**The International Organization for Migration (IOM) Submission to the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change**

**On the topic of:**

**“Addressing the human rights implications of climate change displacement including legal protection of people displaced across international borders”**

**November 2022**

1. **Background:**

The present document is submitted pursuant to the call for input from the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change addressing the human rights implications of climate change displacement including legal protection of people displaced across international borders. The submission provides the International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) views on existing solutions and necessary actions to address the human rights implications of climate change displacement across international borders.

1. **IOM’s Mandate:**

Established in 1951, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is the leading intergovernmental organization in the field of migration and is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. IOM is part of the United Nations system, as a related organization.

IOM supports migrants across the world, developing effective responses to the shifting dynamics of migration and, as such, is a key source of advice on migration policy and practice. The organization works in emergency situations, developing the resilience of all people on the move, and particularly those in situations of vulnerability, as well as building capacity within governments to manage all forms and impacts of mobility.

In line with the [IOM Institutional Strategy on Migration, Environment and Climate Change 2021-2030](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/policy/iom-strategy-migration-climate-change-and-environment), the Organization pursues three broad objectives in addressing migration in the context of climate change, environmental degradation, and disasters, intervening at each stage of the migration cycle:

1. **“We develop solutions for people to move”** - Managing migration in the context of climate change, environmental degradation, and disasters due to natural hazards.
2. **“We develop solutions for people on the move”** - Assisting and protecting migrants and displaced persons in the context of climate change, environmental degradation, and disasters due to natural hazards.
3. **“We develop solutions for people to stay”** - Making migration a choice by building resilience and addressing the adverse climatic and environmental drivers that compel people to move.
4. ***What experiences and examples are you aware of, of individuals or communities, displaced by climate change?***

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) notes that human mobility “can be interpreted as impacts on vulnerable peoples, but also as adaptation strategies to manage risks and reduce exposure when people continue with their lives, temporary or permanently, in a different but stable situation, or when family members send remittances to those that remain in the affected areas”.[[1]](#footnote-2)

Climate change and human mobility are interlinked in various complex ways. This relationship is highly contextual, as climate change affects individuals and communities in different ways. The adverse effects of climate change have considerable implications on the wellbeing and enjoyment of human rights for individuals and communities all over the world, but disproportionately affect those already in situations of vulnerability.

It is important to recognize that the human mobility implications of climate change vary depending on the context and the interaction with a wide array of factors. The consequences of climate change on human mobility are primarily determined by the interaction between the adverse effects of climate change with the multiple drivers of migration. Moreover, population movements can take different forms, including temporary movements such as disaster displacement, pre-emptive evacuation, seasonal and circular migration, or permanent ones, such as planned relocation and resettlement, without forgetting also the realities of immobility for people that lack resources or capacity to move, or do not want to move. It is equally important to recognize that climate-related mobility may evolve over time.

In addition, climate change puts pressure on those in situations of vulnerability and tests their ability to prevent and adapt to, or cope with and recover from climate impacts. Climate change has significant consequences on all dimensions of human life, including access to habitable land, access to water and energy, safe and decent housing, and secure livelihoods. The changing climate is increasingly influencing people’s need and ability to move.

Moreover, the adverse effects of climate change put the livelihoods and personal security of populations at risk, wherever they may be, forcing people to move. The consequences of climate change, as well as their interaction with other environmental factors and pre-existing social, economic and political conditions affect the nature of the movement of people.

During the past 10 years, storms, floods, droughts and other weather-related disasters have caused an average of 21.6 million annual internal displacements worldwide[[2]](#footnote-3). These events occur in all parts of the world but are unequally distributed and underreporting is common in this area. Over 60 per cent of events are recorded in the Middle East, North Africa, East Asia and the Pacific.[[3]](#footnote-4)

If the international community does not take the necessary measures to avert and minimize the consequences of climate change, these numbers are likely to further increase. By 2030, an estimated 50 per cent of the world’s population will live in coastal areas exposed to flooding, storms and tsunamis[[4]](#footnote-5). These events could increase in frequency and magnitude in many regions, raising the risk of future displacement. Depending on future emission and demographic developments sea-level rise is projected to force the displacement of tens to hundreds of millions of people by 2100 if the required progresses in Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) are not achieved.[[5]](#footnote-6)

[**Key Facts and Figures**](https://www.migrationdataportal.org/resource/iom-global-data-institute-brief-climate-change-and-mobility)

With every additional degree Celsius of warming, the risks of involuntary displacement due to floods are expected to increase by approximately 50 per cent globally. Accordingly, the global population at risk of river floods is projected to increase by 120 per cent at 2° Celsius warming scenario and 400 per cent at 4° C.[[6]](#footnote-7)

Depending on the warming scenario and future population growth, tens to hundreds of millions of people are projected to be at risk of future displacement by sea level rise.

By 2050, more than one billion people are expected to be at risk from coastal-specific climate hazards.

Under a high warming scenario, 65 million additional people are projected to experience food insecurity by 2050 as the result of climate change.

Climate impacts on mobility will vary for different places and social groups. It will inhibit the capacity of the poorest to migrate. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, between 17 and 86 million people could migrate internally by 2050.[[7]](#footnote-8) In this region, forecasts suggest a decrease in the number of emigrants from the lowest-income quintile by up to 9 per cent by 2100.[[8]](#footnote-9)

While projections of when and where people will be exposed to climate-related hazards are increasingly precise, estimates of the number of migrants and displaced persons due to these events remain subject to higher uncertainty. The diversity of climate change processes, coupled with the complex and interrelated factors shaping people’s mobility patterns and inconsistent data collection make it difficult to accurately quantify the extent to which climate change drives human mobility.[[9]](#footnote-10)

An often-overlooked impact of climate change on human mobility is the increasing inability (or in certain cases unwillingness) of certain groups and individuals to migrate. Migration, including in the context of disasters, climate change and environmental degradation, requires resources and opportunities. However, those in situations of vulnerability are less likely to have the necessary resources to move and could become “trapped” or “immobile”. In many regions, climate change is likely to increase immobility amongst lowest-income groups[[10]](#footnote-11), leaving them with little alternative but to suffer the adverse effects of climate change.

In Central America, disasters are often a tipping point for people who move away, as they interact with a pre-existing context characterized by environmental degradation, poor living conditions, and restricted livelihoods in certain instances. A recent [IOM study](https://publications.iom.int/books/la-movilidad-humana-derivada-de-desastres-y-el-cambio-climatico-en-centroamerica) recommends introducing measures that promote rural to urban mobility to help provide rural communities with the skills they need to access urban jobs[[11]](#footnote-12)

In Pacific Island States rising sea levels caused by climate change leads to erosion and increasingly frequent and intense flooding events. These floods can damage property, destroy crops, and contaminate vital water supplies[[12]](#footnote-13), therefore contributing to mobility. Additionally, variations in rainfall, combined with lack of aquifers, can lead to a shortage of water[[13]](#footnote-14), while ocean acidification can impact fisheries[[14]](#footnote-15), therefore incurring significant loss on the populations’ livelihoods and forcing them to move.

