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**Human Rights Council**

**Fifty-third session**

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Agenda items 2 and 3

**Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the
High Commissioner and the Secretary-General**

**Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights,
including the right to development**

 Prevention of genocide

 Report of the Secretary-General[[1]](#footnote-2)\*

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| *Summary* The present report is submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 49/9, in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to prepare a follow-up report on the implementation of the resolution, with a particular focus on the impact of technological advances on prevention of genocide efforts, and on the risks. The report highlights measures to build national and regional capacity to prevent genocide and examines the opportunities and challenges of digital technologies for prevention efforts. The report also highlights initiatives within the UN system to address these challenges, in particular regarding hate speech, and contains recommendations to Member States and private companies on how to harness the opportunities provided by the digital space to enhance protection efforts. |
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 I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 49/9, in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to prepare a follow-up report on the implementation of the provisions of the resolution, based on information provided by Member States and other stakeholders, with a particular focus on the impact of technological advances on prevention of genocide efforts, and on the risks of the perpetration of genocide.

2. For the preparation of the report, the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide shared a questionnaire with Member States and other stakeholders, requesting information on the implementation of the resolution. The information compiled from the submissions received has been organized in two main sections, the first pertaining to the prevention of genocide by strengthening capacities at the national, regional, and international levels, and the second on the impact of technological advances on prevention, and possible risks.

 II. Strengthening capacities for the prevention of genocide

3. Genocide was first recognized as a crime under international law in 1946 by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution [96-I](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FRES%2F96(I)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False). It was codified as an independent international crime in the [1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide](file:///C%3A/Users/Andres.Perez/Library/Containers/com.apple.mail/Data/Library/Mail%20Downloads/443834EF-A600-425E-A5F5-976BEFC90174/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf) (Genocide Convention), to which 153 States are Parties. This section reports on measures taken by States to comply with their international obligations and responsibilities in this respect and identify additional steps that could be taken to prevent genocide.

 A. National capacities

4. The duty to prevent and punish genocide is well established in international law and is a responsibility that lies primarily with States. By becoming Parties to the Genocide Convention, States undertake to prevent and punish this crime, thereby contributing to ensuring the non-recurrence, and ultimately the eradication of genocide. Since the previous report[[2]](#footnote-3) the number of States parties to the Genocide Convention has risen to 153, with the accession of Mauritius in July 2019 and the Republic of Zambia in April 2022. Genocide is also recognized as one of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Becoming a Party to the Genocide Convention may constitute the first step in States’ efforts to criminalize genocide. In accordance with the Convention, Parties undertake to enact the necessary legislation to give effect to its provisions, and to provide effective penalties. In the previous report to the Council on the Prevention of Genocide, the Secretary-General highlighted examples of national legislation prohibiting genocide as well as national and regional mechanisms for prevention.[[3]](#footnote-4) Prevention mechanisms such as national committees on genocide prevention or national focal points on genocide prevention can play an important role in detection and response to risk factors.

5. Prevention of genocide is further enhanced by developing legal frameworks that protect and promote human rights. As genocide represents an extreme form of human rights violations, the existence of legal frameworks that ensure the protection of human rights – including through joining and implementing international human rights treaties – is core to the national genocide prevention strategies of States. Genocide is rarely a single event that happens instantly. Instead, it tends to be a dynamic process that requires time, planning and resources to occur. It can take years to create an environment conducive to the perpetration of genocide. The commission of genocide is typically preceded by widespread and systematic human rights violations, often linked to patterns of discrimination and exclusion of population groups based on their ethnic, racial, national or religious background. Ensuring the protection of all human rights and respect for the rule of law; addressing root causes of discrimination and inequality; supporting a strong and diverse civil society and an independent and pluralistic media; establishing legitimate and accountable national institutions and mechanisms for prevention of genocide, and eliminating corruption, all contribute to the prevention of genocide and to recovery in societies that have experienced genocide.

6. It is important, for the purposes of prevention, to adopt legislation that protects human rights and the rights of ethnic, national, racial and religious minorities as well as refugees, internally displaced persons and other groups (who may also be at heightened risk, when they belong to protected groups under the convention), in line with international norms and standards and which codifies international crimes into national criminal law. Prevention also requires the effective implementation of this legislation and the design of policies that promote and protect these rights. At the 30th anniversary of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, the Secretary-General outlined outstanding challenges facing minorities: forced assimilation, persecution, prejudice, discrimination, stereotyping, hatred, and violence; deprivation of their political rights including the right to a nationality; stifling of their cultures, suppression of their languages, and curtailing of their religious practices. If unaddressed, such gaps can become conducive or precursory to atrocity crimes.

7. As stated in the previous report[[4]](#footnote-5), education systems should be inclusive, reflect the ethnic, national and cultural diversity of their societies, and offer an education that promotes global citizenship, sustainable development, human rights, gender equality, a culture of peace and the appreciation of cultural diversity aimed to meet SDG target 4.7. This includes integrating teaching about genocides into school and university curricula. Accounts of past genocides should be factual and comprehensive.

8. Educational programmes for State institutions, including security forces and other government officials, on atrocity crimes and their prevention are also important. In Thailand, armed forces and military units undergo human rights trainings, including on the Genocide Convention, conducted by the Ministry of Defense in collaboration with the International Committee for the Red Cross.

9. Memorialization and remembrance of past atrocity crimes is an essential aspect of reconciliation processes and can contribute to prevention. Shared memories of the past can encourage social cohesion, helping to prevent the reoccurrence of genocide, and sites of memory provide spaces where those affected by violence can honour victims. States have taken measures to raise awareness about past violations. In Colombia, for example, the National Center for Historical Memory is in charge of establishing the Museum of Historical Memory, constituting and managing the human rights archives, and developing guidelines for the protection of archives and human rights, historical memory and armed conflict. In 2022, it carried out Local History Memory Initiatives which promote processes of self-reflection and memorialization in regions and communities that have been historically affected by armed conflict. Türkiye has a bi-lingual website “We Remember-Hatırlıyoruz” with informative materials and documents on the Holocaust and other genocides. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Law on Missing Persons has been adopted to allow marking the places of suffering, excavation, and burial of victims from the war.

