|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | A/HRC/56/22 | |
|  | **Advance unedited version** | | Distr.: General  19 June 2024  Original: English |

**Human Rights Council**

**Fifty-sixth session**

Agenda item 2

**Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for**

**Human Rights and reports of the Office of the**

**High Commissioner and the Secretary-General**

Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Report of the Secretary General[[1]](#footnote-2)\*

|  |
| --- |
| *Summary* |
| The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution [78/220](https://www.undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FRES%2F78%2F220&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False), in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit an interim report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Human Rights Council at its fifty-sixth session. |
|  |

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution [78/220](https://www.undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FRES%2F78%2F220&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False), in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit an interim report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Human Rights Council at its fifty-sixth session. The report provides information on the progress made in the implementation of the resolution, including options and recommendations to improve its implementation, and covers the period from 1 August 2023 to 31 March 2024. It contains information from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, non-governmental and media organizations. It also draws on observations of United Nations human rights mechanisms.

2. The Government continued to engage with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the United Nations human rights mechanisms. The Secretary-General acknowledges the comments provided by the Government in response to the present report.

3. During the reporting period, the death penalty continued to be applied at an alarming rate, including on child offenders, despite an overall decline in the execution of child offenders. The authorities continued to impose national security-related charges and lengthy prison sentences on human rights defenders, journalists, and artists in connection with their work, with broader due process concerns also observed during this reporting period. OHCHR continued to receive reports regarding institutionalized gender-based discrimination, where the authorities have severely deprived women and girls of the achievement of substantive equality and of their fundamental rights, including equal participation in economic, social, and political life, equality before the law, freedom from torture or from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, freedom from discrimination, and right to liberty of movement, peaceful assembly, and to freedom of association and expression. OHCHR also received reports on the impact of unilateral sanctions on the enjoyment of human rights, particularly economic and social rights affecting key sectors of society, with disproportionate impact on those who are most vulnerable, including individuals who require access to life-saving medication and equipment.

II. Overview of the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran

A. Death penalty and right to a fair trial

4. Article 6 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates that, in countries that have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has noted that the term “the most serious crimes” must be read restrictively and appertains only to crimes of extreme gravity involving intentional killing.[[2]](#footnote-3) The Secretary-General remains concerned at the increased application of the death penalty in the Islamic Republic of Iran for a wide range of offences in accordance with the Iranian Penal Code, including *hudud* crimes (such as homicide and adultery), *qisas* (retribution in kind) offences (including unintentional killing) and *ta’zir[[3]](#footnote-4)* crimes (such as drug-related offences).

5. According to information received [by OHCHR] it is estimated that at least 834 individuals were executed in 2023, compared to 582 executions estimated in 2022, marking a 43 per cent increase in executions. Of the total number of executions in 2023, at least 471 (56 per cent) executions were for drug-related offences, compared to 256 executions reported in 2022, marking an 84 per cent increase. The year 2023 marked the highest rate of executions for drug-related offences since 2015.[[4]](#footnote-5)

It is estimated that at least 282 individuals were executed for murder charges, of whom 22 were women, marking the highest number of reported executions of women since 2013.[[5]](#footnote-6)

6. According to information received [by OHCHR], at least 857 individuals sentenced to death for *qisas* crimes in 2023 were forgiven by the next of kin of the alleged victim or have accepted to pay the *diya* which resulted in the death sentences not being carried out.[[6]](#footnote-7) This marked a 37 per cent increase in the number of individuals forgiven for *qisas* crimes compared to 2022 (624).

7. While noting an overall decline in the execution of children since 2014, the Secretary-General is deeply concerned that the execution of child offenders continues and deplores the execution of at least one child offender in 2023, named Hamidreza Azari[[7]](#footnote-8), who was 17 at the time of execution. On 24 October 2023, the Head of the Judiciary issued a directive amendingArticle 91 of the Penal Code in relation to the assessment of a child offender’s maturity by strengthening consultations with medical experts with the aim of reducing death penalties for children.[[8]](#footnote-9) In its November 2023 fifth and sixth periodic report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the Government stated that a “Bill Amending Regulations on Child and Juvenile Criminal Responsibility in the Penal Code” had been prepared with the aim of replacing capital punishment for child offenders.[[9]](#footnote-10) The Secretary-General continues to urge the Government to permanently end the sentencing of child offenders to death.

8. According to information received, in 2023, it is estimated that the Islamic Republic of Iran executed 167 members of the Baluch minority, accounting for 20 per cent of all reported executions for the year, of whom five were women.[[10]](#footnote-11) A majority of those executed for drug-related offences also belonged to the Baluch minority constituting 30 per cent of drug-related executions in 2023.[[11]](#footnote-12) At least 25 Afghan nationals were executed in 2023, marking a 56 per cent increase from 2022.[[12]](#footnote-13)

9. The Government confirmed that nine men were executed in relation to the 2022 nationwide protests, with two of these executions taking place during the reporting period. Milad Zohrevand, aged 22, was the eighth man to be executed in the context of the 2022 nationwide protests.[[13]](#footnote-14) He was arrested on 27 October 2022 in Malayar city and convicted of the murder of an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) intelligence official. Reports received by OHCHR suggest that he was tortured in detention, denied legal representation, and that there was pressure on his family to remain silent.[[14]](#footnote-15) The Government noted that it had respected all due process and fair trial rights in this case.[[15]](#footnote-16) The Supreme Court upheld Mr. Zohrevand’s death sentence on 15 November 2023, and he was executed eight days later in Hamedan Central Prison.[[16]](#footnote-17) The Government stated that Mr Zohrevand’s family and lawyer were notified of the execution 48 hours before it was carried out.[[17]](#footnote-18)

10. On 23 January 2024, Mohammad Ghobadlou, aged 23, became the ninth man executed in connection with the 2022 nationwide protests.[[18]](#footnote-19) He was convicted of killing a police officer and injuring five others during protests in Parand City, Tehran Province. [[19]](#footnote-20) Reportedly, he was sentenced to death twice, for *efsad-e fel-arz* and *qisas*.[[20]](#footnote-21) His trial was allegedly marked by torture-tainted confessions.[[21]](#footnote-22) Ghobadlou had reportedly been diagnosed with a bipolar disorder[[22]](#footnote-23) in 2016, which was contested[[23]](#footnote-24) by the Government.

11. The Government asserted that due process rights were observed, including access to legal representation and the right to appeal. The Government also asserted that Mr. Ghobadlou’s appeals were rejected twice by the Supreme Court and that his medical history and condition were thoroughly assessed by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists, concluding that he was responsible for his behaviour at the time of the crime. However, Mr. Ghobadlou’s defence counsel noted that the Supreme Court had revoked his death sentence in July 2023 due to irregularities, and that no new verdicts had been issued before the execution was carried out.[[24]](#footnote-25)

12. An execution notice was conveyed to Mr. Ghobadlou’s family at short notice on 22 January 2024, and he was executed the next day at Gezelhesar Prison in Karaj City.[[25]](#footnote-26) The Human Rights Committee has noted that failure to provide individuals on death row with timely notification about the date of their execution constitutes a form of ill-treatment.[[26]](#footnote-27) The Secretary-General is also deeply alarmed by the Government’s execution of individuals convicted for espionage. On 27 December 2023, three Kurdish men, Wafa Hanareh, Aram Omri, and Rahman Parhazo, and one woman, Nasim Namazi, were executed for espionage for Israel.[[27]](#footnote-28) Reports received by OHCHR suggest their confessions were coerced through threats of torture against their families.[[28]](#footnote-29) The Government asserted adherence to due process rights in this case.[[29]](#footnote-30) On 29 January 2024, four Kurdish political prisoners were executed for the crime of spying for Israel.[[30]](#footnote-31) Mohsen Mazloum, Mohammad (Hejir) Faramarzi, Wafa Azarbar, and Pejman Fatehiwere executed in Gezelhesar Prison after 18 months of detention. Reports received by OHCHR indicate that they were denied the right to legal counsel and contact with their families, subjected to severe torture while in detention, and their confessions were broadcast on state media.[[31]](#footnote-32)

B. Freedom of opinion and expression, association, and right to peaceful assembly

13. The Government continued to retain broad control over access to information, including by blocking access to social media platforms. On 20 February 2024, the National Center of Cyberspace issued a decree criminalising the use of Virtual Private Networks without a permit.[[32]](#footnote-33) The decree instructs the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, in coordination with various governmental bodies, including the state broadcasting authority, Police Headquarters, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, and the Judiciary, to enforce its provisions. The head of the National Center of Cyberspace stated that the decree aimed to simplify public access to digital platforms and services. However, there are significant concerns that the decree would curtail privacy rights and access to information through greater Governmental oversight and surveillance of online activities. The Secretary-General reiterates[[33]](#footnote-34) his concern regarding reports of increased control over online spaces which may result in self-censorship and stifling of independent voices.

