000 live births, 10 yrs preceding the survey), 2005 ^f	18.3	
Working Children (10-19 years of age) ^b (%)	6.1	
Illiteracy rate (15 yrs +), 2004 - 2005 ^a	9.9	
Immunization: Children with completed immunization scheme (12 - 23 months old), 2004 ⁱ (%)	45.9	
Unemployment rate (15 yrs +), 2004 - 2005 ^a (%)		
Male	7.3	
Female	9.5	
Total	7.9	
Individuals living in poor conditions (low and very low levels of satisfaction), 2004 - 2005 ^f (%)		
Of these, individuals living in very low living conditions (2004-2005) ^f	3.9	
Deprived low and very low levels of satisfaction households based on income index 2004 - 2005 ^f (%)		
49.1		
Distribution of deprived households by head of household, 2004-2005 ^h		
	Male headed households as % of total	Female headed households as % of total
1995	30.1	43.8
2004	22.9	35.9

Children (10 - 14 yrs) working for family income, 2000 ^d (%)		9.6
Distribution of Lebanese population, 2004 - 2005 ^g (%)		
Extreme poor		1.13
Poor		7.97
Near poor		20.59
Better off		71.54
Projected headcount poverty in Lebanon, 1997 - 2007 ^g (%)	Lower poverty line	Upper poverty line
1997	10.1	33.7
2004	8.0	28.6
2007	8.4	30

Notes: a1. % of population getting their water from springs or running water
Economic Deprivation Indicator relates to number of cars for the households, dependency ratio, main occupation of head of household

B.2 DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

Population 2004-2005 ^a		
Size		3,755,034
< 15 yrs (%)		27.3
65 yrs + (%)		7.4
Average annual population growth rate (%)1990-2004 ^o		1.8
Fertility rate for the years1999-2003 (%), 2004 ⁱ		1.9
Dependency ratio (%), 2004-2005 ^a		53.3
Contraceptive prevalence rate modern and traditional (%), 2004 ^j		74.2
Mean bachelor year (years), 2004 ⁱ		
Male		32.8
Female		28.8
Average household size (individuals), 2004 ^a		4.3

B.3 HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION

Adult literacy rate (15 yrs+), 2004 - 2005 ^b (%)	88.5
Combined 1st, 2nd & 3rd level gross enrollment ratio, 2005 ^c (%)	84.6
Specialists and intermediate professions, 2004 - 2005 ^a (%)	17.0
Population (4 years and above) that has attained elementary level education, 2004 - 2005 ^a (%)	33.2
Population (4 years and above) that has attained university level education, 2004 ^a (%)	13.5
Science graduates (% of total graduates), 2005 - 2006 ^p	20.1

B.4 STATUS OF WOMEN

Social

Male to female ratio (x 100), 2004 - 2005 ^a	99
Females who benefit from at least on type of health insurance, 2004 - 2005 ^a (%)	46.3
Disabled females ratio (percent of total disabled), 2004 - 2005 ^a	36
Female life expectancy at birth (years), 2005 ^c	73.7
Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births), 2005 ^j	86.3
Female raw school enrolment ratio, 2004 - 2005 ^a (%)	
Elementary	109
Intermediate	104
Secondary	65.7
Females university graduates as a percent of total university graduate, 2005 - 2006 ^p (%)	54.0
Female Illiteracy rate (aged 10 years and above), 2004 - 2005 ^a (%)	11.8

Economic

Labor force and unemployment, 2004 - 2005 ^a (%)	
Female unemployment rate (15+ yrs)	9.5
Economic activity rate (15 yrs +)	20.4
Economic activity rate (15-64 yrs)	22.3
Female economic activity (15 yrs +) as % of male activity, 2005 ^c	41.0
Ratio of estimated female to male earned income, 2005 ^c	0.31
Ratio of female to male non agricultural wage 2005 ^c	0.95

Political Empowerment

Number of parliamentary representatives ^s	Successful candidates	Percentage of total number of parliament members
1992	3.0	2.3
1996	3.0	2.3
2000	3.0	2.3
2005	6.0	4.7
Number of ministers, 2007		1
Local municipalities, 2004		
Candidates (number of individuals)		700
Winners (number of individuals)		220
% of total		4.05
Females in the government sector (percentage of total), 2004 ^t		
First grade positions		6.5
Second grade positions		18.75
Third grade positions		28.1
Fourth grade positions		31.8
Females in the judiciary sector (% of total), 2006 ^f		37.0

B.5 SOCIO - ECONOMIC

Key Economic Indicators

Nominal GDP (in billions of US\$), 2006 ^w	22.8
GDP (current US\$ billions), 2005 ^u	
2005	38.34
Est- 2006	39.57
Proj 2007	41.43
GDP, PPP (current international \$ billions), 2005 ^u	
2005	38.34
Est- 2006	38.34
Proj 2007	39.11
GDP per capita (PPP US\$) ^u	
2005	9561
Est- 2006	9757
Proj 2007	10112
GDP (US \$ billions) ^v	
2006	22.7
2007	23.8

GDP (m) per capita ^v		
	2006	1.8
	2007	1.3
Real GDP growth (%) ^v		
	2006	0.0
	2007	1.0
Public debt, billions (current US\$) ^u		
	2005	38.5
	Est- 2006	40.4
	Proj 2007	42.0
Total external debt, 2006 ^w		197
Gross capital formation (in percent of GDP), 2006 ^w		11.6
	Government	2.5
	Non government	9.1
Gross national savings (in percent of GDP), 2006 ^w		5.6
	Government	8.6
	Non governmental	14.2
Exports of goods (in US\$, percentage change), 2006 ^w		22.5
Imports of goods (in US\$, percentage change), 2006 ^w		1.8

Flow of Aid, Private Capital and Debt

Official Development Assistance (ODA) received (net disbursements) ^c			
	Total (US million Dollars), 2005	243	
	Per capita (US\$), 2005	67.9	
	As % Of GDP		
	1990	8.9	
	2005	1.1	
Net foreign direct investment inflows (% of GDP) ^c			
	1990	0.2	
	2005	11.7	
	2006 ^w	12.0	
Other private flows (% of GDP) ^c			
	1990	0.2	
	2005	11.3	
Inward remittance flows - USD million			
		Remittances	% of GDP ⁱ
	2005	4,924	22.8
	2006	5,183	22.8
	2007	5,500 (est)	22.4 (est) ^j
Gross debt (billion USD), 2007 ^v		43.2	
Total debt/ GDP mp (%) ^v			
	2006	177	
	2007	171	

Priorities in Public Spending

Public expenditure on education (%GDP), 2002 - 2005 ^c				2.6
Public expenditure on education, 2006 ^y				
%GDP				3.0
as % of total budgetary expenditures				9.2
Public expenditure on health, 2006 ^y				
%GDP				1.48
as % of total budgetary expenditures				4.5
Other social services (%GDP), 2006 ^z				3.8
as % of total budgetary expenditures ^z				11.63
Total social spending (% GDP), 2006 ^z				8.32
as % of total budgetary expenditures ^z				25.35
Military expenditure (% of GDP), 2005 ^c				4.5
Total debt service (%GDP), 2005 ^c				16.1
Public expenditures in social sectors by ministry (2006) ^y	as % of total budgetary	as % of total budgetary expenditures (excluding debt service) (=LL 6,542 billion)		as % of GDP (nominal GDP= LL 34,111 billion)
MEHE	8.24	14.11		2.71
MoPH	3.11	5.30		1.02
MoSA	0.87	1.48		0.28
Pension and end of service indemnity	8.35	14.29		2.74
Total social expenditures	20.56	35.18		6.75

Trends in Social Expenditures in LBP Billion ^z (%)

	1995	2000	2005
Education and Culture Ministries	467	707	909
Ministry of Public Health	159	274	360
Ministry of Social Affairs	68.0	93.0	87.0
Pension and end of service indemnity	320	875	1200
Total social expenditure (including pension)	1014	1949	2552
Social expenditure from budget expenditure (excluding debt service) (%)	30.25	41.56	41.84
Social spending of GDP	5.62	7.85	7.71

Inequality in Income 2004 - 2005^g

Share of income or consumption, poorest 10% (%)	2.86
Share of income or consumption, poorest 20% (%)	7.07
Share of income or consumption, richest 20% (%)	43.55
Share of income or consumption, richest 10% (%)	27.97
Inequality measures, ratio of richest 10% to poorest 10%	9.77
Inequality measures, ratio of richest 20% to poorest 20%*	7.50
Gini index	0.361

Note: * Calculated for NHDR from raw expenditure data based on the poverty matrix provided.

B.6 HEALTH PROFILE

Number of doctors per 10,000 people, 2005 ^{aa}	23.6
Number of nurses and midwives per 10,000 people, 2005 ^{aa}	13.2
Number of dentists per 10,000 people, 2004 ^{aa}	8.81
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births), 2005 ^j	86.3
Budgetary resources allocated to the Ministry of Health (as % of total government expenditures), 2006 ^z	3.11
Prevalence of chronic diseases (having at least one chronic disease), 2004 - 2005 ^a	17.4
Beneficiaries from at least one type of insurance (%), 2004 - 2005 ^a	44.9

B.7 HOUSING

Urban population (% of total), 2005 ^c	86.6
Urban population growth rate, 2004 ⁱ (%)	1.0
Houses with electricity (%), 2000 - 2005 ^a	99.8
Households that own at least one private automobile, 2000 - 2005 ^a (%)	52.5
Ownership of primary residence, 2000 - 2005 ^a (%)	
Owned	71.4
Not owned	28.5
Houses connected to water network, 2004 - 2005 (%) ^a	
Public service	75.8
Public drinking	56.7
Public sanitation	67.4

B.8 LABOR

Labor Force and Unemployment 2004-2005^a

Number of working individuals (15 yrs +)	
Actual labor force	1,108,129
Labor force (15yrs+)	
% of total	44.0
Female (%)	20.4
Male (%)	68.9
Labor force by sector (15+yrs) (%)	
Industry	15.0
Construction	8.7
Commerce	22.1
Services	37.4
Agriculture	7.5
Distribution of the labor force (15 yrs+) by employment category (%)	
General and corporate managers	10.7
Specialists	9.6
Intermediate professions	7.4
Office employees	8.9
Service sector workers and salespersons	10.5
Agriculture and fishery workers	4.7
Skilled workers	19.2

Drivers	9.1
Unskilled workers	15.5
Armed forces	4.4
Distribution of the labor force (15 yrs+) (%)	
Private sector	85.7
Public sector	13.2
Other	1.2
Distribution of actual labor force by health insurance type (%)	
Not receiving any insurance coverage (%)	50.8
Covered by at least one type of insurance (%)	49.2
Unemployment rate (15 yrs+) (%)	
Female	9.5
Male	7.3
Total	7.9
Unemployment rate by age (number)	
15 yrs+	94,442
15-64 yrs	92,094
Unemployment rate by educational attainment (15 yrs+)(%)	
Illiterate	4.9
Reads and writes	5.9
Elementary	7.7
Intermediate	9.2
Secondary	8.7
University graduate	8.2