Unprecedented rainfall and the worst flooding in decades have hit Pakistan in late August 2022. Some 33 million Pakistanis were affected, and 7.9 million people were displaced, with nearly 600,000 living in relief sites.[[15]](#footnote-16) In Bangladesh, the worst floods in 20 years have affected some 7.2 million people with 481,000 displacements recorded[[16]](#footnote-17). In Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh heavy rains affected 59,611 refugees and triggered secondary displacement.[[17]](#footnote-18)

Many of the high-impact disasters in 2022 happened consecutively, leaving little time for recovery from one shock to the next. The southern Africa region has been battered by an unprecedented series of five cyclones over two months, surging the protection and shelter needs for hundreds of thousands of affected persons, including refugees. More than 190,000 people who lost or fled their homes during Tropical Storm Ana in January remain displaced inside Malawi.[[18]](#footnote-19) Two months after the storm has displaced over 20,000 people in Mozambique,[[19]](#footnote-20) UNHCR recorded 736,000 people affected by Tropical Cyclone Gombe in Nampula and Zambezia provinces.

1. ***Do you think there are differences between the notion of climate change migrants and people displaced by climate change? If yes, what are these differences?***

It is often difficult to isolate the environmental and climatic factors from the other factors, but an increasing number of studies show that environmental challenges are clearly an element that impacts the decision to move or to stay[[20]](#footnote-21). Most of the time, human mobility in the context of disasters, climate change and environmental degradation will be the result of complex considerations, through which those affected by climate change are likely to assess short- and long-term risks **not exclusively linked to environmental constraints**. The decision to move will be shaped by people’s perceptions of constraining elements and risk factors, including insecurity, dwindling resources and availability of livelihoods, as well as the opportunities to which they have access. In this sense, **it is difficult to clearly distinguish between forced and voluntary movements**. Rather, they should be regarded as part of the same continuum.

None of the dimensions of people’s movement, including the anticipatory/reactive nature of the movement, the distance travelled, the intended duration and destination, the causality of the movement decision, allow for clear-cut categorization, nor can they be unequivocally associated with “forced” movements. Moreover, the trajectories, conditions and status of people on the move is dynamic – movements that were initially temporary labor migration can transform into more forced types of movement or immobility in response to severe risks in areas of origin, transit or destination.

The notion of living with risk and of pendular displacement (home-evacuation–return/solutions), on a regular basis, linked to more forced movements needs further consideration with regards to States’ responsibilities and the modalities of protection required. Current data does not always permit to establish the difference between people displaced pre-emptively and those who are forced to move during or after a disaster. Therefore, IOM considers that complementary to the United Nations [Secretary-General’s Executive Action Plan for the Early Warnings for All](https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/11/1130277), the discussion on the protection of displaced persons will require a much more granular understanding of displacement data.

[Environmental Migration Glossary](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/environmental-migration)

**“Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad”[[21]](#footnote-22)** ([**IOM**](https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/about_iom/en/council/94/MC_INF_288.pdf), 2007:33).

This definition is deliberately broad and flexible in order to account for the diverse range of population movements due to all types of environmental drivers. This definition shows that environmental migration can take many complex forms: forced and voluntary, temporary and permanent, internal and international, individual and collective, of proximity and of long distance. The nature, duration and scale of environmental migration also depends on whether it takes place in the context of slow-onset events and processes (sea level rise, increasing temperatures, land degradation, etc) or sudden-onset events and processes (floods, cyclones, storms, etc.) that are exacerbated by the adverse effects of climate change and environmental degradation. It also depends to what extent it interacts with other socio-economic, cultural and political factors that influence the decision or necessity to move. Because of this complexity and multicausality, environmental migration should not be understood as a wholly negative or positive outcome – migration can amplify existing vulnerabilities, but it can also allow people to build resilience.

In the absence of a legal definition or an internationally accepted one, several other proposals were made on categorizing the movements of people due to environmental drivers. They usually propose a narrower definition by either focusing on one type of movement (for instance displacement) or one type of environmental driver (for instance climate change impacts).

**Climate migration** refers to “the movement of a person or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment due to climate change, are obliged to leave their habitual place of residence, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, within a State or across an international border” ([**IOM**](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1411/files/iml_34_glossary.pdf), 2019). Climate migration is thus a subcategory of environmental migration; it defines a singular type of environmental migration, where the change in the environment is due to climate change. While, this is an IOM working definition with an analytic and advocacy purpose which does not have any specific legal value, the term is used in the legally-binding [**Cancun Agreements on climate change adaptation**](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1411/files/07a01.pdf), adopted by States Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the 2010 Conference. The Cancun Agreements identify three forms of “climate change induced” movement: displacement, migration, and planned relocation.

**Planned relocation** “in the context of disasters or environmental degradation, including when due to the effects of climate change, [refers to] a planned process in which persons or groups of persons move or are assisted to move away from their homes or place of temporary residence, are settled in a new location, and provided with the conditions for rebuilding their lives. The term is generally used to identify relocations that are carried out within national borders under the authority of the State and denotes a long process that lasts until “relocated persons are incorporated into all aspects of life in the new setting and no longer have needs or vulnerabilities stemming from the Planned Relocation”” ([**IOM**](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1411/files/iml_34_glossary.pdf), 2019; [**Georgetown University, UNHCR, and IOM, 2017**](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1411/files/PLANNING%20RELOCATIONS_TOOLBOX_SPLIT%20VERSION.pdf); UNHCR, the Brookings Institution and Georgetown, 2015).

**Disaster displacement** is a term that “refers to situations where people are forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence as a result of a disaster or in order to avoid the impact of an immediate and foreseeable natural hazard. Such displacement results from the fact that affected persons are (i) exposed to (ii) a natural hazard in a situation where (iii) they are too vulnerable and lack the resilience to withstand the impacts of that hazard” (Nansen Initiative, 2015). This term is mostly used to identify forced movements of people triggered by sudden-onset events in the environment. The concept of “cross-border disaster-displacement” is also sometimes associated with this term, particularly identifying the destination of population movements, to another country. “Disaster displacement” is used and promoted in the work of the Platform on Disaster Displacement as an umbrella term, while humanitarian agencies like [**IOM**](https://www.iom.int/disaster-risk-reduction-and-resilience) and [**UNHCR**](https://www.unhcr.org/climate-change-and-disasters.html) employ it with the narrow scope of forced sudden movements. The term is also used by the [**Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre**](https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2020/) (IDMC) in presenting annual estimates on new internal displacements in the context of disasters.