14. Journalists and writers continued to be targeted for their work. In 2023, at least 49 writers including 34 men and 15 women were reportedly imprisoned including for “propaganda” and “collusion” against the state.,[[34]](#footnote-35) The majority were reportedly released on bail or subjected to additional conditions affecting the exercise of their rights, including a ban on using social media or prohibiting them from continuing their professions.[[35]](#footnote-36) Journalists have faced arrests on various charges including “disseminating falsehoods”, “propaganda against the system”, “collusion against national security”, “cooperation with hostile governments”, and “disrupting public order”. These charges often lead to harsh penalties, lengthy prison sentences, and restrictions on their profession.

15. Concerns remain about the continued imprisonment of at least eight journalists.[[36]](#footnote-37) Niloofar Hamedi and Elaheh Mohammadi were arrested in 2022 in connection with their reporting on Jina Mahsa Amini. They were reportedly convicted for “collusion to commit crimes against the country’s security”, “propaganda against the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran”, and “cooperating with the hostile government of the United States.” and were sentenced on 22 October 2023 by Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolution Court.[[37]](#footnote-38) While noting their release on bail[[38]](#footnote-39) on 14 January 2024 after 17 months in detention, the Secretary-General expresses concern about reports that the judiciary had opened a new case against them for appearing in photos without hijab following their release.[[39]](#footnote-40)

16. The Secretary-General welcomes the release of journalist Nasim Soltanbeigi on medical furlough,[[40]](#footnote-41) while concerns remain that her conviction on national security offences which appeared linked to her peaceful human rights activism, has not been lifted.[[41]](#footnote-42)

17. On 5 February 2024, state security forces reportedly raided the office of *Fardaye Eghtesad* online, an independent news outlet in Tehran, detained four of its journalists and confiscated their belongings without informing them of their charges.[[42]](#footnote-43) Three of the four journalists were reportedly released on bail,[[43]](#footnote-44) while journalist Ali Tasnimi reportedly remained in custody at the Shapur Tehran police detention center[[44]](#footnote-45). On 31 January 2024, freelance economic journalist, Mehdi Afshar-nik, was reportedly arrested by state security forces and his family and lawyer have reportedly been unable to obtain information on his whereabouts.[[45]](#footnote-46) Journalist and editor-in-chief of the weekly newspaper *Siyahat’e Shargh*, Nasrin Hassani, was convicted of “disseminating false information” and “non-compliance with hijab in public” in November 2023.[[46]](#footnote-47) On 4 February 2024, she commenced a seven-month prison term in Bojnurd Prison, North Khorasan Province.[[47]](#footnote-48) Additionally, she faces a one-year sentence for “spreading propaganda against the system”.[[48]](#footnote-49) Hassani was previously arrested for her coverage of the 2022 nationwide protests and for allegedly violating hijab laws.[[49]](#footnote-50)

18. The Secretary-General had expressed concern over the detention of artist Toomaj Salehi, who is now facing new charges related to an ongoing case from October 2022 in connection with his music perceived to be critical of the authorities[[50]](#footnote-51). In November 2023, Mr. Salehi was released on bail,[[51]](#footnote-52) but reports indicated that he was violently rearrested shortly thereafter in relation to a video he had released describing his experiences of torture and other violations while in detention.[[52]](#footnote-53) Charges of “disseminating false information” and “inciting people to violence” related to the video were dismissed by the Criminal Court of Isfahan in March 2024.[[53]](#footnote-54) In January 2024, two new charges were included as part of his ongoing October 2022 case of “abetting in rebellion” and “conspiracy with the intent to compromise national security”.[[54]](#footnote-55) In late March 2024, his request for early release was rejected and he remains in detention.[[55]](#footnote-56)

19. The Secretary-General also expresses concern over the detention of other artists for exercising their right to hold opinions and freedom of expression, including Vafa Ahmad Pour, known as “Vafadar”, on charges of “propaganda against the system”, “dissemination of falsehoods”, and “disturbing public opinion”, in relation to the production of a song in support of the 2022 nationwide protests.[[56]](#footnote-57) Artist Saman Yasin also remains in prison after the Supreme Court’s decision of December 2022 to overturn his death sentence for “assembly and collusion with intention of committing a crime against the security of the country” and “disturbing the public order and peace”[[57]](#footnote-58) in connection to songs he produced perceived to be critical of the Government.[[58]](#footnote-59) The Supreme Court’s decision to overturn his death sentence was reportedly due to “investigative irregularities.”[[59]](#footnote-60). There were also disturbing reports of his torture, forced confessions, and mock executions while in detention.[[60]](#footnote-61) Mr. Yasin published an open letter in February 2024 to the Head of the Judiciary condemning his indefinite imprisonment and unjustified transfers to a psychiatric hospital.[[61]](#footnote-62)

20. In its Concluding Observations of 26 October 2023, the United Nations Human Rights Committee expressed concerns regarding multiple reports of hate speech by public officials, instigating prejudice against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) persons.[[62]](#footnote-63) It also expressed concern about the criminalisation of consensual same-sex relations between adults which could lead to flogging or sentencing to death.[[63]](#footnote-64) The Committee also expressed concern about acts that restrict freedom of association, such as preventing meetings by civil society actors from taking place and arbitrarily arresting members of civic associations and trade unions, including members of the Iranian Teachers Trade Association and the Free Union of Iranian Workers.[[64]](#footnote-65)

21. The Secretary-General is deeply concerned by reports of the use of lethal force against peaceful protestors.[[65]](#footnote-66) On 29 September 2023, 1 and 20 October 2023, security forces reportedly fired “birdshot” shotgun pellets at worshippers from Zahedan's Maki Mosque after Friday prayers, resulting in injuries.[[66]](#footnote-67) Special Forces, Revolutionary Guards, and plainclothes agents, some reportedly disguised in traditional attire and masks, were allegedly implicated in these operations.[[67]](#footnote-68) The Secretary-General welcomes the opening of the trial of members of security forces for their alleged involvement in the killing of protestors in Zahedan during the September 2022 protests,[[68]](#footnote-69) on 7 February 2024.[[69]](#footnote-70) In its comments to the present report, the Islamic Republic of Iran affirmed its commitment to investigating allegations of misconduct by law enforcement officials in relation to this incident.

C. Economic and Social rights

**Adequate standard of living**

22. The Secretary-General reiterates[[70]](#footnote-71) his concerns at the impact of the economic crisis on living conditions, exacerbated by unilateral sanctions, which impacted a range of economic and social rights.

23. According to the International Monetary Fund, in 2023, the inflation rate in the Islamic Republic of Iran was at 47 per cent.[[71]](#footnote-72) A devaluation of the national currency has caused high inflation, which negatively impacted the purchasing power of households.[[72]](#footnote-73) Consumption patterns have changed, with reports indicating that many consumers purchase cheaper, lower quality food items to meet caloric and nutritional needs.[[73]](#footnote-74)

24. Increasing rent levels have affected the right to adequate housing and further impacted socio-economic welfare[[74]](#footnote-75) as state reports estimated that 25 per cent of the population are renters,[[75]](#footnote-76) while in Tehran, the capital, an estimated 51 per cent are renters.[[76]](#footnote-77) With increased urbanisation and demands for housing, the official news agency IRNA reported in November 2023 that as many as 543 cities are experiencing growing informal settlements and slums with an estimated population of 19 million.[[77]](#footnote-78) In its comments to the present report, the Government asserts that it constructed one million homes, with 335,000 residential units already completed.