Migrant Labor (Work Permits by Nationality-Continent, 2006)^{bb}

Arab countries	20123
Africa	14743
America	262
Asia	71549
Europe	623
Total	107,314

B.9 CULTURE AND PUBLIC LIFE

Culture and Communication

Households who own televisions ^a (%) (2005)	98
Households with computers, 2004 - 2005 ^j (%)	23.9
Personal computers ^{cc}	
1995	50000
2000	175000
2004	400000
Internet users (numbers)	
1996	5000
1997	45000
2000	300000
2005	700000

Internet users (per 1,000 people), 2005 ^c (%)	196
Internet use in the past week by sex (%) population age 16 years and above, 2004 - 2005 ^b	
Male	12.1
Female	7.5
Total	9.8
Individuals who read newspapers and magazines weekly (16 yrs +), 2004 - 2005 ^b (%)	
Male	31.8
Female	27.0
Total	29.3
Individuals who engaged in artistic and cultural activities in the past year (16 yrs +), 2004 - 2005 ^b (%)	
Male	14.8
Female	13.4
Total	14.1
Individuals participating in students and social activities in the past week (16yrs+), 2004 - 2005 ^b (%)	
Male	14.8
Female	13.4
Total	14.1
Daily newspapers, 2004 ^{dd}	
Number of titles	15
Total average circulation	215000
Total average circulation per 1,000 inhabitants	54.23
Total average circulation per 1,000 literate inhabitants	86.50
Journalists, 2005 (number) ^{dd}	
Male	771
Female	364
Total number	1300
Per 1,000,000 inhabitants	324
Radio and television institutions, 2005 ^{dd}	
Total number	18
Percentage of private radio institutions	91.0
Percentage of public radio institutions	9.0
Percentage of private television institutions	90
Percentage of public television institutions	10

Public Life Participation: Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Lebanon ^{ee}

Number of CSOs in Lebanon*	
CSOs officially registered in Lebanon	6032
Self declared sectarian affiliation of NGO (%)	
Non sectarian	79.0
Sectarian affiliation	21.0
Base	2836
Founding period of NGO (%)	
Mandate period (earliest 1710-1943)	4.0
Post-Mandate (1944-1974)	22.0
Civil war (1975-1990)	20.0

Post-War (1991-2000)		37.0
2000-2006		17.0
Base		3276
NGO services by religious character * (%)	Not religious	Religious
Scientific & cultural activities	55.0	41.0
Artistic & recreational activities	53.0	32.0
Social services	49.0	67.0
Aid and relief activities	49.0	58.0
Awareness raising in various fields	36.0	47.0
Capacity building activities	36.0	31.0
Protection of the environment	35.0	20.0
Health services	30.0	36.0
Protection of rights	21.0	12.0
Participation in conferences	13.0	11.0
Participation in training programs	12.0	8.0
Empowerment activities	11.0	8.0
Activities outside Lebanon	2.0	0.0
Base	3016	132

* Note: Multiple answers are possible

B.10 IDENTITY, CONFESSION AND SOCIAL COHESION

Attitudes towards Confessionalism and Personal Status Laws^{ff}

Right to be free from the control of confessions		
Strongly Agree		35.7
Agree		31.9
Disagree		17.9
Strongly Disagree		7.2
No response		7.2
Right to adopt a civil status law		
Strongly Agree		15.8
Agree		28.9
Disagree		29.8
Strongly Disagree		14.8
No response		10.6
Right to apply secular standards to marriage and inheritance laws		
Strongly Agree		11.8
Agree		27.2
Disagree		29.8
Strongly Disagree		20.0
No response		11.1

Attitudes Towards Nation and Identity by Confessional Group^{ff}

	Christians				Muslims			
	Maronites	Greek Catholics	Greek Orthodox	Other Christians	Sunni	Chiite	Other Muslims	Druze
Confessionalism and national unity in Lebanon								
Confessionalism contradicts	64.0	65.8	71.8	77.8	60.5	61.4	56.1	69.6
Confessionalism contributes to	28.4	21.5	25.5	—	27.1	22.5	43.9	14.3
No response	7.7	7.7	7.7	7.7	13.6	13.6	13.6	16.1
Right to be free from the control of confessions								
Strongly agree	38.1	43.0	37.6	29.6	28.8	38.1	4.9	55.4
Agree	35.6	39.2	34.2	63.0	28.2	31.6	17.1	8.9
Disagree	15.2	11.4	18.8	26.6	12.8	53.7	—	5.4
Strongly disagree	6.2	1.3	5.4	—	12.1	4.7	24.4	5.4
No response	4.8	5.1	4.0	—	4.2	12.8	—	25.0
Right to establish personal status laws on a secular basis like other confessional communities								
Strongly agree	17.8	25.3	23.5	22.2	8.2	20.1	2.4	44.6
Agree	43.4	50.6	40.3	51.9	23.7	23.5	34.1	14.3
Disagree	24.7	12.7	22.1	18.5	38.4	23.0	46.3	8.9
Strongly disagree	4.8	2.5	6.0	—	22.9	14.4	17.1	5.4
No response	9.2	8.9	8.1	7.4	6.8	19.1	—	26.8
Right to adopt a civil status law								
Strongly agree	17.8	25.3	22.1	14.8	7.6	15.4	2.4	35.7
Agree	38.1	31.6	43.6	44.4	20.9	19.6	36.6	16.1
Disagree	29.3	31.6	20.1	29.6	37.9	27.4	43.9	12.5
Strongly disagree	6.2	3.8	6.0	7.4	27.4	20.1	17.1	5.4
No response	8.5	7.6	8.1	3.7	6.2	17.5	—	30.4
Right to apply secular standards to marriage and inheritance laws								
Strongly agree	14.3	17.7	20.8	11.1	4.8	9.7	2.4	26.8
Agree	40.4	39.2	33.6	66.7	18.6	15.4	26.8	17.9
Disagree	26.8	27.8	25.5	18.5	38.1	28.2	48.8	17.9
Strongly disagree	10.0	6.3	12.8	3.7	31.6	27.4	22.0	17.9
No response	8.3	8.9	7.4	—	6.8	19.3	—	30.4

Attitudes towards Democracy and Governance⁹⁹

There are many countries that, like ours, have a variety of different groups - language groups, religious groups, ethnic groups and others. Together these countries have different systems of government and there are differing opinions about the best system. We would like to present some of these opinions. Please tell us for each opinion whether you think it is acceptable or unacceptable for Lebanon.

	1987	2002	2006
"The country must be partitioned and each group should found its own state."	4.0	11.0	9.0
"The strongest group should govern. The other groups must accept what this group decides."	20.0	8.0	6.0
"The numerically strongest group should govern. The other groups must accept what this group decides."	6.0	12.0	10.0

"One group should govern, and groups that don't like it must leave the country."	10.0	9.0	6.0
"One single party that everybody can join should govern without an opposition."	35.0	28.0	33.0
"Everybody votes for the party of their choice. The party or parties that win form the government; the other parties remain in the opposition."	71.0	54.0	51.0
"Everybody votes for the party they want, but the government should be formed on the principle that all groups should have a share of power."[1]	80.0	65.0	68.0

B.11 JUSTICE

Administration of Justice^c

Homicides (per 100,000 people), 2000 - 2004	5.7
Prison population total, 2007	5971
Prison population (per 100,000 people), 2007	168
Prison population (% female of total), 2007	4.0

Honor Killings^{hh}

Distribution of accused as per the 1st motive of crime	Numbers	Percentages	
Suspicion of emotional or marital adultery	11	16.7	
Marital differences	4	6.1	
Loss of virginity prior to marriage	1	1.5	
Suspicion of having a relationship without engagement or marriage	1	1.5	
Marriage or engagement without parents approval	2	3.0	
Avenging family honor	17	25.8	
Greed (hoping for money and property)	4	6.1	
Bad behavior	2	3.0	
Other	7	10.6	
Not shown	17	25.8	
Total	66	100	
Distribution of accused as per the classification of crime upon sentencing	Numbers	Percentages	
On purpose	30	45.5	
Deliberate	28	42.4	
Other	1	1.5	
Not shown	7	10.6	
Total	66	100	
Distribution of crimes depending on the relation between the accused and the victim and the means of the crime (%)	Family	Next of Kin	Relative
Firearm weapon	15.0	13.0	3.0
Beating, strangling, stabbing	11.0	9.0	1.0
Fire causing explosion, poisoning	—	6.0	1.0
More than one means or cause	2.0	2.0	—

Note: This study is based on a sample of 66 cases of women murdered by a relative or an associate in the 6 mohafazat of Lebanon. While not entirely representative they give an indication of the general trends in honor crimes in the country. For the distribution of the sample see page 27 of the study.

B.12 YOUTH

Youth and Future Aspirations, 2004ⁱ

Ratio of youth population considering immigration (%)	50
Ratio of youth population willing to participate in parliamentary elections (%)	61.5
Ratio of youth willing to participate in municipal elections (%)	61.5

Unemployment Rate among Youth (15-19) by Educational Status and Poverty, 2004-2005^g

	Better off	Poor	Extremely poor	Total
Illiterate	11.7	0.0	29.8	19.9
Read and write	12.2	9.2	0.0	9.5
Pre-School	0.0	0.0	56.4	31.5
Elementary	18.5	17.0	25.6	19.4
Intermediate	20.3	16.6	21.0	19.2
Secondary	22.7	30.9	48.0	25.9
University	22.2	26.9	30.5	22.8

Youth and Citizenship: Attitudes of 14-15 year old by Sect 2007-2008 (%)ⁱⁱ

	Sunni	Chiite	Druze	Catholic	Maronite	Orthodox	Protestant	Total
Love for the country								
E2: We should prevent other countries from influencing political decisions in Lebanon	91.5	92.7	91.7	90.7	91.3	87.2	100	91.0
E3: I am proud of the Lebanese flag	95.9	96.1	96.9	94.0	95.1	91.7	100	95.0
B7: A good citizen is ready to serve in the army to defend the country	92.8	92.8	97.3	86.9	89.1	89.8	100	91.5
Gender								
G6: Women should stay out of politics	29.1	28.0	17.0	15.7	19.1	22.2	—	25.2
G13b: Lebanese women married to non-Lebanese men should be able to transfer nationality to their children	72.6	71.8	72.9	87.7	81.2	80.4	100	74.0
G13: Men are better suited to be political leaders than women	56.2	57.4	45.8	38.5	49.5	43.8	44.8	52.2
Trust in institutions								
D9: I trust the United Nations	59.5	23.5	51.5	54.9	61.4	60.1	55.2	48.6
D1: I trust the Council of Ministers	64.2	11.7	50.3	30.5	34.5	26.5	—	37.3
D3: I trust the Justice System	74.4	69.3	72.9	76.3	77.3	79.6	100	73.0
D4: I trust the Police	74.0	60.2	73.0	54.6	58.8	64.0	44.8	64.7
D11: I trust Parliament	54.2	59.3	42.6	38.6	47.5	45.8	—	52.0
D14b: I trust Religious Institutions	73.3	74.7	71.6	67.4	85.6	79.7	100	75.0
D8: Trust in Political Parties	30.4	37.9	34.8	27.5	43.6	40.7	—	36.0

Other Communities

F9b: I would like to study in a school with students from my own religious community	24.8	28.0	20.4	27.8	27.6	27.2	—	25.8
G14b: Marriage of a female to a male of a different religion is acceptable	50.6	59.1	38.5	64.4	61.0	65.7	44.8	56.4
F1b: Running for parliamentary elections and voting in these elections should be sanctioned by religious authorities	30.4	31.0	31.1	44.1	42.4	36.5	—	33.8
F3b: Ministries and public positions should be subdivided amongst community leaders equally	77.3	70.3	77.3	74.9	73.4	73.6	100	73.5
F7b: The three main governmental positions should be divided amongst the leaders of the three main religious communities	64.8	62.5	72.3	65.8	69.0	69.1	—	65.3
F8b: It is important to carry out activities with schools unlike ours	85.5	85.3	81.5	85.6	86.9	85.6	100	85.2

Based on a survey conducted by UNDP and the MEHE on 3111 9th grade students in 113 public and private schools in the 6 mohafazat.

