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in response to the call for inputs for the report on **“The impact of toxics on Indigenous peoples”** by the Special Rapporteur on the implications for human rights of the environmentally sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and wastes

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The following responses and information are related to the impacts of hazardous substances to indigenous peoples in Brazil caused by extractive industries, particularly mining activities. We hope that the systematization of the information will contribute to the report by the Special Rapporteur.

**Combined response to questions 1 and 2 on impacts and effects of hazardous substances and toxic waste to indigenous peoples**

The main conflicts[[1]](#footnote-1) involving hazardous substances and toxics are related to activities carried out by mining industries. These situations are causing many human right violations, including: a) the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment within indigenous peoples and quilombola territories; b) the obstruction of access to water caused by contamination of waterways, the privatization of water sources by companies, and the complete depletion and pollution of water sources; c) and violations of multiple economic, social and cultural rights as described below.

In Mariana,[[2]](#footnote-2) Minas Gerais, the passage of tailings into the Rio Doce following the dam collapse resulted in water pollution, which caused a lack of access to water and supply to communities, diseases and illness, and difficulties in crop and livestock farming as well as other activities for subsistence such as fishing. Communities suffered from a loss of income, which was coupled by non-compliance with reparations by the company, whose negligence caused the collapse.

In the case of the Paraopeba River, impacts resulting from the 2019 dam collapse in Brumadinho[[3]](#footnote-3) have continued along the river and have even reached the Três Marias Plant, in the municipality of Pompéu. Studies are still being conducted about the impact caused by the disaster on communities in the 21 affected municipalities, but more recently the impact has reached a larger number of groups and communities.[[4]](#footnote-4) Those directly affected include the indigenous Pataxó Naô Xohã people, the campsites of landless families who live on the banks of the Paraopeba River, and other groups such as fishermen and local farmers.

In 2018, in Barcarena, Pará, a leak affected the tailings dam belonging to Hydro, a company that explores, extracts and processes bauxite and aluminium in the region. This leakage was due to an increase in production, which overwhelmed the structure of the dam. After the inspections, a report by the Evandro Chagas Institute attested that the level of aluminium in the surrounding rivers was 25 times higher than the amount allowed by the legislation.[[5]](#footnote-5) Even though the government could have provided temporary solutions to access safe drinking water, the population had no option but to consume and use the contaminated water. Additionally, this report also disclosed the existence of a clandestine pipeline discharging untreated effluent directly into the environment.[[6]](#footnote-6) The Mucurupí River and the Pará River were directly affected, as were at least 80 riverine, quilombola and indigenous communities in the municipalities of Barcarena and Abaetetuba.[[7]](#footnote-7) In these communities, about 40,000 people were affected by the contamination, both in terms of health due to contact with toxic residues, and in social and economic terms, due to the impact on fishing, farming, and on their livelihoods.[[8]](#footnote-8)

Mercury contamination by “*garimpos*” affects Munduruku and Yanomami indigenous people's lands and waterways. In addition to the Mundurukus, the Sai Cinza and Sawre Muybu Lands, also presents high levels of contamination.[[9]](#footnote-9) A study carried out in the middle region of the Tapajós indicates that six out of ten indigenous people have toxins above the recommended limit by health agencies.[[10]](#footnote-10) This is also the case with the Yanomami people, [[11]](#footnote-11) where mercury has been found in 56% of the women and children in the Maturacá region, in the state of Amazonas.[[12]](#footnote-12)

A project that is still in the environmental licensing stage but has already been the cause of conflict within traditional communities[[13]](#footnote-13) for about ten years, especially the Geraiszeiros, is the exploration and processing of low-grade iron ore in the north of the state of Minas Gerais, known as the Block 8 Project, in the municipalities of Grão Mogol, Padre Carvalho, Fruta de Leite, and Josenópolis. This project would affect more than 72 communities who are not consulted and are excluded from negotiations and decision-making processes. For the implementation of this project, there are plans to build an open-pit mine, a processing plant, a water pipeline, a 482 km mining pipeline to Ilhéus, in the state of Bahia, tailings dams, and a water dam on the Vacaria River for processing and transporting the ore, which is expected to flood 757 ha of land. Social movements have denounced the great impact that construction of a tailings dam would have, including: a) it puts at risk the communities downstream of the mining complex; b) the displacement of communities for the construction of the dams, the mine, and its pipeline; c) the risks of contamination resulting from this exploitation in the states of Minas Gerais and Bahia, and d) an increase in water shortage in the region that it is already heavily affected by similar projects.