**Human mobility** is “a generic term covering all the different forms of movements of persons. The term human mobility reflects a wider range of movements of persons than the term “migration”. The term is usually understood as also encompassing tourists that are generally considered as not engaging in migration” ([**IOM**](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1411/files/iml_34_glossary.pdf), 2019). In the context of environmental drivers, human mobility is being used within the work of UNFCCC, where the [**Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage**](https://unfccc.int/wim-excom/areas-of-work/migration-displacement-and-human-mobility) associated with climate change has a strategic workstream (d) dedicated to human mobility, and where the several international organizations have created the “Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility.” In this context, human mobility is understood as encompassing the three forms of “climate change induced” movement from the [**Cancun Agreement**](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1411/files/07a01-2.pdf), namely, displacement, migration, and planned relocation. The term is increasingly used in multi-stakeholder engagements, as actors working on the different types of movements of people can easily converge towards it."

1. ***What legislation, policies and practices are you aware of that are in place to give protection to the rights of individual and communities displaced by climate change?***

Individuals and communities moving in the context of climate change are entitled to enjoy, equally and without discrimination, the same fundamental human rights and freedoms guaranteed by international and national legal frameworks. These fundamental rights are well established in the key international human rights instruments - including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

There is a series of relevant human rights instruments and conventions that can be applied more specifically to the protection of those moving due to climate change, environmental degradation and disasters, such as the **Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, the Convention on the Status of Stateless People, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families and the Convention on the Rights of Indigenous People.**

Those who move in the context to climate change, environmental degradation and disasters most commonly benefit from protection for **humanitarian reasons** and based on **human rights law**. However, there are instances in which individuals and communities displaced across international borders in the context of climate change may fall “through the cracks of international refugee and immigration policy,”[[22]](#footnote-23) and suffer from a lack of protection.

Recourse to complementary protections mechanisms[[23]](#footnote-24) and temporary protection or stay arrangements[[24]](#footnote-25) can help ensure access to international protection for those who have been forced to move across international borders in the context of climate change and cannot return to their country of origin. Additionally, States may offer protection to persons whose country is unable to protect them against serious harms such as climate-related hazards.

**GLOBAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES:**

In addition to these measures, there is a range of international frameworks, intergovernmental bodies, guidelines and standards specifically available to advocate for and provide supportive engagement on the rights of those on the move in the context of climate change, environmental degradation and disasters. These include:

* **The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM)** is a non-binding international cooperation framework that articulates a common set of commitments for states to respond to the challenges and opportunities of contemporary international migration, on the basis of 23 objectives. The GCM also formulates provisions for implementation, follow up and review. The GCM was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 2018. The text has **multiple references to environmental migration, articulating a wide and comprehensive understanding of the challenges linked to the environment-migration nexus.**

Most of the references related to environmental migration are under “**Objective 2: Minimizing the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin**”, which contains a section specifically dedicated to the subject and entitled "**Natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change, and environmental degradation"**. Furthermore, other important references can be found under “**Objective 5: Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration**”. The GCM recognizes that climate change mitigation and adaptation measures in countries of origin need to be prioritized to minimize drivers of migration. However, it also acknowledges that adaptation *in situ* or return of migrants might not be possible in some cases and that the strengthening of regular migration pathways, including through planned relocation and visa options, need to be part of migration management tools.

* **The Task Force on Disaster Displacement:** The Task Force was established by the 2015 Paris Agreement at the 21st Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC (COP21). Its original mandate was to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change (Decision 1/CP.21).
* **IOM’s Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) Initiative’s** [***Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster***](https://micicinitiative.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1426/files/micic_guidelines_english_web_13_09_2016-2.pdf)apply to situations in which migrants are present in a country experiencing a conflict or **disaster, including those linked to climate change.** The Guidelines, developed under the leadership of the United States of America and the Philippines, provide concrete and practical guidance to stakeholders at the local, national, regional, and international levels on how to prepare for and respond to crises in ways that protect and empower migrants and help migrants and host communities recover from crises. The implementation of the Guidelines is supported by a [Toolkit](https://micicinitiative.iom.int/data-and-resources) developed by IOM.
* **Mass Evacuation in Natural Disasters (MEND):** The MEND Guide was published in 2014 as a result of result of a collective effort initiated by the Global Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster. The Guide serves as a reference providing key background considerations and a template to assist planning bodies at national, regional, municipal, and other levels – both urban and rural – in the development and/or refinement of **evacuation plans in accordance with emergency management principles.**
* [**The UN Network on Migration**](https://migrationnetwork.un.org/)was established to ensure effective, timely and coordinated system-wide support to UN Member States in the context of the GCM implementation, follow up and review. In an effort to bolster a common UN system approach to the topic, the Network's workplan features a **thematic priority Migration in the Context of Disasters, Climate Change and Environmental Degradation.**
* [**Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund (Migration MPTF)**](https://migrationnetwork.un.org/projects/migration-multi-partner-trust-fund-migration-mptf) was established to help Member States in their national implementation of the Global Compact. Climate migration concerns have been identified as one of the MPTF’s priorities and a large regional project based in Eastern Africa is currently under development in partnership with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)[[25]](#footnote-26).
* **The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) 2015-2030 – work on human mobility:** Significant efforts are directed towards the advancement of human mobility-based strategies in **the disaster risk reduction and resilience programmes of Member States**. In 2017, IOM elaborated a four-year plan of action to guide the Organization’s disaster risk reduction activities in support of States’ efforts to implement the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. Additionally, the [**Words into Action guide**](https://www.undrr.org/publication/words-action-guidelines-developing-national-disaster-risk-reduction-strategies) released in 2019 offers practical guidance to help governmental authorities integrate disaster displacement and other related forms of human mobility into regional, national, sub-national and local DRR strategies, in accordance with **Target (E) of the Sendai Framework to revise or develop DRR strategies by 2020.**
* **The Nansen Initiative (2012-2015) and the Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD):** IOM plays a key role in supporting States’ efforts to implement the Nansen Initiative Protection Agenda and the priorities identified by the PDD Steering Group, which are directly in line with IOM’s longstanding work on migration, environment, climate change and Risk Reduction (MECR) and its operational activities on migration management, including in the context of disasters.

**REGIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS:**

* **The 1969 Organization for African Unity (OAU) Convention[[26]](#footnote-27)** Article I(2) of the 1969 OAU Convention provides refugee protection to, *inter alia*, “every person who, owing to ... events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality”.
* **The 1984 Cartagena Declaration[[27]](#footnote-28)[[28]](#footnote-29)** also extends the definition of refugees, as it recognizes the risk of cross-border displacement associated with climate change and disasters. The Declaration’s Conclusion III(3) it recommends that refugees include “persons who have fled their country because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by ... other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order”. Moreover, the [2017 San Pedro Sula Declaration](https://www.acnur.org/5b58d75a4.pdf) contributing to the Global Compact on Refugees recognizes the multicausality of movement, including in the context of climate change.

Both regional instruments are highly valuable in their respective regions, as they expand the definition of a refugee to include a person compelled to leave their country of origin because of other ‘events seriously disturbing public order’, or in the Americas as a result of ‘massive violation of human rights’, which could include the right to a healthy environment.

As such, this broader understanding of criteria for refugee status could encompass those facing the adverse impacts of climate change. These instruments may provide a regional source of protection for some who cross borders in the context of climate change.

**REGIONAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES**

Additionally, certain regions or sub-regional blocs have adopted regional integration processes and frameworks, including free movement agreements, which can provide an effective way to assist and protect those moving across international borders in the context of climate change. Agreements for the free movement of persons provide a useful and effective way to address certain aspects of the protection gap for persons displaced in the context of disasters, climate change and environmental degradation, by permitting entry and stay into host states, allowing access to territory, livelihood opportunities and assistance from international and non-government organizations. However, it is worth noting that many of these regional frameworks have been only partly implemented. Their positive contributions will therefore not be fully assessed until they are completely implemented.

These regional integration processes, policies and practices include, *inter alia*:

**Africa:**

* **The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS):** ECOWAS Member States signed their first Protocol relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment (ECOWAS Protocol) in 1979.[[29]](#footnote-30) It has been supplemented several times and, in total, there are now five separate ECOWAS Protocols addressing the issue.[[30]](#footnote-31) Free movement arrangements have been better implemented in ECOWAS than in Africa’s other RECs, though ‘[w]hile the right of entry and abolition of visa requirements for a 90-day stay have been implemented in all the ECOWAS member countries, there is less progress on the right of residence, right of establishment and access to employment’.[[31]](#footnote-32)
* In East Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) comprises Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda.[[32]](#footnote-33) In February 2020, all seven Member States of organization [endorsed the IGAD Free Movement Protocol in Khartoum](https://disasterdisplacement.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Communique-on-Endorsement-of-the-Protocol-of-Free-Movement-of-Persons.pdf), after years of negotiations and consultations. The Protocol provides broad protection for people affected by disasters and climate change, facilitating entry and lawful stay for those forced to move. Moreover, it allows those at risk of displacement [to move pre-emptively as a way of avoiding, or mitigating, the impacts of a disaster.](https://disasterdisplacement.org/staff-member/new-pact-paves-way-for-innovative-solutions-to-disaster-and-climate-change-displacement-in-africa)
* [**Kampala Ministerial Declaration on Migration, Environment and Climate Change:**](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1411/files/documents/Kampala%20Ministerial%20Declaration%20on%20MECC_English%20signed.pdf) In 2022, a number of African States adopted the *Kampala Ministerial Declaration on Migration, Environment and Climate Change* (Kampala Ministerial Declaration). In this declaration, States committed to enhance action and cooperation on this. The Declaration includes more specific commitments, including to address drivers of mobility, to support countries hosting migrants and disaster displaced persons, and to establish an **Inter-Ministerial Working Group on Climate Change, Environment and Migration** to monitor implementation.

**The Americas:**

* In March 2022, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), in cooperation with the Office of the Special Rapporteur on Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Rights (REDESCA), adopted the [**Resolution No. 3/21 entitled “Climate Emergency: Scope of Inter-American Human Rights Obligations”**.](https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/pdf/2021/resolucion_3-21_ENG.pdf) This resolution recognizes the link between climate change and the enjoyment human rights and attempts to systematize the human rights obligations of States in the context of climate change. Paragraph 20 of the resolution specifically underlines Member Sates’ duty to “**guarantee due process during the procedure leading to the recognition of their [migrant workers and others moving for reasons directly or indirectly related to climate change] migratory status, and in any case guarantee their human rights, such as the safeguard of non-refoulement while their status is determined**”
* In 2018, the South American Conference on Migration (SACM) [adopted a non-binding regional instrument on the protection of people displaced across borders and on migrants in countries affected by disasters linked to natural hazards](https://disasterdisplacement.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/CSM-Lineamientos-regionales-personas-desplazadas-por-desastres_compressed.pdf).
* In November 2016, countries of the Regional Conference on Migration (RCM) in Central America adopted a [**Guide to Effective Practices on Admission and Stay for Persons Moving across Borders in the Context of Disasters**](https://disasterdisplacement.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/PROTECTION-FOR-PERSONS-MOVING-IN-THE-CONTEXT-OF-DISASTERS.pdf)**.** The Guide seeks to support the more effective and consistent use of existing law, policy and practice to ensure an appropriate response to the needs of cross border disaster-displaced persons and those affected by disasters.

**NATIONAL FRAMEWORKS, POLICIES AND PRACTICES**

National and local authorities play a central role in the protection of those displaced in the context of climate change and disasters. Accordingly, IOM is supporting Member States in developing and implementing national strategies on migration that integrate climate change considerations.[[33]](#footnote-34)

In Peru, this includes the provision of technical support to develop and Action Plan on climate change and migration and the strengthening of national authorities and local communities’ capacities.[[34]](#footnote-35)

Similarly, the Government of Chile instituted new migration policies in 2018, including the establishment of new visa categories. These changes benefited migrants originating from environmentally fragile areas such as Haiti, whose presence in Chile has grown recently from 1,800 Haitian migrants in 2014 to 120,000 in 2018. These migrants now have better access to regular migration pathways. The Brazilian Government also developed humanitarian visas allowing the entry and stay on humanitarian grounds of Haitians.[[35]](#footnote-36)

Bangladesh has developed and launched a National Strategy on Internal Displacement Management in 2021, outlining the country’s approach to prevent displacement through disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation.[[36]](#footnote-37) The Strategy recognizes the multifaceted nature of migration and its historical role as an adaptation strategy to offset the impacts of environmental shocks. It also outlines the country’s efforts to prepare for potential internal migration and planned relocation when adaptation and prevention measures are no longer sufficient.

