Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean:

Connecting the Dots

Prepared by Altai Consulting for IOM MENA Regional Office, June 2015

IOM • OIM

altai consulting

This report was prepared, researched, and written by Arezo Malakooti (Project Director), under the supervision of Eric Davin (Altai Partner).

All field research was managed and conducted by Arezo Malakooti, with the exception of fieldwork with migrants in Libya, which was carried out by Altai's local partner, Istishari Consulting. Assistance was also provided by Tahar Benattia, Marie-Cecile Darme, Souad Chatar and Matthew Burnard (all from Altai Consulting).

We gratefully acknowledge IOM's Middle East and North Africa Regional Office (Cairo) for its role in designing and framing this study, as well IOM country offices in Egypt, Italy, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Spain and Tunisia for their valuable input and assistance. UNHCR offices in all of the above-mentioned countries are also gratefully acknowledged for their time and expertise.

We are also indebted to the numerous migrants, government representatives, humanitarians/aid workers, academic researchers and community members who shared their views on the various themes that this study covers.

The image on the front cover of this report was graciously provided by the Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS.eu)/ Darrin Zammit Lupi.

Layout and graphic design by Marie-Cecile Darme.

Altai Consulting provides strategy consulting and research services to private companies, governments and public institutions. Altai teams operate in more than 25 countries in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and Europe. Since its inception 12 years ago, Altai Consulting has developed a strong focus on migration and labour market related research and program evaluations.

Contact Details:
Arezo Malakooti (Director of Migration Research): amalakooti@altaiconsulting.com
Eric Davin (Partner): edavin@altaiconsulting.com
www.altaiconsulting.com

This publication was produced by Altai Consulting for review by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Opinions expressed in the report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IOM.

Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean:

Connecting the Dots

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AVR	Assisted voluntary return
AVRR	Assisted voluntary return and reintegration
AWAS	The Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers (Malta)
CAR	Centros de Acogida de Refugiados (Refugee Reception Centres, Spain)
CETI	Centro de Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes (Temporary Centre for Immigrants and Asylum Seekers, Spain)
CNDH	National Council for Human Rights, Morocco
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DCIM	The Directorate for Combatting Illegal Migration (Libya)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS	The Economic Community Of West African States
EU	European Union
GFC	Global financial crisis
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDI	In-depth interview
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
KII	Key informant interview
LGBTI	Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
RSD	Refugee status determination
RMMS	Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat
START	Stabilizing at-risk communities and enhancing migration management to enable smooth transitions in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya (IOM Project)
UAM	Unaccompanied minor
UNHCR	The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USCIS	United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
VOT	Victim of trafficking

Please note: for the purposes of this report, and because the flows being studied are mixed flows, the word migrant is used broadly to refer to all people on the move along the routes studied, including economic migrants, asylum seekers, refugees and involuntary migrants (victims of trafficking, kidnapping and misinformation), unless a distinction is otherwise made.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword 1

Definitions 3

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

IOM's Regional Office for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) commissioned Altai Consulting in November 2014 to create a fresh and updated understanding of the dynamics of the migration flows across the Mediterranean by looking at two routes in particular: the Western Mediterranean route and the Central Mediterranean route.

Fieldwork was conducted between November 2014 and February 2015 across seven countries in the MENA region and Europe (Egypt, Italy, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Spain and Tunisia). Across the sample of locations, 60 in-depth interviews were conducted with migrants and 73 key informant interviews were conducted, resulting in a total of 133 in-depth qualitative interviews.

1. THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN ROUTE

1. 1 PROFILES

- Close to 90% of irregular migrants in Spain entered regularly but became irregular over time and only 10% came by boat from sub-Saharan Africa through the Mediterranean.
- The main countries of origin coming through the Mediterranean have traditionally been Senegal, Cameroon, Guinea and Nigeria but since 2013 there has been a shift towards more migrants from countries of concern (asylum seekers).
- Unlike in Libya, most migrants tend to have a clear objective to move on to Europe when they first arrive in Morocco but most spend much more time in Morocco than they originally anticipated because of the difficulties in crossing over into Spain.

1.2 PUSH AND PULL FACTORS

- The push factors emerge as far more influential than the pull factors and the most significant push factor is the need to flee from instability: either war or conflict (asylum seekers) or economic or societal pressures that inhibit a stable life.
- Aspirational migration: a feeling of inequality is often more influential than absolute need in a decision to migrate, which is why many of the migrants on the Western Mediterranean route were not the worst-off in their home countries.
- The tipping point: for most migrants life back home was precarious and held together by very thin threads that could very easily come undone. When one of those threads gives in, migrants often finally decide to leave.
- For other migrants, the tipping point comes when they observe returnees who come back in a better situation or when friends who return from a migration abroad decided to migrate again and offer to take them along.

1.3 MAIN ROUTES OF TRAVEL AND THE CONDITIONS OF THE JOURNEY

- **Route through Mauritania:** mainly Senegalese migrants move from Dakar and over the border into Nouakchott (Mauritania), then to Nouadhibou, then over the border into Bir Gandouz (Morocco) and then to Dakhla and

Laayoune and subsequently to towns such as Casablanca, Rabat, Tangier, Oujda and Nador in the north of Morocco.

- **Desert route:** English speaking migrants generally come through Agadez and French speaking migrants through Gao. They all move to Tamanrasset (Algeria), then to Ghardaia, then to Algiers or Oran, then to Maghnaia and over the border into Oujda (Morocco).
- **Routes from Morocco to Spain:** the sea route traditionally crossed the Strait of Gibraltar from Tangier to Tarifa and the land routes moved from Morocco into the enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta. In more recent years there have also been sea routes from Morocco into Melilla and Ceuta.
- **Smuggling:** the hotspots are in Agadez (Niger) and Gao (Mali). Arlit in Niger is a hotspot for trafficking and prostitution. The migrants usually deal with a frontman, who is working for the smuggler and who is from the same country of origin as the migrants. Some migrants also spoke of nominating a guarantor who would pay the smuggler once the migrant had successfully arrived in destination.
- **Trafficking:** the vast majority of Nigerian women that arrive in Morocco have been trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation. In 2014, the number of Cameroonian women being trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation started to surpass the number of Nigerian women in the same situation.

1.4 MAIN ACTORS AND PROGRAMS

Spain

- Spain has responded to the Mediterranean issue by developing bilateral policies with Morocco, Cape Verde, Mali, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Niger, Mauritania, Senegal.
- **Reception of irregular migrants:** in Spain, irregular migration is not a crime and irregular migrants are not detained on arrival but if the Spanish authorities feel that they need to retain a person in order to be able to enforce a return order, then they can apply to a court to give them that right.
- **Reception of asylum seekers:** all applications for asylum are processed by the Spanish Asylum Office, which was created in 1992 under the Spanish Ministry of Interior (MoI). The Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security is responsible for the reception process. There are 45 centres for the reception of asylum seekers in Spain.
- Spain has a thriving civil society that works on providing assistance to migrants and asylum seekers under all types of circumstances, often in conjunction with IOM and UNHCR and the Spanish government.

Morocco

- In 2013, Morocco instigated a number of changes to its policies and laws in relation to migration, specifically in regard to: the regularisation of irregular migrants in the country, the status of refugees in the country, law reform in relation to migration, and a renewed commitment to regional and international cooperation in relation to migration.
- In addition to IOM and UNHCR, Morocco is also home to a vibrant civil society that serves the needs of migrants in a number of ways.

2. THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN ROUTE

2.1 RECENT TRENDS

Libya

- The Libyan crisis of 2014 created a number of changes to the environment for migrants in the country, the

protection space for asylum seekers and, ultimately, the characteristics of the flows entering and departing Libya.

- **Risks:** arbitrary arrest and detention, harassment, bonded labour and labour exploitation, rumours linking Syrians to particular militia groups, scapegoating of Syrians and Palestinians, religious minorities particularly at risk.
- **Detention:** DCIM maintains 18 detention centres in Libya but militia groups are also believed to be maintaining non-official detention centres.
- **Outflows:** migrants report a huge migratory pressure to leave the country in the current context, with little way of doing so other than leaving via the Mediterranean.
- **Those that decide to remain in Libya** are typically those that are still in stable employment, protracted refugees and extremely vulnerable sub-Saharan migrants who become stranded.
- **Inflows:** may have decreased but not ceased as migration routes into the country and transit routes are well established. There are also impressions of smugglers taking advantage of the situation and encouraging migrants to come to Libya now.

Egypt

- As the flow of asylum seekers into Egypt has increased (doubled between 2011 and 2014), the protection space has decreased, particularly in the case of Syrian refugees.
- As socio-economic conditions for asylum seekers in Egypt became increasingly more unfavourable, this led to some refugees departing Egypt irregularly by sea or land in order to seek protection elsewhere. As a result, Egypt stepped up its efforts to arrest and detain anyone trying to leave the country irregularly, which decreased the outflows.