In 2021, cyanide contamination was identified in bodies of water in the municipality of Pedra Branca do Amapari, in Amapá state. The contamination is suspected to have come from the tailings dam belonging to the Mina Tucano mining company, a subsidiary of Canadian Great Panther Mining Limited,[[14]](#footnote-14) which explores for gold in the region. Two streams, Silvestre and Areia, tributaries of the Amaria River, are contaminated, with impacts on the physical, biotic, and socioeconomic environments, causing fish mortality and risk for the riverside population. Due to a suspected contamination of the Amapari River, the municipality suspended the collection of water from the river, which caused a lack of water supply for the population of the municipality.

**Combined response to questions 5 and 12 on legal actions and remedies**

Many communities affected by mining disasters have not yet had full reparations for the impacts their health, their homes, and their lands have suffered. A large number of people affected are still not recognized as victims either by the government or the companies, and remain excluded from emergency aid and compensation programs. Thus, the process of reparation itself brings further human rights violations, including economic, social and cultural rights.

It has been seven years since the collapse of the Fundão dam in Mariana, and 344 families of the three destroyed communities (Gesteira, Paracatu de Baixo and Bento Rodrigues) are still waiting for their homes to be rebuilt. In the meantime, they are forced to rent other places or to live with relatives. Several families, especially in the coast of Espírito Santo, are still not recognized as having been affected. Others are being pressured to sign settlement agreements with low reparation payouts. The affected people and social movements note that the Renova Foundation, created by an agreement to implement the reparation deal, has not carried out the planned reparation measures. It is also noteworthy that most of the affected communities still do not have the right to independent technical advice, which would give them independent and impartial information to participate in the decision-making process.[[15]](#footnote-15) In addition, the outsourcing of reparations to this Foundation, controlled and maintained by the mining companies, thus lacking independence, has been generating a series of delays in the implementation of reparation measures in the affected territories and communities. The inefficiency of the Foundation was even acknowledged by the authorities when the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Minas Gerais,[[16]](#footnote-16) in February 2021, requested the closing of Renova.

In the midst of so many lawsuits[[17]](#footnote-17) in the Mariana case, and after the Brumadinho agreement was signed (as explained below), a "re-negotiation" of the Mariana/Rio Doce case began to be discussed. Once again, the conciliation meetings took place behind closed doors, without any participation of the affected communities or social control mechanisms.[[18]](#footnote-18) After numerous demands, the public hearings convened by the National Council of Justice to debate the renegotiation contemplated only a reduced number of affected people.

The non-recognition of those affected and lack of participation is also to be observed in the region affected by the Córrego do Feijão dam in Brumadinho. Several families and communities along the Paraopeba River are not considered affected due to the criteria used for this recognition. Besides this, Vale, the company responsible for the disaster, was constantly challenging the legitimacy of independent technical experts during the legal proceedings. At the end of 2019, the intention to reach a reparation agreement between the mining company Vale and the State of Minas Gerais in the case of Brumadinho became public. On 4 February 2021, the agreement[[19]](#footnote-19) was signed between the mining company, the State of Minas Gerais - represented by its Attorney General's Office - the Public Prosecutor's Office of Minas Gerais, the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office, and the Office of the Ombudsman of the State of Minas Gerais. Despite being celebrated as historic and ground-breaking in some media, the agreement[[20]](#footnote-20) has generated doubts and indignation among the affected population. This is because the agreement was negotiated in secrecy, without any participation by the affected communities.[[21]](#footnote-21) Furthermore, the instrument was signed without the proper consideration of independent assessments on the damage caused by the disaster.