10. Accountability for past atrocity crimes is key to ensuring their non-recurrence and, in post-conflict societies, to the success of reconciliation processes and the consolidation of peace. States have obligations under international law to investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible for acts of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, and to provide victims with the right to an effective remedy.

11. Various judicial options are being used to promote accountability. Besides national courts prosecuting genocide and other atrocity crimes committed within their own jurisdiction, international and hybrid mechanisms have been established for several countries. Recent examples include the hybrid Special Criminal Court in the Central African Republic, which handed down its first verdict in October 2022 against three members of an armed group found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity for their involvement in the killing of civilians in the northeast of the country in May 2019. In addition, in September 2022, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia upheld previous convictions for genocide against the ethnic Vietnamese and other atrocity crimes committed in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979. A number of States have also opted to institute national proceedings based on extraterritorial and universal jurisdiction. In January 2022, the Higher Regional Court in Koblenz (Germany) convicted and sentenced a senior officer of the General Syrian Intelligence Service to life imprisonment for crimes against humanity in relation to torture in a Syrian prison. Since 2021, three judgments were also delivered by German courts in relation to crimes committed against the Yazidi community, including of a former member of Da’esh being convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

 B. Regional and international initiatives

12. States can strengthen prevention of genocide efforts through membership in regional and international networks. Regional – and subregional – mechanisms can be more effective in responding early to signs of concern, as they are well placed to access information and interact with relevant actors at the level of their region.

13. The Global Action Against Mass Atrocity Crimes is a global coalition of States, civil society and academic institutions that supports States in establishing architectures and policies for the prevention of atrocities. Its Fourth Global Meeting, held in The Hague in November 2021, focused on strengthening national efforts to address hate speech and discrimination and prevent incitement. At the regional level, its initiatives and working groups provide contextually relevant support to national atrocity prevention mechanisms in their respective regions.

14. The Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide also supports regional capacity-building initiatives. In August 2019, it supported the African Union Commission to integrate atrocity crimes risk factors in the Continental Early Warning System, including developing indicators, methodology and tools for monitoring and data managing. In March 2022, it held a conference on tackling hate speech with members of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, national committees on prevention of genocide from the region and civil society, to discuss trends and challenges and develop a plan of action. In June 2022, the Office held a consultation in Abuja with traditional leaders from across the world to discuss their role in preventing atrocity crimes and developing a plan of action for traditional leaders and actors. In Europe, a regional meeting of civil society was convened in March 2022 to develop a plan of action on countering hate speech. The Office has also supported the establishment of civil society networks on atrocity prevention, such as the Western Balkans Coalition for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Crimes Prevention.

15. The Global Forum against the Crime of Genocide, an initiative by Armenia convened since 2015, brings together States, academia and civil society to examine challenges, opportunities, experiences and perspectives of specific aspects of genocide. The Fourth Global Forum held in Yerevan in December 2022 was dedicated to the prevention of genocide in the era of new technologies.

 C. Actions by the United Nations system on the prevention of genocide

16. The *UN Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes*[[5]](#footnote-6) is a tool for States to understand risks and take appropriate action for prevention. One of the indicators of risk and potential triggers outlined in the Framework is hate speech. Since 2019, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has led a UN system-wide effort to develop a Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech[[6]](#footnote-7), which the Secretary-General launched on 18 June 2019, a day subsequently designated by the General Assembly as the International Day for Countering Hate Speech in resolution 75/309.[[7]](#footnote-8)

17. In-country visits by the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide provide opportunities to assess strengths at the national level and identify areas needing further support from the international community to build capacity to prevent or address genocide and other atrocity crimes. The Special Adviser visited Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2021 and 2022. During both visits, she expressed concern about revisionism, noting that genocide denial and the glorification of war criminals continued to present a serious challenge to reconciliation efforts. The Special Adviser also drew attention to concerns about the segregation of the education system, including textbooks and curricula, leading to children being taught different versions of the past. This presents long term challenges to dealing with a past of atrocity crimes and promoting reconciliation and sustaining peace. In July 2021, the Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Criminal Code was amended to introduce the prohibition of the denial and glorification of crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes carried out in a manner likely to incite to violence or hatred. In July 2022, the Special Adviser attended the anniversary of the genocide in the former Yugoslavia at the Srebrenica Memorial Center and met with victims and survivors.

18. In April 2022, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide visited Bangladesh, with the primary objective to meet with Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar. The Special Adviser emphasized the importance of ensuring support and protection to the Rohingya community, noting that the risk of genocide facing the Rohingya in Myanmar remained unchanged since the outbreak of violence in 2017.

19. In May 2022, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide visited Iraq, in support of efforts by the Government, the Investigative Team to support domestic efforts to hold ISIL (Da’esh) accountable by collecting, preserving and storing evidence in Iraq of acts that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide committed by the terrorist group ISIL (Da’esh) in Iraq (UNITAD) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) to ensure accountability for atrocity crimes, strengthen the protection of vulnerable communities and contribute to the prevention of sectarian violence. The Special Adviser also undertook visits to Brazil, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and Nigeria in line with her mandate.