Tunisia

- Tunisia is no longer a significant departure point for Europe; today there are more irregular migrants boarding boats for Europe from Egypt than from Tunisia. There are even reports of Tunisians and Moroccans traveling to Libya to board boats to Europe rather than doing so from their own countries, as well as migrants from other third countries (sub-Saharan Africans and Syrians) traveling from Tunisia to Libya to take boats to Europe.
- At the time of the 2014 Libyan crisis, Tunisia effectively closed its borders to non-Libyan migrants trying to exit Libya via Tunisia.

Malta

- In 2014, Malta saw a large decrease in boat arrivals (568 arrivals in total, compared to an average of 1,500 per year before that) mainly because Mare Nostrum was disembarking in Sicily but there was a slight increase in flows overland, particularly in the case of Libyans.
- There is a new trend of migrants who have been granted asylum in Italy moving to Malta to follow family or the perception of better job prospects.
- The Maltese government is planning legislative changes to the current detention policy (to be finalised by July 2015) in line with the new EU Reception Directive.
- There have been cases of Eastern European criminal networks selling fake passports or identity documents to Syrians in Malta to facilitate movements to other parts of the EU.

Italy

- In 2014, Italy experienced a dramatic increase in boat arrivals across the Mediterranean (170,100 arrivals in total, which is three times the 2011 record). The flow was augmented by strong push factors, including the increase in conflict in Europe's immediate neighbourhood.

- In 2014, Libya was still the main departure point and half of the arrivals in 2014 were Syrian and Eritrean.
- The majority of Syrians and Eritreans who arrived in Italy through the Central Mediterranean route left Italy undetected for other European destinations.

2.2 PUSH AND PULL FACTORS

- While some argue that Mare Nostrum acted as a pull factor, the reality is that a number of push factors led to an increase in the number of people on the move towards the North African coast (conflict in Iraq, Syria, Central African Republic, South Sudan, and worsening repression in Eritrea).
- Moreover, since the end of Mare Nostrum, the number of migrants on boats that departed the Libyan coast has increased (with over 33,000 arrivals having been reported in Italy by May 2015, compared to just over 26,000 in the same period in 2014).
- The crisis in Libya also created a migratory pressure for migrants already in the country as well as a perception of the doors to Europe being 'open,' which increased opportunistic flows.

2.3 MAIN ROUTES OF TRAVEL AND THE CONDITIONS OF THE JOURNEY

- The main flows into Libya, post-revolution, remained active in 2014 but a number of newer routes into and out of Libya, did emerge. Specifically, there were flows out of Libya and into Egypt and flows between Tunisia and Libya in both directions.
- Libya is still the most common departure point, with over 80% of boat arrivals in Italy in 2014 having departed from the Libyan coast, but boat departures from Egypt and Turkey did also increase in 2014.
- The main boat departure points from Libya in 2014 were beach heads 50kms to the east and west of Tripoli, around Zwarah, Zawiya, Tripoli and increasingly from Benghazi.
- The main departure points from Egypt were east of Alexandria, between Damietta and Alexandria, and west of Alexandria, between El-Hamam and Alexandria.

Smuggling

- 2014 witnessed a greater focus on the marketing of smuggling services, particularly on social media, and the targeting of different groups of migrants through different packages of services ('safer' journeys at a higher price for Syrians).
- Smugglers took advantage of Mare Nostrum by using vessels that were not seaworthy, on the assumption that they would be picked up by the Italian navy soon after departure.
- While previously it was possible to price the various routes in standard ways, today the price of a particular route, or segment of the journey, depends on the nationality of the migrant paying for it, the level of service the migrant is willing to pay for, and the smuggling ring a migrant comes into contact with in Libya (due to the multiplicity of groups involved in smuggling in Libya now).
- 2104 also witnessed an increase in the purchase of journeys from country of origin all the way to Europe.

Trafficking

- The number of detections of women who arrived in Italy in a context of trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation increased by 300% in 2014.
- Nigerian women continued to mark the increase in the arrival of trafficked women on Italian shores in 2014, but there was also an increase in the numbers of trafficked Cameroonian women.

3. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES AND CROSS ANALYSIS

3.1 SYRIAN REFUGEES AND MEDITERRANEAN ROUTES

- In 2013, Syrians arrived by air into Algeria, Egypt and Libya, all of which did not require visas for Syrians at the time. By July 2013, visa requirements were instituted in Egypt, and by December 2014 in Algeria.
- Syrians landing in Algeria moved to Libya by land, via Tunisia, to board boats to Europe.
- Air arrivals into Egypt either moved to Libya or made direct sea crossings from the Egyptian coast.
- Sudan still welcomes Syrians without the need for a visa. From Khartoum, Syrians move into Libya by land.
- Syrian air arrivals into Libya ceased at the time of the 2014 crisis but have resumed again, particularly for Syrians flying into Libya from Jordan.
- Towards the end of 2014, the number of Syrians that arrived in Italy on boats that had departed Turkey increased.

3.2 DECISION MAKING FACTORS WHEN SELECTING BETWEEN THE ROUTES

Typically, the considerations that factor into the decision between the two Mediterranean routes studied, are: how heavily border-crossing points are controlled; the ease of passage to Europe; the possibility for regularisation at some point along the route; the levels of abuse and conditions in the transit countries; the risks involved; the duration of the journey; the cost of the journey; the presence of networks or friends along the way or in transit countries.

3.3 ACROSS THE CROSSING POINTS: TOWARDS BETTER MIGRATION MANAGEMENT

- Any effort to manage the irregular flows across the Mediterranean requires a package of coordinated responses that are implemented in the short, medium and long term and that take into account the variety of countries along the way, actors in these countries, and the spectrum of risks and vulnerabilities.
- Given the urgency of the situation in the Mediterranean, it is important for all of these responses to be affected with urgency and in the present time period. Those grouped under medium-term and long-term categorisations may need a longer time frame to be refined and perfected but these categorisations in no wise imply that the interventions are not required immediately.

Short-term responses include:

1. Protection at sea
2. Access to asylum

Medium-term responses include:

3. Counter-smuggling and anti-trafficking measures
4. Information campaigns
5. Regularisation campaigns

Long-term responses include:

6. Increased legal alternatives to dangerous journeys
7. Coordination and cooperation
8. Regional mobility schemes
9. New approaches to a coordinated European asylum system
10. Integration of migrants and asylum seekers at destination
11. New approaches and alternatives to camps

INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND



INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Migration to Europe, often in dangerous and risky ways, is not a new phenomenon. The search for safety, in the face of persecution and conflict, or the search for economic security, has pushed migrants to Europe for decades.

While the phenomenon is not new, it is on the rise. The world's population quadrupled in the 20th century, which has led to greater migratory movements. However, while there is a greater number of people on the move, the options for regular movement have remained limited, leading to clandestine and often very dangerous and risky journeys. Since the year 2000, almost 40,000 people have perished on migration routes worldwide. Between January and September 2014, in the Mediterranean alone, more than 120,000 individuals were rescued, with an estimated 3,072 having drowned (out of a total of 4,077 reported deaths worldwide on migrant vessels), making it the deadliest sea in the world.[2] Moreover, internal displacement and movements within a country's territorial borders are increasing at an even higher rate.

The flows have also evolved. The flow to North Africa and across the Mediterranean to Europe is a mixed flow comprised of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. This means that the people on the move today are a complex group of people with differing motivations, but yet, they all follow the same journeys and are often in the hands of the same smugglers. Moreover, while they are not all asylum seekers and in need of international protection, they all possess human rights that deserve to be protected and there are a number of risks and vulnerabilities that arise out of the nature of the journey itself that means all require protection.

Today, the European Union is facing the biggest migratory pressure it has experienced since it came together as a union and, given the conflict in its immediate neighbourhood (Syria, Libya, Iraq, Ukraine, South Sudan to name a few), this is unlikely to decrease anytime soon and creates pressures for all countries surrounding the Mediterranean, turning it into a regional issue and not just a European one. As most of the land borders are now closed, the pressure is on the sea crossing points across the Mediterranean, and mainly on the Central Mediterranean Route, which saw an increase of 376% between 2013 and 2014.[3] Unfortunately, while the flows have increased, the conditions of the journey have deteriorated.

IOM's Regional Office for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) commissioned Altai Consulting in November 2014 to create a fresh and updated understanding of the dynamics of the migration flows across the Mediterranean. Fieldwork was conducted between November 2014 and February 2015 across seven countries in the MENA region and Europe (Egypt, Italy, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Spain and Tunisia). The study focuses on two routes in particular: the Western Mediterranean route from Morocco to Spain and the Central Mediterranean route from North Africa (typically, Libya or Egypt) to Italy or Malta.

This study builds upon the findings of the "Mixed Migration: Libya at the Crossroads" study conducted by Altai Consulting for UNHCR Libya in 2013 by focusing on how the situation has evolved in the central Mediterranean since then and by providing an analysis of the situation in the Western Mediterranean and looking at the interaction between the two routes.