1. ***Please provide examples of policies, practices and legal remedies and concepts of how States, business enterprises, civil society and intergovernmental organizations can provide protection for people and communities displaced by climate change.***

Member States, international organizations, non-governmental actors and relevant stakeholders should work jointly to develop durable solutions and provide protection for people and communities on the move in the context of climate change. They should ensure that these solutions are context-specific, locally owned and respectful of the aspirations of those affected. They must also consider the existing global and regional practices during the development and adoption of practices intended to provide protection to those displaced by climate change, ensuring a holistic and comprehensive protection framework.

In line with a comprehensive and human rights-based approach, complementary protection options, which would provide effective rights protection to environmental migrants, such **as temporary protection measures, humanitarian visas or measures which would provide authorization to stay on a temporary basis**, and would apply prior to or alongside the right to seek asylum and without prejudice to that right, based on international customary law (principle of non-refoulement), international human rights law and humanitarian considerations, would therefore be most appropriate. This can be done through the adoption of a specific law or by modifying the State’s Immigration Law. That way, options to provide status to those moving in the context of environmental and climate change would cover the potential protection gaps.[[37]](#footnote-38)

International, regional and national courts and tribunals have also sought to protect the rights of those moving in the context of climate change by using a human rights-based approach. The Human Rights Committee recognized that the *non-refoulement* obligations of States could be triggered under international human rights law when individuals were exposed to the effects of climate change in a manner constituting a violation of their right to life or their right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.[[38]](#footnote-39) The Supreme Court of New Zealand has adopted a similar comprehensive view, taking into account human rights law and refugee law.[[39]](#footnote-40)

Additionally, States and other stakeholders should provide solutions for people to move, enabling safe and regular migration. They should strive to provide individuals and communities affected by climate change the necessary conditions to move within their country’s borders and internationally in a safe, orderly and regular manner. Policymakers should address human mobility comprehensively, putting the needs of those affected at the center of their concerns, and acknowledging that people moving in the context of climate change do not necessarily fall squarely within any given category provided by existing international legal frameworks.

Moreover, there is an urgent need to promote and assist innovative **research, data and evidence** work on migration and displacement in the context of climate change. The IOM Migration Data Strategy 2020–2025[[40]](#footnote-41), which maps out IOM’s priorities with respect to migration data, outlines a set of concrete deliverables to move forward in these and other areas to enhance the availability and promote use of data to achieve stronger governance outcomes and positive impacts for migrants and societies. This includes efforts to strengthen the global evidence base on the climate change and human mobility nexus.

All stakeholders need to commit to and promote **rights-based and protection approaches** in the work on displacement in the context of climate change, in line with relevant international law and frameworks, as well IOM’s internal strategic and guidance documents.

Joint efforts should be directed towards much-needed **mainstreaming of** **climate change and environmental concerns in migration and displacement policy frameworks** at the regional, national and subnational levels. Similarly, climate and environmental consideration should be **better integrated** in regional migration policy processes. This is a keyway to **ensure the protection and promotion of the human rights of individuals and populations moving in the context of climate change.**


**We also need to support States and other relevant actors** in providing assistance and protection to people moving in the context of climate change through a **rights-based approach**. We must also **recognize and promote** the positive contributions of people on the move to climate action and sustainable development.

In the same vein, reducing the risk of secondary displacement for those who are located in climate change and disaster hotspots is critical. Many of those who had to move in the context of climate change are situated in areas vulnerable to climate change and disasters. It is therefore important to increase the preparedness and resilience of those who have been displaced and their host communities, including through Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), climate change adaptation and sustainable development initiatives.

More support should be directed towards host communities and countries, notably through the provision of durable solutions. In this sense, more efforts should be directed towards the enhancement of infrastructure and the protection of the environment in areas that host people who have moved in the context of climate change. Humanitarian operations can play a central role in this context by implementing climate-smart and environmentally friendly solutions such as access to clean energy, environmental management initiatives, and the promotion of climate-resilient livelihood activities.

Finally, it is crucial to assist countries of origin in addressing the adverse effects of climate change that led people to move in the first place, allowing those who are willing and able to return to their area of origin to do so in a dignified manner. This could be achieved through the promotion of climate change adaptation, DRR and sustainable, climate-resilient development activities that ensure access to livelihoods.

**Solutions examples and timescale** (From “[People on the Move in a Changing Climate – Linking Policy, Evidence and Action](https://publications.iom.int/books/people-move-changing-climate-linking-policy-evidence-and-action)”)

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1. ***What international, regional and national policies and legal approaches are necessary to protect people and communities displaced by climate change***

Because of the necessity to adopt a comprehensive human rights-based approach when it comes to environmental and climate change-linked migration, IOM strongly recommends considering other options based on international customary law, such as the principle of **non-refoulement, international human rights law and humanitarian considerations**, which would ensure rights protection of all persons affected and/or displaced due to the adverse effects of climate change. Such protection measures have already been adopted by numerous States (see examples above).

Protection can be provided through international legal obligations and policy guidance that take a human rights-based approach. States have obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil the human rights of all persons. In the context of climate change, this translates into a need for States to undertake measures to mitigate climate change and prevent its negative impacts on human rights, to ensure all persons have the capacity and means to adapt; and to ensure accountability and an effective remedy for harms caused by climate change.

From a legal and policy perspective, **more attention should be directed towards facilitating human mobility in the context of climate change.** These policies should **consider all patterns of movement and immobility, and associated needs and conditions of vulnerability**. Most relevant instruments are mostly focused on climate change governance, including mitigation, adaptation, and financial actions to address climate change. In this sense, they are **primarily dedicated to reducing drivers and risks**. We need legal frameworks and policies recognizing the effects of climate change, environmental degradation and disasters on human mobility, including displacement, to better account for human rights.

**The principle of *non-refoulement[[41]](#footnote-42)*** – a customary law principle applicable to all States irrespective of whether they have signed the relevant treaties – is a valuable principle capable of addressing the gap in protection for those forced to move across borders as a result of the adverse effects of climate change. States and other key stakeholders should build on this principle and the obligations derived from it, particularly the prohibition of sending someone back to a country where he/she would be submitted to "degrading treatments".

**Regional cooperation** is essential to complement the existing international mechanisms in addressing human mobility in the context of climate change. Regional and sub-regional groups should increase cooperation efforts in the field of labour mobility and the free movement of persons, among other sectors, taking into account the specific needs of those moving in the context of climate change, environmental degradation and disasters.

Intergovernmental organizations, regional institutions and States should increase efforts to anticipate human mobility linked to climate change and develop approaches that proactively seek to protect the rights of those affected before, during and after they move. Such anticipatory approaches would also facilitate the protection of the rights of those moving across international borders.