Youth and Citizenship: Attitudes of 14-15 year old by School Sector 2007-2008 ⁱⁱ

Socio-economic role of the State	Private (%)	Public (%)
C1: Insure employment for everyone who requires it	60.6	39.4
C3: Provide basic health care for all	62.8	37.2
C4: Insure an adequate standard of living for the elderly	62.9	37.1
C6: Insure an adequate standard of living for the unemployed	65.1	34.9
C7: To reduce differences in income and wealth among people	64.7	35.3
Lebanese System - Students who agreed with the following statements		
I16b: Citizens should be allowed to use public spaces and parks as they wish	22.3	17.8
I17b: Restaurant owners should be prevented from placing their chairs and tables on pavements and using them for their own benefit	56.5	54.2
I13b: Ministries in Lebanon carry out their duties towards their citizens	34.1	33.2
A good citizen is		
B2: Votes in every election	79.4	81.5
B3: Joins a political party	47.7	46.9
B7: Is ready to serve in the army to defend the country	89.9	94.0
B9: Participates in activities that help the community	91.4	91.6
B15: Ready to ignore a law that violates human rights	38.5	39.6

Good for democracy

A1: When everyone has the right to express their opinions freely	89.6	88.4
A2: When differences in income and wealth between the rich and the poor are small	35.4	23.4
A6: When one company owns all the newspapers	13.7	16.6
A7: When people demand their political and social rights	88.8	88.5
A4: When newspaper are free of all government [state, political] control	19.9	11.3

Trust in Institutions

D1: Council of ministers	36.8	38.1
D8: Political parties	36.6	35.0
D11: Parliament	50.0	55.2
D13b: Public schools	79.9	61.7

Based on a survey conducted by UNDP and the MEHE on 3111 9th grade students in 113 public and private schools in the 6 mohafazat.

B.13 ENVIRONMENT

Environmental Protection Index (EPI), July 2008^{kk}

Rank				90
Score				70.3
Objectives				
	Environmental health			95.5
	Ecosystem vitality			45
Data and proximity to target	Value	Proximity to target	Target	
	Urban particulates (PM10)	41.839	81.6	20 ug/m3
	Environmental burden of disease (DALYs)	2	96.4	0
	Indoor air pollution	5	94.7	0%
	GHG emissions per capita	5.4	93.9	2.24 Mt CO ₂ eq.*
	Emissions per electricity generation (CO2KWH)	667	28.1	0 g CO ₂ per kWh

Environmental Sustainability

Forest area		
	Percentage total land, 2005 ^{**jj}	13.2
	Thousand sq km, 2005 ^{ll}	1.39
	Average annual change (%), 1990-2005 ^c	0.8
Land area protected to maintain biological biodiversity (%), 2003 ^{mm}		2.0
Number of environmentally preserved sites, 2005 ^{***nn}		49 sites
Percent agricultural land /land area (%), 2003 ^{mm}		32.0
Total renewable fresh water from conventional sources (millions cubic meters/year), 2003 ^{mm}		2,267
Number of quarries, 2005 ⁿⁿ		1000
Households with access to public drinking water network, 2004-2005 ^a		56.7
Households with access to public sanitation water network, 2004-2005 ^a		67.4
Access to sewage networks, 2004 - 2005 ^a		69.2

Access to drinking water by network, 2004-2005 (%) ^a	
Public	56.7
Private	2.1
Artesian	8.1
Mineral	31.8
Number of landfills, 2001 ^{mm}	2.0
Quantity of waste dumped in landfills, 2004 (%) ⁿⁿ	77.0
Hazardous waste production/Year, 2002 ^{oo}	100,494
Species that are rare or endangered (Fauna), 2006 ^{ll}	36 species
Species that are rare or endangered (Flora), 2006 ^{ll}	0 species
Annual energy consumption (as proxy of energy efficiency), 2006 ^{pp}	4,168,931 metric tons
Electricity consumption per capita (% change), 1990-2004 ^c	3.7
Electrification rate (%), 2006 ^c	100
Energy generated from renewable sources (percent), 2005 ^{pp}	1.13
CO ₂ emissions, total (Mt CO ₂), 2004 ^{+c}	16.3
Emission of green house gases, 1999 ⁿⁿ	18,147.5 Gg CO ₂ equivalent
GHG emission per capita, 2007 ^{kk}	93.9
Consumption of agents that deplete the ozone layer ^{kk}	
Consumption of ozone-depleting CFCs, 2006 ⁺⁺	224.3
Consumption of ozone-depleting HFCs, 2006 ⁺⁺⁺	21.3
Consumption of ozone-depleting Methyl Bromide, 2006 ⁺⁺⁺⁺	44.3

Notes:

* Estimated value associated with 50% reduction in global GHG emissions by 2050, against 1990 levels

**The impact of the severe fires in the last 2 years are not considered in this figure.

***This includes 8 Nature Reserves, 24 Natural sites, 5 Himas, 12 Protected Forests. Another 14 touristic sites are also protected. For more information see <http://www.moe.gov.lb/ProtectedAreas/categories.htm>

⁺Refers to carbon dioxide emissions stemming from consumption of solid, liquid and gaseous fossil fuels as well as from gas flaring and the production of cement. Original values were reported in terms of metric carbon tonnes. In order to convert these values to metric tonnes of carbon dioxide a conversion factor of 3.664 (relative molecular weights 44/12) has been applied.

⁺⁺Consumption of Ozone-Depleting CFCs is the sum of the consumption of the weighted tons of the individual substances in the group—metric tons of the individual substance (defined in the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer) multiplied by its ozone-depleting potential. Ozone-depleting substances are any substance containing chlorine or bromine that destroys the stratospheric ozone layer. The stratospheric ozone absorbs most of the biologically damaging ultraviolet radiation. The consumption of CFCs is the national production plus imports, minus exports, minus destroyed quantities, minus feedstock uses of individual CFCs. National annual consumption of CFCs is the sum of the weighted tons (consumption in metric tons multiplied by the estimated ozone-depleting potential) of the individual CFCs.

⁺⁺⁺Ozone-depleting substances are any substance containing chlorine or bromine that destroys the stratospheric ozone layer. The stratospheric ozone absorbs most of the biologically damaging ultraviolet radiation. Hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) were developed as the first major replacement for CFCs. While much less destructive than CFCs, HCFCs also contribute to ozone depletion. They have an atmospheric lifetime of about 1.4 to 19.5 years.

⁺⁺⁺⁺Ozone-depleting substances are any substance containing chlorine or bromine that destroys the stratospheric ozone layer. The stratospheric ozone absorbs most of the biologically damaging ultraviolet radiation. Methyl bromide (CH₃Br) is used as a fumigant for high-value crops, pest control, and quarantine treatment of agricultural commodities awaiting export. Total world annual consumption is about 70,000 tonnes, most of it in the industrialized countries. It takes about 0.7 years to break down. used as a fumigant for high-value crops, pest control, and quarantine treatment of agricultural commodities awaiting export. Total world annual consumption is about 70,000 tonnes, most of it in the industrialized countries. It takes about 0.7 years to break down.

B.14 IMPACT OF CONFLICT (2006)

Impact of the July 2006 Military Offensive on Lebanon⁹⁹

Human losses		
Number of people killed *		1,214
Number of people injured **		4,630
Number of Internally Displaced People (IDPs)		1,000,000
Economic losses		
Value of lost assets		\$2.8 billion
Number of housing units/sections (damaged/destroyed)		117,661
Number of boats destroyed		328
Million square meters of mine affected area		41.7
Number of industrial enterprises damaged		142
Damage to tourism infrastructure		
Cafes, restaurants, hotels & accommodations		78
Swimming resorts		19
Travel agencies & car rental		48
Social losses		
Health facilities damaged		46
Education facilities damaged (Public & Private Schools)		342
Schools used as camps for IDPs		587
School children affected		400,000
Number of unexploded ordinances (UXOs), 2006*		
Spread over an estimated area of 32 million squared meters contaminated large swathes of agricultural land		1.2 million

Estimated Costs of Direct and Indirect Impact of August War (in US\$ million)^{rr}

Infrastructure sectors	Direct Impact	Indirect Impact	Total
Housing	1,800	100	1,900
Energy	84	5-8	89-92
Water	65		65
Transport	135	95	230
Municipal	80		80
Agriculture and irrigation	212	470 - 475	682 - 687
Social sectors			
Education	44	43	87
Health	12	16 - 78	28 - 90
Pensions	4	13 - 26	17 - 30
Total	2,436	742 - 825	3,178 - 3,256
Labor			
Direct job losses	—	—	120,000
Population estimation who left the country	—	—	200,000
Persisting employment losses	—	—	30,000
Increase in pre-conflict unemployment (%)	—	—	3.0

Overall cost of environmental degradation caused by the July 2006 hostilities in Lebanon^{ss}

	US\$ million average	% of GDP
Waste	290.2	1.4
Oil spill	203.1	1.0
Water	131.4	0.6
Quarries	95.5	0.5
Forests	8.9	0.0
Air	N/A	N/A
Total environmental cost caused by hostilities	729	3.6

Notes: *Includes 1,187 death from July/August 2006 war, and 27 from cluster munitions & UXOs.