2. 'Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration,' IOM, 2014 **3.** Frontex provided data

Focus Box 1: Definition of Mixed Migration

Refugees and asylum seekers often move from one country to another alongside other people whose reasons for moving are different and not necessarily protection-related.

According to the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, there are 2 main definitions of mixed migration flows:

1. Mixed complex population movements including refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants and other migrants (IOM)
2. People travelling in an irregular manner along similar routes, using similar means of travel, but for different reasons (UNHCR)

METHODOLOGY



METHODOLOGY

1. APPROACH

This study was conducted through a qualitative approach that combined a number of research modules, across seven countries, in order to develop a comprehensive picture of the migration flows across the Mediterranean.
The various modules were:

1. Secondary research/literature review;
2. Key informant interviews with individuals who have a good sense of migration dynamics in their area;
3. In-depth interviews with migrants.

These modules are described in greater detail below.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

At the outset of the study, a desk review of available literature was conducted on migration flows through the Mediterranean as well as a review of literature available on the migration dynamics of the countries in the sample. The purpose of this exercise was to allow for a comprehensive framing of the study and a deeper understanding of the historical context, as well as to ensure that the study was complementary to existing efforts. A list of the literature consulted during this review appears in Annex 2 of this report.

3. FIELDWORK

Fieldwork ran from November 2014 until February 2015 and culminated in a total of 73 key informant interviews (KII) and 60 in-depth interviews (IDI) with migrants across 12 locations in seven countries.
The locations for this study were:

1. Cairo (Egypt)
2. Tunis (Tunisia)
3. Madrid (Spain)
4. Melilla (Spain)
5. Rabat (Morocco)
6. Tangier (Morocco)
7. Oujda (Morocco)
8. Nador (Morocco)
9. Mineo (Sicily, Italy)
10. Rome (Italy)
11. Malta
12. Tripoli (Libya)

Locations include border cities and border crossing points, cities of settlement, cities of employment, ports and departure points, detention centres, and administrative centres. They are presented on Map 2 along with the number of interviews conducted in each location.


3
4
2
3
5
5
4
13
8
13
Cairo
Madrid
Melilla
Rabat
Tangier
Oujda
Nador
Mineo
Malta
Tripoli


Egypt
5%
Spain
10%
Libya
22%
Malta
13%
Morocco
28%
Italy
22%

A total of 38% of the migrants (26 interviews) were interviewed on the Western Mediterranean route (Spain and Morocco) and 62% (34 interviews) were interviewed on the Central Mediterranean route (Italy, Malta, Libya, Egypt). As demonstrated by Figure 3, a total of 19 countries of origin are represented by the sample.

Figure 3: The sample of migrants according to country of origin



The breakdown of the sample of migrants in terms of age (Figure 4) and gender (Figure 5) is presented below. 28% of the sample are below the age of 26 and 78% of the sample is male. A total of 13 women were interviewed. In some locations, the sample of migrants also included smugglers, as well as community elders within migrant communities.

Figure 4: Breakdown of the sample of migrants in terms of age



Figure 5: Breakdown of the sample of migrants in terms of gender



3.2 KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

A total of 73 key informant interviews were conducted across 12 locations in seven countries. The purpose of these interviews was to speak to individuals who had a strong sense of migrant flows and migrant communities in their area, or who had a good understanding of migration routes through the country, in order to supplement information gained from migrants themselves.

Key informants included individuals in agencies and organisations working with migrants, as well as local and national-level authorities. A full list of all key informants interviewed appears in Annex 3.

THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN ROUTE

Figure 6: Detected irregular border crossings, Western Mediterranean route (sea and land) 2008-2014



Data source: Frontex

➤ **The Western Mediterranean route** generally refers to the route **from North Africa to Spain**. It encompasses a sea passage from North Africa to the Iberian Peninsula, by way of boat across the Strait of Gibraltar from Tangier to Tarifa; a land route through the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla that are surrounded by Morocco; as well as a sea passage to the Canary Islands in Spain.

➤ Algerian and Moroccan nationals traditionally and most commonly used this route to reach Spain, France and Italy, but over the years there have been increasing numbers of West Africans on this route also.

➤ The following section will examine the Western Mediterranean route by exploring the profiles of the migrants on this route and the push and pull factors that affect their decision to migrate; the main routes of travel and the conditions of the journey along this route; as well as an outline of the main institutional and legal frameworks that govern migration in Spain and Morocco.

THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN ROUTE

1. PROFILES AND PUSH AND PULL FACTORS

1.1 PROFILES

While Morocco has mainly been a transit country for migrants wishing to reach Spain, the heavier controls on the Spanish border and the general increased difficulty in reaching Spain, has turned Morocco into somewhat of a destination country with some communities of migrants having inadvertently settled there for a number of years. For this reason, the profile of migrants in Spain and Morocco is treated separately, as it is no longer appropriate to assume that it is the same flow at different points.

What is true for the entire flow, however, is that not everyone is seeking asylum, some are in search of a better life, of greater dignity, and for the ability to meet their potential. That is, it is a mixed flow and needs to be framed as a broader migration issue, which moves beyond only refugees and questions of asylum. While not all people on the move on this route are in need of international protection, everyone is exposed to the same risks that arise out of the conditions of the journey and possess a set of human rights that need to be observed and protected regardless of their motivations.

1.1.1 Spain

Spain receives a number of migratory flows into the country, not all of which pass through the Mediterranean. The profiles span irregular migrants, regular migrants, involuntary migrants (particularly those that are trafficked), unaccompanied minors, and asylum seekers.

Traditionally, most of the migrants who arrived in Spain followed a path of regular migration through an offer of employment. This flow followed Spain's economic boom and was facilitated by a number of facilities for the granting of work permits in the main countries of origin. The flow was so great that the number of international migrants living in Spain increased from less than two per cent of the population in 1999 to more than 12 per cent in 2009. The main countries of origin were Ecuador, Bolivia, Romania[5] and Morocco. After the global financial crisis (GFC) and its affects on the Spanish economy, the inflow of labour migrants into Spain decreased as a reaction to the less favourable labour market conditions. By 2012, the outflows from Spain actually exceeded the inflows and according to the national statistics office, the foreign-born population now stands at 6.6 million,[6] down from more than 7 million just two years ago.[7]

The main flow of migrants entering the country today, tend to do so through regular means via an airport but move into an irregular administrative status when they overstay their visas. There is also a flow of migrants arriving on tourist visas, which they overstay, and end up working without documentation. This trend has been observed to be increasing amongst the Pakistani population in the country.

5. As Romania is now a part of the EU, Romanians have freedom of movement within the Union. **6.** It should be noted that part of this decrease could also be attributed to the nationalisation of migrants who have been in the country for some time. **7.** Spanish Ministry of Interior

While the flow of irregular migrants who arrive through the Mediterranean, either by boat across the Strait of Gibraltar (and sometimes by boat to the enclaves) or by land into the enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta,[8] is not the main flow into the country in terms of numbers, it is a flow that is generally increasing. More importantly, it is the flow that garners the most attention because it is so risky and dangerous and because it is considered the most flagrant. Figure 7 presents the number of irregular arrivals in Spain through the enclaves between 2010 and 2014.

Figure 7: Number of irregular border crossings into Ceuta and Melilla between 2010-2014[9]



The main countries of origin that constitute the irregular flows through the Mediterranean, on the Western Mediterranean route, have traditionally been Senegal,[10] Cameroon, Guinea and Nigeria but since 2013 there has been a shift towards more migrants coming from countries of concern, particularly Eritrea and the Syrian Arab Republic. In 2012, the main countries of origin were Somalia (15%), Afghanistan (14%), Tunisia (10%), and Eritrea (8%). By 2013 this had shifted to Syrian Arab Republic (28%), Eritrea (18%), and Somalia (9%). In 2014, Syrians (30%) and Eritreans (16%) continued to be the top two countries of origin with Malians also appearing at 4% and Somalis dropping to 3%, as demonstrated in Figure 8. Syrians arrive through a number of means, including by boat across the Strait and to the enclaves, over the land borders at the enclaves and through airports. Malians tend to come through Melilla. Nonetheless, despite the increase in asylum seekers, it is still a mixed flow and should be framed and understood as a broader migration issue, not just a refugee issue.

Figure 8: Country of origin of irregular arrivals in Spain in 2014 (all borders)[11]



8. Melilla and Ceuta are two exclaves on the northern coast of Africa that are under Spanish administration and that share borders with Morocco. They provide the only two land borders between Europe and Africa. **9.** Data includes crossings over the fence as well as arrivals by sea. **10.** "Unspecified sub-Saharan" refers to migrants who did not disclose their nationality at arrival or whose nationality was not able to be verified. **11.** There is also a flow of Senegalese arriving regularly through airports and overstaying their visas and thus, becoming irregular, in addition to the flow by sea and land.