Preventive and rights-based approaches to human mobility in the context of climate change would enable States to act before severe harm occurs. In concrete terms, this means taking the necessary measures to prevent displacement, whenever possible, by enabling people to stay in conditions under which their human rights are guaranteed, to allow for migration, as an adaptation measure, within conditions that uphold human rights, or to facilitate human rights-responsive planned relocation to move people from harm’s way.

The slow-onset effects of climate change pose unique challenges as they are particularly difficult to isolate their role in driving human mobility. To fully address the impacts of climate change for human mobility, the implementation of the Global Compacts and the Task Force on Displacement recommendations should consider the particular challenges posed by slow onset processes, as well as the opportunity to address these challenges and the adverse effects to people through proper planning, specific protection interventions, support for affected persons, and international cooperation.

Furthermore, climate change agreements broadly require States to prevent or mitigate the harm caused by climate change, and to strengthen adaptation. Human rights law must be considered in the interpretation of these obligations and integrated into the planning and implementation of climate action. International cooperation and assistance are also critical in this context, both as a matter of state obligation and necessity to address the global challenges created by climate change and related human mobility.

In this sense, IOM has urged the international community to **step up efforts to support the most vulnerable countries** to strengthen their access to **sustainable and predictable finance**, for addressing climate-change related human mobility **including through robust loss and damage measures.** It is imperative to mobilize stronger commitments from the international community to **support adaptation efforts and reduce loss and damage in the most vulnerable countries**, particularly through accelerated access to climate finance.

1. ***Please provide separate considerations for people or communities internally displaced and those displaced across international borders***
2. ***What do you understand by the concept of “climate change refugee”? Do you think that the UN Refugee Convention should include a separate category for climate change refugees? How do you think this would work? What other legal options may be possible?***

***(Response to question 6 and 7 have been merged)***

**Reference Paper:** [**Internal displacement in the context of the slow-onset adverse effects of climate change - Submission by the International Organization for Migration to the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons**](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1411/files/documents/idp-sr-report.pdf)

Member States and other relevant stakeholders should address human mobility comprehensively, putting the needs of those affected at the center of their concerns, and acknowledging that people moving in the context of climate change do not necessarily fall squarely within any given category provided by existing international, regional or national legal frameworks and definitions.

Most people displaced in the context of climate change and disasters remain inside their own country and are internally displaced persons (IDPs). In these cases, the State remains obligated to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of IDPs within their territory without discrimination. In addition to the relevant international human rights law treaties, the following principles and guidelines provide valuable guidance on the relevant legal and policy frameworks that apply in such circumstances:

* The [**UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement**](https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G98/104/93/PDF/G9810493.pdf?OpenElement)have been recognized by the international community as an “important international framework for the protection of internally displaced persons”.[[42]](#footnote-43) Persons displaced within their country due to disasters caused by natural or human made hazards are also covered by provisions laid out in the Guiding Principles. This coverage is contingent on the extent to which a country has adopted the Guiding Principles.[[43]](#footnote-44) The Guiding Principles compile human rights and humanitarian law relevant to internally displaced persons. They describe IDPs as **“persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence” for reasons including “natural or human- made disasters”[[44]](#footnote-45)** and who have not crossed an international border. The Guiding Principles are an important tool for dealing with internal displacement, and States, United Nations agencies and regional and non-governmental organizations are invited to apply them as a standard.
* **The UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement:** The High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement was established by the UN Secretary-General to find concrete solutions to internal displacement, increase global attention and develop concrete recommendations to address displacement issues. The High-Level Panel submitted a report containing key findings and [recommendations](https://www.un.org/internal-displacement-panel/sites/www.un.org.internal-displacement-panel/files/idp-report-listofrecs_web.pdf) to help prevent and reduce the risks of new displacement and strengthen the quality of protection and assistance to IDPs, insisting on the role of climate change and disasters in displacement.

Building on the [report](https://internaldisplacement-panel.org/) of the UN Secretary-General’s [High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement](https://www.un.org/internal-displacement-panel/), the Secretary-General’s launched [Action Agenda on Internal Displacement](https://www.un.org/en/content/action-agenda-on-internal-displacement/), which includes references to climate change and sets out 31 commitments by the [UN system](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-system) to better resolve, prevent, and address internal displacement crises. The UN Secretary-General also appointed Robert Piper as Assistant Secretary-General, Special Adviser on Solutions to Internal Displacement to ensure robust follow-up to the Action Agenda and strengthen United Nations leadership on solutions.

There are also examples of regional frameworks focusing on internal displacement and migration with explicit provision for those moving in the context of climate change, disasters and environmental degradation. This includes:

* **African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention)[[45]](#footnote-46):** provides for the protection of people forced to move within their country as a result of, inter alia, disasters and climate change. It is based on the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement adopted in 1998 but goes further by including climate change among the causes of displacement listed in the definition of an Internally Displaced Person.

Regional policies dealing with free movement of persons, particularly the context of disasters and the adverse effects of climate change and environmental degradation, also have relevance to the issue of internal displacement.

On the other hand, **those who move across international borders from areas adversely affected by climate change** will do so in a variety of circumstances. Some may move in the context of conflict and/or persecution, and thus may qualify as refugees and be entitled to protection under international and regional refugee law. Others may qualify for some other form of legal protection. However, many will not be considered as refugees or stateless persons. In such situations, a need for international protection would reflect the inability of the country of origin to protect against serious harm.[[46]](#footnote-47) This is a gap in terms of the protection of persons in other vulnerable situations under international law. Yet these gaps do not mean that international inaction is acceptable, highlighting the importance of international cooperation and assistance to provide assistance and protection following a human rights approach and for humanitarian considerations.

The lack of a general right of admission for those who seek to cross borders can result in more precarious journeys and dangerous entry attempts. The construction of barriers to entry and practices such as the use of violence, collective expulsions, pushbacks, refoulement, dangerous interceptions, the erection of fences, and criminal or administrative sentences, among others, put migrants at risk. Many of these practices do not comply with human rights law principles and standards and fail to address the needs of migrants, contributing instead to further risks and exacerbating vulnerability. Even though States have sovereignty to govern their borders and manage migration movements, they must abide by their international law obligations, especially the principle of non-refoulement.

Despite these gaps and obstacles, human rights law and the non-refoulement principle under international customary law provides the strongest legal basis for claims for admission or non-return due to the harm to which individuals displaced across borders due to climate change might be subjected to in the country of origin. The principle of non-refoulement is particularly relevant in such situations, as it protects against the forced return to life-threatening circumstances, serious violations of human rights, or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.