Another disaster that remains unpunished and where victims are still waiting for reparation is the contamination of the water resources by Norsk Hydro in Barcarena in 2018 as mentioned before. The affected people criticize the agreement made between the company and the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office, since the latter does not oblige the company to clean, restore and decontaminate the water courses and the agreement does not foresee the monitoring and evaluation of the toxicity of the tailings. The affected communities, especially quilombola, have been in legal battles to this day, for the right to compensation, filing lawsuits against the company both in Brazil and in the Netherlands. One of these suits demands that toxicological screenings shall be conducted in all the affected population of Barcarena to evaluate the level of contamination caused by the company's action, and thus inform measures included in the reparation process.[[22]](#footnote-22)

**Response to question 6 on challenges to eliminate exposure to toxics**

In recent years, the Brazilian government has adopted a set of regulations and measures, and presented bills, usually without wide and public participation, that have aimed to expand and benefit extractive industries. In addition, many Covid-19 recovery plans are envisaging the weakening of environmental licensing. This will particularly increase mining activities that eventually would expose indigenous peoples and other communities to toxics. In addition, the government has attempted to weaken institutions,[[23]](#footnote-23) such as the Instituto Chico Mendes de Conservação da Biodiversidade”[[24]](#footnote-24) and the Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis,“[[25]](#footnote-25) that could effectively supervise and monitor the implementation of environmental regulations and policies.

The Bill on Environmental Licensing (PL 3729/04) proposes to get rid of the obligation to conduct any environmental or human rights impact assessments when granting environmental licenses to various industries on indigenous and traditional lands. If adopted, this would facilitate a possible expansion of mining projects by reducing the regulation of their activities.

The licensing process could be subject to regressive amendments[[26]](#footnote-26) particularly through the bill (PL- “*projeto de lei*”) 2159/2021, which is currently in the Lower House (*Camara dos deputados*) as PL 3729/2004. Issues related to this bill include that[[27]](#footnote-27):

* 1. It would benefit the mining sector and would only exclude large and/or high-risk projects. This does not consider the pollution that medium or smaller projects could create.
	2. It would waive the requirement to request some license for parts or the totality of a project and activity and it would introduce new types of environmental licensing aiming to regularize some operations and projects that were carried out in part or in totality without authorization.
	3. It would reduce licensing requirements for those authorizations obtained by means of use permits, by considering these mining applications as a simple expansion of the usage permit.
	4. As it was observed in concrete cases, it reinforces the use of non-judicial mechanisms such as negotiation, mediation, and conciliation, for conflict resolution. In fact, the cases of Mariana and Brumadinho showed that these mechanisms have been ineffective due to the lack of transparency and participation of affected communities, and put obstacles to access judicial remedies for the victims.
	5. It would waive environmental licensing when the activity is linked to “urgent works and interventions aimed at preventing the occurrence of imminent environmental damage or interrupt a situation that creates a risk to life.” In reality, this could be misused by companies to bypass the licensing process as this does not require an assessment to verify the institutional ability to guarantee the safety of these structures or under the supervision of independent technical experts.

The Bill 2644/2020 is currently at the Senate; if passed, it would allow for the expansion of the land regularization process to the detriment of communities and would pose the risk of additional deforestation of up to sixteen thousand square kilometers by 2027.[[28]](#footnote-28) This bill is referred to as the “*grilagem* bill”[[29]](#footnote-29) or the “regularization of illegal occupation project” because it would establish a self-declaration process that would would favor the regularization of land in favor of land grabbers even when there are disputes involving traditional communities’ claims over the ownership of the lands, and it makes it easier for illegal land grabs, including squatters, to take possession over Conservation Units and lands occupied by indigenous peoples or quilombolas.