In 2014, 5,941 asylum applications were made in Spain, 1,680 of which were Syrian and 620 of which were Malian. While most Syrians receive some form of protection, Malians are determined on a case-by-case basis. According to the UNHCR, some applications for asylum came from Malians who had been in the country for sometime but only requested asylum later when the situation at home became worse. Ukrainians also became prominent in asylum applications in Spain in 2014, with a total of 942 applications having been made in this period. Asylum applications made in Spain in 2014 are presented according to country of origin in Figure 9.

Figure 9: Asylum seekers in Spain in 2014 by country of origin



Data source: Spanish Ministry of Interior

The Syrian caseload has been steadily increasing, especially over the last year and a half. At first, Syrians were not immediately applying for asylum; they would come to visit friends or family and then apply for asylum if they liked the country. However as the numbers of Syrians arriving in Spain started to increase rapidly, presumably as a response to an increasingly desperate situation at origin, expectations started to change, as did profiles. That is, initially the Syrian flow consisted of young and single men but now there is a steady flow of Syrian families amongst them who are no longer just visiting but looking to settle. Those working in the Temporary Centre for Immigrants and Asylum Seekers (CETI) in the enclaves explained, "We have to adapt our work to the Syrian people because their reality is different and their expectations are also different." Syrians who arrive through the enclaves tend to not apply for asylum in Spain so that they can move to other European countries without being stopped pursuant to The Dublin Regulation,[12] whereas those that arrive by air have a tendency to stay. It is mainly Kurdish Syrians that are travelling by land to Spain and arriving via the enclaves. The Kurdish Syrians interviewed expressed that they followed the Western Mediterranean route because they felt that non-Arabs were poorly treated in Libya and so wanted to avoid the country.

There is also a flow of involuntary migrants, particularly women who are trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation. However, detections are difficult and there is little data that underscores the issue. The main country of origin of these women is Nigeria, and it is assumed that they are trafficked by a criminal network that begins in the country of origin.[13] The dynamics of trafficking in Morocco provide some further insight into this phenomenon, as discussed in the proceeding section.

12. Which also implies that the number of Syrians arriving in Spain may actually be higher than those recorded. **13.** Routes are described in greater detail in section 2, 'Main Routes of Travel and the Conditions of the Journey'.

1.1.2 Morocco

Unlike in Libya, most migrants tend to have a clear objective to move on to Europe when they first arrive in Morocco; however, there is also a small proportion of the flow that arrives with no clear objective and is open to trying a life in Morocco. Even those that intend to move on to Spain, usually end up spending a large number of years in Morocco due to the difficulty in crossing the borders. The profiles in Morocco span irregular and regular migrants, women, unaccompanied minors, seasonal migrants and asylum seekers.

Regular migrants in Morocco tend to include both students and labour migrants. According to official statistics, there are approximately 13,000 students coming to study in Morocco per year who are mainly from African countries such as Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau and Chad. There is also a demand for domestic workers in Morocco that tends to be filled by Filipino or Indonesian women. However, while most of these women enter the country regularly, they do have a tendency to overstay their visas and move into an irregular administrative status over time.

Image 1: Migrant camps in Oujda, Morocco (Altai Consulting)

The main countries of origin represented by the irregular migrants in Morocco[14] are Cameroon, Nigeria, Guinea, Senegal, Mali and Cote d'Ivoire. It is important to note that passport holders from a number of West African nations are able to enter Morocco without a visa for a period of 90 days.[15] IOM Morocco has observed that irregular migrants from these countries tend to come from a particular city or neighbourhood within their country of origin.

14. Referring specifically to those that enter the country irregularly, rather than those that move into an irregular administrative status with time. **15.** For example, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal.


Refugees
254
123
95
30
15
9
44
Cote d'Ivoire
DRC
Iraq
Palestine
Cameroon
Nigeria
Other

1.2 PUSH AND PULL FACTORS

Figure 11: Push and pull factors on the Western Mediterranean route



While there are a set of both push and pull factors that influence flows across the Mediterranean, along the Western Mediterranean route, it is the push factors that emerge as more influential than the pull factors, as will be explored in this section.

The underlying and most significant push factor for most people on the move, regardless of their origins, tends to be **the need to flee from instability.** This instability may take the form of war or conflict (as in the case of asylum seekers on the route, such as the Syrians, and some Ivoirians, Malians and Nigerians) or may relate to economic or societal pressures, or the lack of livelihood opportunities, that prevent individuals from creating a stable life at origin. More specifically, it can relate to low wages or low purchasing power of income, lack of regular employment or underemployment, lack of opportunities or means for education, or the lack of an enabling environment for stable living (for example: absence of rule of law, human rights or equal rights in home countries).

Most migrants, when speaking of the lure of employment in Europe, spoke specifically of the higher salaries. However, this must be understood through the lens of the purchasing power of income, which is linked to currency exchange rates, as stated by one 37 year old Nigerian man: "*The situation of Africa is quite different to the Western world. The main difference is the currency difference. I was a teacher in Nigeria but the money I received at the*

end of the month was not enough for the life of my family and I. If I did the same job in Europe, and only had a little bit of money left over after my expenses, even if it is only 100 euro per month, if I send that back home and it is converted into the local currency, it will be a lot of money for my family." Lack of regular employment or underemployment not only pushes migrants out of their home countries, but also pushes them out of Spain (and Italy). When they arrive in the countries on Europe's southern sea borders, they realise that the stability they are searching for may not be in reach in these economically frustrated countries and they start to head north.

> " I was a teacher in Nigeria but the money I received at the end of the month was not enough to support my family. "
> Nigerian man in Morocco, 37.

This search for stability is often for more than just a stable and favourable income, but also relates to **education**. For many of the migrants on this route, it was not a matter of education not being available to them at home but rather that it was out of their reach due to economic pressures. For example, one 25 year old man from Cote d'Ivoire stated, "*When I was in Cote d'Ivoire, I had to work all the time and couldn't find time to study. In Europe, I will be able to increase my quality of life by working and studying at the same time.*" (Male, Cote d'Ivoire, 25)

A number of the migrants interviewed in Morocco explained that they had previously made attempts to settle in other countries (south-south migration) and only came to Morocco to cross the Mediterranean when those attempts proved futile. **This suggests that the push factors may be more relevant than the pull factors and that if migrants can address the obstacles that stand in the way of a stable life in neighbouring countries, they may not necessarily undertake the extremely risky journeys to Europe.** One 26 year old man from Togo explained, "*I tried many countries in Africa: Senegal, Mauritania, Burkina-Faso, Benin, Niger, Ghana, and I found jobs in these countries but the salaries were always the same as what I received in my own country so I decided that I had to go to Europe. Cote d'Ivoire was different. I spent 10 years in Cote d'Ivoire, it was a good country. I had a job, I made money, but after the war it changed. I would have stayed if the war had not come.*"

> " I tried many countries in Africa... but the salaries were always the same as what I received in my own country so I decided that I had to go to Europe... I spent 10 years in Cote d'Ivoire and it was a good country; I had a job, I made money, but after the war it changed. I would have stayed if the war had not come. "
> Togolese man in Morocco, 26.

Moreover, **certain factors that had previously been understood as pull factors are in fact coping mechanisms rather than pull factors.** For example, migrants interviewed in Spain explained that they establish networks amongst themselves and amongst migrants from the same country of origin to survive, but they are not pull factors that influence their choice of location.

Some of these factors are not only push factors that encourage one to instigate a migration, but may also be influential in the choice between regular or irregular migration. For example, many migrants explained that they would have preferred to travel to Europe through regular means but that they were limited by the high cost of instigating a regular process. As a result, there is a proportion of the flow that comes to Morocco (and presumably other North African countries) in order to make enough money to be able to go home and afford the cost of obtaining a visa to Europe: "*I decided to go to Morocco to work and make enough money so that I could go back to Togo to make my papers for Europe.*" (Male, Togo, 26). Unfortunately, few of them end up going back home to instigate a

regular process, as originally intended. The same Togolese man explained, "*I found small jobs in Morocco but the salary is not enough to save – you just live in basic ways. Once I got here, people also told me that I could go directly to Europe from here, so now I am trying to cross the fence.*" In any case, it is clear that if more legal channels were open to migrants at origin, and in ways that are accessible, the irregular flow could potentially be curtailed to some extent.