20. The Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide provides technical assistance to national prevention efforts. In 2020, it supported the Tanzania National Committee on the Prevention of Genocide to organize community level dialogues in regions affected by ongoing intercommunal tensions, and in 2022, facilitated intercommunal dialogues in Mali aimed at promoting trust between the security forces and local communities. In Colombia, the Ombudsman's Office collaborated with the Office of the Special Adviser to assess the risks faced by vulnerable communities and support initiatives to mitigate them. The Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has also led initiatives in Africa and Asia to develop curricula and learning material on atrocity crimes working with national actors, including Ministries of Education, academic institutions and civil society. Beyond formal education such information can also be spread through networks, as done by the Latin American Network for Education about the Holocaust and Other Genocides, led by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

21. Over the past few years, there have been growing calls for the permanent members of the Security Council to voluntarily refrain from using their veto in situations involving atrocity crimes, including two State-led initiatives – notably for a code of conduct, launched by the cross-regional Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group[[8]](#footnote-9), supported by over 120 States, and a political declaration launched by France and Mexico signed by 104 Member States[[9]](#footnote-10). In October 2021, the Special Adviser briefed in an Arria Formula meeting of the Security Council on the topic of addressing and countering hate speech and preventing incitement to discrimination, hostility and violence on social media. In June 2022, the Special Adviser briefed the Security Council on the maintenance of peace and security related to Ukraine with a particular focus on the role of incitement and hate speech.

22. The Human Rights Council and its mechanisms in particular the Universal Periodic Review as well as relevant Special Procedure mandate holders and commissions of inquiries, have an important role in monitoring States’ adherence to their human rights obligations, and raising concern over risks of genocide. The intersessional meetings of the Council offer a space for debate and exchange among States on specific aspects and forms of prevention. The Council’s mechanisms can provide practical assistance to States and help them correct structural gaps and reverse trends of increasing human rights violations. Special Procedures mandate holders provide substantial analysis on conditions conducive to genocide and offer guidance and recommendations to prevent the escalation of such threats. The Council continues to address specific human rights situations that require its urgent attention and to establish investigative mechanisms on country situations including commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions or similar mechanisms – to examine allegations of gross human rights violations and atrocity crimes. The work of these mechanisms allows the Council to keep its attention on warning signals of genocide or other atrocity crimes and engage at an early stage to pre-empt the escalation of tensions. For example, the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi in its reports has used the Framework of Analysis as a basis for its assessment of the situation, which allowed it to design recommendations addressing specific risk factors. Mandates of United Nations investigations into human rights violations have further been progressively expanded to include tasks such as gathering and preserving evidence, examining and qualifying documented violations under international criminal law, identifying potential perpetrators, and lately, building criminal case files. Examples include the mandates of mechanisms established by the General Assembly to assist in the investigation of international crimes in Syria[[10]](#footnote-11), by the Security Council related to crimes by Da’esh/ISIL in Iraq[[11]](#footnote-12), and by the Human Rights Council on Myanmar[[12]](#footnote-13). Such initiatives help bring awareness to serious violations and support current or future accountability efforts.

23. In the previous report, the Secretary-General emphasized the usefulness of the Universal Periodic Review for atrocity prevention.[[13]](#footnote-14) Recommendations systematically include the ratification of the Genocide Convention. States under review increasingly include information in their national reports on measures taken which contribute to preventing genocide.[[14]](#footnote-15) The potential for the mechanisms of the Human Rights Council to support prevention of atrocity crimes could be further harnessed based on the examples outlined, by more systematically including assessment of risk of genocide in the work of the mechanisms, its reports and processes, as well as by the stakeholders who contribute to the work of the Council mechanisms, including civil society.

 III. Technological advances: risks and opportunities for the prevention of genocide

24. Digital technologies are advancing at an exponential pace, profoundly transforming societies and giving rise to unprecedented opportunities for positive changes but also to unprecedented challenges and risks. In resolution 75/1, the General Assembly outlined the risk associated with digital technologies, inter alia, that they can fuel divisions within and between countries, increase insecurity, undermine human rights, and exacerbate inequality.[[15]](#footnote-16) While offering means to accelerate prevention efforts, they also provide opportunities for perpetrators of incitement of hate and violence that are new in scope, reach, speed and impact.

 A. Prevention of genocide in the digital age

25. Digital technologies offer new ways for people to exercise their rights and freedoms. Online platforms provide the means to reach wider audiences, including marginalized communities, and facilitate the exercise of freedom of expression to impart and access information, including potentially in countries and societies where such freedoms are restricted. Digital technologies have contributed to expanding and reshaping civic space and public participation and to enhancing prevention efforts. The widespread and low-cost availability of tools to monitor situations and document and verify human rights violations that could lead to genocide, often in real-time, have democratized evidence-gathering and information-sharing, allowing for more effective early warning. Technologies also have the potential to support initiatives towards more inclusive sustainable development by facilitating participation and outreach to communities, including marginalized groups, addressing drivers of conflict and potential indicators of risk of genocide.

26. At the same time, digital technologies open avenues to new forms of human rights violations which pose risks to the prevention of genocide. The right to freedom of expression and other human rights can be curtailed by internet shutdowns or by imposing undue limitations on online conversation. Internet shutdowns to limit public scrutiny[[16]](#footnote-17) during conflict or tense situations or using laws that criminalize incitement of violence to silence opposition or critical voices may be arbitrary and are often justified on “public order” or “national security” grounds with a negative impact on human rights. Such restrictions can facilitate the commission of genocide. Those who use the internet to promote prevention of genocide including by documenting and reporting on human rights violations can themselves become targets of attacks, in particular human rights defenders, who might face unlawful surveillance and attacks on social media, including defamation, intimidation, and death threats.[[17]](#footnote-18)

27. Social media have been used several times as echo chambers for hate speech and incitement on occasion leading to offline violence. Artificial intelligence-related technologies might also contribute to deepen existing inequalities and exacerbate discrimination, or be misused for surveillance purposes.

28. Technological safeguards must be put in place to ensure the prevention of genocide and protection of human rights in the digital space. The application of digital technologies has been accelerating, driven by technological advances and sometimes with disregard for the safety and rights of users, with mechanisms for regulation and governance struggling to keep pace. The accepted principle espoused in Human Rights Council resolution 20/8 that the same rights that are protected offline should be protected online[[18]](#footnote-19), places the primary responsibility on the State as duty bearer. The lack of appropriate implementation of the international human rights framework in the digital context has created protection gaps.