Moreover, and in addition to bills that would create less protective, and more lenient and simplified environmental licensing procedures,[[30]](#footnote-30) there are two bills currently threatening indigenous lands. PL 490/2007, on the so called “*marco temporal*” or time frame for the recognition of indigenous lands, and PL 191/2020, which regulates mineral activity on indigenous lands. The discussion of PL 490/2007 was reopened in 2021 when the Constitution and Justice Commission (CCJ) -the organ that approved the original draft law - established “October 5, 1988” (the date of entry into force of the Federal Constitution) as the date as of which indigenous peoples must prove that they had possession and occupied the relevant land in order to be granted recognition. This bill has been contested, including by United Nations experts, because this arbitrary date “ignores the fact that indigenous peoples may have been forcibly removed from their lands before that date” [[31]](#footnote-31) and that they are the original inhabitants of the lands and territories. The bill also allows for easier contact with isolated peoples and allows for the legalization of development projects in reserve areas. [[32]](#footnote-32)

The Lower House will be voting on PL 191/2020. This bill allows exploration and exploitation of mineral and hydrocarbon resources in indigenous lands, as well as of water resources to generate electricity. Despite providing for consultations with indigenous peoples, the bill allows for the Federal government to send authorization requests for exploitation or exploration to Congress, even if indigenous communities are opposed to it. The discussion of this bill was recently re-opened; UN experts previously shared their concern if this is adopted.[[33]](#footnote-33)

1. The term “conflict” includes situations produced by, on the one hand, actions and reactions of affected communities to the practices, strategies and impacts of extractive activities (such as protests and complaints). On the other hand, it will also include those activities that change the lifestyles and livelihoods of communities and degrade their environment during the different stages of the concerned megaprojects (extraction, processing, and construction of infrastructure). This definition is provided by the Observatório dos Conflitos da Mineração no Brasil. *Observatório Dos Conflitos Da Mineração No Brasil.* Accesible at:<http://conflitosdamineracao.org/>. (Last accessed on 28 Mar. 2022). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. OHCHR, Allegation Letter, AL BRA 11/2018, 5 September 2018, Accessible at: <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=24044>; OHCHR, Allegation Letter, AL BRA 2/2016, Accessible at: <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=3215>; OHCHR, Urgent Appeal, UA BRA 10/2015, Accessible at: <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=14484> [Last accessed on 28 March 2022] [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. OHCHR, Advance Unedited Version on the visit to Brazil, A/HRC/45/12/Add.2, 17, 2020, Para. 16, Accessible at:

<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ToxicWaste/A_HRC_45_12_Add2_AUV.docx> [Last accessed on 28 March 2022] [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Instituto Guaicuy. *Rompimento Da Barragem De Rejeitos Da Vale Completa 3 Anos*. 2022, Accessible at: https://guaicuy.org.br/rompimento-da-barragem-de-rejeitos-da-vale-completa-3-anos/. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Senra, R. (2018). Mineradora norueguesa tinha 'duto clandestino' para lançar rejeitos em nascentes amazônicas. 23 February. [online] *BBC Brasil*. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-43162472 [Accessed: 24 May 2019]. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The Nordic Page – Norway. (2018). Toxic Waste from Norwegian Hydro Threatens Amazon and Drinking Water Supply in Brazil. 24 February. [online] *The Nordic Page – Norway*. Available at: https://www.tnp.no/norway/panorama/toxic-waste-from-norwegian-hydro-amazon-water-brazil [Last accessed: 29 March 2021]. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Fernandes, Leonardo. Barcarena: há um ano, mais uma tragédia marcava a mineração no Brasil, Brasil de Fato, 2019, Accessible at: <https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2019/02/17/barcarena-ha-um-ano-mais-uma-tragedia-marcava-a-mineracao-no-brasil> [Last accessed on 8 February, 2022] [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Carmeiro, Taymã. Contaminação de rios em Barcarena, no PA, que afeta 40 mil pessoas vira processo internacional na Holanda, g1, 2021, Accessible at: <https://g1.globo.com/pa/para/noticia/2021/02/09/acao-coletiva-leva-caso-hydro-no-para-a-justica-holandesa.ghtml> [Last accessed on 8 February, 2022] [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Molina, Luísa and Wanderley, Luiz Jardim. O cerco do ouro: garimpo ilegal, destruição e luta em terras Munduruku. Brasília, DF: Comitê Nacional em Defesa dos Territórios Frente à Mineração, 2021. Accessible at: https://acervo.socioambiental.org/acervo/documentos/o-cerco-do-ouro-garimpo-ilegal-destruicao-e-luta-em-terras-munduruku-resumo [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Fiocruz. Estudo analisa a contaminação por mercúrio entre o povo indígena munduruku, 2020, Accessible at: <https://portal.fiocruz.br/noticia/estudo-analisa-contaminacao-por-mercurio-entre-o-povo-indigena-munduruku> [Last accessed on 8 February, 2022]. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. OHCHR, “Brazil: UN experts deplore attacks by illegal miners on indigenous peoples; alarmed by mercury levels” 02 June 2021. Accessible at**:** <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/06/brazil-un-experts-deplore-attacks-illegal-miners-indigenous-peoples-alarmed?LangID=E&NewsID=27134> [Last accessed on 29 March, 2022]; OHCHR, Allegation Letter AL BRA 3/2021, 28 May 2021, <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26420>, [Last accessed on 30 March, 2022] [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Leonel Filipe, Contaminação por mercúrio se alastra na população Yanomami, Fiocruz, 2019, Accessible at: <http://informe.ensp.fiocruz.br/noticias/46979> [Last accessed on 8 February, 2022] [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Since 2011, there has been an interest in exploring this region. The project has already undergone several changes and has been under constant pressure from social groups in the region, which have been resisting the various actions of the mining company. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Ruiz Leotaud, Valentina, “Great Panther fined $9m by Brazilian environmental agency for cyanide pollution”, 30 December 2021. Accessible at: <https://www.mining.com/great-panther-mining-receives-9-million-fine-from-brazilian-environmental-agency-for-cyanide-pollution/> [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Coletivo Nacional de Comunicação do MAB. 6 anos após crime de Mariana, 244 famílias ainda aguardam reconstrução das casas destruídas pela lama, 2021, Accessible at: <https://mab.org.br/2021/11/06/6-anos-apos-crime-de-mariana-344-familias-ainda-aguardam-reconstrucao-das-casas-destruidas-pela-lama/> [Last accessed on 28 March, 2022] [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Ministério Público de Minas Gerais. (2021, February, 02). *MPMG pede na Justiça extinção da Fundação Renova*.