**Right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment**

25. Unilateral sanctions have imposed a heavy burden on the national energy infrastructure, which requires access to foreign investment and technology to improve the quality and quantity of domestic production[[78]](#footnote-79). Coupled with population growth and urbanization, the energy infrastructure has been strained further. Air pollution, exacerbated by widespread burning of fuel oil to compensate for a weak national energy infrastructure, has negatively impacted the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment. According to information shared by the Air Pollution Research Centre of Tehran University Medical Sciences Faculty in December 2023, an estimated 45,000 to 50,000 people die annually due to health issues related to air pollution, with 700 to 1,000 being children under the age of five.[[79]](#footnote-80)

26. There have been protests against the Governments’ inadequate response to severe air pollution from the industrial use of fossil fuels, such as in the city of Ardakan in December 2023,[[80]](#footnote-81) and in the city of Arak against the Shazand power plant in late February 2024.[[81]](#footnote-82) The Government highlighted the lack of funding and challenges in accessing modern pollution reduction technologies due to the ongoing unilateral sanctions.[[82]](#footnote-83)

27. The Islamic Republic of Iran entered its fourth consecutive year of drought, with the National Centre for Climate and Drought Crisis Management reporting a 44.8 per cent decrease in the country’s average rainfall. State-affiliated media has highlighted that 70 per cent of the country’s land is currently in critical condition. This situation, exacerbated by reports of water mismanagement, is impacting a variety of rights, including the right to adequate food and the right to water and sanitation. This is exemplified by the worsening water crises in areas like the Gavkhni Marshes and the declining water levels of Lake Urmia. State-affiliated media reported in January 2024 that Government officials had pointed to the lack of adequate conservation measures in water usage across households, industries, and agriculture, exacerbating the strain on natural groundwater resources.

**Right to health**

28. The overall economic crisis has significantly impacted the health sector, exacerbating already challenging working conditions for medical staff and negatively affecting people’s enjoyment of the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.[[83]](#footnote-84) Medical staff face a variety of pressures, including low wages[[84]](#footnote-85) and delayed salary payments.[[85]](#footnote-86) Citing troubling statistics, the President of the Supreme Council of the Medical System has drawn attention to an increase in suicide rates within the medical community due to challenging socioeconomic conditions.[[86]](#footnote-87)

29. On 14 January 2024, the Supreme Insurance Council announced a46 per cent increase in prices for medical services for 2024-2025.[[87]](#footnote-88) This could further jeopardize the already strained ability of many individuals and families in accessing affordable and quality healthcare.[[88]](#footnote-89)

30. The compounded effects of unilateral sanctions, together with overcompliance by different actors, such as States, businesses, financial institutions, and humanitarian actors, and the overall complex economic situation in the country, have jeopardized the availability of medical products and equipment, seriously impacting the right to health, including of access to essential healthcare and medications for chronic illnesses including for thalassemia. Reports received by OHCHR indicate that, since 2017, at least over 750 people have died due to medication shortages.[[89]](#footnote-90)

**Rights to work and to social security**

31. According to official figures, unemployment has decreased from 9 per cent in 2022 to 8.2 per cent in 2023[[90]](#footnote-91) while the International Monetary Fund put the latest unemployment rate at 9 per cent for 2022 and 2023.[[91]](#footnote-92) Labour activists and representatives had reportedly demanded a 42 per cent increase of the minimum wage.[[92]](#footnote-93) On 19 March 2024, the Government announced a 35.5 per cent increase in the minimum wage of labourers, a move that was labelled as insufficient by labour representatives, noting that inflation rates have outpaced such increase.

32. According to information received [by OHCHR], between October and December 2023, retirees held weekly strikes in various regions, especially retirees from various industries such as steel, oil, telecommunications, military, and health.[[93]](#footnote-94)

33. Reportedly, municipal public service workers frequently obtain employment through contractors that offer low pay, and they routinely face significant delays in receiving their wages. Government officials have reportedly noted reduced municipal incomes as reasons for such delays.[[94]](#footnote-95) Employees in urban and rural water and sewage companies, telecommunications, and transportation sectors face similar challenges impacting their right to work.

34. The Secretary-General notes the Islamic Republic of Iran’s ratification of the International Labour Organisations’ Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (No. 155) and the Protocol of 2002 to the Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 on 7 February 2024, which could strengthen the protection framework for workers and improve working conditions, especially for vulnerable groups.

D. Human rights situation of women

35. During its October 2023 review before the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the Government stated that various programmes had been rolled out to support women and that there had been an increase in women’s representation in tertiary education, medicine, business, and science.[[95]](#footnote-96) In its comments to the present report, the Government stated that the number of women in managerial positions more than doubled from 2020 to 40,683 in 2023 and significant appointments of women include 455 women in political roles, 6,471 women working in legal and judicial affairs, and 1,006 women serving as judges.

36. The Secretary-General continues[[96]](#footnote-97) to be concerned at the slow progress to review and adopt the Bill on Protection of Women Against Violence presented to Parliament in 2021.

37. The Secretary-General also remains [[97]](#footnote-98) concerned about the Bill to Support the Family by Promoting the Culture of Chastity and Hijab (Chastity and Hijab Bill), which seeks to reinforce mandatory public hijab requirements for women and girls and introduce severe penalties for non-compliance which could amplify gender discrimination On 20 September 2023, the Bill was adopted in Parliament by a majority vote and was subsequently submitted for the approval of the Guardian Council.[[98]](#footnote-99) Since then, the Bill has undergone severalparliamentary adjustments following rejections by the Guardian Council. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Special Procedures and Treaty Bodies have called for the Bill to be repealed.

38. The Secretary-General is deeply disturbed by reports of discrimination, harassment, and punishment the women and girls in Iran face daily. Based on reports received [by OHCHR], in May 2023, Iranian security forces detained Ms. Heshmati on charges of “propaganda against the Islamic Republic”, “hurting public chastity”, “producing inappropriate (vulgar) content”, “promoting corruption”, and “appearing in public without a veil”. Following an appeal against her initial sentence of 13 years, Ms. Heshmati was subsequently sentenced to 74 lashes for “offending public morality and chastity” in connection with publishing a photo of herself online without hijab.[[99]](#footnote-100) The ruling further contended that the flogging was for her “alleged connection to an organized movement outside the country, receiving funds to promote non-compliance with laws in busy hours in Tehran”.[[100]](#footnote-101)

39. Between 16 and 17 August 2023, 11 women rights activists were arrested across Gilan Province, including in the cities of Bandar Anzali, Fuman, Lahijan, and Rasht.[[101]](#footnote-102) Reports indicate that they were arrested in the run up to the one-year anniversary of the 2022 nationwide protests and for their involvement in women’s rights campaigns.[[102]](#footnote-103) On 27 March 2024, they were convicted by Branch Three of the Revolution Court in Rasht for “consensus and collusion with intention of disturbing national security”, “membership in an illegal group”, and “propaganda against the government”. Notably, Zohreh Dadras received the most severe sentence of nine years, six months, and two days of imprisonment for “establishing an illegal group with the intention of disrupting national security” and “consensus and collusion to disrupt national security”.[[103]](#footnote-104) They were reportedly held in solidarity confinement, and their whereabouts remained unknown due to the denial of access to legal representation and restricted phone calls.[[104]](#footnote-105) They were released on bail from Lakan prison between 16 September to 1 October 2023.