 B. New technology risks – hate speech

29. Hate speech can fuel discrimination, undermine social cohesion, erode shared values, and can, in some cases, constitute incitement to violence. Hate speech is not new and has been a precursor and accompaniment to genocide from the Holocaust to the genocides in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.

30. The last few years have seen a growing spread of hate speech, against the backdrop of rising intolerance, xenophobia, racism, antisemitism, islamophobia, misogyny and homophobia and their normalization. These years coincided with rapid societal changes generated by globalization and digitalization, global economic and financial crises which have deepened inequalities, and more recently the COVID-19 pandemic, impacting people’s sense of control over their lives. This has provided a fertile ground for the rise of populism, which purports to offer simple solutions to complex problems, capitalizing on people’s fears.The ethnocentric vision it can project and the paradigm of “Us versus Them”, portraying “the people” as homogenous communities, fuels exclusion and discrimination and hate that may contribute to risk factors for genocide.

31. Social media and other digital platforms allow politicians to mobilize support and shape public opinion, which can pave the way to online hate speech, if misused. Politicians have rapidly harnessed the power of social media, which facilitates simplified discourses and emotional appeals, offers ample control of their narratives and unmediated access to a broad audience.

32. The use of new technologies has undoubtedly contributed to the rise and spread of hate speech. However, its root causes are not technological, technology being merely a means through which such ideas are communicated. It is therefore important to address the offline realities which constitute the underlying drivers and causes of hate speech.

33. In response to these developments, the Secretary-General launched the Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech,[[19]](#footnote-20) which for the first time sets out guidance for the UN system on how to address and counter hate speech at national and global level. It pursues two objectives – to enhance UN efforts to address root causes and drivers of hate speech; and to enable effective UN responses to the impact of hate speech on societies. This system-wide effort is coordinated by the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide supporting Member States and civil society to address and counter hate speech in full respect with fundamental human rights and engaging with social media platforms to promote policies and practices to tackle online hate speech. UN field presences, UN Country Teams, peacekeeping missions and political missions have a critical role to play in implementing the Strategy in cooperation with their national partners, and the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide supports them in developing context specific action plans on tackling hate speech. The Office has also developed several policy initiatives based on the Strategy, including a policy paper on *Combating Holocaust and Genocide Denial Protecting Survivors, Preserving Memory, and Promoting Prevention*,[[20]](#footnote-21) a Plan of Action for Countering Hate Speech through Sport (The Game Plan) of December 2022[[21]](#footnote-22), as well as a guidance for Policy Makers on Addressing Hate Speech through Education, developed jointly with UNESCO and which builds on the outcomes of the Global Ministerial Conference on Addressing Hate Speech Through Education[[22]](#footnote-23) of October 2021 convened by UNESCO and Namibia.

34. The Strategy is grounded in four key principles: implementation is to be in line with the right to freedom of opinion and expression; countering hate speech is the responsibility of all – governments, societies, the private sector, and individuals; support to a new generation of digital citizens, empowered to recognize, reject and stand up to hate speech; and coordinated data collection and research, including on the root causes, drivers and conditions conducive to hate speech. The working definition of hate speech for the purposes of the Strategy provides a guide for understanding and implementing measures to tackle hate speech before it reaches the threshold of incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.[[23]](#footnote-24)

35. Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) prohibits advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence; article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination restricts incitement to racial discrimination; and article 3 (c) of the Genocide Convention prohibits direct and public incitement to genocide. Freedom of expression is guaranteed by article 19 (2) of the ICCPR, which also includes expression that may be regarded as deeply offensive.[[24]](#footnote-25) This relationship between freedom of expression and incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence is critical. Restrictions to the right to freedom of expression are regulated by article 19 (3) of the ICCPR.[[25]](#footnote-26) Too often, governments of State Parties use hate speech and incitement laws to silence critics and opponents, while failing to address threats resulting from speech that incite discrimination or violence. The Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence provides guidance to States on implementing the international obligation of prohibition of incitement, including a six-part threshold test.[[26]](#footnote-27)

 C. Scope and dynamics of online hate speech

36. Social media can play a significant role in entrenching hate speech, disseminating mis/disinformation and facilitating incitement of discrimination, hostility or violence. Left unchecked, the speed and reach of narratives that dehumanize already marginalized groups and rationalize violence can metastasize into more widespread and systematic forms of violence.[[27]](#footnote-28) The impact of this has been reported in instances such as Myanmar. The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (IIFFMM) noted the prevalence of hate speech and longstanding dehumanizing and stigmatizing rhetoric against the Rohingya, and Muslims in general, in particular by some religious groups, and that the authorities, by condoning and promoting such narratives, had fostered a climate in which human rights violations were legitimized, and incitement to discrimination and violence facilitated.[[28]](#footnote-29) The IIFFMM also pointed to the role of a major social media company in spreading hate.

37. New technologies enable the dissemination of unparalleled volumes of content at unprecedented speed.[[29]](#footnote-30) The widespread prevalence of conspiracy theories and mis/disinformation online erodes trust in state institutions and facilitates democratic backsliding. Fearmongering, scapegoating and hate speech rose exponentially during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, in many instances, States’ regulations have led to undue restrictions on the right to freedom of expression and increased public distrust.[[30]](#footnote-31)

38. A dominant approach in the current business models of most social media platforms encourages collecting personal data for commercial purposes, so that content and advertising can be more effectively tailored to individuals’ consumption patterns. This raises a number of privacy issues. Large platforms derive revenue from keeping users engaged as long as possible so that they can show them more advertisements. The use of predictive algorithms leads to the personalization of content displayed, including by proposing similar content and exposing a user to less diverse information. Such business models, if left unchecked, risk incentivizing divisive, misleading, hateful and violent content by exacerbating exposure to hate and limiting exposure to other sources of information that may counter such narratives.[[31]](#footnote-32)

 D. Emerging technologies and risks - artificial intelligence

39. Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies can enable increased efficiency and operating systems at a large scale.