Image 3: A migrant shows his injuries after attempting to storm the fences, Oujda, Morocco (Altai consulting)

While it has been understood for some time that the countries on Europe's southern borders are considered transit countries by many migrants who wish to move to European destinations that have a stronger economy and welfare system, it seems that Europe itself is starting to become a transit for a small sub-group of migrants who wish to move on to other continents. For example, one 26 year old man from Togo explained, "*I pray to God that if I enter Spain, I will go to Germany, work and make money and then go to Canada. I am thinking to go to Germany because Germany colonised Togo, so it is like my country. I think there is a lot of work in Canada. I planned to go to Germany first in order to be able to make the money to get to Canada, I cannot make that money here.*"

It is also important to note that this search for stability, and specifically stability that is derived from a regular and reasonable income, applies to everyone on this route, even the asylum seekers that fled their countries because of war/conflict or persecution. That is, even if economic motivations do not constitute the primary reason for which a migrant fled his/her country, they still play a role in terms of his/her expectations of a host country. For example, the vast majority of Syrian asylum seekers who arrive in Spain (and even Italy, through the central Mediterranean route) do not wish to be registered as asylum seekers in Spain or Italy so that they can move to other European countries, with more favourable labour market conditions, and not be sent back to their port of arrival through the Dublin Regulation. While Spain may provide them with protection in the form of refugee status, the protection and stability that they are seeking also includes the ability to generate a regular and reasonable income that allows the

1.2.1 A More Nuanced Analysis: Aspirational Migration

Any analysis of push and pull factors also requires a nuanced approach that explores some of the more underlying motivations. While many of the migrants on this route come from countries that are experiencing conflict or disaster, most are moving for economic reasons. Yet, there are also large proportions of the population in their home countries that are just as poor (or even more so) but not moving, implying that poverty is not necessarily the sole factor that influences a decision to migrate. Poverty usually needs to be accompanied by a perception of inequality or an appreciation for the fact that something greater exists. For the purposes of this report, this phenomenon is termed 'aspirational migration.'

One element of aspirational migration relates to inequality and the awareness of communities or individuals that are in a more favourable situation. **Sometimes this inequality is more influential than absolute need:** "*The mentality in Africa is that they don't really push people to educate and better themselves. They don't create the conditions for people to evolve, whereas in Europe the governments support people to evolve.*" (Male, Cote d'Ivoire, 25) and, "*Life in Europe has more opportunity: you have the chance to do whatever you like and be who you want.*" (Male, Nigeria, 37). This was also explored in the World Migration Report of 2013 where an exploration of factors affecting well-being found that, "*Indeed, aspirations are linked to the notion of comparative and relative wealth: those who gain a higher income (and status) begin to compare themselves to a higher reference group, instead of gaining satisfaction by comparing themselves to a stable reference group.*" [17]

This implies that **as development increases in countries of origin and income rises, this will not necessarily decrease migration.** In a study in 2014, Micheal Clemens[18] found that there is no negative relationship between income and emigrant stock where income per capita is between USD600 and 7,500 in a given country. Within this range, the relationship between income and migration is positive; the higher people's income becomes, the more migration takes place, until they hit USD7,500, or upper-middle incomes.[19] The 'Easterlin paradox' provides some possible explanation for this dynamic by explaining that while a 'snapshot' comparison of individuals shows that people with higher incomes are happier than those with less income, increases in income over time do not appear to raise average levels of happiness.[20]

Another element relates to the desire to realise one's potential. Many of the migrants encountered on the Western Mediterranean route were not the most disadvantaged in their countries. Most of the migrants on this route were educated and in employment at origin, yet felt limited: "*I was an educated man who worked hard to get a good job (teaching at a public school) but I did not get a salary that was good enough to run my life. I wanted to reach my potential and grow and evolve but Nigerian society and the nature of my family background did not allow me to do this. I did not have the right family background or connections, so no matter how hard I worked, I would never amount to anything there.*" (Male, Nigeria, 37)

For some migrants, this went as far as suggesting that it was in their destiny to migrate: "*Most migrants don't know why they are leaving home. There is an element of destiny involved – if it is in your destiny to reach*

17. Boyce et al., 2010, cited in "World Migration Report 2013" by IOM, 2013, page 94. **18.** In a working paper for the Center for Global Development in March 2014. **19.** Quoted in "What if? Scenarios of implemented and enhanced migration legislation and policies in the Horn of Africa and Yemen" by RMMS, 2015. **20.** Easterlin, 1974, cited in "World Migration Report 2013" by IOM, 2013, page 93.

Europe, you will get there. For some others, it is not in their destiny but they do it because of peer pressure. They are the ones that face problems and cannot make it." (Male, Nigeria, 37). This attitude, which appears as somewhat of a coping mechanism, helps explain why learning about the very grave risks of the journey often does not deter migrants from proceeding.

Image 5: Migrants waiting for work (Altai Consulting)

1.2.2 The Tipping Point

The decision to migrate is often considered for many years before the journey actually commences. The point at which a migrant finally makes the decision to leave is referred to as the tipping point.

While the tipping point will vary for each migrant, in general, it seems that for most migrants, life back home was precarious and held together by very thin threads that could very easily come undone. When one of these threads does come undone, it can lead to a dire situation, prompting a migrant to finally leave. For example, one 26 year old man from Senegal explained, "*For a time, I was OK. I was a taxi driver, which made ok money, and Dad was helping me with my bills so I had just enough to pay all my expenses. But then we started having some family issues, Dad retired and the taxi broke down, and I didn't have money to fix it. So I left to look for a job and money for my family*."

For asylum seekers, if the decision to leave does not arise out of an immediate threat that necessitates immediate departure, the decision to leave usually comes about after a well thought out process that leads to the realisation that life is too compromised in the current location and that there is no other option but to leave.

This may relate to one's immediate security or to stability in the long-term, vis–à–vis the ability to be employed, access to government services, and education for children (particularly in the case of persecuted minority groups).

> " I decided to go to Morocco to work and make enough money so that I could go back to Togo to make my papers for Europe. I found small jobs in Morocco but the salary was not enough to save… People also told me that I could go directly to Europe from here, so now I am trying to cross the fence. "
> Togolese man in Morocco, 26.

For other migrants, it seems that the tipping point comes when they observe **returnees who come back in a better situation:** "My parents had no money. Some of my friends went to Europe and when they came back, they had money and bought cars for their family. One day I thought, 'I am the same as these people; I should do the same'." (Male, Cote d'Ivoire, 25).

For some migrants the tipping point occurred when **friends who had returned from a migration abroad decided to migrate again and offered to take friends along with them:** "*My friend had already been to Morocco and he said, 'Come with me, I'll take you, I've already done it and know how it works',so I went with him.*" (Male, Cameroon, 29). Most migrants interviewed believed that returnees often migrated again and usually took a group with them, implying that repeat migration is not only a problem because it exposes the individual to great risks again, but because it exposes a larger number of people to these risks. Community elders who were interviewed for this study gave the impression that these returnees who take friends with them are implicated in the smuggling business.

1.2.3 Factors Specific to Morocco

Not all migrants on the Western Mediterranean route intend to move to Spain, some target Morocco specifically. IOM Morocco found that in interviews with migrants who were applying for assisted voluntary return and reintegration assistance, some mentioned that they had come to Morocco specifically for work, particularly in the agricultural sector. Indeed, **there seems to be a demand for foreign workers in both the agricultural and construction sectors in Morocco where migrant workers are perceived to work harder than Moroccans for a lower salary.** Some migrants interviewed for this study also mentioned that they had originally migrated to Tunisia but eventually moved to Morocco because friends told them that there were more jobs in Morocco. It should be noted that six out of every 10 of the beneficiaries of IOM Morocco's AVRR programs in 2014 stated that they had not made any attempts to cross the fences into the enclaves.

> " Now that I can be regularised here, I will try to build a life in Morocco. I hope I can stay and settle here. If it doesn't work, then I will try to go to Europe. "
> Senegalese man in Morocco, 26.

The Moroccan government's decision to offer migrants the opportunity to regularise in 2014[21] encourages some of the migrants who are currently in the country to stay in Morocco instead of attempting dangerous and clandestine journeys to Europe. A number of migrants expressed that now that their status was regularised, they would try to stay in Morocco and find a job through legal

21. See section 3.2.1 for more information on the regularisation campaign

means. Moreover, migrants who had not yet received their residency under the regularisation scheme, but knew friends who had, stated that they would also attempt to settle in Morocco if regular status was granted to them instead of attempting a clandestine journey to Europe. Most of these migrants expressed a willingness to wait two years to find stable employment in Morocco before reconsidering an onward journey to Europe; implying that two years is the tipping point. However, it should be noted that a number of arrests occurred, particularly in Gourougou forest (which is located along the border of Melilla), at the end of the regularisation campaign, which impacted 800 detainees including minors, asylum seekers, one pregnant woman, and people who applied for regularisation before the deadline but did not receive a response from the lower court.[22] Such arrests may, of course, affect perceptions of the campaign.

22. https://www.fidh.org/International-Federation-for-Human-Rights/north-africa-middle-east/morocco/between-round-ups-and-regulations-morocco-s-vacillating-migration

2. MAIN ROUTES OF TRAVEL AND THE CONDITIONS OF THE JOURNEY

2.1 ROUTES TO MOROCCO

There are two main routes into Morocco for West Africans: there is the coastal route through Mauritania (see Map 4) **and the desert route through Niger or Mali that involves the crossing of the Sahara** (see Map 3). The coastal route through Mauritania is mainly comprised of Senegalese migrants, as it is much shorter for those coming from Senegal, but Senegalese migrants are sometimes joined by migrants from Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire or Benin. In addition to the land routes, there is also a large flow that flies into the country; this flow is comprised of mainly Ivorian and Congolese migrants and other nationals who do not require visas, who then join the rest of the migrants in Morocco in their attempts to cross over to Spain by land or sea.