40. Ms. Sedigeh Vasmaghi, a prominent religious scholar, writer, poet, and socio-political analyst,[[105]](#footnote-106) was also arrested on 16 March 2024, and subsequently convicted for “propaganda against the system” and “public appearance without hijab” According to reports, Ms. Vasmaghi had questioned the legal and religious jurisdiction of compulsory hijab following the 2022 nationwide protests, expressing objections to the treatment of women and mandatory hijab.[[106]](#footnote-107)

41. The United Nations Human Rights Committee expressed concern about the lack of representation and participation of women in senior and decision-making positions in political and public life and the private sector.[[107]](#footnote-108) On 1 March 2024, the Islamic Republic of Iran held its twelfth parliamentary election. Although over 1,700 women were approved to run for parliament, of the 245 elected members during the first round, only 11 were women This marked a further decrease compared to the outgoing parliament, which had 16 women, indicating that major impediments to the political participation of women persist.

42. The Secretary-General also acknowledges the findings of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Fact-Finding Mission”) published on 8 March 2024.[[108]](#footnote-109) The Fact-Finding Mission, concluded that there is pervasive and deep-rooted structural and institutionalized discrimination against women and girls, permeating all areas of their public and private lives.[[109]](#footnote-110) It also found that this was a trigger and enabler of widespread serious human rights violations and crimes under international law committed against women and girls.[[110]](#footnote-111) The Secretary-General notes the Government’s comments on the report of the Fact-Finding Mission.[[111]](#footnote-112)

E. Human rights situation of children

43. The Secretary-General acknowledges the Government’s longstanding commitment to facilitating education, which is also reflected in its Constitution and the Charter of Citizens’ Rights.[[112]](#footnote-113) However, Government reports indicate that, between December 2023 and January 2024, at least 30,000 children with disabilities have been unable to attend primary school, depriving them of their basic right to education.[[113]](#footnote-114) The Secretary-General recalls Article 27 of Iran’s Law on the Protection of Rights of the Disabled of 2017 which underlines the State’s obligation to provide a living allowance to individuals with severe disabilities based on the minimum wage approved by the Supreme Labour Council.[[114]](#footnote-115) The Secretary-General notes the allocation of resources equivalent to 60 million USD for school renovations announced by the Minister of Education in March 2024 to improve learning.[[115]](#footnote-116)

44. The Secretary-General remains concerned that child marriage is yet to be prevented and eliminated. The legal age of marriage for girls and boys under the Civil Code remains at 13 and 15 years respectively. In practice, girls are more at risk of early and forced marriages. In October 2023, the Government reported[[116]](#footnote-117) to the United Nations Human Rights Committee that there were 43,000 child marriages registered. This is a considerable rise from the last available data from the national Statistical Centre for the period between March 2022 and March 2023, where the marriages of 25,900 girls and 15 boys had been registered.[[117]](#footnote-118)

45. The Secretary-General is concerned that over 40,000 children lack official identification documentation as highlighted by the 8 October 2023 announcement by the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labour, and Social Welfare.[[118]](#footnote-119) This impedes their access to state services and jeopardizes the enjoyment of their rights to health and education. According to semi-official state media outlets, the children are predominantly from minority groups, as well as those with non-Iranian fathers.[[119]](#footnote-120) The Secretary-General notes the Government’s efforts in addressing this issue, including the public commitment by the head of the National Civil Registration Organization on 23 January 2024 to prioritize this matter.[[120]](#footnote-121) The Secretary-General further notes the implementation of the *Faghedin* electronic registration system designed to expediate the registration of undocumented individuals including children.[[121]](#footnote-122)

F. Human rights situation of human rights defenders, lawyers, and families

46. Since the 2022 nationwide protests, an ongoing atmosphere of intimidation, coercion, and repression against lawyers, human rights defenders, and the families of protest victims has persisted during the current reporting period. These individuals have been targeted for their legitimate engagement in journalism, human rights protection, legal services, and for exercising their rights to free expression and peaceful assembly.

47. Saleh Nikbakht, the lawyer representing Jina Mahsa Amini’s family, received a one-year prison sentence from Branch 28 of the Tehran Revolution Court for “spreading propaganda against the state”, and a two-year ban on online activities.[[122]](#footnote-123) The convictions appear to be linked to his media interviews regarding Ms. Amini’s case. Due to a reported travel ban on the Amini family, Nikbakht represented them at the European Parliament on 12 December 2023, to accept the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought on their behalf.[[123]](#footnote-124) Upon his return to the Islamic Republic of Iran, the authorities reportedly confiscated the prize.[[124]](#footnote-125)

48. Mahdokht Damghanpour, the legal representative of the ninth executed protestor, Mohammad Ghobadlou,[[125]](#footnote-126) was summoned to the Culture and Media Court on 13 February 2024. This summons stemmed from her criticism of the judicial process and the execution of Ghobadlou’s sentence.[[126]](#footnote-127) These instances illustrate the challenges faced by legal representatives working on legal cases that are politically sensitive, particularly those that are high profile and visible.

49. The Secretary-General expresses serious concern about reports received [by OHCHR] indicating Government interference with the independence of the Iranian Bar Association. On 7 February 2024, authorities reportedly obstructed the association’s attempt to hold elections for its executive board. Allegedly, the Tehran Public Places Administration ordered the cancellation of the elections and its relocation to the Central Bar Association’s office. The elections did not take place due to insufficient attendance.[[127]](#footnote-128) The Government reportedly also questioned the Iranian Bar Association’s legal status, advocating for the cancellation of their elections, and the adoption of a legal clause during an open session of parliament on 21 August 2023, compelling all bar associations to follow the Regulatory Board of the Ministry of Economy’s decisions.[[128]](#footnote-129) Members of the Bar Association expressed concern that they were not able to challenge this in the Administrative Justice Court.

50. On 22 January 2024, United Nations special procedures urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to respect and protect lawyers, emphasizing the need to implement measures to ensure that lawyers could fulfil their crucial role without facing prosecution or sanctions.[[129]](#footnote-130)

51. Human rights defenders continued to be targeted for their work in seeking accountability and justice. Nobel Laureate, human rights defender and journalist, Narges Mohammadi has remained imprisoned since 16 November 2021 in Evin prison. At the time of writing, reports indicate that Mohammadi has been denied access to her lawyer and prevented from contacting her family since 29 November 2023.[[130]](#footnote-131) Reports received [by OHCHR] also indicate that she was prohibited from attending her father’s funeral in late February 2024.[[131]](#footnote-132) Her sentence was extended by an additional 15-months in January 2024 for “spreading propaganda against the state”. This is her fifth conviction since March 2021, three of which appear to be in relation to her human rights activism in prison. Overall, she has been arrested 13 times and sentenced to a total of 31 years in connection with her human rights activism.[[132]](#footnote-133)

52. The Secretary-General is alarmed at reports about the physical and mental wellbeing of human rights defender Ms. Fatemeh Sepehri. Ms. Sepehri has been imprisoned since 21 September 2023 in Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad.[[133]](#footnote-134) The Government asserts that Ms. Sepehri committed various crimes, including “communicating with hostile governments”, “encouraging teachers to stage illegal rallies”, “conducting an interview with Israeli media”, and “encouraging Israel to conduct military action against Iran”. Additionally, she was accused of signing a letter allegedly urging the President of the United States to exert greater economic pressure on the Iranian people, as well as insulting Iranian officials and authorities.[[134]](#footnote-135)

53. Sepehri was sentenced to 18 years in prison for “collaboration with hostile foreign governments”, “assembly and collusion against national security”, “insulting the Supreme Leader” and for “propaganda against the government”.[[135]](#footnote-136) Reports indicate that charges brought against her might stem from her human rights activism.[[136]](#footnote-137)

54. The Secretary-General is concerned by information indicating possible lack of adequate medical care during Sepehri’s time in prison. According to information received [by OHCHR], Sepehri suffers from cardiovascular diseases in addition to other health conditions. Despite being granted a one-week medical furlough in October 2023 following open-heart surgery, Sepehri was re-arrested by security forces at her residence, which interrupted her essential medical treatment and recovery.[[137]](#footnote-138) In its Concluding Observations on the fourth periodic report on the Islamic Republic of Iran, the UN Human Rights Committee underlined the need to ensure proper conditions of detention compatible with the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), the UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules), including with regard to the provision of medical attention when needed.[[138]](#footnote-139)