**Includes 4,398 injured from July/August 2006 war, and 232 from cluster munitions & UXOs.

B.15 REFUGEES

Palestinian Refugees^{tt}

Demographic		
Palestinian refugees registered in Lebanon, 2001 (UNRWA)		383,000
Live in camps		214,000
Refugees live outside the camps		168,000
Lebanese authorities		400,000
Living in urban areas (%)		73.0
Dependency ratio (%)		72.0
Mother and child health indicators		
Total fertility rate		3.0 children per women
Mortality rates		32 per thousand live births
Under 5 child mortality		37.3 per thousand live births
Prenatal maternity care (%)		
Visit a medical doctor		58.0
See a midwife		40.0
Go to a nurse		8.0
Do not receive any prenatal care		5.0
Post-Natal child care		55.0
Unemployment rate (%)		17.0
Activity rate (%)		
Male		69.0
Female		16.0
Education / Distribution by gender		
	Literates (%)	Illiterates (%)
Male	87.7	12.3
Female	74.4	25.6
Education / Distribution by age		
15-28	93.0	7.0
30-43	89.2	10.8
45+	48.9	51.1
Total	80.8	19.2
Poverty (%)		
	Ultra poor	Poor
Camps	15.0	36.2
Gathering	13.2	31.3

2. Iraqi Refugees^{uu}

Estimation of the Iraqi population in Lebanon, 2007* (number)			
	Using UNHCR data		26,368
	Using General Security Office (GSO) data		50,000
Legal Status (%)		Legal	Illegal
	All individuals	33.0	67.0
	Male	29.0	71.0
	Female	41.0	59.0
Demographics			
Age/Sex distribution ** (%)			
	Male		30.1
	Female		42 (19 years or less)
Educational status and school enrollment: 40% of individuals under 18 years did not complete elementary level; this is consistent with age distribution of individuals where the majority are infants and young children from 0 to 4 yrs old.			
Working status (%)	Employed	Seasonal employment	Unemployed
Working youth (under 18years)			
	Male	25.0	5.0
	Female	10.0	5.0

Notes: *Taking into consideration the time factor, there are indications of a decline of entry to Lebanon between 2006 and 2007. However in comparison to 2005 there is a net estimated increase.

**The Iraqi population in Lebanon is a young population where 60% are 29 yrs of age or less **

Sources for Human Development Indicators

HDI

Column1: Life expectancy at birth: UNDP, 2008 HDR, *A Statistical Update*; Column 2-3, calculations based on raw data of MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2004 *Living Conditions of Households Survey*; Column 4, GDP per capita: World Bank [2008] data made available to the NHDR

HDI- By gender

Column1: Life expectancy at birth: UNDP, 2008 HDR, *A Statistical Update*; Column 2-3, calculations based on raw data of the MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2004 *Living Conditions of Households Survey*; Column 4, GDP per capita replaced by estimated earned income: calculated based on World Bank [2008] and CAS data made available to the NHDR

HPI-1

Column1: Probability at birth of not surviving till 40: UNDP, 2007 HDR, *Fighting Climate Change*; Adult literacy rate: calculated from the raw data of the MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2004 *Living Conditions of Households Survey*; Under weight children under age five: League of Arab States, MOSA, CAS, 2004, *Lebanon Family Health Survey*; Population not using improved water sources, UNDP, 2007 HDR, *Fighting Climate Change*

HPI-2

Probability of Survival: UNDP, 2008, HDR, *A Statistical Update*; Individuals lacking functional literacy skills: calculated from the raw data of the calculations based on raw data of the MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2004 *Living Conditions of Households Survey*; Long unemployment (15+ yrs): calculated from the raw household data of the 2004 *Living Conditions of Households Survey*, MoSA, CAS, UNDP (2004); Population living below 50% of median income was calculated from the raw data of the MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2004 *Living Conditions of Households Survey*,

GDI

Life expectancy at birth: UNDP, 2008 HDR, *A Statistical Update*; Estimated earned income calculated using World Bank, MoF and Mosa, CAS, UNDP data made available to the NHDR; Adult literacy, combined gross enrolment ratios, share of population: MoSA, CAS, UNDP (2006) *Living Conditions of Households Survey*

GEM

Female legislators, senior officials and managers, female professional and technical workers from MOSA, CAS, UNDP (2006) ratio of estimated income, calculations by NHDR based on national sources

Sources for Other Human Development Tables

- a: MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006, *Living Conditions of Households: The National Survey of Household Living Conditions 2004*
- b: Calculated for the NHDR from the raw data of MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2004, *Living Conditions of Households*
- c: UNDP, 2007, HDR 2007-2008, *Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World*
- d: CAS, UNICEF, 2003, *State of Children in Lebanon 2000*
- e: MOET estimates. 2006 GDP is an estimate based on Ministry of Finance Annual Prospects Report 2006
- f: MoSA, UNDP, 2008, *Mapping of Living Conditions in Lebanon 2004-2005*
- g: MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2008, *Poverty, Growth and Income Distribution in Lebanon*
- h: MoSA, UNDP, 2007, *Progress in Mapping of Living Conditions in Lebanon between 1995 and 2004: A comparative study with the Mapping of Living Condition in Lebanon 1998*
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- L: MEHE, 2000, *Compulsory Education in Lebanon; The need for Public Education*
- m: Educational Research and Development Center, 2003, *Indicators of the Educational System in Lebanon 2002*
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- o: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006
- p: MEHE, 2004: http://www.crdp.org/CRDP/Arabic/ar-statistics/STAT_AR/2005_2006/statistics20052006_Ar.htm
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- z: MoF, Budget Proposal 2007
- aa: MoPH: <http://www.public-health.gov.lb/>, Statistics Section
- bb: Ministry of Labor. Table created by CAS (2006): <http://www.cas.gov.lb/> (accessed August 2008)
- cc: United Nations Statistics Division, Key Global Indicators (accessed September 2008)
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- gg: Theodor Hanf, 2007, *E pluribus unum? Lebanese opinions and attitudes on coexistence*, Centre International des Sciences de l'Homme, International Centre for Human Sciences & Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Byblos (Jbeil)
- hh: Azza Charara Beydoun, KAFA, *The Murder of Women in the Lebanese Justice System*
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C.1 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Human Development Index (HDI)

	Human development index (HDI) value	Life expectancy at birth (years) 2000	Adult literacy rate (% aged 15 and above) 2004	Combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary education 2004 (%)	GDP per capita (PPP US\$) 2004	Life expectancy index	Education index	GDP index
Lebanon	0.747	71.30	88.50	73.40	4,452	0.77	0.83	0.63
Beirut	0.794	74.50	88.90	73.50	7,479	0.83	0.84	0.72
Mount Lebanon	0.774	73.50	91.00	75.30	5,079	0.81	0.86	0.66
North	0.705	68.50	89.20	70.40	2,862	0.73	0.83	0.56
Bekaa	0.713	69.50	82.80	73.10	3,665	0.74	0.80	0.60
South	0.734	73.10	86.90	71.90	3,274	0.80	0.82	0.58
Nabatiyeh	0.727	70.60	82.20	74.70	4,239	0.76	0.80	0.63

Note: For the sake of consistent comparison between national and governorate levels expectancy values are based on the 1996 survey and real per capita expenditures derived from the poverty and income distribution study. See Statistical Methodology for details.

Human Poverty Index (HPI-1)

	HPI	Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 (% of cohort) 2000 ^a	Adult illiteracy rate (% aged 15 and above) 2004	Population not using improved water sources 2004 ^b (%)	Under-weight children under age five 2000 ^a (%)	
	HPI-1	P1	P2	P31	P32	P3
Lebanon B	7.2	5.0	9.9	0.0	3.1	3.9
Beirut	4.4	3.0	6.1	0.0	2.2	1.5
Mount Lebanon	5.5	4.0	7.5	0.0	1.0	1.8
North	8.0	8.0	10.0	0.0	2.3	6.0
Bekaa	11.8	6.0	16.8	0.0	4.2	6.3
South	8.6	4.0	12.2	0.0	4.1	4.5
Nabatiyeh	11.7	4.0	16.7	0.0	9.8	8.2

Notes: a: Probability of survival and percentage of underweight children are based on 1996 values taken from the NHDR, 2000. No adjustments were carried out to these values as they were meant to identify regional disparities rather than depict an accurate HPI figure for the regions. Moreover any life table projections to measure life expectancy will not take into account the difference that investments in the health sector over the last 10 years may have made to mortality rates. Similarly available 2004 data for under-weight children were not used since they seem to be over reported for Beirut and under reported for the regions; the South and North in particular.

b: Differs from the standard indicator: access to improved water network for Lebanon (B); indicator used: not connected to water network.

Human Poverty Index (HPI-2)

	HPI-2	Probability at birth of not surviving to age 60 (% of cohort) 2000-2005	People lacking functional literacy skills (% aged 16-65) 2004-2005	Long-term unemployment (as % of labor force) 2006	Population living below 50% of median income 2000-2004
Lebanon	23.6	8.9	36.5	2.9	14.4
Beirut	N/A	N/A	18.1	5.1	1.001
Mount Lebanon	N/A	N/A	30.9	2.7	6.123
North	N/A	N/A	52.1	1.4	33.64
Bekaa	N/A	N/A	37.7	1.4	16.182
South	N/A	N/A	42.4	4.0	23.139
Nabatieh	N/A	N/A	49.1	5.6	6.653

Note: See Given that Lebanon did not participate in the Functional Literacy survey, we assumed that anyone with an elementary education and below was most likely suffering from functional literacy defined as the ability to understand and use printed information in daily activities at home, at work and in the community. See technical note for further explanations.

Gender Development Index Variables

	Life expectancy at birth (years) 2005		Adult literacy rate (% aged 15 and above) 2004-2005		Combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary education 2004-2005 (%)		Estimated earned income (PPP \$US) 2004-2005 ^a		Share of population 2004-2005	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Lebanon	73.7	69.4	83.9	93.3	74.2	72.6	4,537	15,942	0.502	0.498
Beirut	N/A	N/A	83.1	96.2	70.6	76.5	N/A	N/A	0.541	0.459
Mount Lebanon	N/A	N/A	86.7	95.2	75.5	75.2	N/A	N/A	0.493	0.507
North	N/A	N/A	86.2	92.5	72.5	68.3	N/A	N/A	0.501	0.499
Bekaa	N/A	N/A	76.5	89	74.4	72	N/A	N/A	0.493	0.507
South	N/A	N/A	82.8	91.4	74.9	68.9	N/A	N/A	0.515	0.485
Nabatieh	N/A	N/A	74.8	90.1	76.9	72.8	N/A	N/A	0.504	0.496

C.2. DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

	Beirut	Mount Lebanon	North	Bekaa	South	Nabatieh	Lebanon
Distribution of population by Mohafaza (%)							
1996 ^e	13.1	36.8	21.6	12.9	9.1	6.6	100
2004-2005 ^a	10.4	40	20.5	12.5	10.7	5.9	100
Distribution of population by Mohafaza (number)							
1996 ^e	407,403	1,145,458	670,609	399,890	283,057	205,411	3,111,828
2004-2005 ^a	390,503	1,501,570	768,709	471,209	401,197	221,846	3,755,034