2.1.1 Routes Through Algeria

Map 3: Routes through Algeria to Morocco

Routes through Algeria either pass through Mali or Niger, and through Gao or Agadez specifically, as both are major smuggling hubs. Generally, **English-speaking migrants** tend to make their way to Niamey and then Agadez (Niger) quite easily, using public buses and enjoying the freedom of movement of the ECOWAS region. From Agadez they move to Tamanrasset (Algeria), usually through the aid of a smuggler.

Focus Box 3: ECOWAS

Founded in 1975, the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional group of 15 countries whose mission is to promote economic integration in all fields of economic activity. Persons from member countries are given free passage amongst the 15 countries of the community with presentation of any type of identity papers. The 15 countries are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.

French speaking migrants tend to move through Mali; they go to Gao specifically (and quite easily) and then move from Gao to Borj Mokhtar (Algeria), usually with the aid of a smuggler.

Both flows meet in Tamanrasset from where they move to Ghardaia (Algeria). It is not uncommon for migrants to spend some time in Ghardaia working.

From Ghardaia, migrants either move to Algiers or Oran, in the north of Algeria. Asylum seekers or migrants who require medical attention tend to move to Algiers, as UNHCR and other organisations providing medical assistance are restricted from moving beyond Algiers. From Oran, migrants move to Maghnia (usually via Remchi and Tlemcen) from where **they cross the border into Oujda, Morocco**. Those that move from Algiers to Morocco also pass though Oran.

The journey from Gao or Agadez to Oujda takes about **48 hours** if it is completed all at once. It usually costs about **600-1,000 euro** for men and is slightly cheaper for women (with the presumption being that they are then 'indebted' to the smuggler and possibly exploited). **The journey is not particularly dangerous** (although travel conditions can be harsh), except for the border crossing into Morocco where there are gangs searching for money, who have also been known to sexually assault women.

The Moroccan government is currently building a fence along the border with Algeria, much akin to the fences along the borders of the enclaves. This is likely to affect flows into this area. Moreover, border security has been stepped up along this border for some time, with the border having been officially closed since 1994. Since March 2014, there have been reports of migrants being stranded in Agadez because of their inability to pay smugglers. It has been mainly women and there are reports of many of them becoming 'indebted' to smugglers.

2.1.2 The Route Through Mauritania

The route through Mauritania moves from Dakar (Senegal), over the border into Nouakchott (Mauritania), and then on to Nouadhibou. From Nouadhibou, migrants cross the border into Bir Gandouz (Morocco) and then move to Dakhla and Laayoune and subsequently to towns such as Casablanca, Rabat, Tangier, Oujda and Nador in the north (see Map 4).

The border between Senegal and Mauritania is controlled (although the geographic features of the border make it quite porous) and the Spanish Guardia Civil has established controls in Nouadhibou; therefore, mainly migrants with passports and visas travel this route. There is also a market for fake documents. The route tends to be dominated

2.3 ROUTES ACROSS THE MEDITERRANEAN

There are a number of routes from Morocco to Spain: the sea route has traditionally crossed the Strait of Gibraltar from Tangier to Tarifa and the land routes involve crossing the borders that separate the towns of Melilla and Ceuta from Morocco. However, in more recent years, there have also been sea routes from Morocco into Melilla and Ceuta (see Map 7).

While most sub-Saharan African migrants in Morocco make numerous attempts to cross over to Spain, and sometimes by trying a number of methods and entry points, the general trend seems to be that migrants who are either trafficked to Morocco, or who are still connected to a smuggler when they enter the country, move to the north of the country and attempt to cross the land borders. **Migrants that move to Tangier to cross the Strait of Gibraltar by boat tend to be independent of a smuggler and they tend to be in a relatively better financial position,** allowing them to be able to invest in the purchase of a boat.

Most of the migratory flows in the Western Mediterranean were traditionally carried out by sea; however, in recent years, the sea crossings have decreased, as a result of greater monitoring, and the flows overland have increased. In 2013, nearly two-thirds of the detected irregular border crossings on the Western Mediterranean route were reported at the land borders in Ceuta and Melilla.[24]

Map 7: Routes from Morocco to Spain



24. Frontex Annual Risk Analysis 2014, page 39.

2.3.1 Land Routes

Migrants that wish to cross the fence into Melilla tend to wait in the forests surrounding Nador (Gourougou) and Oujda for long periods of time and usually make the attempted crossings in very large groups (sometimes more than a hundred people and lately even several hundred) who storm the fences together, allowing some migrants to pass through while the majority are stopped by authorities. Those that storm the fences are typically young and strong men of sub-Saharan origins; the fences are six metres high and topped with barbed wire in most parts, so it requires a lot of strength and is quite dangerous. Very few women have ever crossed the fences; they tend to cross over more typically by hiding in the cars of Moroccans who are crossing the border (see Focus box 4). **Migrants that can afford to do so also tend to avoid the crossing of the fences in favour of crossing the border with a fake or rented Moroccan passport.**

Focus Box 4: Entering the Enclaves with Moroccan Passports

As Moroccan passport holders who live near Melilla and Ceuta can enter these towns for limited periods of time without any type of visa, there is a trend of using Moroccan passports to cross the borders into them by car, or by hiding in the cars of Moroccans who are making the crossing. As it becomes more and more difficult to cross the fences, this method becomes increasingly popular. However, it is very expensive so most sub-Saharans cannot afford to do so. Moreover, sub-Saharans are easily spotted as they look quite different to Moroccans, so when they cross the border in this way, they are usually hidden (women often wear niqabs to hide their faces). It is usually Arab men who rent passports from Moroccans, and now mainly those of Syrian origin (previously Algerian) as they have the ability to pay greater sums of money so the smugglers target them. It usually costs about 20,000 Dhs (USD 2,000). The hidden flows are sparse and most likely not orchestrated by a smuggler, unlike the Syrian flows.

The flow into Melilla is larger than the flow into Ceuta (even though there are more transfers to the mainland from Ceuta, which should be a pull factor) because it has become relatively easier to cross over into Melilla and mainly because of this new trend of doing so with Moroccan passports, which has emerged along the border with Melilla. The overland crossing into Ceuta typically occurs from Fnediq in Morocco.

In 2014, the Moroccan authorities began building another layer of fencing on the Moroccan side of the border with Melilla, which is likely to make the attempted crossings even more dangerous and success in doing so even more elusive.

Since February 2014, there has been a steady increase in the number of attempted irregular crossings over the fences. February 2014 saw an incident in Ceuta where a group of migrants who were trying to reach the enclaves by sea were received by pellet guns that were fired by the Spanish Guardia Civil in an attempt to push them back, resulting in the death of 15 migrants. When the remainder of the group arrived on the beach, they were taken by

security forces and delivered back to Morocco.[25] The Spanish government was criticised for the event, which led to a discontinuation of this policy of deterrence.[26] It may be that migrants felt that this event provided them with an opportunity to be exploited, leading to the increases in flows, although this is speculative at this point.

Civil society actors and migrants report that this has resulted in a number of deportations from Nador,[27] where authorities move migrants who are camped out in the mountains of Nador to other parts of Morocco in order to lessen the migratory pressure. They are reportedly sent to cities such as Rabat, Fes, Casablanca and Meknes. Most migrants end up begging in the streets of these cities until they have enough money to be able to travel back to Nador and try to cross the fences again. One such example occurred on 9 February 2015 when 700 migrants were arrested in Gourogou and, after being identified and fingerprinted, were sent to other cities in Morocco, mainly in the South.[28]

Image 6: Fences along the border between Morocco and Melilla (Altai Consulting)

25. https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/02/spain-accountability-urged-appalling-migrant-deaths-ceuta **26.** See section C.3.1.1 “Issues of concern” for more information. **27.** Migrants were reportedly being summarily deported to Algeria until December 2013 when the strategy was shifted to being deported to other cities in the country. **28.** http://www.gadem-asso.org/Communique-de-presse-sur-les

2.3.2 Sea Routes

The main sea route is from Tangier to Tarifa and in more recent times, migrants have attempted to enter Ceuta by boat by sailing around the coast.

Tangier to Tarifa spans a distance of only 14-30kms, depending on which part of the coast migrants end up reaching. Traditionally, migrants made the crossing with smugglers, which was quite expensive and could cost them up to USD 3,000. More recently, migrants have started to make the journey on their own. Typically, a group of migrants put their money together and buy vessels with which to make the journey (usually basic rubber dinghies and sometimes row boats). As a result, the vessels are much less seaworthy, making the journey more dangerous.