55. The Government asserts that Sepehri is being held in a newly renovated and well-equipped prison facility with three other inmates[[139]](#footnote-140) and has been transferred to external medical centers on more than 50 occasions for surgeries and to receive proper medical care and necessary medication.[[140]](#footnote-141)

56. There are also concerns regarding Sepehri’s lawyer, Mr. Khosrow Alikordi, known for representing journalists, activists, and families of protestors. He was reportedly transferred to Vakil Abad prison on 17 February 2024 to serve a one-year prison sentence for “propaganda activities in favour of groups opposing the Islamic Republic system”.[[141]](#footnote-142) The UN Human Rights Committee emphasised in its Concluding Observations the need to ensure that lawyers can exercise their profession without reprisals.[[142]](#footnote-143)

57. The Secretary-General is concerned by ongoing reports of pressure by the authorities against families of protests victims during the reporting period, for seeking justice for loved ones killed or executed in relation to the 2022 nationwide protests. Manouchehr Bakhtiari, whose son Pouya was killed during the November 2019 protests, was sentenced to 18 years in prison and 74 lashes for security-related charges in January 2024. Reportedly, this is in connection to his advocacy efforts aimed at holding authorities accountable for the death of his son. He has been detained since July 2021.[[143]](#footnote-144) The Government noted that the initial sentence was overturned on appeal due to jurisdictional errors, and that the case has been transferred to another branch for further adjudication.[[144]](#footnote-145)

58. On 17 December 2023, Masoumeh Yazdani, whose son was killed in the 2022 protests, commenced a 13-year prison sentence after being convicted of “insulting the Supreme Leader” and “activities against the Islamic Republic”.[[145]](#footnote-146) In the first months of 2024, Bahareh Shiri and Farzaneh Barzekar, the mothers of protestors killed in 2022, were sentenced to six and two years in prison respectively on various convictions, including “inciting people to disrupt public security”, “propaganda against the government”, and “insulting the Supreme Leader”.[[146]](#footnote-147) Mashallah Karami, the father of Mohammad Mehdi Karami, who was also executed in the context of the 2022 protests, has been detained for over five months on various charges including “membership in groups with the intention of acting against national security” and “propaganda against the state”.[[147]](#footnote-148) Masoud Shekari, the father of Mohsen Shekari – the first man to be executed in connection with the 2022 protests – was arrested on 27 February 2024 and subsequently released on 5 March 2024.

G. Human rights situation of minorities

59. OHCHR continued to receive reports documenting instances whereby individuals were arrested, imprisoned, expelled from educational institutions, or denied economic opportunities based on their perceived affiliation with religious and/or ethnic minorities. In its Concluding Observations on the fourth periodic report on the Islamic Republic of Iran, the United Nations Human Rights Committee expressed concerns regarding restrictions on, and discrimination against members of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities, including the Baloch, Ahwazi Arab, Kurdish and Baha’i minorities.[[148]](#footnote-149)

60. OHCHR received reports that, since October 2023, over 50 reported arrests and imprisonments, took place in various cities including in Hamadan Isfahan, Karaj, Shiraz, and Yazd.[[149]](#footnote-150) Over two-thirds of those reportedly arrested and detained were women. In addition, there are continuing concerns with regards to the right to education of Baha’i students. They are reportedly required to complete a mandatory form to sit national university entrance examinations requiring them to pledge not to take part in sectarian activities which may impact their right to freedom of religion or belief and the right to take part in cultural life.[[150]](#footnote-151)

61. As of the time of writing, at least 14 Christians are reportedly detained for sentences between three months and five years in connection with the peaceful exercise of their religion.[[151]](#footnote-152) At least eight others have been sentenced for the same reason and await summons while temporarily released on bail.[[152]](#footnote-153)

H. Human rights situation of foreign and dual nationals

62. The Secretary-General acknowledges the release of five American-Iranian dual nationals in September 2023, including environmentalist Morad Tahbaz.[[153]](#footnote-154) However, concerns remain regarding the underlying basis for the detention of dual and foreign nationals particularly those with backgrounds in socio-political, cultural, academic, environmental, and journalistic fields. The UN Human Rights Committee expressed concern regarding the right to liberty and security of foreign and dual nationals being arbitrarily detained on the basis of national security charges including charges which carry the death penalty.

63. Two dual nationals, German-Iranian Jamshid Sharmahd and Swedish-Iranian Ahmedreza Djalali, remain at risk of execution. Ahmedreza Djalali has been arbitrarily detained since April 2016,[[154]](#footnote-155) and faces a serious and substantial imminent risk of execution It was reported that an official from the judiciary visited Ahmadreza Djalali in prison on 22 December 2023 warning him that his conviction and death sentence are “confirmed” and “will soon be implemented”.[[155]](#footnote-156) Swedish national, Johan Floderus is detained in the Islamic Republic of Iran on charges of *efsad-e-fel-arz* for espionage, which could carry the death penalty.[[156]](#footnote-157) His court verdict is yet to be reached.

III. Accountability and international human rights obligations

64. The Secretary-General welcomes the 28 November 2023 directive on “Referring to International Human Rights Conventions in Judicial Decisions” presented by the Deputy Head of the Judiciary. The directive instructs judges to align their decisions with the international human rights obligations of the Islamic Republic of Iran.[[157]](#footnote-158)

65. The Secretary-General also notes the executive summary of the report of the “Special Committee Investigating the 2022 Unrests” published in March 2024[[158]](#footnote-159), pending publication of the full report. The Special Committee was tasked with investigating violations in the context of the 2022 protests.[[159]](#footnote-160) Its findings indicate that 292 individuals are currently detained in the context of the September 2022 protests “for perpetrating violent criminal acts”. It also highlighted that the judiciary addressed over 244 complaints by the public against law enforcement officers in connection with the protests and that disciplinary measures have been imposed on 21 security personnel found culpable or negligent by the Law Enforcement Command. The Special Committee also noted that the National Security Council decided that, in an initial phase, 122 individuals would be compensated as part of a 19 October directive to compensate victims of the 2022 protests.[[160]](#footnote-161) The Secretary-General also notes the recommendations provided by the Special Committee, including training of law enforcement officers to ensure they perform their legal duties effectively, efforts to bolster and advance the involvement of women and girls in the legislative and regulatory process, and putting in place parliamentary proposals concerning assemblies and demonstrations.

66. While these efforts toward accountability are welcome, the Secretary-General is concerned by the lack of clarity over the independence of the Special Committee, given the lack of transparency over the selection process of its members. While the Committee stated that it took measures to protect victims and witnesses by protecting their statements, it is unclear whether it implemented other protection measures to sufficiently guarantee a safe environment for victims and witnesses to engage with the Committee. While the Committee stated that it relied on domestic and international law in its methodology, it remains unclear how international human rights law was applied. The Special Committee also did not provide information on preventing future human rights violations and addressing long-standing human rights grievances.

IV. Cooperation with international human rights mechanisms and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

**Human rights treaty bodies**

67. The Government has reiterated its commitment to engaging with international human rights mechanisms. As of finalising this report, however, the reports of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and to the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities remained overdue. The Government submitted its fifth and sixth periodic reports to the Committee on the Rights of the Child in November 2023.

**Special Procedures and the Fact-Finding Mission**

68. The Secretary-General regrets that the Government denied the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Fact-Finding Mission access to the country during the reporting period as well as its limited engagement with both mechanisms. The Secretary-General notes that there was some interaction between the Special Committee to Investigate the 2022 Unrest and the Fact-Finding Mission[[161]](#footnote-162) as well as some interaction between the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Geneva with some thematic Special Procedures mandate holders.

69. Between 1 August 2023 and 31 March 2024, Special Procedures mandate holders issued 13 communications on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.[[162]](#footnote-163) The Government replied to nine communications.[[163]](#footnote-164)

**Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights**

70. The Secretary-General welcomes ongoing dialogue between the Government and OHCHR and the regular information-sharing by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Secretary-General also welcomes the mission conducted by the Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Islamic Republic of Iran from 3 to 5 February 2024 to discuss critical human rights issues.