C.3. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

	Beirut	Mount Lebanon	North	Bekaa	South	Nabatieh	Lebanon
Illiteracy, 2004-2005 ^a (%)	5.6	6.6	8	13.4	9.8	12.9	8.3
Immunization - Coverage of indicated shots for children aged 12 to 23 months, 2004 ^b (%)	70	52.1	36.7	25.8	55.2	42.0	45.9
Economic activity rate (15 years and above), 2004-2005 ^a (%)	511	47.2	40.0	37.7	39.7	40.8	44.0
Unemployment rate (15 years and above), 2004-2005 ^a (%)	10.0	8.5	5.0	5.5	8.5	9.6	7.9
Economic Dependency ratio, 2004-2005 ^a (%)	43.5	47.4	63.1	57.8	57.1	66.3	53.3
Distribution of doctors according to Mohafaza in 2007 ^g							
Percentage	29.0	41.3	11.0	7.2	7.8	3.8	100
Number	3381	4815	1286	838	906	441	11667
Population with no health insurance, 2004-2005 ^a (%)	38.5	45.1	65.2	58.5	62.8	64.7	53.3

C.4. REGIONAL DEPRIVATION

	Beirut	Mount Lebanon	North	Bekaa	South	Nabatieh	Lebanon
Distribution of deprived households by Mohafaza ^c (%)							
1995	7.6	29.9	26.2	15.3	10.3	10.8	100
2004	4.4	27.9	23.3	17.8	15.4	11.2	100
Deprived households, within each Mohafaza ^c (%)							
1995	15.9	23.6	42.8	39.9	36.4	50.3	30.9
2004	9.3	16.2	31.2	37.7	37.3	46.4	24.6
Unsatisfied basic needs (income related indicators) ^c *(%)							
1995	35.2	33.5	52.1	52.4	52.3	57.8	42.8
2004	42.0	43.7	61.8	58.2	63.7	60.3	51.6
Deprivation in satisfaction of living conditions, (basic needs index) 2004-2005 ^f							
Very low level of satisfaction	0.4	2.7	7.3	6.4	5.6	9.3	4.4
Very low and low level of satisfaction	9.0	22.2	42.4	33.5	44.5	50.1	29.7
Deprivation in money metric welfare ^f							
% of the poor using lower PL	0.7	3.8	17.8	10.8	11.6	2.2	8.0
% of the poor using upper PL	5.9	19.6	52.6	29.4	42.2	19.2	28.6
Proportion of poor population in the total population	10.4	39.9	20.7	12.7	10.5	5.9	100
Distribution of poverty groups (2004-2005) ^d (%)							
Extremely Poor population	0.9	18.9	46.0	17.2	15.4	1.6	100
Poor population	2.6	30.5	34.9	11.4	15.6	4.9	100
Entire poor population (extremely poor and poor)	2.1	27.3	38.0	13.0	15.6	4.0	100
Poverty measures by governorate (2004-2005) ^d							
Extremely poor							
The head count index (P0)	0.67	3.79	17.75	10.81	11.64	2.18	7.97
The poverty gap index (P1)	0.07	0.69	3.65	1.81	2.00	0.21	1.50
The poverty severity index (P2)	0.01	0.21	1.08	0.53	0.53	0.05	0.43

Entire Poor Population

The head count index (P0)	5.85	19.56	52.57	29.36	42.21	19.19	28.55
The poverty gap index (P1)	0.95	4.45	18.54	8.05	11.35	3.97	8.15
The poverty severity index (P2)	0.24	1.52	8.63	3.06	4.22	1.26	3.23

Note: Economic deprivation indicator relates to number of cars for the households, dependency ratio, main occupation of head of household.

C.5 HOUSING

	Beirut	Mount Lebanon	North	Bekaa	South	Nabatieh	Lebanon
Distribution of primary residences per Mohafaza (%)							
1996 ^e	10.9	43.5	16.8	11.4	17.3	100	100
2004-2005 ^a	11.6	42.2	18.4	11.6	10.1	5.9	100
Population density (individuals per square kilometers)							
2000-2005 ^a	21,938	884	389	110	397	212	374
Ownership of primary dwelling by place of residence and poverty status, % 2004 ^d							
Better off	44.1	67.4	82.7	93.2	76.4	91.4	71.9
Poor	25.2	52.8	80.9	90.8	72.9	92.1	71.3
Extremely poor	69.6	50.7	89.8	94.6	69.7	91.8	80.0
Total	43.3	64.5	83.4	92.9	74.6	91.6	72.4
Distribution of primary residences connected to the public service water network % (2004-2005) ^a							
	90.9	74.3	66.5	74.3	77.2	85.5	75.8
Distribution of primary residences based on source of potable water, 2004-2005 ^a							
Public network	61.7	45.8	61.5	72.3	64	66.1	56.7
Spring or running water	0.9	4.8	14.7	4.3	1.1	10.9	6.1

C.6 LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND POVERTY^d

	Beirut	Mount Lebanon	North	Bekaa	South	Nabatieh	Lebanon
Number of actual labor force							
Better off	137076	406708	107619	91004	64154	46509	853070
Poor	5857	70980	67194	21696	26502	9230	201459
Extremely poor	475	13957	27755	11805	10265	1420	65677
Total	143408	491645	202568	124505	100921	57159	1120206
Employer hiring wage earner							
Better off	4.6	6.0	4.3	11.1	3.9	4.9	5.9
Poor	0.0	1.4	0.9	4.1	0.4	1.9	1.4
Extremely poor	0.0	0.9	1.3	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.9
Total	4.4	5.2	2.8	8.8	2.7	4.3	4.8
Self employed							
Better off	18.4	25.1	25.4	38.3	31.6	43.1	26.9
Poor	33.7	32.6	32.1	40.6	33.3	44.9	34.0
Extremely poor	33.1	35.0	35.6	36.8	24.6	33.7	33.9
Total	19.0	26.5	29.0	38.6	31.1	43.1	28.6
Salaried employee							
Better off	65.5	58.3	46.9	39.0	46.0	34.2	53.7
Poor	37.7	48.3	24.1	22.2	35.4	16.0	33.9

Extremely poor	33.9	32.4	18.4	15.6	30.4	4.0	22.6
Total	64.3	56.1	35.4	33.8	41.6	30.5	48.3
Employee paid weekly, hourly							
Better off	7.2	7.3	19.7	6.0	13.0	13.5	9.5
Poor	16.9	15.5	34.3	23.0	25.7	20.1	24.1
Extremely poor	33.1	29.8	41.4	39.8	38.5	24.8	37.8
Total	7.7	9.1	27.5	12.2	18.9	14.8	13.8
Worker with family							
Better off	2.9	2.1	2.8	4.3	5.4	3.7	2.9
Poor	11.8	1.4	7.4	8.9	2.8	15.3	5.3
Extremely poor	0.0	–	2.9	7.4	2.8	25.3	3.6
Total	3.3	2.0	4.3	5.4	4.5	6.1	3.4
Volunteer							
Better off	1.4	1.1	0.9	1.4	0.4	0.7	1.1
Poor	0.0	0.8	1.3	1.3	2.4	1.9	1.2
Extremely poor	0.0	1.9	0.4	0.3	2.6	12.2	1.3
Total	1.4	1.1	0.9	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1

C.7 JUSTICE - HONOR CRIMES ^j

	Beirut	Mount Lebanon	North	Bekaa	South	Nabatieh
Geographic distribution of honor crimes from 1978 to 2004	15.2	34.8	13.6	25.8	9.1	1.5
Distribution of accused as per place of birth	12	4	20	22	30	12

Note: This study is based on a sample of 66 cases of women murdered by a relative or an associate in the 6 mohafazat of Lebanon. While not entirely representative they give an indication of the general trends in honor crimes in the country. For the distribution of the sample see page 27 of the study.

C.8 YOUTH

Working Youth (15-19), Employment and Poverty by Gender and Mohafaza^d

	Beirut	Mount Lebanon	North	Bekaa	South	Nabatieh	Lebanon
Better off							
Male	16.4	13.5	10.1	13.7	15.4	19.7	14.3
Female	8.8	4.1	1.0	4.3	5.8	0.8	4.4
Total (%)	12.7	9.2	4.6	9.2	9.7	11.1	9.4
Number of Youth	4602	8943	1282	2882	1966	1651	21324
Poor							
Male	0.0	28.2	49.3	32.8	27.3	19.1	34.9
Female	35.6	10.8	0.0	4.3	5.8	14.5	6.3
Total (%)	25.2	20.0	23.5	19.6	17.7	16.6	20.8
Number of Youth	484	5413	7692	2193	2647	776	19206
Extremely Poor							
Male	0.0	15.3	30.5	16.6	26.0	29.5	23.8
Female	50.0	19.5	0.0	8.0	2.4	0.0	4.6
Total (%)	50.0	16.6	14.7	12.8	14.1	18.9	14.9
Number of Youth	157	1250	3185	1141	1083	173	6989
Total							
Male	15.9	16.5	32.4	18.4	22.2	20.1	20.7
Female	11.4	6.2	0.4	4.9	5.2	4.4	4.9
Total (%)	13.7	11.9	14.7	12.1	13.3	12.7	12.9
Number of Youth	5243	15606	12158	6216	5696	2601	47520

Education and Citizenship: Attitudes of 14-15 year old by Mohafaza 2007-2008^k

	Beirut	Mount Lebanon	North	South	Nabatieh	Bekaa	Lebanon
Expectations of Future Political Participation							
M1: Vote in Parliamentary Elections	67.2	68.3	69.9	68.2	71.5	70.0	69.0
M3: Joining a Political party	36.7	50.6	34.3	46.7	57.5	50.9	45.9
M4: Write a letter to newspapers on political or social concerns	28.1	39.6	38.1	40.6	42.9	40.3	38.4
M5: Be a candidate for a local or city office	20.0	26.0	35.2	28.6	32.5	32.0	28.8
M9: Participate in a peaceful demonstration	67.8	69.8	66.4	73.1	76.3	74.4	70.3
M10: Spray paint slogans on the wall	8.0	9.9	11.1	14.	18.8	14.3	11.6
M11: Blocking Traffic	9.8	13.5	12.8	15.8	27.0	20.5	15.0
M12: Occupying Public Buildings	8.5	14.3	11.5	12.4	22.4	17.2	13.8
Culture of Law							
H1b: If the street is empty and the driver is in a hurry it is ok to drive the wrong way in a one way street	21.2	15	18.6	15.3	22.6	19.7	17.6
H2b: An employee who makes good money beyond his salary is smart	41.2	51.6	50.7	36.0	44.9	39.0	46.8
H3b: I am ready to participate in a school activity through which we document all incidents where the law is being broken in society and publishing these in the press	68.2	73.1	71.5	76.9	73.5	73.8	72.7
H4b: When I am 18 I would like to have a driver's license without a driver's test	27.1	26.2	22.1	25.3	26.4	29.7	25.8
H5b: A policeman should give a ticket to those who go through a red light even if it is after midnight	81.9	81.3	85.4	84.1	80.8	80.4	82.4
Trust in Institutions							
D1: Council of Ministers	43.0	37.7	45.8	23.3	19.2	37.4	37.3
D2: Local Municipality	56.5	58.0	63.1	58.2	54.8	54.9	58.3
D3: Justice System	54.7	58.2	66.5	58.3	60.0	52.9	59.0
D4: Police	58.3	62.9	73.2	64.5	67.0	60.8	64.7
D5: News on TV	46.4	47.2	43.5	50.9	46.3	44.0	46.2
D6: News on Radio	40.4	40.7	39.9	46.2	40.3	39.6	40.9
D7: News in Daily papers	46.1	46.5	45.3	47.5	46.2	42.1	45.7
D8: Political Parties	34.5	39.2	29.2	35.9	39.9	37.0	36.0
D9: United Nations	53.8	50.4	61.9	32.4	31.9	38.2	48.6
D10: Public Schools	50.6	55.8	69.6	61.6	60.0	54.7	58.9
D11: Parliament	48.6	47.4	55.3	59.0	61.4	53.3	52.0
D13: Private Schools	72.2	71.9	76.4	71.6	68.7	75.0	73.0
D14b: Religious Institutions	65.3	75.5	77.8	75.5	78.1	75.6	75.0