There is no consensus yet on whether the negative impacts of climate change already meet this threshold of harm, but this possibility remains promising, and it does not exclude possibilities in cases where the threshold of harm is explicit. In the case of [Teitiota v New Zealand](https://www.refworld.org/cases,HRC,5e26f7134.html), the Immigration and Protection Tribunal acknowledged that disasters, whether caused by climate change or otherwise, could ‘provide a context in which a claim for recognition as a protected person...may be properly grounded’. This decision was subsequently endorsed by New Zealand Supreme Court. The Tribunal noted that Tuvalu—the plaintiff’s State of origin—is not required to mitigate all the underlying environmental drivers associated with climate change and disasters. It must, however, take steps to reduce risks from these drivers to satisfy the positive obligations required to protect the lives of people under its jurisdiction.

In 2020, the Human Rights Committee released its decision regarding the Teitiota case. While the Committee upheld New Zealand’s decision and decided that the right to life was not violated in this instance, it raised the question of whether Teitiota was exposed to a “real risk of irreparable harm” to his right to life in Kiribati. The Committee reasoned that climate change-induced harm can occur both through sudden-onset events (such as intense storms and flooding), and slow-onset processes (such as sea level rise, salinization, and land degradation). Both sudden-onset events and slow-onset processes can prompt individuals to cross borders to seek protection from climate change-related harm. The Committee took the view that: “[W]ithout robust national and international efforts, the effects of climate change in receiving States [of rejected asylum-seekers] may expose individuals to a violation of their rights under articles 6 or 7 of the Covenant, thereby triggering the non-refoulement obligations of sending States.” [[47]](#footnote-48)

IOM recommends considering options based on international customary law (principle of non-refoulement), international human rights law and humanitarian considerations, which would ensure rights protection of the affected environmental migrants, that is all persons on the move without discrimination, under an inclusivist approach. IOM therefore believes, based on international law, that protection solutions for those moving due to the adverse effects of climate change would benefit from a more comprehensive framework, which the refugee regime only might not be able to provide. Human rights law and the non-refoulement principle under international customary law provides the strongest legal basis for claims for admission or non-return due to the harm to which individuals displaced across borders due to climate change might be subjected to in the country of origin.

The term “climate/environmental refugee” does not exist under international law due to the strict nature of the Refugee Convention and the refugee definition. **"Climate refugee** or **environmental refugee** are terms frequently used on purpose in the media and by activists to draw attention on the situation and needs of those uprooted because of disasters, climate change and environmental degradation. While their situations and needs can be similar to those of refugees, such as crossing a border after a disaster and needing protection and assistance, people moving for environmental reasons, do not fall squarely within any one particular category provided by the existing international legal framework. Terms such as "climate change refugee" or "environmental refugee" thus have **no legal basis in international refugee law**. There is also a growing consensus among concerned agencies, including [**IOM**](https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/06/lets-talk-about-climate-migrants-not-climate-refugees/) and [**UNHCR**](https://www.refworld.org/docid/5f75f2734.html), that their use is to be avoided. These **terms are misleading and fail to recognize a number of key aspects that define population movements in the context of climate change and environmental degradation**, including that environmental migration is mainly internal and not necessarily forced, and the use of such terms could potentially undermine the international legal regime for the protection of refugees. In addition, all persons moving in the context of environmental drivers are protected by international human rights law.

1. ***Should separate and particular considerations be given to indigenous peoples with respect to climate change displacement? What are these particular considerations?***

Indigenous people and communities are considerably exposed to the adverse effects of climate change and climate-related mobility. The loss of ancestral living spaces and the degradation of key ecosystems has far-reaching, acute consequences, as it often leads to the loss of cultural practices, religion and traditional beliefs, identity, and language. In the Caribbean coast for instance, indigenous groups in countries like Nicaragua and Honduras are heavily affected by coastal erosion and sea level rise. In mountain areas of the Andes, glacier melting is affecting belief systems of indigenous groups as well as their traditional livelihoods, since water scarcity challenges agricultural production and cattle raising.[[48]](#footnote-49)[[49]](#footnote-50)

Moreover, indigenous peoples may tend to be dependent on local natural resources for their livelihoods and security, which are often heavily affected by climate change. Different processes influenced by climate change are contributing to the displacement of these groups all around the world, including loss of sea ice, permafrost thawing, erosion and changes in species distribution in the Artic, drought, desertification and loss of fertile land in Africa and higher mean temperatures and rainfall pattern changes in the Amazon.

Despite being among the people with the lowest environmental footprint, and despite their profound knowledge of adaptive practices in variable environments, these groups are likely to be affected more heavily throughout their movement. They often have knowledge and skills, livelihoods and resources that might not be easily transferred across contexts and are likely to experience a profound disruption of their lifestyle in their destination – with widespread collective and individual impacts. Existing evidence from other displacement contexts (e.g. linked with development projects, both in the context of spontaneous movements and planned relocations) supports this hypothesis.[[50]](#footnote-51)

Unfortunately, the experience of indigenous people has not been given proper consideration in international migration frameworks. There is a generalized vision of indigenous peoples as communities deeply rooted in their territories and customs, despite the increasing mobility of indigenous individuals and groups from their territories.[[51]](#footnote-52)

Adequate support for indigenous peoples who have migrated, been displaced, or relocated, with particular attention for those who move to urban areas, is imperative to mitigate the already traumatic experience of cultural discontinuity these communities face when moving. It is evident that supporting indigenous communities and protecting the right to stay on their ancestral lands is now a matter of climate justice, for communities that have made limited or no contribution to climate change and also as a mechanism to protect invaluable ecosystems on which indigenous communities depend and help to remain balanced and protected.

Although not uniform across all urban areas, for many indigenous peoples who have migrated or have been displaced or relocated to urban settings, existing social systems within urban regions end up providing at best inadequate coverage for indigenous communities. Developing durable solutions for indigenous peoples is vital given that urban indigenous migrants are [significantly more likely](https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/145891467991974540/pdf/Indigenous-Latin-America-in-the-twenty-first-century-the-first-decade.pdf) to live in vulnerable situations than urban non-indigenous residents, frequently lacking proper access to [important social services, including housing and food support](https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/145891467991974540/pdf/Indigenous-Latin-America-in-the-twenty-first-century-the-first-decade.pdf). Developing durable solutions for indigenous peoples is vital given that urban indigenous migrants are [significantly more likely](https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/145891467991974540/pdf/Indigenous-Latin-America-in-the-twenty-first-century-the-first-decade.pdf) to live in vulnerable situations than urban non-indigenous residents[[52]](#footnote-53), frequently lacking proper access to [important social services, including housing and food support](https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/145891467991974540/pdf/Indigenous-Latin-America-in-the-twenty-first-century-the-first-decade.pdf). Further, a lack of access to [**intercultural health care**](https://rosanjose.iom.int/en/blogs/5-key-aspects-migration-indigenous-peoples) has contributed to worsening health conditions among indigenous migrants.[[53]](#footnote-54)

In sum, global efforts are being made to strengthen indigenous inclusion in policymaking forums and to place indigenous peoples at the center of the response to climate change. However, policymakers and local decision-makers must significantly strengthen their inclusion of indigenous peoples who have migrated, been displaced or relocated due to climate-related impacts. An important component of this engagement must come through improving the inclusion of urban indigenous youth. Through crafting holistic policies centered around indigenous traditions, indigenous language instruction, and indigenous youth community groups, local authorities can develop durable integration solutions for indigenous youth who are unable to return to their original lands. As climate change accelerates and impacts human mobility and decisions by indigenous peoples whether to stay in their place of origin, the need for these solutions become.