In more recent years, controls in Tangier have increased and successful sea crossings have become more and more difficult. Consequently, a community of migrants, who have not been able to get through the controls, has inadvertently settled in Tangier. It has become one of the biggest communities in the country and was traditionally comprised of young Ivoirians and Senegalese men. In August of 2014 there was an incident in which Moroccan authorities loosened their control in the area and in a two-day period over 1,800 migrants arrived from Tangier to Tarifa. Many of those providing aid and assistance to migrants in Tangier explained that this consequently led to a large influx of migrants in Tangier wanting to try their luck across the Strait and shifted the composition of migrants in the area to also include groups of Cameroonians and Nigerians.

Malians are also seen attempting to cross the Strait by boat but they tend to stop close to the Spanish coastline and swim the remainder of the way in order to avoid being detected and pushed back. In February 2014, a group of 50 Malian men drowned while trying to swim to Tarifa. While 23 men from the same group did manage to arrive, they were pushed back to Morocco by the authorities without being given the opportunity to apply for asylum.

2.4 THE DYNAMICS OF MIGRANT SMUGGLING

Before migrants reach Morocco, they pass through a number of smuggling hotspots along the way, such as Agadez in Niger and Gao in Mali, which are the locations where most migrants first connect with a smuggler. Arlit, in Niger, is a particular hotspot for women where trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation is common.

Migrants in Morocco explain that the smuggling business is complex and layered and quite similar in characteristics to Libya,[29] in the sense that there is usually someone at the top of the hierarchy that the migrants never see. The migrants usually deal with a frontman, who is working for the smuggler, and who is usually from the same country of origin as the migrants. Some migrants also spoke of nominating a guarantor who would pay the smuggler once the migrant had successfully arrived in destination. That is, a migrant might take his sister to meet the smuggler and show the smuggler the full amount of the payment but hand it over to his sister who would subsequently pay the smuggler with it once her brother had arrived in destination.

29. See 'Mixed Migration: Libya at the Crossroads' by Altai Consulting/UNHCR Libya for more information on the dynamics of migrant smuggling in Libya.

Figure 12: The dynamics of smuggling in Morocco



2.5 TRAFFICKING

2.5.1 Spain

In Spain, the national framework for trafficking only deals with sexual exploitation. However, labour exploitation is also rife, particularly amongst Asian workers in the hospitality sector and amongst sub-Saharan migrants in the agricultural sector. According to IOM interviewees, there are also impressions that domestic workers in Spain are vulnerable to exploitation but evidence is rare. The Spanish government is currently working on a strategy to address labour exploitation.

Trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation occurs frequently and most actors believe that it is probably more commonplace than is generally understood. Although there are no official statistics, those working with victims of trafficking glean that they are usually women from the EU (particularly Romania and Bulgaria), Colombians, Brazilians and women from the Dominican Republic. There is also a flow of Nigerian women who are trafficked to Spain for this purpose through the Mediterranean. More recently, the number of minors in this area is increasing (or at least detections are increasing).

2.5.2 Morocco

Female migrants on the route to Morocco generally fall into one of three categories: women who have enough money to make the journey from beginning to end, women who arrive out of money in Agadez and end up in prostitution as a way to generate income, and women who are trafficked from country of origin for the purposes of sexual exploitation.

As explained in the section on profiles, **the vast majority of Nigerian women that arrive in Morocco have been trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation and Nigeria is traditionally the most common country of origin for women in this predicament. In 2014, the number of Cameroonian women being trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation started to surpass the number of Nigerian women in the same situation.** While it is hard to put a figure on this phenomenon, some actors in the field estimate that as many as 90% of Nigerian female arrivals and 70% of Cameroonian women are trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation. They are often controlled by voodoo and told by their exploiters that if they escape, voodoo will be used against their family back home.

The Cameroonian networks tend to have a different modus operandi. Within the Nigerian community, the network tends to be more locally run. That is, when the woman arrives in Morocco, she is typically handed over to a man who acts as her agent and he decides her fate. There also tends to be a range of women amongst them, in terms of age and appearance. The Cameroonian women, however, tend to enter a more organised business where they work within brothels and they tend to all be young and have a similar appearance. The other difference between the two networks is that the Nigerian women tend to be sent to Morocco simply to pass through on their way to Europe (but end up stuck in Morocco), whereas there are impressions that the Cameroonian women are coming to stay in Morocco. Also, the high numbers of Cameroonian women in brothel-like set ups in Oujda implies that there must be a demand for them on the local market.

Women from Cote d'Ivoire and DRC are also found in situations of prostitution in Morocco but usually out of desperation. The impression is that often women arrive in Agadez out of money and in search of income generating activity so that they can continue their journey. The smugglers exploit their vulnerability and send them to Arlit for prostitution as large prostitution rings have been established there. The trend seems to be that if a women has found herself in prostitution once along the way, it is very likely that she will end up prostituting herself again whenever she is out of money. While Arlit is a prostitution hub, such hubs are also known to exist in migrant ghettos in Ghardaia, Oran, Maghnia (Algeria) and Oujda (Morocco). While these women may not have entered prostitution in a context of trafficking, they are at risk of being trafficked for sexual exploitation due to their vulnerability.

Image 7: CETI in Melilla (Altai Consulting)

3. MAIN PROGRAMS AND ACTORS

3.1 POLICIES, PROGRAMS AND FRAMEWORKS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL IN SPAIN

Spain is a country with a rich migration history. Until the 1970s it was predominately a country of emigration and in the 1980s it became a country of immigration. Some years, it experienced the greatest net inflow of migrants after the USA and its foreign population reached 13% of the total population. As of 2013, both phenomena were apparent.

In terms of irregular migration to Spain, close to 90% of irregular migrants in the country entered regularly but became irregular over time and only 10% came by boat from sub-Saharan Africa through the Mediterranean. However, Spain's policy response to irregular migration was almost solely focused on the Mediterranean flows because it was perceived as the most flagrant and the flow that demanded the greatest need for control and protection.

In 2006, a need for a response to the irregular flows through the Mediterranean became critical when over 30,000 West African migrants arrived by boat through the Canary Islands in just one year. New policies were established by the Spanish government that led to cooperation with the main countries of origin in a regional response (see Focus box 5). These policies were successful from the viewpoint of control, as only 173 migrants arrived through the Canary Islands by 2012 (see Figure 13).

Focus Box 5: Operation Seahorse Atlantic

Led by the Spanish Ministry of Interior and Civil Guard, Seahorse Atlantic was established in 2006 with the aim of deterring migrants from travelling to the Spanish coast irregularly by boat.

A regional coordination centre was established in the Canary Islands to facilitate coordination with Portugal, Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal, Cape Verde, Gambia and Guinea Bissau.

Figure 13: Irregular boat arrivals at the Canary islands 2006-2014



Data source:
Spanish Ministry of Interior

Since the Arab Spring of 2011, a similar situation has developed again in the Mediterranean, with the focus being mainly on the Central Mediterranean this time. By 2014, Italy was receiving 80% of the flows across the Mediterranean and mainly because of the instability in Libya. The flow through the Central Mediterranean is also more predominately comprised of asylum seekers than the flow through the Western Mediterranean, although this is starting to shift somewhat in recent years, with more Malians and Syrians arriving through the Western Mediterranean.

Nonetheless, much like its response to the situation in the Canary Islands, Spain has responded to the Mediterranean issue by developing bilateral policies with Morocco. The result of such measures is that migrants are increasingly prevented from crossing over into Spain, causing Morocco to have to deal with the flows more urgently as it is increasingly becoming an inadvertent country of destination, rather than a country of transit. This has also lead to programmatic changes with more European countries focusing on the funding of assisted voluntary return and reintegration programs from Morocco, for example.

Spain also engages in bilateral cooperation with other countries of origin (including Cape Verde, Mali, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Niger, Mauritania, Senegal) in the form of readmission agreements that allow for the speedy return of irregular migrants that are detected at Spanish borders, while also preventing their crossing through increased maritime patrols and border surveillance. Multilateral cooperation is conducted via the Rabat Process.

Focus Box 6: The Rabat Process

The Rabat Process brings together nearly 60 European and African countries from North, West and Central Africa, as well as the European Commission and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with a view to tackling challenges arising from migration in a spirit of shared responsibilities.

Spain has also increased its presence in countries of origin through the:[30]

- Opening of embassies and consulates in more of the countries of origin;
- Signing of Memoranda of Understanding with countries in Western Africa and the Maghreb;
- Deployment of police attachés (Ministry of Interior) at Spanish Embassies in countries of origin.

The Spanish government is also exploring options for providing asylum seekers the ability to apply for asylum in Morocco so that asylum seekers do not have to cross the fence in dangerous ways in a search for protection.