V. Recommendations

71. **The Secretary-General urges the Government:**

(a) **To immediately halt the execution of all individuals, including those sentenced to death in the context of protests and for drug-related offences and to refrain from further application of the death penalty;**

(b) **To abolish the death penalty and introduce an immediate moratorium on its use as a first step towards its prompt abolition, and prohibit the execution of all offenders who were under the age of 18 at the time of the crime, in all circumstances, and commute their sentences;**

(c) **To release immediately all persons detained arbitrarily, including women and girls, human rights defenders, lawyers and journalists who were detained for legitimately exercising their rights to freedoms of opinion, expression, association and peaceful assembly;**

(d) **To ensure that Internet shutdowns are never applied, as they inherently impose wide-ranging and disproportionate consequences for the people and enjoyment of their basic human rights;**

(e) **To guarantee the right of peaceful assembly and ensure that security measures in relation to protests are carried out in line with international human rights norms and standards, including the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and United Nations Human Rights Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement;**

(f) **To uphold full respect for due process and fair trial rights in line with international norms and standards, among others by ensuring that all defendants, including those accused of crimes against national security, have effective access to legal counsel of their choosing during the preliminary investigative stage and all subsequent stages of the judicial process;**

(g) **To ensure prompt, transparent and effective investigations by an independent and impartial body, into allegations of the excessive and lethal use of force and firearms when not strictly unavoidable to protect life, including during protests, deaths in custody, torture or other ill-treatment and inadequate prison conditions;**

(h) **To** **prosecute and hold accountable public officials, including law enforcement officials, for issuing relevant orders or acting in breach of applicable international human rights law; and make the findings of investigations public;**

(i) **To take further steps to eliminate all forms of gender-based discrimination and violence against women and girls in law and in practice, including through the revision and repeal of laws and policies that criminalize non-compliance with compulsory veiling; and to urgently implement effective measures to respect and protect their fundamental human rights, in accordance with international norms and standards, and advance their equal and safe participation in public life;**

(j) **To guarantee the rights to freedom of opinion and expression and of peaceful assembly, and to ensure that any limitation to rights offline and online complies with the established criteria under applicable international human rights law;**

(k) **To ensure that human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists, writers, and labour rights activists are not harassed, detained or prosecuted for exercising their legitimate work ;**

(l) **To ensure that lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons do not face reprisals or harassment and are not arrested, detained, or prosecuted for exercising their human rights;**

(m) **To protect the rights of all persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities, and address all forms of discrimination against them without delay;**

(n) **To** t**ake all measures necessary to mitigate the effects of economic challenges and to meet its obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including on the protection of at-risk groups;**

(o) **To join the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty; the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Workers and Members of Their Families; and the fundamental International Labour Organization conventions;**

(p) **To submit the outstanding periodic reports to the human rights treaty bodies, implement the recommendations of the international human rights mechanisms – the treaty bodies, the special procedures of the Human Rights Council and the universal periodic review – and cooperate with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran, including by accepting visits by these mandate holders; and**

(q) **To continue to engage with OHCHR and the United Nations Country Team in the implementation of all the recommendations made in the reports of the Secretary-General and those of international human rights mechanisms.**

72. **Noting the economic and financial challenges experienced by the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Secretary-General reiterates his call on States that have imposed unilateral sanctions on it to take appropriate steps to ensure that measures such as humanitarian exemptions are given prompt, broad and practical effects in order to minimize their adverse consequences.**