40. Predictive analytics and other forms of artificial intelligence are prone to reproducing and exacerbating biases reflected in existing algorithms, data and policies and leading to discrimination based on race, gender, religion, sexual orientation or nationality.[[32]](#footnote-33) Gaps in the data on which AI models are trained can likewise automate existing patterns of discrimination, which can have profound real-life consequences when such systems are used to make decisions.[[33]](#footnote-34)

41. Facial recognition, used remotely in public places for surveillance, by law enforcement and border management, and increasingly for commercial purposes, and without the knowledge of the individual, raises a number of human rights concerns. Real-time tracking and identification carry the risk of individuals and communities being targeted on the basis of their identity. Another critical aspect of facial recognition is its reliability and accuracy. Studies on demographic effects in facial identification revealed that false positive rates widely varied across demographics, with highest false positive rates for people of African and East Asian origin; and media have reported that the analysis of three commercial gender-classification systems of facial analysis algorithms showed that women of colour were the most misclassified group.[[34]](#footnote-35)

 E. Impact of technologies on women, minorities, and marginalized communities

42. Studies show that the adverse impacts of digital technologies on human rights disproportionately affect certain population groups, deepening inequalities and discrimination, and fueling bias:

43. Women are disproportionately targeted by hate speech and suffer disproportionately serious consequences, in particular women human rights defenders, journalists and politicians, women with disabilities, lesbian, bisexual and transgender women, indigenous women and women belonging to ethnic minorities and other marginalized groups.[[35]](#footnote-36)

44. According to the Special Rapporteur on minorities, where disaggregated data is available, approximately 70 per cent of those targeted by online hate violence belong to minorities, including Roma, Dalits, persons of African descent, migrants, and refugees. Antisemitism, Islamophobia and targeting of religious minorities are also on the rise.[[36]](#footnote-37)

45. In the digital era, the ability to obtain timely information, to communicate with others and access social services is becoming increasingly dependent on access to the Internet. Affordable and reliable connection and education on the use of the Internet is therefore paramount in prevention efforts. According to the International Telecommunication Union around 90 per cent of the population of developed countries are online and only 36 per cent in Least Developed Countries. Women account for an increasing share of the global offline population: in 2022, women outnumbered male non-users by 18 per cent, up from 11 per cent in 2019.[[37]](#footnote-38)

 F. Use of new technologies to support early warning and accountability

46. Digital technologies open a myriad of new opportunities to support prevention efforts, offering a wide array of tools, granting access to numerous resources, and facilitating the collection of evidence and detection of precursory developments that could pose risks such as movements of troops or refugee groups. At the same time, the use of technologies as predictive tools for early warning and accountability may carry risks, if developed and used without sufficient prevention of genocide and human rights safeguards. For example, AI systems relying on faulty or biased data can erroneously flag an individual as a perpetrator.

47. The use of open source intelligence, including social media content, satellite imagery and geolocation, has increasingly gained traction in human rights investigations. The IIFFMM used satellite imagery to corroborate information provided by victims and witnesses of the “clearance operations” in August 2017, showing transformations in northern Rakhine State with at least 392 villages in Rohingya-populated areas burnt to the ground.[[38]](#footnote-39)

48. The Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations[[39]](#footnote-40), developed in 2020 by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the University of California Human Rights Center, establishes legal and ethical standards for open source investigation and provides guidelines for the identification, collection, preservation, verification and analysis of digital open source information to improve its effective use in international criminal and human rights investigations.

49. The growing use of information and communications technologies has seen the emergence of online initiatives involving NGOs, research institutes, academia, and non-profit tech companies. Some run platforms that assist community early warning efforts by offering access to open source software, and tools and services for mapping, crowdsourcing and information management and analysis. Others work on risk assessment and early warning models, and conduct research, capacity-building and advocacy on tech-related human rights issues. Several technology companies with social media platforms have launched Safety Advisory Councils and Oversight Boards to detect and moderate hate speech and violent extremism. In addition, many are working closely with the Office of the Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide, to implement the UN Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech*.*

 G. UN system initiatives

50. Digital technologies have rapidly transformed society, heralding unprecedented changes which can advance the human condition but also give rise to profound new challenges. Sensing the urgency of the moment, in July 2018, the Secretary-General convened an independent high-level panel to consider the question of “digital cooperation” – the ways we work together to address the impacts of digital technologies in order to maximize their benefits and minimize their harm, and how digital cooperation could contribute to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. The High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation highlighted some critical questions, and called for universal internet connectivity, digital capacity building and mechanisms to improve digital trust and security.[[40]](#footnote-41)

51. The Roadmap for Digital Cooperation[[41]](#footnote-42) contains recommendations for concrete action by the international community that could enhance global cooperation and help ensure that all people are connected, respected, and protected in the digital age. The roadmap builds on the recommendations of the High-level Panel and input from Member States, the private sector, civil society, the technical community, and other stakeholder groups.

52. The Office of the Special Adviser, in partnership with the Economic and Social Research Council’s Human Rights, Big Data and Technology Project at the University of Essex, has since 2020 convened three roundtable consultations to discuss the implementation of the UN Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech in the online space. These consultations engaged technology and social media companies on their roles and responsibilities in addressing online hate speech in line with international human rights norms and standards, with a view to building partnerships for the implementation of the Strategy and formulated recommendations addressed to technology and social media companies, Member States, the United Nations, civil society, academia and the media. In June 2022, the Office published *a policy paper on Combating Holocaust and Genocide Denial Protecting Survivors, Preserving Memory, and Promoting Prevention*.[[42]](#footnote-43) The paper outlines challenges of online Holocaust and genocide denial linked to hate speech and provides recommendations for action. In June 2023, the Office issued an additional policy paper with recommendations for tackling online hate speech, based on the roundtable discussions convened.[[43]](#footnote-44)

53. Strengthening human rights in the digital space is also one of the priority areas in the Secretary-General’s Call to Action for Human Rights[[44]](#footnote-45), which emphasized that advances in new technologies must not be used to erode human rights, deepen inequality or exacerbate existing discrimination and that the governance of AI needs to ensure fairness, non-discrimination, accountability, and transparency.