https://www.mpmg.mp.br/comunicacao/noticias/mpmg-pede-na-justica-extincao-da-fundacao-renova.htm [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. The National Council of Justice (CNJ) estimates more than 90,000 individual and class actions about the case. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Lei de Acesso à Informação (Lei nº 12.527/2011):Art. 3º Os procedimentos previstos nesta Lei destinam-se a assegurar o direito fundamental de acesso à informação e devem ser executados em conformidade com os princípios básicos da administração pública e com as seguintes diretrizes:[…] V - desenvolvimento do controle social da administração pública. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Girundi, D., Freitas, R., & Moreno, C. (2021, February 5). *Vale assina acordo de R$ 37,68 bilhões para reparar tragédia de Brumadinho*. G1. https://g1.globo.com/mg/minas-gerais/noticia/2021/02/04/vale-assina-acordo-bilionario-de-r-3768-bilhoes-para-reparar-danos-causados-em-brumadinho.ghtml [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Nadia Pontes (2021, February 15). *As lacunas do acordo da Vale em Brumadinho*. DW.COM. https://www.dw.com/pt-br/as-lacunas-do-acordo-da-vale-em-brumadinho/a-56572096 [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. On 10 February 2021, a group of organizations and political parties filed an action against the agreement with the Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal - STF in Portuguese), requesting the suspension of the judicial approval of the agreement, considering that it was a public agreement and not a private agreement. The main argument for the court action is the lack of participation of the affected communities. The appeal was dismissed. Similarly, on 2 March 2021, a group of organizations filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals of the State of Minas Gerais (Tribunal de Justiça de Minas Gerais - TJMG in Portuguese) requesting the effective guarantee of the right to participation of those affected in the reparation policy in the agreement. Once again, the appeal was dismissed by the competent court. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Neto, Cicero Pedrosa. Barcarena, uma Chernobyl na Amazônia, Amazonia Real,, Accessible at: <https://www.ihu.unisinos.br/78-noticias/615654-barcarena-uma-chernobyl-na-amazonia> [Last accessed on 11 February, 2022]. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Sudré, Lu. "Fusão Entre Ibama E Icmbio Irá Paralisar Políticas Ambientais, Alerta Servidor". *Brasil De Fato*, 2021, Accessible at: <https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2021/02/03/fusao-entre-ibama-e-icmbio-ira-paralisar-politicas-ambientais-alerta-servidor>. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. This Institute is the organ within the Ministry of the Environment with the mandate to propose, implement, manage, protect, supervise and monitor the Conservation Units established by the Union. It is also responsible for promoting and carrying out research, protection, preservation and biodiversity conservation programs, and for exercising the power of environmental police to protect Federal Conservation Units. *See Instituto Chico Mendes De Conservação Da Biodiversidade*, Accessible at: https://www.icmbio.gov.br/portal/oinstituto. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. This organ of the Ministry of the Environment formulates and implements environmental public policies aimed at protecting the environment and promoting sustainable socioeconomic development. See Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis. *Sobre O Ibama*. 2020, Accesible at: https://www.gov.br/ibama/pt-br/acesso-a-informacao/institucional/sobre-o-ibama#missao-visao-valores. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Some of these concerns were also raised by some UN experts. OHCHR, Urgent Appeal UA BRA 5/2017, 30 May 2017, Accessible at: <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=23144>, [Last accessed on 29 March, 2022] [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Milanez, Bruno; Magno, Lucas; and Wanderley, Luiz. O Projeto de Lei Geral do Licenciamento (PL 3.729/2004) e seus efeitos para o setor mineral. Versos (Textos para Discussão), v 5, n 1, 2021. Accessible at: <https://www.ufjf.br/poemas/files/2017/04/Versos-2021-O-PL-do-Licenciamento-e-seus-efeitos-para-o-setor-mineral.pdf> [Last accessed on 28 March, 2022]. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Fasolo, Carolina. 'Cheque em branco' para a grilagem, PL 2633 segue ao Senado. Instituto Socioambiental. Accessible at: <https://www.socioambiental.org/pt-br/noticias-socioambientais/cheque-em-branco-para-a-grilagem-pl-2633-segue-ao-senado> [Last accessed February 10, 2022] [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Conectas. "Ongs Pedem A Pacheco Que Projetos Que Alteram Direitos Socioambientais Passem Por Comissões". *Conectas*, 2021, Accessible at: <https://www.conectas.org/noticias/ongs-pedem-a-pacheco-que-projetos-que-alteram-direitos-socioambientais-passem-por-comissoes/>. [Last accessed on 29 March, 2022] and Observatório do Clima (OC); WWF Brasil; Instituto Democracia e Sociedades (IDS); SOS Mata Atlântica; Instituto Socioambiental (ISA); Instituto Sociedades, População e Natureza (ISPN); Instituto de Estudos Socioeconômicos (INESC); Instituto Talanoa. *Carta Ao Pacheco Grilagem E Licenciamento. Lei Geral Do Licenciamento Ambiental E Regularização Fundiária*. Brasília, 2021. Accessible at: [[Carta-ao-Pacheco-Grilagem-e-Licenciamento-1.pdf](https://www.conectas.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Carta-ao-Pacheco-Grilagem-e-Licenciamento-1.pdf)](https://www.conectas.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Carta-ao-Pacheco-Grilagem-e-Licenciamento-1.pdf). [Last accessed on 29 March, 2022] To know more about the concept of “ Thomas, Jennifer Ann. Grilagem: o que é, as causas e as consequências. Um So Planeta. 2021. Accessible at: <https://umsoplaneta.globo.com/sociedade/noticia/2021/08/25/o-que-e-grilagem.ghtml> (Last accessed on 28 March, 2022). [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. OHCHR, Urgent Appeal UA BRA 5/2017, 30 May 2017, Accessible at: <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=23144>, [Last accessed on 29 March, 2022] [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
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33. See OHCHR, OL BRA 4/2022, 12 April 2022, Accessible at <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27186> [↑](#footnote-ref-33)