1. \* The present report was submitted to the conference services for processing after the deadline so as to include the most recent information. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. [CCPR/C/GC/36](https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/general-comment-no-36-article-6-right-life), para 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. Punishment for these offences is at the discretion of the presiding judge. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. At least 642 executions were reported in 2015 for drug-related offences. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. <https://iranhr.net/media/files/Iran_Human_Rights-Annual_Report_2023.pdf>, pages 13, 56 and 85. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. <https://iranhr.net/en/articles/6620/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2023/11/comment-un-human-rights-office-spokesperson-liz-throssell-executions-child-and>. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Report of the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted to OHCHR (November 2023). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. [CRC/C/IRN/5-6](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2FC%2FIRN%2F5-6&Lang=en), para 420. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. <https://iranhr.net/media/files/Iran_Human_Rights-Annual_Report_2023.pdf>, page 85. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. [Ibid,](https://iranhr.net/media/files/Iran_Human_Rights-Annual_Report_2023.pdf) pages 13 and 89. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. [Ibid](https://iranhr.net/media/files/Iran_Human_Rights-Annual_Report_2023.pdf), page 90. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2023/11/comment-un-human-rights-office-spokesperson-liz-throssell-executions-child-and>. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. <https://hengaw.net/en/news/archive/62905>. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. Report of the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted to OHCHR (January 2024). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67512588>. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. Report of the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted to OHCHR (January 2024). [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/01/iran-sharp-spike-use-death-penalty> [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-executes-protester-charged-with-murder-2024-01-23/>; *see also* <https://iranhumanrights.org/2024/01/street-protester-mohammad-ghobadlou-hanged-in-iran-amid-state-sanctioned-killing-spree/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. <https://www.amnesty.org/fr/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/MDE1363682023ENGLISH.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. <https://www.amnesty.org/fr/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/MDE1363682023ENGLISH.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. <https://www.bbc.com/persian/63924870>. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. Report of the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted to OHCHR (March 2024); *see ﷟also* <https://www.mizanonline.ir/00JxG5>. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. <https://twitter.com/amirreiis/status/1749677255280697394>. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/01/iran-executions-of-protester-with-mental-disability-and-kurdish-man-mark-plunge-into-new-realms-of-cruelty/>; *see also* [CCPR/C/GC/36](https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/general-comment-no-36-article-6-right-life), para 40. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. [CCPR/C/GC/36](https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/general-comment-no-36-article-6-right-life), para. 40. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. Report of the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted to OHCHR (January 2024). [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. <https://kurdistanhumanrights.org/fa/news-fa/executions-fa/2024/02/26/p32773/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. Report of the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted to OHCHR (January 2024). [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. <https://www.mizanonline.ir/00JxXp>. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. <https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/11/09/3030534/4-تروریست-موساد-در-ایران-اعدام-شدند-روایتی-از-پروژه-بمب-گذاری-اسرائیل-در-یک-مرکز-دفاعی-فیلم>. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. <https://www.isna.ir/news/1402120201316/مصوبه-ممنوعیت-استفاده-از-فیلترشکن-مخاطب-عمومی-ندارد-خطاب-مصوبه>. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. [A/78/511](https://undocs.org/en/A/78/511), para 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. Submission to OHCHR. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. Submission to OHCHR. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. <https://ifj-farsi.org/?p=12365>. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. <https://irna.ir/xjNJCy>. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. <https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/10/24/3023026/نیلوفر-حامدی-و-الهه-محمدی-با-قرار-وثیقه-آزاد-شدند>. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. [https://www.mizanonline.ir/00JwuW; https://www.en-hrana.org/journalists-niloofar-hamedi-and-elahe-mohammadi-sentenced-to-a-combined-25-years-in-prison/nonline.ir/00JwuW](file:///\\fshq.ad.ohchr.org\redirected$\khadija.buhadi\Desktop\04%20Countries\iran\Correspondence\OV\%09https:\www.mizanonline.ir\00JwuW;%20https:\www.en-hrana.org\journalists-niloofar-hamedi-and-elahe-mohammadi-sentenced-to-a-combined-25-years-in-prison\nonline.ir\00JwuW). [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. <https://www.sharghdaily.com/fa/tiny/news-922450>; *see also* <https://humanrightsinir.org/نسیم-سلطان-بیگی،-زندانی-سیاسی-به-مرخصی/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. [AL IRN 18/2023](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28583), page 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. <https://www.dw.com/fa-ir/چهار-روزنامهنگار-نشریه-فردای-اقتصاد-به-بازداشتگاه-منتقل-شدند/a-68246859>. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. <https://journalismisnotacrime.com/fa/news/5648/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. <https://www.radiofarda.com/a/closure-journal-iran-arrest-journalist/32885152.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
45. <https://www.hra-news.org/2024/hranews/a-47313/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
46. <https://www.en-hrana.org/journalist-nasrin-hassani-receives-one-year-prison-sentence-for-alleged-propaganda-against-regime/?hilite=Shargh>. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
47. <https://www.etemadonline.com/بخش-سیاسی-9/650842-اجرای-حکم-حبس-تعزیری-نسرین-حسنی>. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
48. <https://www.en-hrana.org/journalist-nasrin-hassanis-one-year-sentence-upheld-on-appeal/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
49. <https://cpj.org/2024/02/iranian-journalist-nasrin-hassani-begins-7-month-prison-sentence/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
50. [A/HRC/53/23,](https://www.undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC%2F53%2F23&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False) para 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
51. <https://www.dw.com/en/jailed-iranian-rapper-toomaj-salehi-released-on-bail/a-67484551> [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
52. <https://www.cbc.ca/lite/story/1.7047425>; <https://www.en-hrana.org/protest-singer-toomaj-salehi-faces-re-arrest/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
53. [https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/1885696/%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AC%  
    D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%87-%D8%B4%D8%AF](https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/1885696/%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%87-%D8%B4%D8%AF). [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
54. <https://www.en-hrana.org/protest-singer-toomaj-salehi-faces-charges-of-armed-rebellion-baghi/?hilite=toomaj+salehi>. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
55. <https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-rapper-salehi-release-denied-amini-protests/32879660.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
56. <https://twitter.com/dadban4/status/1773015597548261442>; <https://www.en-hrana.org/protest-rapper-vafa-azarpour-faces-political-charges-in-evin-court/?hilite=vafa+ahmadpour> [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
57. <https://kurdistanhumanrights.org/en/news/2024/03/01/imprisoned-kurdish-rapper-saman-yasin-protests-extended-detention/#:~:text=The%20document%20sent%20to%20Yasin,the%20public%20order%20and%20peace>. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
58. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/12/iran-un-experts-condemn-execution-protestor-raise-alarm-about-detained> [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
59. <https://tn.ai/2825873>. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
60. <https://www.radiofarda.com/a/mock-execution-of-saman-yasin/32692650.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
61. <https://kurdistanhumanrights.org/en/news/2024/03/06/saman-yasin-taken-to-psychiatric-hospital-for-second-time-in-a-year/>; *see also* <https://iranhr.net/fa/articles/6597/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
62. [CCPR/C/IRN/CO/4,](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FIRN%2FCO%2F4&Lang=en) para 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
63. [CCPR/C/IRN/CO/4,](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FIRN%2FCO%2F4&Lang=en) para 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
64. [CCPR/C/IRN/CO/4,](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FIRN%2FCO%2F4&Lang=en) para 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
65. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/11/22/iran-security-forces-violently-repress-anniversary-protest>. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
66. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/11/22/iran-security-forces-violently-repress-anniversary-protest>. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/11/22/iran-security-forces-violently-repress-anniversary-protest> [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
67. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/10/iran-new-wave-of-brutal-attacks-against-baluchi-protesters-and-worshippers/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
68. [A/HRC/53/23](https://www.undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC%2F53%2F23&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False), para 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
69. <https://haalvsh.org/2024/02/07/برگزاری-اولین-جلسه-دادگاه-رسیدگی-به-پر/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
70. [A/78/511](https://www.undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2F78%2F511&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False%5d), para 25 and para 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
71. <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/IRN#countrydata>; *see also* <https://amwaj.media/article/deep-data-the-iranian-economy-in-2024>. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
72. <https://www.entekhab.ir/fa/news/766076/بانک-مرکزی-اعلام-کرد-سقوط-۶%DB%B0-درصدی-قدرت-خرید-مردم-در-آذرماه-تورم-نقطه-به-نقطه-شهری-۵۴۲-درصد>. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
73. <https://www.etemadnewspaper.ir/fa/main/detail/214850/سبد-غذايي-مطلوب-1402-كاهش-قدرت-خريد-مردم-را-تاييد-كرد->; *see also* <https://hammihanonline.ir/بخش-جامعه-23/12385-مشتری-ها-فقیرتر-شده-اند>. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
74. <https://www.radiozamaneh.com/795285/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
75. <https://snn.ir/fa/news/1112353/۲۵-درصد-جمعیت-ایران-مستأجر-هستند>. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
76. <https://www.isna.ir/news/1402102416942/پیشنهاد-بودجه-۱۶۹-هزار-میلیاردی-برای-۱۴%DB%B0۳-شهرداری-تهران-حمل>. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
77. <https://www.irna.ir/news/85268853/حلقه-قانون-برای-ساماندهی-حاشیه-نشینی>. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
78. <https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/czr8z70ynm8o> [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
79. <https://www.hamshahrionline.ir/news/813346/ارتباط-عجیب-مرده-زایی-در-کشور-با-آلودگی-هوا-چه-کسی-مقصر-است>. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
80. [https://farsnews.ir/Provinces/1703910366000379227/استاندار-یزد:-به-محض-دریافت-مطالعات-منشأ-آلودگی-هوای-استان-شفاف%E2%80%8Cسازی-و-اقدام--جدی-می%E2%80%8Cکنیم;](file:///\\fshq.ad.ohchr.org\redirected$\khadija.buhadi\Desktop\04%20Countries\iran\Correspondence\OV\%09https:\farsnews.ir\Provinces\1703910366000379227\استاندار-یزد:-به-محض-دریافت-مطالعات-منشأ-آلودگی-هوای-استان-شفاف%25E2%2580%258Cسازی-و-اقدام--جدی-می%25E2%2580%258Cکنیم;) *see also* <https://www.radiofarda.com/a/32747847.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