54. In the report *Our Common Agenda[[45]](#footnote-46)*, the Secretary-General proposed that the United Nations, governments, the private sector, and civil society come together to prepare a Global Digital Compact to be agreed at the Summit of the Future in September 2024. In his *Policy Brief* on a Global Digital Compact, the Secretary-General proposes shared principles for an open, free, and secure digital future for all. The *Policy Brief* proposes that Member States commit to avoiding blanket internet shutdowns and recognizes the human rights risks of “data-fuelled State surveillance and predatory business models”. It also calls all stakeholders to cooperate to close the existing governance gap in artificial intelligence, including Member States’ actions to prohibit the use of technology applications “whose potential or actual impacts cannot be justified under international human rights law”.[[46]](#footnote-47) The Secretary-General has also issued a policy brief on “Information Integrity on Digital Platforms”.[[47]](#footnote-48)

55. The Human Rights Council can play an essential role in ensuring that new technologies contribute to the prevention of genocide. In 2012, it adopted resolution 20/8 in which it affirmed that the same rights apply online as offline.[[48]](#footnote-49) In the last few years, it has been paying increased attention to the human rights impact of new and emerging digital technologies, adopting several resolutions mandating panels, studies, and expert consultations on various aspects of the impacts, opportunities, and challenges of these technologies for human rights.[[49]](#footnote-50) Special Procedures mandate holders have also made valuable contributions by examining impacts of digital technologies on specific rights and issuing recommendations contributing to the prevention of genocide.

56. The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights[[50]](#footnote-51) are a powerful tool for governments, the private sector and civil society to ensure that innovation is managed responsibly and with respect for human rights. Their use can effectively help prevent or mitigate human rights risks of new technologies and hold companies developing these new technologies accountable.

 IV. Conclusions and recommendations

 Strengthening Capacities for the Prevention of Genocide

57. **Prevention of genocide requires our constant vigilance and action. We have to invest in prevention early to address risk factors before they escalate into more serious concerns. A prevention of genocide approach needs to be integrated in the broader prevention agenda of the UN system. I urge States to prioritize prevention of genocide at the national, regional, and international level by implementing the following measures:**

 For Member States

58. **Build capacity to prevent genocide and establish or strengthen national mechanisms for prevention.**

59. **Consider the appointment of focal points on the prevention of genocide, who could cooperate and exchange information and best practices among themselves and with the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, relevant United Nations bodies and with regional and subregional mechanisms.**

60. **For States which have not yet done so,** **become party to the Genocide Convention and criminalize genocide in national legislation.**

61. **Develop inclusive national genocide prevention policies, fulfil collective responsibilities to protect populations from atrocity crimes and establish or strengthen national mechanisms for genocide prevention.**

62. **Conduct a regular national assessment of existing risks, which should be system-wide, include the identification of vulnerable populations and ensure their participation in the formulation of recommendations that address identified risks.**

63. **Work closely with and support the engagement of civil society in risk assessment and in addressing identified risks.**

64. **Join existing or create relevant regional or sub-regional initiatives on prevention of genocide. States that are already part of early warning mechanisms or networks at the regional or sub-regional level should work towards including an atrocity prevention lens into these mechanisms.**

65. **Continue cooperation with the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, including by invitations to support country level risk assessment and responses based on technical assistance and capacity building support; to brief relevant bodies, including the Security Council and the Human Rights Council, on situations of concern where elements of the risk of genocide are present. Take follow-up action accordingly, utilizing all the tools available to prevent genocide and to strengthen international accountability for such crimes**.

66. **Where relevant, consider setting up national prevention mechanisms.**

67. **Continue to promote the prevention role of the Human Rights Council by acting on warning signs of potential genocide or other atrocity crimes.**

68. **Continue to utilize tools such as fact-finding missions, commissions of inquiry and Special Rapporteur mandate holders to support prevention and accountability for atrocity crimes.**

69. **Explore further enhancing in national reports and outcome documents of the Universal Periodic Review an assessment of measures being taken to prevent the commission of genocide and specific recommendations to address risks.**

 For Regional Organizations

70. **Establish or integrate into existing early warning mechanisms risk factors of genocide and support action to address risks identified.**

71. **Promote exchange and sharing of good practices on preventing genocide at regional levels.**

 For civil society

72. **Continue to monitor and raise alarm of risk factors of genocide and bring to the attention of States, the UN system and other relevant actors, including through the Human Rights Council.**

73. **Support awareness raising on the importance of prevention and teaching on past genocides through education, including specific indicators of risk such as hate speech and Holocaust and genocide denial.**

74. **Support initiatives to work with new or underutilized actors such as the media and religious and traditional leaders to promote prevention of genocides addressing hate speech .**

 Technological Advances: Risks and Opportunities for the Prevention of Genocide

75. **As the primary duty-bearer, the State holds the ultimate responsibility to ensure the prevention of genocide, and that international human rights norms and standards are applied in the digital sphere, and to all aspects of the development and use of digital technologies.**

76. **Multi-stakeholder cooperation is crucial in addressing the challenges arising from new technologies, including the implications for vulnerable and marginalized communities, and in contributing to strengthening prevention efforts. Technology companies have a key role in the creation of a rights-based, inclusive digital space.**

77. **A genocide prevention lens must be a central element of broader prevention efforts to protect populations from the most egregious atrocity crimes. I urge Member States and the private sector to implement the following measures:**

 For Member States

78. **Define in law what constitutes prohibited content, in accordance with Member States’ obligations under international human rights law, including article 20 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and article 3 (c) of the Genocide Convention;**

79. **Review existing laws on hate speech to meet the requirements contained in article 19 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and ensure that new laws are in line with these requirements.**

80. **Engage in regional, international and UN-led initiatives to counter hate speech online and offline and develop and implement measures within the framework of the UN Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, including national action plans in partnership with the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide as the designated focal point.**

81. **Ensure equal respect for and enforcement of all human rights online and offline, and place prevention at the centre of regulatory frameworks and legislation on the development and use of digital technologies, ensuring compliance with international standards**.