Gender Issues

G1: Women should run for public office and take part in government just as men do	75.1	77.4	65.5	67.1	61.7	66.6	71.2
G4: Women should have the same rights as men in every way	83.6	86.4	80.0	80.9	78.1	76.5	82.4
G6: Women should stay out of politics	19.1	21.9	31.8	23.0	30.2	28.9	25.2
G9: When jobs are scarce, men [should] have more right to a job than women	35.1	44.4	52.6	45.2	53.4	52.3	46.8
G11: Men and women should get equal pay when they are in the same jobs	88.6	92.0	88.1	89.7	88.2	87.8	89.8
G13: Men are better qualified to be political leaders than women	44.8	50.5	56.2	49.4	59.0	56.0	52.2
G3: Lebanese women married to non-Lebanese men should be able to transfer nationality to their children	75.9	79.2	71.6	75.7	67.2	69.2	74.8
G14b: It is acceptable for a girl to marry someone of a different religion	57.7	59.4	52.2	54.9	52.8	56.4	56.4
G15b: It is acceptable for a girl to marry someone of a different sect	75.3	66.4	62.9	63.8	56.5	65.1	65.6

Good for Democracy

A9: When political parties have rules that support women to become political leaders	77.0	81.6	71.6	74.1	71.0	72.1	76.4
A19: When laws that women claim are unfair to them are changed	61.0	63.7	48.5	54.2	56.6	50.8	57.2

Government Subsidized KG Schools by Region & Religious Affiliations 2006-2007^m

Region	Religious Affiliation				
	Armenian	Christian	Islamic	Druze	Private
Beirut 1	2	7	10	—	1
Beirut Direct Suburbs	4	6	7	—	36
Beirut Close Suburbs	—	8	1	—	2
Beirut Far Suburbs Keserwan and Aley	—	4	2	—	7
Jbeil/Keserwan/Matn	—	26	—	—	—
Baabda-Aley	—	5	—	3	2
Chouf	—	2	2	1	—
Tripoli City	—	4	2	—	11
Minnieh/ Dinnieh	—	2	3	—	6
Akkar	—	7	13	—	16
Zgharta, Koura and Bcharri	—	10	2	—	—
Batroun	—	4	—	—	—
Zahle City/Suburbs/Qada	—	8	4	—	11
Hermel	—	—	4	—	3
Baalbak	—	7	5	—	29

West Bekaa/Rashaya	—	5	9	1	1
Saida City/Suburbs/Qada	—	—	6	6	11
Jezzine	—	1	—	—	—
Tyr	—	1	8	—	6
Nabatieh	—	3	4	—	12
Bent Jbeil	—	—	5	—	4
Hasbaya-Marjayoun	—	1	—	2	6
Total number of Subsidized Schools (KG, Cycle 1 & 2)					379
Total of no of students in Subsidized Schools (KG, Cycle 1 & 2)					124,281
Total no. of Students in Private Schools (KG, Cycle 1 & 2)					297,931
Total no. of Students in Public Schools (KG, Cycle 1 & 2)					179,226

Note: Schools designated as private may also be affiliated with religious organizations even if not officially declared

C.9. CULTURE AND PUBLIC LIFE

Culture and communication^h

	Beirut	Mount Lebanon	North	Bekaa	South	Nabatieh	Lebanon
Internet use in the past week by governorate population age 16 years and above (%), 2004-2005	14.6	11.4	5.8	8.3	7.4	8.6	—
Read newspapers and magazines in the last past week per governorate population age 16 years and above(%), 2004-2005	41.3	33.4	12.0	25.0	32.2	36.8	—
Practicing cultural and artistic activities in the past year population age 16 years and above by governorates, 2004-2005	30.6	16.7	6.7	9.8	7.2	6.7	—
Practicing students and social activities in the past week by governorates population age 16 years and above, 2004-2005	30.6	16.7	6.7	9.8	7.2	6.7	—

Participation in Public Life : Civil Society organizations (CSOs)^l

	Beirut	Mount Lebanon	North	Bekaa	South	Nabatieh	Lebanon
Distribution of NGOs by Mohafaza and per 1,000 inhabitants (%)	22.0	35.0	16.0	12.0	9.0	6.0	3353
Distribution of NGOs by Mohafaza and per 1,000 inhabitants (Numbers)	723	1188	529	408	294	211	3353
Distribution of NGOs by Mohafaza and per 1,000 inhabitants	1.49	0.8	0.74	0.79	0.74	0.91	3830.37
Founding period of NGOs by Mohafaza (%)							
Mandate period (earliest 1710-1943)	6.0	4.0	5.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	4.0
Post-Mandate (1944-1974)	18.0	22.0	25.0	24.0	25.0	19.0	22.0
Civil war (1975-1990)	21.0	19.0	21.0	20.0	20.0	19.0	20.0
Post-War (1991-2000)	35.0	36.0	33.0	42.0	43.0	40.0	37.0
2000-2006	19.0	19.0	16.0	13.0	12.0	20.0	17.0
Base	711	1,162	514	394	289	206	3,276
General character of the NGO (%)							
General	66.0	59.0	78.0	62.0	64.0	50.0	64.0

Local	16.0	20.0	10.0	18.0	9.0	21.0	17.0
Family	6.0	12.0	6.0	10.0	16.0	15.0	10.0
Other	7.0	4.0	3.0	4.0	8.0	11.0	5.0
Religious	4.0	5.0	3.0	5.0	4.0	2.0	4.0
Base	665	1142	486	373	281	201	3148

Percentage of NGO's with self declared sectarian affiliation by Mohafaza

Non Sectarian	82.0	75.0	85.0	79.0	82.0	75.0	79.0
Sectarian affiliation	18.0	25.0	15.0	21.0	18.0	25.0	21.0
Base	577	1007	486	373	231	162	2836

NGO services by Mohafaza (%)

Scientific & cultural activities	54.0	57.0	52.0	51.0	54.0	52.0	62.0
Artistic & recreational activities	50.0	39.0	52.0	49.0	62.0	47.0	62.0
Social services	50.0	44.0	55.0	51.0	43.0	55.0	45.0
Aid and relief activities	47.0	37.0	47.0	49.0	52.0	51.0	58.0
Awareness raising in various fields	36.0	29.0	34.0	37.0	39.0	38.0	52.0
Capacity building activities	35.0	30.0	35.0	36.0	37.0	35.0	45.0
Protection of the environment	33.0	17.0	33.0	35.0	45.0	35.0	51.0
Health services	29.0	23.0	28.0	39.0	32.0	23.0	33.0
Protection of rights	20.0	19.0	19.0	17.0	17.0	27.0	32.0
Participation in conferences	12.0	20.0	10.0	9.0	12.0	11.0	11.0
Participation in training programs	11.0	18.0	9.0	7.0	12.0	12.0	10.0
Empowerment activities	11.0	9.0	9.0	13.0	10.0	11.0	24.0
Activities outside Lebanon	2.0	4.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	1.0
Base	3353	723	1188	529	408	294	211

*Note: Multiple answers are possible.

Sources for Human Development Indicators

HDI

Column 1: UNDP, NHDR 2000; Column 2-3, calculations based on raw data of the 2004 *Living Conditions of Households Survey* (MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2004-2005); Column 4, GDP per capita is replaced by mean of nominal per capita expenditure from UNDP, 2008, *Poverty, Growth and Income Distribution in Lebanon*. Beirut, Lebanon.

HPI-1

Probability at birth of not surviving till 40: Ministry of Social Affairs, United Nations Population Fund. 2000, *Analytical Studies of Population and Housing Survey*. Beirut. Lebanon; Adult literacy rate: calculated from the raw data of the *Living Conditions of Households Survey*, MoSA, UNDP, CAS (2004); Under weight children under age of five: League of Arab States, MOSA, CAS (1996), *Lebanon Health Survey for Mother and Child, PAPCHILD*; Population not using improved water sources, MoSA, CAS, UNDP (2006) *Living Conditions of Households*

HPI-2

Probability of Survival: UNDP, 2008, *A Statistical Update*; Individuals Lacking Functional literacy skills: calculated from the raw data of the calculations based on raw data of the 2004 *Living Conditions of Households Survey*, MoSA, UNDP, CAS (2004); Long unemployment (15+ yrs): calculated from the raw data of the 2004 *Living Conditions of Households Survey*, MoSA, CAS UNDP (2004); Population living below 50% of median income was calculated from the raw expenditure data of the 2004 *Living Conditions of Households Survey*, MoSA, CAS, UNDP (2004)

GDI

life expectancy at birth: <http://hdrstats.undp.org/indicators/270.html>; Estimated earned income calculated using World Bank, MoF and MoSA, CAS, UNDP sources; Adult literacy, Combined Gross enrolment ratios, Share of population: MoSA, CAS, UNDP (2006) *Living Conditions of Households Survey*

Sources All other tables:

- a: MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006, *Living Conditions of Households: the National Survey of Household Living Conditions 2004*, (Beirut, Lebanon)
- b: League of Arab States, MoSA, CAS, 2004, *Pan Arab Family Health Survey*, (Beirut, Lebanon)
- c: MoSA, UNDP, 2007, *Progress in Mapping of Living Conditions in Lebanon between 1995 and 2004: A comparative study with the Mapping of Living Condition in Lebanon 1998* (Beirut, Lebanon)
- d: MoSA, UNDP, 2008a, *Poverty, Growth and Income distribution in Lebanon*, (Beirut, Lebanon)
- e: MoSA, UNFPA, 2000, *Analytical Studies of Population and Housing Survey*, (Beirut, Lebanon)
- f: MoSA, UNDP, 2008b, *Mapping of Living Conditions (2004-2005) in Lebanon*, (Beirut, Lebanon)
- g: Data provided by the Lebanese Order of Physicians for Lebanon and the north for the NHDR, 2008
- h: Calculated for the NHDR from the raw data of the MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006, *Living Conditions of Households: the National Survey of Household Living Conditions 2004*, (Beirut, Lebanon)
- i: MoSA, UNDP, Fafo, 2004, *The Social and Economic Status in Lebanon: Reality and Prospects*, (Beirut, Lebanon)
- j: Charara-Beydoun, KAFA, 2008, *The Murder of Women in the Lebanese Justice System*, (Beirut, Lebanon)
- k: UNDP, MEHE, 2008, *Education and Citizenship in Lebanon, Concepts, Attitudes, Actions of ninth grade students*, (Beirut, Lebanon)
- l: MoSA, CDR, 2008, *Evaluation of the Non-Governmental Organisations National Survey : A Community Development Project of the Council of Reconstruction and Development* (Draft report) prepared by Karin Seyfert based on field work implemented by Etudes et Consultations Economiques (ECE) in association with PADECO Co. Ltd.
- m: MEHE made available to the NHDR

VULNERABLE GROUPS IN LEBANON

D.1 GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION

	Disabled	Female head of household	Unemployed	Working children	Elderly	Fishermen Agricultural workers
Beirut	8.9	17.4	16.7	9.2	15.8	0.3
Mount Lebanon	38.8	41.6	48.1	31.6	39.7	15.3
North	12.2	14.6	11.3	27.5	14.1	27.3
Bekaa	15.5	8.3	7.4	12.8	14.3	29.2
South	16.0	11.6	10.1	12.6	9.5	13.2
Nabatieh	8.6	6.4	6.3	6.3	6.7	14.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

D.2 DEMOGRAPHY

	Disabled	Female heads of household	Unemployed	Working children	Elderly	Fishermen Agricultural workers
Number						
Male	47265	—	69314	37673	142653	69648
Female	26631	124461	27323	8922	139599	5629
Total	73896	—	96637	46595	282251	75277
Percentage						
Male	64.0	—	71.7	80.9	50.5	88.5
Female	36.0	100	28.3	19.1	49.5	11.5
Total	100.0	—	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number of Individuals in household (%)						
1-5 members	83.3	95.3	70.0	97.7	90.9	81.1
2-10 members	16.4	4.7	29.5	2.2	9.1	18.6
11 + members	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.1	—	0.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	—
Age groups						
0-4	1.9	—	—	—	—	—
5-9	5.1	—	—	—	—	—
10-14	6.3	—	—	11.7	—	0.8
15-19	5.7	0.1	0.1	88.3	—	3.3
20-24	7.3	1.2	2.2	—	—	6.8
25-29	4.4	1.4	17.1	—	—	6.1
30-34	6.0	1.9	30.1	—	—	6.0
35-39	7.8	4.3	16.5	—	—	7.7
40-44	7.9	6.4	9.7	—	—	6.5
45-49	5.6	8.4	6.3	—	—	7.4
50-54	5.2	9.4	6.0	—	—	7.6
55-59	3.9	11.1	3.5	—	—	6.3
60-64	5.5	13.1	2.8	—	—	8.6
65-69	7.2	13.0	1.5	—	40.0	11.3

70-74	7.4	14.8	1.9	—	29.7	10.6
75-79	5.5	8.7	1.6	—	17.5	6.8
80-84	4.4	4.2	0.6	—	9.5	3.1
85+	2.8	1.8	0.3	—	3.3	1.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Social Status

Never married	50.6	13.7	80.5	5.6	4.6	22.3
Married	37.7	3.4	17.3	33.9	64.4	71.5
Widowed	10.1	76.6	0.6	51.4	30.0	5.8
Divorced	1.3	4.5	1.0	8.1	0.7	0.3
Seperated	0.3	1.9	0.5	0.9	0.2	0.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

D.3 HEALTH

	Disabled	Female heads of household	Unemployed	Working children	Elderly	Fishermen Agricultural workers
Medical insurance (%)						
No	68.9	60.6	94.4	97.1	50.0	82.3
Yes	31.1	39.3	4.3	2.8	49.3	17.7
Total	100.0	99.9	1.4	0.1	99.3	100.0
Having physical, mental, or any health condition lasted or could last for 6 months or more, restricting the ability to function as an equal aged normal person (%)						
Yes	100.0	95.8	98.9	96.2	92.2	95.1
No	—	4.1	1.1	0.1	7.1	4.9
		99.9	100.0	96.2	99.3	100.0
Number of chronic diseases (%)						
None	53.4	34.9	88.7	97.1	29.7	64.1
1.0	24.4	26.6	8.1	—	30.2	20.4
2.0	11.8	20.8	1.8	2.8	21.3	8.4
3.0	7.3	11.2	0.8	0.1	12.4	5.3
4.0	2.0	4.2	0.3	—	4.6	1.6
5.0	1.1	2.3	0.2	—	1.8	0.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

D.4 EDUCATION

	Disabled	Female heads of household	Unemployed	Working children	Elderly	Fishermen Agricultural workers
Literacy						
Literate	60.2	63.9	97.1	92.8	58.5	68.9
Illiterate	38.2	35.9	2.7	2.3	41.4	31.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	—	100.0

Education level attained

Reads and writes	10.2	11.4	3.5	3.1	18.8	18.2
KG	0.9	0.5	0.6	2.1	0.5	0.7
Elementary	20.4	23.8	28.3	49.5	21.8	33.2
Intermediary	10.9	13.0	25.3	28.9	7.9	12.2
Secondary	3.0	8.4	10.9	4.0	4.9	3.3
University level	2.0	5.3	13.9	0.1	4.0	0.6
BP	0.2	0.1	0.9	1.5	0.2	0.2
BT	1.0	0.7	5.8	2.4	0.3	0.3
TS	0.5	0.4	3.1	0.3	0.2	0.1
LT	—	0.1	0.5	—	0.1	0.1

D.5 SATISFACTION OF LIVING CONDITIONS

	Disabled	Female heads of household	Unemployed	Working children	Elderly	Fishermen Agricultural workers
Satisfaction levels for living conditions index with- out recreational						
Very low and low levels of satisfaction	50.7	39.5	44.8	8.3	38.4	66.3
Medium level of satisfaction	38.6	38.2	42.2	28.8	40.5	29.1
High and very high levels of satisfaction	10.7	22.3	13.0	47.3	21.1	4.5
Total	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9	99.9

D.6 HOUSING

	Disabled	Female heads of household	Unemployed	Working Children	Elderly	Fishermen Agricultural workers
Area per capita recoded into 5 categories						
30m ² and less per capita	63.0	20.3	75.6	84.2	34.4	58.2
31-80 m ² per capita	32.6	20.4	22.6	0.2	51.2	36.5
81-140 m ² per capita	3.7	15.6	1.1	34.7	11.1	4.3
141-200 m ² per capita	0.6	4.7	0.5	65.3	2.0	0.7
201+ m ² per capita	0.0	1.5	99.9	100.0	0.8	0.2
Total	99.9	99.8	0.1	—	99.6	99.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	—	100.0	—
Status of residence						
Rent	19.8	0.7	75.6	81.4	19.3	4.8
Confiscation	0.6	0.4	22.6	9.5	0.7	1.2
Donated by the employer	0.6	4.6	1.1	2.3	0.5	1.8
Donated by the family	4.2	0.3	0.5	1.6	2.3	2.1
Other	0.8	32.6	99.9	0.7	0.4	0.4
Total	26.1	67.4	0.1	95.6	23.2	10.3
Missing	73.9	100.0	100.0	4.4	76.8	89.7
Total	100.0	—	—	100.0	100.0	—

D.7 SOCIAL NETWORKS AND ACTIVITIES

	Disabled	Female heads of household	Unemployed	Working children	Elderly	Fishermen- Agricultural workers
Has read during the past week						
Does not practice	85.8	80.7	31.6	86.3	82.0	91.8
Less than 2 hrs	7.8	11.7	0.5	5.9	10.0	6.3
2 to less than 5 hrs	2.7	4.5	0.9	1.7	4.2	1.2
5 to less than 10 hrs	0.9	1.8	2.3	1.4	2.0	0.3
10 hrs or more	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.4	1.1	0.3
Has used the internet during the past week						
Does not practice	96.3	97.5	65.0	94.9	98.6	99.1
Less than 2 hrs	1.1	1.2	22.2	0.5	0.3	0.4
2 to less than 5 hrs	0.1	0.8	6.6	0.3	0.1	0.2
10 hrs or more	0.1	0.1	2.8	95.8	0.0	0.2
Has engaged in artistic activities during the past week						
Does not practice	96.8	98.8	84.1	92.4	98.6	99.6
Less than 2 hrs	0.2	0.4	7.7	1.0	0.1	0.2
2 to less than 5 hrs	0.2	0.1	4.9	0.9	0.1	0.1
5 to less than 10 hrs	0.1	0.0	1.7	0.8	0.1	—
10 hrs or more	0.2	0.0	1.0	0.7	98.9	—
Has participated in students' or social activities during the past week						
Does not practice	94.5	95.4	96.8	93.8	94.0	95.9
Less than 2 hrs	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.4	0.8
2 to less than 5 hrs	0.6	1.3	0.5	0.9	1.5	1.0
5 to less than 10 hrs	0.6	0.4	0.9	0.1	0.5	0.5
10 hrs or more	0.8	1.2	0.1	96.0	1.5	1.5
Has engaged in political activities during the past week						
Does not practice	96.7	99.1	93.4	62.8	98.0	95.8
Less than 2 hrs	0.3	0.1	1.3	15.8	0.5	3.3
2 to less than 5 hrs	0.4	0.2	0.9	3.8	0.2	0.5
5 to less than 10 hrs	0.2	99.3	0.6	11.2	0.1	0.1
10 hrs or more	0.1	0.7	2.9	93.5	0.1	0.0

* Calculated from the raw data of MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2004-2005, *Living Conditions Survey*



GOAL 1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger

Indicator	Value	Target
Target 1A: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day		
Population living under lower PL (1.4\$/day), 1997 ^{*a}	6.3%	3.1
Population living under lower PL (2.4\$/day) ^b		4.0%
1997	10.1%	
2004-2005	8%	
Population living under upper PL (4\$/day) ^b		10.3%
1997	33.7%	
2004-2005	28.5%	
Share of the poorest 17% in national income, 1997 ^c	4.0%	
Share of the poorest 20% in total consumption, 2004-2005 ^b	7%	
Individuals living in very low conditions		3.3%
1995 ^c	6.8%	
2004-2005 ^d	3.9%	
Individuals living in low conditions		17.0%
1995 ^c	28.4%	
2004-2005 ^d	27.0%	
Gini Coefficient ^b	0.361	
Target 1B: Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people		
Growth rate of GDP per person employed (E) ^{qq}		
1996	2.35	
2006	-2.43	
Employment to Population ratio		
1997 ^a	31.1	
2004-2005 ^{e2}	40.6%	
Male	31.1%	
Female	9.4%	
Proportion of employed people living below \$1 (ppp) per day, 2005 ^{qq}	1107.23	
Proportion of own account and contributing family workers in total employment	N/A	
Target 1C: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger		
Prevalence of underweight children		2
1995 ^f	3.0%	
2004-2005 ^g	3.9%	
Severely underweight	0.6%	
Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption		0.5
1990 ^h	<2.5%	
1995 ^h	<2.5%	
2004-2005 ^b	1.10%	