**Additional Resources**

The [IOM Environmental Migration Portal](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/) and the [Global Migration Data Portal’s Environmental Migration page](https://www.migrationdataportal.org/themes/environmental_migration_and_statistics) are comprehensive resources that provide access to cutting-edge data analysis and hundreds of research, policy and operational documents on the migration and climate change nexus.

**The following are some key IOM readings**

Daria Mokhnacheva 2022 [Implementing the Commitments Related to Addressing Human Mobility in the Context of Disasters, Climate Change and Environmental Degradation.](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1411/files/documents/17052022_pdd_baseline_mapping_report_final_compressed.pdf)

IOM

2022 [Migration Governance Indicators Data and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration: A Baseline Report](https://publications.iom.int/books/migration-governance-indicators-data-and-global-compact-safe-orderly-and-regular-migration). IOM, Geneva.

2022 [Leaving Place, Restoring Home A Literature Review of French, Spanish and Portuguese Literature on Planned Relocation in The Context of Hazards, Disasters, And Climate Change](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1411/files/documents/pub2021_183_r_2022_final-version-march-2022.pdf). IOM, Geneva.

2021 [Institutional Strategy on Migration, Environment and Climate Change 2021–2030](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1411/files/documents/IOM-Institutional-Strategy-MECCC_0.pdf).

2020 [IOM and the Sendai Framework: A Global Review of IOM’s Contributions to Strengthening Disaster Resilience.](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/drr-2019-ar.pdf.)

2020, [Internal displacement in the context of the slow-onset adverse effects of climate change - Submission by the International Organization for Migration to the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons.](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1411/files/documents/idp-sr-report.pdf)

2018 [Mapping Human Mobility and Climate Change in Relevant National Policies and Institutional Frameworks.](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/20180917%20WIM%20TFD%20I.1%20Output%20final%20.pdf.)

2018 [Mapping Human Mobility (Migration, Displacement and Planned Relocation) and Climate Change in International Processes, Policies and Legal Frameworks.](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/WIM%20TFD%20II.2%20Output.pdf.)

2018 [Taking Sendai Forward: IOM Progress Report on Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience 2018.](https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/DOE/humanitarian_emergencies/transition-%20recovery/drr/drr-report-2017-2018-1221.pdf)

2017 [Extreme Heat and Migration.](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/extreme-heat-%20and-migration.)

2016 [Ocean, Environment, Climate Change and Human Mobility.](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/ocean-environment-climate-change-and-human-mobility.)

2016 [IOM Submission for OHCHR’s Study on the Relationship between Climate Change and the Enjoyment of the Right to Health](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/Impact/IOM.pdf)

2015 [Contributions to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/contributions-united-nations-convention-combat-%20desertification-unccd.)

2014 [IOM Outlook on Migration, Environment and Climate Change.](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/iom-outlook-migration-environment-and-climate-change-1)

2013 [Compendium of IOM Activities in Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience.](https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/What-We-Do/docs/IOM-DRR-Compendium-2013.pdf.)

2009 [Compendium of IOM’s Activities in Migration, Climate Change and the Environment.](https://publications.iom.int/es/system/files/pdf/compendium_of_ioms_activities.pdf.%20%20%20IOM%20and%20OHRLLS)

IOM & OHRLLS

2019 [Climate Change and Migration in Vulnerable Countries: A snapshot of least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing States.](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/climate-change-and-migration-vulnerable-countries-%20snapshot-least-developed-countries-landlocked)

Oakes R, Banerjee S and Warner K 2019 [Chapter 9: Human Mobility and Adaptation to Environmental Change](https://publications.iom.int/books/world-migration-report-2020-chapter-9). In *World Migration Report 2020*.

Vigil A, IOM and UNCCD [2019 Addressing the Land Degradation – Migration Nexus: The Role of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification.](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/addressing-land-%20degradation-%E2%80%93-migration-nexus-role-united-nations-convention-combat-desertification)

UNICEF, IOM, Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of International Migration, United Nations University and Center for Policy Research 2022 [*Guiding Principles for Children on the Move in the Context of Climate Change*](https://www.unicef.org/globalinsight/reports/guiding-principles)*.* UNICEF.

United Nations Network on Migration 2021 [Migration in the context of disasters, climate change and environmental degradation. Thematic Priority 4](https://migrationnetwork.un.org/sites/g/files/tmzbdl416/files/resources_files/workplan_climate_change_and_migration_final.pdf). Geneva.

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2. International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) 2022. Global Report on Internal Displacement 2022. IDMC, Geneva. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. *Ibid.* [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. IPCC 2022 Cities, Settlements and Key Infrastructure. In: Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, pp. 907–1040. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. *Ibid.* [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. [IOM Global Data Institute Thematic Brief #1: Evidence Summary on Climate Change and the Future of Human Mobility](https://www.migrationdataportal.org/resource/iom-global-data-institute-brief-climate-change-and-mobility) [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. IPCC Africa. In: *Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, pp. 1285–1455. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Benveniste, H., M. Oppenheimer and M. Fleurbaey. 2022 Climate change increases resource-constrained international immobility, Nature, 12, 634/641. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. [IOM Global Data Institute Thematic Brief #1: Evidence Summary on Climate Change and the Future of Human Mobility](https://www.migrationdataportal.org/resource/iom-global-data-institute-brief-climate-change-and-mobility) [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. Benveniste, H., M. Oppenheimer and M. Fleurbaey. 2022 Climate change increases resource-constrained international immobility, Nature, 12, 634/641. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. IOM 2021 La Movilidad Humana Derivada de Desastres y el Cambio Climático en Centroamérica. IOM, Geneva. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. Asian Development Bank (ADB) 2011 Climate Change and Migration in Asia and the Pacific. ADB, Manila, Philippines. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
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