82. **Incorporate safeguarding systems to uphold international due diligence standards, as defined by the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, including due diligence throughout the lifecycle of technological tools and digital infrastructure and integrating specific risk factors related to atrocity crimes.**

83. **Develop a gender-based approach to tackling online hate speech and violence against women and provide for trainings on gender-based hate speech for schools, communities and private companies.**

84. **Ensure that the use, development, and governance of AI is in compliance with international human rights norms and standards.**

85. **Consider the imposition of strict regulations on the sale and /or use of AI systems that pose human rights risks, including the use of remote facial recognition in public spaces, unless and until adequate safeguards to protect human rights and prevent genocide are in place and its discriminatory impacts are removed.**

86. **As part of the prevention of genocide, support domestic and international efforts on using digital technologies to strengthen monitoring, data collection, analysis, documentation and investigation, and ensure participation by civil society**. **Develop guidance on how standards related to prevention of genocide apply in the digital age, building inter alia on the work of the Special Procedures and treaty bodies.**

 For private companies

87. **Review business models in line with the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and ensure that business operations, data collection and data processing practices are compliant with international human rights norms and standards and data protection principles.**

88. **Conduct in-depth human rights assessments for products, policies, and operations, particularly of the role of algorithms and, for social media platforms, the role of ranking systems in amplifying content.**

89. **Social media platforms should invest the necessary resources to develop their understanding of local contexts that drive hate speech and their knowledge, languages, policies, and services in relation to minorities and vulnerable groups. They should also conduct human rights impact assessments that include indicators of the risk of genocide, based on national contexts before entering new markets.**

90. **Ensure that comprehensive human rights due diligence is conducted when artificial intelligence systems are acquired, developed, deployed and operated, as well as before data about individuals are held, shared or used. Such assessment should include specific indicators related to the risk of genocide.**

91. **Work with civil society, States and the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide to uphold responsibilities to prevent genocide and other atrocity crimes. Online platforms should assist by signalling patterns of hate serving as early warning signs of genocide, taking action so that online platforms are not utilized for incitement or planning of atrocity crimes, and preserving potential evidence of crimes, including materials removed.**