81. <https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/czr8z70ynm8o>; *see also* <https://twitter.com/ICHRI/status/1760327376473342318>. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
82. <https://www.sharghdaily.com/fa/tiny/news-909267>. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
83. <https://www.irna.ir/news/85322412/رییس-سازمان-نظام-پزشکی-دلیل-مهاجرت-برخی-پزشکان-نبود-شرایط-کاری>. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
84. <https://www.irna.ir/news/85196595/مهاجرت-پزشکان-آینده-پر-افتخار-پزشکی-کشور-را-نشانه-گرفته-است>; *see also* <https://www.mehrnews.com/news/5926515/۶-ساعت-اضافه-کاری-پرستار-برای-خرید-یک-قوطی-کنسرو-ماهی>. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
85. <https://www.irna.ir/news/85301042/معوقات-پرستاران-تا-دو-هفته-آینده-پرداخت-می-شود>; *see also* <https://www.sharghdaily.com/بخش-روزنامه-100/921180-پرستاران-همیشه-تنها>. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
86. <https://www.etemadonline.com/بخش-اجتماعی-23/652114-هشدار-خودکشی-رزیدنت-دستیارپزشکی>. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
87. <https://www.irna.ir/news/85364552/موافقت-شورای-عالی-بیمه-با-رشد-۴۶-درصدی-تعرفه-های-پزشکی-در-سال>. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
88. <https://www.mehrnews.com/news/5859168/برخی-بیماران-به-دلیل-شرایط-اقتصادی-درمان-را-رها-می-کنند>. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
89. Submission to OHCHR. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
90. <https://amwaj.media/article/deep-data-the-iranian-economy-in-2024>. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
91. <https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/LUR@WEO/IRN?zoom=IRN&highlight=IRN>. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
92. <https://iranwire.com/en/news/126568-35-percent-increase-in-irans-minimum-wage-sparks-discontent-as-inflation-soars/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
93. Submission to OHCHR. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
94. Submission to OHCHR. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
95. [CCPR/C/SR.4038](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FSR.4038&Lang=en), para 40. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
96. [A/74/273](https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/a74273-situation-human-rights-islamic-republic-iran-report-secretary), para 44. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
97. [A/71/511](https://www.undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2F78%2F511&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False), para 29 – 37. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
98. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2023/09/iran-concerns-over-chastity-and-hijab-bill>. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
99. <https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-women-defiant-flogging-hijab-violation/32767635.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
100. https://www.mizanonline.ir/00JwXv [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
101. <https://www.mehrnews.com/news/5863925/بیانیه-اداره-کل-اطلاعات-گیلان-در-خصوص-دستگیری-های-اخیر>. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
102. <https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-women-activists-sentenced-long-prison-terms/32881067.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
103. <https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/cpr0xgdj022o>; *see also* <https://www.sharghdaily.com/بخش-سیاست-6/924434-صدور-حکم-فعالان-حقوق-زنان-گیلان-برای-نفر-مجموعا-بیش-از-سال-حکم-حبس-صادر-شد>. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
104. <https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/group-human-rights-defenders-gilan-province-sentenced-over-sixty-years-prison>. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
105. <https://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/1198547/صدیقه-وسمقی-کیست-از-عضویت-در-شورای-شهر-تهران-تا-کشف-حجاب>. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
106. <https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/cv2yvnegn7zo>. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
107. [CCPR/C/IRN/CO/4](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FIRN%2FCO%2F4&Lang=en), para 17. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
108. The Fact-Finding Mission was mandated through UN Human Rights Council resolution ([S35/1](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC%2FRES%2FS-35%2F1&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False)) to thoroughly and independently investigate alleged human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran related to the protests that began on 16 September 2022, especially with respect to women and children [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
109. [A/HRC/55/67](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC%2F55%2F67&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False) , para 122. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
110. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
111. <https://geneva.mfa.ir/portal/newsview/741577>. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
112. [https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g19/255/98/pdf/g1925598.pdf?token=W6GDKJRl7IOQ3I  
     BSJE&fe=true](https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g19/255/98/pdf/g1925598.pdf?token=W6GDKJRl7IOQ3IBSJE&fe=true) [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
113. <https://www.irna.ir/news/85364609/تشریح-جزئیات-بازماندگی-از-تحصیل-۳%DB%B0-هزار-نفر-از-بازماندگان-کودکان>.[https://www.ekhtebar.ir/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/قانون-حمایت-از-حقوق-معلولان.pdf](https://www.ekhtebar.ir/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82-%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86.pdf) [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
114. <https://www.ilna.ir/بخش-کارگری-9/1441931-ماده-قانون-حمایت-از-معلولان-را-اجرا-کنید>. [https://www.ilna.ir/بخش-کارگری-9/1441931-ماده-قانون-حمایت-از-معلولان-را-اجرا-کنید](https://www.ilna.ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C-9/1441931-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7-%DA%A9%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AF) [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
115. <https://www.isna.ir/news/1402121309157/تخصیص-۶%DB%B0-میلیون-دلار-از-صندوق-ذخیره-ارزی-به-سازمان-نوسازی-مدارس>. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
116. [CCPR/C/SR.4039](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FSR.4039&Lang=en), para 43. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
117. <https://women.ncr-iran.org/2023/10/20/marriages-of-children/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
118. <https://www.isna.ir/news/1402071610370/سجلی-برای-بی-هویتها>. [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
119. <https://www.mehrnews.com/news/5946818/غم-نامه-شناسنامه-ناگفته-های-ازدواج-زنان-ایرانی-با-اتباع-خارجی>.; <https://irna.ir/xjPzqq>. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
120. <https://www.irna.ir/news/85362847/ثبت-۲۵%DB%B0هزار-تقاضا-از-سوی-فاقدین-شناسنامه-اعطای-هویت-به-۲۶-هزار>. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
121. <https://irna.ir/xjPzqq>. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
122. <https://www.sharghdaily.com/بخش-سیاست-6/901292-وکیل-خانواده-مهسا-امینی-به-اشد-مجازات-اتهام-تبلیغ-علیه-نظام-محکوم-شد>. [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
123. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20231208IPR15773/sakharov-prize-parliament-honours-jina-mahsa-amini-and-iranian-women-protesters>. [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
124. <https://hengaw.net/fa/news/archive/63439>. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
125. See para 10 of the present report. [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
126. <https://www.sharghdaily.com/بخش-سیاست-6/918639-وکیل-محمد-قبادلو-احضار-شد>; *see also* <https://humanrightsinir.org/soummon-206/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
127. <https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-bar-association-lawyers-blocked-new-leadership/32813462.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
128. <https://scoda.org/خط-قرمز-مدیران-کانونهای-وکلا،-استقلا/>; *see also* <https://hammihanonline.ir/بخش-تیتر-یک-14/12642-بحران-انتخابات-اتحادیه-کانون-های-وکلاء-پیشنهادی-به-دیوان-عالی-کشور>. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
129. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/01/un-experts-urge-iran-respect-and-protect-lawyers#:~:text=The%20situation%20of%20lawyers%20affects,key%20elements%20of%20due%20process>. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
130. Submission to OHCHR. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
131. Submission to OHCHR. [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
132. <https://www.instagram.com/p/C2HUcMDK5cp/?igsh=aHIxdDdxNjgxejM1&img_index=2>; *see also* <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67986227>. [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
133. <https://www.en-hrana.org/update-on-fatemeh-sepehris-health-in-vakilabad-prison/> [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
134. Report of the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted to OHCHR (February 2024). [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
135. <https://www.en-hrana.org/update-on-fatemeh-sepehris-health-in-vakilabad-prison/> [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
136. [UA IRN 2/2024](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28716). [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
137. [UA IRN 2/2024](https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28716). [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
138. [CCPR/C/IRN/CO/4](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FIRN%2FCO%2F4&Lang=en), para 34 (a). [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
139. Government’s comments to the draft of the present report. [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
140. Report of the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted to OHCHR (February 2024). [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
141. <https://iranhrs.org/خسرو-علیکردی،-انتقال-به-زندان-وکیلآب/> [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
142. [CCPR/C/IRN/CO/4](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FIRN%2FCO%2F4&Lang=en), para 52 (c). [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
143. <https://www.en-hrana.org/political-prisoner-manoochehr-bakhtiari-faces-extended-incarceration-and-corporal-punishment/?hilite=Bakhtiari>. [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
144. Government’s comments to the draft of the present report. [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
145. <https://iranhrs.org/احضار-مادر-دادخواه-مهسا-یزدانی-به-زندا/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
146. <https://hengaw.net/en/news/archive/63719>. [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
147. <https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-father-executed-protester-detained-anniversary-amini/32561787.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
148. [CCPR/C/IRN/CO/4,](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FIRN%2FCO%2F4&Lang=en) para 57. [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
149. Submission to OHCHR. [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
150. Submission to OHCHR. [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
151. <https://articleeighteen.com/news/14486/>. <https://articleeighteen.com/news/14486/> [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
152. Submission to OHCHR. [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
153. <https://www.reuters.com/world/us-allows-6-billion-transfer-part-iran-prisoner-swap-2023-09-11/#:~:text=%22To%20facilitate%20their%20release%2C%20the,where%20the%20funds%20will%20be>. [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
154. For more info, see A/HRC/49/75, para. 27; and A/HRC/WGAD/2017/92. [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
155. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/12/iran-arbitrarily-detained-swedish-iranian-academic-ahmadreza-djalali-at-grave-risk-of-retaliatory-execution/> [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
156. <https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2023/12/10/3004314/swedish-citizen-appears-in-iranian-court-for-hostile-activities>. [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
157. <https://www.ekhtebar.ir/بخشنامه-استناد-به-کنوانسیونهای-بین/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
158. <https://geneva.mfa.ir/portal/newsview/741579>. [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
159. <https://geneva.mfa.gov.ir/files/mfageneva/geneva/Summary%20-%20EN.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
160. <https://geneva.mfa.ir/files/mfageneva/geneva/Summary%20-%20EN.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
161. [A/HRC/55/67](https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session55/list-reports), para 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
162. <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/LatestReports/CommunicationSent>. [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
163. <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/LatestReports/RepliesReceived>. [↑](#footnote-ref-164)