GOAL 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education

Indicator	Value	Target
Target 2A: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling		
Net enrolment rate in primary education*		100
1996 ^l	97.6%	
2004-2005 ^{e1}	92.7%	
Male	93.0%	
Female	92.0%	
Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5 (primary completion rate)		100
1997 ^J	91.1%	
2000 ^J	95.3%	
2007 ^{qq}	96.3%	
Literacy rate of the 15 – 24 years age group		100
1996 ^k	98.9%	
2000 ^k	97.5%	
2004-2005 ^{e2}	96.8%	
Male	98.3%	
Female	95.3%	
Public expenditure on education as a percentage of national budget, 2006 ^m		
Of budget including debt	82.0%	
From budget excluding debt	14.0%	
Government expenditure on education as percentage of GDP, 2006 ⁿ	3.0%	



GOAL 3: Promote Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women

Indicator	Value	Target
Target 3A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and all levels of education not later than 2015		
Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education, 2006-2007 ^{o**}	102.1	100
Ratio of literate females to males (15-24) ^{***}		100
1996	94.2%	
2004-2005	91.6%	
All age groups ^{e2}		
1996	97.5%	
2004-2005	96.0%	
Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector		
1995 ^p	14.2%	
2004-2005 ^{e2}	32.4%	

The proportion of women employed as salaried workers 2004 - 2005^{e2}

Of employed women	87.5%
Of all actual labor force	20.4%

Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament

1995 ^k	2.3%
1999 - 2000 ^k	2.3%
2005 ^l	4.7%



GOAL 4: Reduce Child Mortality

Indicator	Value	Target
Target 4A: Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five child mortality rate		
Under five mortality rate (per 1,000)		12
1996 ^f	32.0%	
2000 ^g	35.0%	
2004-2005 ^g	19.1%	
Male	14.8%	
Female	22%	
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000)		10
1996 ^f	28.0%	
2000 ^g	27.0%	
2004-2005 ^g	18.6%	
Male	13.2%	
Female	19.2%	
Proportion of children under one year immunized against DPT (%)		95
1996 ^g	94.2%	
2000 ^g	93.6%	
2006 ^f	98.0%	
Proportion of children under two years immunized against MMR (immunization against measles, mumps and rubella) (%)		90
1996 ^g	88.0%	
2000 ^g	79.2%	
2004 ^g	53.4% of children aged 12-23 months completed their vaccines for measles	



GOAL 5: Improve Maternal Health

Indicator	Value	Target
Target 5A: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 , and 2015, the maternal mortality rates		
Maternal mortality rate**** for every 100,000 live-births		26
1996 ^f	104.0%	
2004-2005 ^g	86.3%	

Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel		98
1996 ^s	96.0%	
2004-2005 ^g	98.2%	
Contraceptive prevalence rate modern and traditional, 2004-2005 ^g	74.0%	
Adolescent birth rate per 1000 women (15-19 years of age), 2004 ^g		
Pregnant women or first time mothers	1.9%	
Antenatal care coverage (at least one visit), 2004-2005 ^g	96.0%	
Unmet need for family planning	N/A	



GOAL 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other Diseases

Indicator	Value	Target
Target 6A: Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/ AIDS		
HIV prevalence among pregnant women aged 15-24		
1996 ^t	24.0%	
2007 ^u	zero	
Target 6A: Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/ AIDS		
Prevalence of tuberculosis (per 100,000)		
2001 ^t	13	
2005 ⁿ	12	
Proportion of TB cases detected and cured under DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment Short Course)		
2001 ^t	100%	
2004 - 2005 ⁿ	90.0%	
Cured	74.0%	
Detected		



GOAL 7: Environmental Sustainability

Indicator	Value	Target
Target 7A & B: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources		
Proportion of land covered by forests		
1996 ^v	13.0%	
2005 ^w	13.3%	
Land area protected to maintain biological diversity		
1992 ^x	0.2%	
2000 ^x	2.0%	
2003 ^y	2.0%	

Annual energy consumption (as proxy of energy efficiency)		
2006 ^{aa} (metric tons)		4,168,931
Consumption of agents that deplete the ozone layer (tons)		
1999 ^{bb}		
CFC		527.3
MeBR		202
2006 ^{cc}		
CFCs		224.3
HFCs		21.3
MeBR		44.3
Total		224.3
Emission of green house gases		
1994 ^{dd} (gigagram CO ₂)		15,874.82
1999 ^{ee} (Gg CO ₂ equivalent)		18,147.5
Energy generated from renewable sources (percent)		
1997 ^{ff}		1.6%
2005 ^{aa}		1.13

Target 7C: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water

Proportion of dwellings with sustainable access to water (drinking water)		90
1996 ^{gg}	79.30%	
2004-2005 ^e		
Connected to public networks of drinking water	56.7%	
Connected to a private network	2.1%	

Target 7D: by 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least one million slum dwellers

Proportion of dwellings with access to waste networks		
1996 ^{hh}	30.7%	
2004-2005 ^e (closed sewers)	67.4%	
Disposal of solid waste, (2000) ⁱⁱ		
Landfill	82.8%	
Conversion	5.1%	
Recycling	5.3%	



GOAL 8:

Developing a Global Partnership for Development

Indicator	Value	Target
Target 8A: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system		
Exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP,		
1990 ^k	18.0%	
1999 ^k	13.0%	
2005 ^{lj}	16.5%	

Weighted average tariffs on imports	
1995 ^k	11.4%
1999 ^k	18.6%
2006 ^{ij}	4.7%
Proportion of total country exports admitted duty free to developed countries, 2004 ^{kk}	37%
Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on agricultural products, 2006 ^{ll}	6.8%
Net foreign direct investment inflows as a percentage of GDP	
1990 ^k	0.2%
1999 ^k	1.8%
2006 ^{mm}	11.9%
Other private flows as a percentage of GDP	
1990 ^k	0.2%
1999 ^k	10.5%
2006 ^{mm}	-6.67

Target 8B & 8C not applicable

Target 8D: Deal comprehensively with the debts problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term

Net ODA as a percentage of GDP	
1990 ^k	9.1%
1999 ^k	1.2%
2006 ⁿⁿ	3.2%
Proportion of ODA to basic social services ^{oo}	
1995	11.9%
1999	16.9%
Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services	
1990 ^k	3.3%
1999 ^{qq}	27.0%
2005 ^{pp}	66.0%
Debt service as a percentage of GDP	
1990 ^k	3.5%
1999 ^k	14.6%
2005 ⁿ	16.1%

Target 8D: Develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth

Unemployment rate among 15-24 year olds	
1997 ^a	21.6%
2004-2005 ^{e2}	20.9%

Target 8E: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs

Proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on sustainable needs, 2000 ^{qq}	85
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Target 8F: Make available the benefits of new technologies especially information and communications

Telephone lines per 100 persons **** r	
2000	15.6
2006	17
Cellular subscribers per 100 population ^{ss}	
2000	8.3
2006	27.6
Internet users per 1000 population ^{ss}	
2000	8.8
2006	15.1

Notes: *Study conducted by the Center for Educational Research and Development (CERD) in 2000, based on a different population estimate (no census available). It indicates that primary enrolment rate was 91% in 1998.

**Ratio of girls to boys in primary education: 93%(1995), 100%(1999/2000), 100%(2005 Target) - CAS and UNICEF, *Status of Children in Lebanon 2000, 2003*

***Ratio of literate females to male 15-24 years old: 96.5%(1995) - MOSA and UNFPA, *Population and Housing Survey, 1996*

****Indicator reflects the time frame of 12 years before the survey

*****Land-based and cellular

E = Estimate

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RATIFIED CONVENTIONS

Status of Major International Human Rights Instruments

International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948)	1953
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965)	1971
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)	1972
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)	1972
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)	1991
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984)	2000

UN Conventions directly related to Women

Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others	1949
Women's Political Rights Convention 1953	1955
Convention on the Citizenship of Married Women 1957	1957
Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages	1962
UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education 1960, ratified by Lebanon in 1964	1964
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979)	1997

International Labor Organization (ILO) Conventions directly related to Women

Women's Right Work Convention 1948, amended by convention No 1990/171	1962
Equal Remuneration Convention 1951	1977
Women's Underground Work Convention 1937, ratified by Lebanon in 1947	1947
Convention against Discrimination in Employment and Occupation 1958	1977
Employment Policy Convention 1964	1977
Paid Educational Leave Convention, 1973	1973
Rural Workers' Organisations Convention, 1975	1975
Human Resources Development Convention, 1975	1975
Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981	1981

Select Indicators on Governance and Civil and Political Rights

Indicator *	Year	Value	Target (international)
International legal commitments to Human Rights [1]			
1. Status of ratification of, reservations to and reporting obligations under international human rights instruments	2000	5/9 main HR instruments ratified, one signed, reservations lodged to 2, 3/5 reports overdue.	Acceding to all international human rights instruments and avoiding the resort to reservations, as far as possible
2. Status of follow-up to concluding observations of UN human rights treaty bodies	2000	Poor	
Democracy and participation			
3. Periodicity of free and fair elections	1992-1996 2000	Every four years.	Free and fair elections and democratic government (WCHR)
4. Recognition in law of the right to freedom of expression, association and assembly	1999	Yes. Constitution guarantees these rights within framework of law.	
Administration of justice			
5. Recognition in law of guarantees for independent and impartial judiciary and fair trial	1999	Yes. Constitution guarantees certain aspects of independence and impartiality of judiciary and fair trial. In practice these rights, particularly the former, are violated.	Effective legislative framework, law enforcement, prosecutions, legal profession, and fair trials in conformity with international standards (WCHR)
6. Recognition in law of the right to seek judicial remedies against state agencies/officials	1999	Yes. The Majlis Al-Shura hears complaints. Though, Constitutional Council cannot consider challenges from individuals and Lebanon has not ratified the OP (individual complaints procedure) to the ICCPR	Existence of legal remedies in conformity with international standards
Security of person			
7. Recognition in law of the prohibition of gross violations of human rights affecting the security of person	1999	No. Right to life is not guaranteed in the Constitution, nor is torture banned specifically.	Elimination of gross violations of human rights affecting security of person, including torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; summary and arbitrary execution; disappearances, and slavery (WCHR)

[1] These commitments include economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights.

Women's Political Participation

Year women received right	
To vote	1952
To stand for election	1952
Year first women appointed to Parliament	1991
Women government at ministerial level (% of total) 2005	6.9
Seats in parliament held by women (% of total) 2007	4.7