1. \* The present report was submitted late as a result of administrative constraints. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. [A/HRC/41/24](https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G19/299/76/PDF/G1929976.pdf?OpenElement). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. [A/HRC/41/24](https://unitednations.sharepoint.com/sites/EOSG_DRI/InternalDRI/DRI%20Documents/F2300871-OHCHR/A/HRC/41/24). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. [A/HRC/41/24](https://unitednations.sharepoint.com/sites/EOSG_DRI/InternalDRI/DRI%20Documents/F2300871-OHCHR/A/HRC/41/24). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. [A/70/741-S/2016/71, annex](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/821715?ln=en#record-files-collapse-header) (2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. [United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, 2019](https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/advising-and-mobilizing/Action_plan_on_hate_speech_EN.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. A/RES/75/309. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. [A/70/621–S/2015/978](https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/433/57/PDF/N1543357.pdf?OpenElement). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. [*Political statement on the suspension of the veto in case of mass atrocities*](https://onu.delegfrance.org/IMG/pdf/2015_08_07_veto_political_declaration_en.pdf),
70th General Assembly of the United Nations (presented by France and Mexico). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. A/RES/71/248. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. S/RES/2379. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. A/HRC/RES/39/2. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. [A/HRC/41/24](https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G19/299/76/PDF/G1929976.pdf?OpenElement), para 36-38. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. Ghana ([A/HRC/WG.6/42/GHA/1](https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G22/576/36/PDF/G2257636.pdf?OpenElement), para. 42) and Nauru ([A/HRC/WG.6/37/NRU/1](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC%2FWG.6%2F37%2FNRU%2F1&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False), para. 133), for example, informed of criminalizing genocide in their national legislation, while Gabon reported having introduced the non-applicability of statutory limitations to atrocity crimes in its Criminal Code ([A/HRC/WG.6/42/GAB/1](https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G22/535/29/PDF/G2253529.pdf?OpenElement), para. 11). Other States reported on developments in transitional justice processes dealing with past conflicts, for example, Argentina ([A/HRC/WG.6/42/ARG/1](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC%2FWG.6%2F42%2FARG%2F1&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False), paras. 14-30), Nepal ([A/HRC/WG.6/37/NPL/1](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC%2FWG.6%2F37%2FNPL%2F1&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False), paras. 23-25), Peru ([A/HRC/WG.6/42/PER/1](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC%2FWG.6%2F42%2FPER%2F1&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False), paras. 149-157) and Somalia ([A/HRC/WG.6/38/SOM/1](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC%2FWG.6%2F38%2FSOM%2F1&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False), para. 21).). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. A/RES/75/1, para 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. [A/HRC/50/55](https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G22/341/55/PDF/G2234155.pdf?OpenElement), paras. 24 et seq. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. [A/75/165](https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/185/66/PDF/N2018566.pdf?OpenElement), para. 34 and [A/77/178](https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=A/77/178&Lang=E), para. 46. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. A/HRC/RES/20/8, para 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. [United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, 2019](https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/advising-and-mobilizing/Action_plan_on_hate_speech_EN.pdf) [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. [Combating Holocaust and Genocide Denial Protecting Survivors, Preserving Memory, and Promoting Prevention](https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/publications-and-resources/22-00041_OSAPG_CombatingDenial_PolicyPaper.pdf) (OSAPG, 2022) [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. [The Role of Sports in Countering Hate Speech: Compilation of statements as delivered at the United Nations event marking 9 December 2022: the International Day of Commemoration and Dignity of the Victims of Genocide and the Prevention of this Crime](https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/The_Role_of_Sports_in_Countering_Hate_Speech_booklet_April_2023.pdf), April 2023 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. [Addressing hate speech through education: A guide for policy-makers (OSAPG, UNESCO 2023)](https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/publications-and-resources/Addressing_hate_speech_through_education_A_guide_for_policy_makers.pdf) [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. For the purposes of the Strategy, hate speech is defined as ‘any kind of communication in speech, writing or behaviour, that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are, in other words, based on their religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, colour, descent, gender or other identity factor.’ [United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, 2019](https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/advising-and-mobilizing/Action_plan_on_hate_speech_EN.pdf), p.2. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. [CCPR/C/GC/34](https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf), para 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. Ibid, paragraph 50. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. [A/HRC/22/17/Add.4](https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G13/101/48/PDF/G1310148.pdf?OpenElement), Appendix, para 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. [Our Common Agenda Policy Brief 8: Information Integrity on Digital Platforms;](https://indonesia.un.org/en/236014-our-common-agenda-policy-brief-8-information-integrity-digital-platforms) Sarah Kreps[,](https://protectionapproaches.sharepoint.com/staff/Shared%20Documents/Atrocity%20Prevention%20Working%20Group/Joint%20activities/The%20Role%20of%20Technology%20in%20Online%20Misinformation) [The Role of Technology in Online Misinformation](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-role-of-technology-in-online-misinformation/)[,](https://protectionapproaches.sharepoint.com/staff/Shared%20Documents/Atrocity%20Prevention%20Working%20Group/Joint%20activities/The%20Role%20of%20Technology%20in%20Online%20Misinformation) Brookings Institution, June 2020. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. [A/HRC/39/64](https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/39/64), para 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. [A/77/287](https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/459/24/PDF/N2245924.pdf?OpenElement), para 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. [A/77/287](https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/459/24/PDF/N2245924.pdf?OpenElement), para. 41. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. [Our Common Agenda Policy Brief 8: Information Integrity on Digital Platforms](https://indonesia.un.org/en/236014-our-common-agenda-policy-brief-8-information-integrity-digital-platforms). [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. [A/HRC/44/57](https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G20/151/06/PDF/G2015106.pdf?OpenElement); [CERD/C/GC/36](https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G20/349/50/pdf/G2034950.pdf?OpenElement); Sarah West, Meredith Whittaker and Kate Crawford, “[Discriminating systems: gender, race and power in AI](https://ainowinstitute.org/publication/discriminating-systems-gender-race-and-power-in-ai-2)” (AI Now Institute, 2019). [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. [A/74/493](https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N19/312/13/PDF/N1931213.pdf?OpenElement), para. 77 and [A/HRC/48/31](https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/ahrc4831-right-privacy-digital-age-report-united-nations-high), para. 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. [A/HRC/44/57, para. 12](https://www.undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC%2F44%2F57&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False); [A/73/348](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2F73%2F348&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False); Joy Buolamwini and Timnit Gebru, “[Gender shades: intersectional accuracy disparities in commercial gender classification](http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a/buolamwini18a.pdf)”, Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, vol. 81 (2018) on the proceedings of the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency; [Racial bias in facial recognition algorithms](https://www.amnesty.ca/surveillance/racial-bias-in-facial-recognition-algorithms/) (Amnesty International, 2023). [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. [A/HRC/38/47](https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/184/58/PDF/G1818458.pdf?OpenElement), para. 28 [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. [A/HRC/46/57](https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G21/054/14/PDF/G2105414.pdf?OpenElement), para 21 and 37. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. See International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Measuring digital development: Facts and Figures 2022, p.3 (Geneva, 2022). [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. [A/HRC/39/64](https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/274/54/PDF/G1827454.pdf?OpenElement), para 42. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. [Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations: A Practical Guide on the Effective Use of Digital Open Source and Information in Investigating Violations of International Criminal, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law](https://www.ohchr.org/en/publications/policy-and-methodological-publications/berkeley-protocol-digital-open-source), Published jointly by OHCHR with the Human Rights Center at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, January 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. Report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation: “[The Age of digital interdependence](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3865925?ln=en)” June 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. [A/74/821](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2F74%2F821&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False). [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. [Combating Holocaust and Genocide Denial Protecting Survivors, Preserving Memory, and Promoting Prevention](https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/publications-and-resources/22-00041_OSAPG_CombatingDenial_PolicyPaper.pdf) (OSAPG, 2022). [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. Countering and Addressing Online Hate Speech: A Guide for policy makers and practitioners (OSAPG, 2023). [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. [The Highest Aspiration A Call to Action for Human Rights (2020)](https://www.un.org/sg/sites/www.un.org.sg/files/atoms/files/The_Highest_Asperation_A_Call_To_Action_For_Human_Right_English.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
45. Our Common Agenda, Report of the Secretary-General ([A/75/982](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2F75%2F982&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False)). [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
46. Our Common Agenda Policy Brief 5 A Global Digital Compact — an Open, Free and Secure Digital Future for All. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
47. [Our Common Agenda Policy Brief 8: Information Integrity on Digital Platforms](https://indonesia.un.org/en/236014-our-common-agenda-policy-brief-8-information-integrity-digital-platforms). [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
48. A/HRC/RES/20/8, para 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
49. A/HRC/RES/41/11; [A/HRC/47/52](https://undocs.org/A/HRC/47/52); A/HRC/RES/49/9; [A/HRC/46/57](https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Minorities/SR/A_HRC_46_57.docx); [A/77/288](https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/a77288-disinformation-and-freedom-opinion-and-expression-during-armed). [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
50. Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework A/HRC/17/31, annex [↑](#footnote-ref-51)