3.1.1 Legal Framework For Migration

In Spain, the responsibility for the management of migration is divided in the following manner:

- Border management, national security and asylum is the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior (MoI);

30. http://www.euromed-migration.eu/uploads/tx_euromedhelper/05_SPANISH_EXPERIENCE.pdf

- Centres for asylum seekers and the integration of refugees fall under the Ministry of Employment and Social Security (General Security for Immigration and Emigration);
- The migration law is a national law but regional governments in Spain determine the day-to-day policies and develop their own plans for integration.

Until two years ago, the law stated that migrants had the same rights as citizens in terms of social services (excluding employment) as long as they registered in a local city hall. This applied to both regular and irregular migrants. Two years ago, however, the law was changed under the new government so that regular migrants still enjoy these rights but irregular migrants only have access to emergency health services (with exceptions made in the favour of minors and pregnant women). Some regional governments, such as the one in Andalucía, have not applied the new law.

Reception of Irregular Migrants

In Spain, irregular immigration is not a crime and thus, irregular migrants are not detained on arrival. However, after any immediate assistance that may be required is provided and if the individual has decided not to exercise their right to apply for asylum, a return order is issued and the individual in question has the option of returning voluntarily (in which case their travel expenses are covered by the Spanish government through co-financing by the European Return Fund) before that return order is enforced.

If the Spanish authorities feel that they need to retain a person in order to be able to enforce a return order, then they can apply to a court to give them that right, and if the court determines that it is necessary, then the individual can be retained for a maximum of 60 days in one of the closed centres in Spain.[31] The average length of stay currently (according to the Spanish MoI) is 30-40 days.

As the cooperation of the country of origin is required in order for the individual's identity to be confirmed before they are sent home, there are many cases where the government has not been able to enforce a return order within the 60 days, and in such cases, they are obliged to release him/her. In most cases, the authorities then have difficulty in locating the individual and the assumption is that they have moved to other locations in Europe.

Migrants that arrive irregularly in the enclaves are obliged to register with the police (if such migrants arrive at the CETI, they are directed to the police office first to be registered) and unless they apply for asylum, it becomes an immigration issue and the return order is issued. **When a return order is issued, the migrant is transferred to the mainland, as part of the enforcement of that return order, where they wait in a closed centre for deportation. There has been a trend of asylum seekers not applying for asylum immediately when they arrive in the enclaves,** being issued a return order, being transferred to the mainland as part of the enforcement of that order, and then applying for asylum once they are on the mainland in order to avoid waiting in the enclaves while the decision on their asylum application is made.

Issues of Concern

There are a number of civil society organisations in Spain who feel that the Spanish government uses **detention arbitrarily** and not exceptionally as a last resort, as the law stipulates (see the work of Centro Pueblos Unidos). Another issue of concern for civil society organisations in Spain is '**express removals**' where police issue a return

31. The centres in the enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta are exceptionally open centres, all centres on the mainland are closed centres.

order and enforce it within 72 hours without the right to appeal or the right to speak with a lawyer. In 2013, the figures for express removals were higher than the figures for removals from detention centres.

Finally, in terms of the cooperation between Spain and Morocco, the most critical and controversial issue for Spain today is that of the **pushback policies**, which prevent access to territory for asylum seekers and withholds the right to apply for asylum. Reforms to the Spanish Immigration Law in 2015 now provide a legal basis for the pushbacks by stating that irregular migrants who attempt to cross the borders of Ceuta and Melilla without authorisation "will be rejected in order to prevent illegal immigration into Spain." Such rejection does not provide for any of the procedural safeguards laid down in Articles 20 and 22 of the Spanish Immigration Law (i.e. the right to an effective remedy, the right to appeal against administrative acts or the right to a lawyer and interpreter) and can violate the principle of non-refoulement (Article 57.6).[32]

3.1.2 Legal Framework for Asylum

The asylum legislation in Spain was last amended in 2009 and it provides for two types of protection in Spain:

- **Refugee status under international law:** gives protection to those that have a well-founded fear of persecution on religious, social or political grounds.
- **Subsidiary protection under national law:** derives from the EU Qualifications Directive of 2004 and the Procedures Directive of 2005 and is granted where there is "well grounded fear of persecution," which makes it more open than the criteria for refugee status.

The main difference between the two is that subsidiary protection is reviewed every five years and grants residency and the right to work, but asylum seekers that qualify for this type of protection can only apply for nationality after ten years, whereas refugees can apply after five years.

Focus Box 7: Definition of a Refugee, 1951 Convention

Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as:

"A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it…"

In some cases, **humanitarian protection** is granted, which grants the authorisation to stay for humanitarian reasons under national law, taking the form of a short term residency with the expectation of reviewing the on-going need for protection in the future.

32. http://us1.campaign-archive2.com/?u=8e3ebd297b1510becc6d6d690&id=81f488d384&e=[UNIQID]#op-ed

The implementing decree of the asylum law has not yet been determined, which, according to UNHCR, poses some challenges for family reunification and the treatment of vulnerable cases.

Reception of Asylum Seekers

When an asylum seeker arrives in Spain, he or she can apply for asylum in Madrid, in an asylum office, or in any of the 55 provinces of Spain in a police station of that province. **All applications are then processed by the asylum office, which was created in 1992 under the Spanish MoI.**

The Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security is responsible for the reception process. There are 45 centres for the reception of asylum seekers in Spain[33] and the reception process is divided into three stages:[34]

- Six months in the centre (or nine for vulnerable cases) where asylum seekers are given room and board and services to allow them to become independent in Spanish society. This includes learning to speak the language, finding a job, learning how to deal with the Spanish administration and schooling for children.
- After 6-9 months asylum seekers are transferred out of the centres and move into apartments that they rent from the private market, with some assistance from NGOs for rent, food and basic needs. This assistance continues for 12-18 months (depending on the level of vulnerability of the individual).
- The third phase, which commences after 18-24 months, involves targeted assistance (vocational training, legal aid, counseling services) as required, and can continue for up to two years.

If at some point during this process, the application for asylum is rejected, the individual is asked to leave the program and the centres.

Figure 14: Types of protection granted to all recognised asylum seekers in Spain 2010-2013



33. Four that are completely funded and managed by the government with 400 places available across them (two in Madrid, one in Valencia and one in Seville), and 41 that are run by NGOs with 500 places available across them. For more information: http://www.madrid.org/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1352808410362&ssbinary=true **34.** This is an offering to asylum seekers, which they are free to accept or refuse.

3.1.3 Progams and Actors

Spain has a thriving civil society that works on providing assistance to migrants and asylum seekers under all types of circumstances, often in conjunction with IOM and UNHCR and the Spanish government.

IOM

IOM projects in Spain are mainly focused on the integration and reintegration of migrants. Within the integration component:

- IOM works with both regular and irregular migrants as it is often hard to draw a clear line between the two and because often both types of migrants will exist in the same family;
- IOM works on projects that encourage the participation of migrants in the community and in politics through training courses and working groups on participation, education, racism and xenophobia;
- This year, IOM will also start working on the integration of children who are born in Spain to parents who were migrants, which is an emerging phenomenon in Spain;
- This year, IOM will also start a program in Senegal on entrepreneurship, which will complement AVR(R) activities.

IOM contributes to reintegration through its assisted voluntary return and reintegration programs (AVRR). IOM implements a number of different AVR and AVRR programs through various funding streams. In terms of the reintegration component:

- A number of training programs – both in terms of psycho-social preparedness and capacity building / skills development – are provided pre-departure to ensure that returnees have the skills to engage in self-employment options on return, as well as the necessary psychological preparedness to re-assimilate;
- On return to country of origin, IOM also provides technical and economic assistance;
- While the EU only provides funding for the assistance of irregular migrants, IOM also assists the return and reintegration of regular migrants through national funding from the Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security.

Reintegration assistance is provided to victims of trafficking through the CARE project,[35] which provides up to 2,000 euro for each victim who devises a personal plan for their return. IOM Spain also works to improve access to health services through the Equi-Health project.[36]

Figure 15: AVR through IOM Spain, 2010-2014



35. A joint project between Spain, Portugal, UK, France, Austria and led by IOM Paris. **36.** A European project led by IOM Brussels, which focuses on the southern entry points and analyses the health components of the reception process.

UNHCR

The Spanish representation of the UNHCR was established in Madrid in 1979 and is divided into two departments: International Protection and Communications and External Relations.

As part of its international protection activities, UNHCR:

- Receives notification of all asylum applications, evaluates them and issues a recommendation to the Spanish authorities on which applications should be granted;
- Offers guidance on the interpretation and application of international refugee law and advises Spanish authorities, asylum seekers, refugees, NGOs, law professionals on the application of the law;
- The protection unit organizes training activities and seminars for lawyers, public servants, NGO workers and students.

The department of Communications and External Relations works on communication, awareness-raising and fundraising.

3.2 POLICIES, PROGRAMS AND FRAMEWORKS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL IN MOROCCO

As mentioned previously, Morocco has traditionally played the role of a transit country along the Western Mediterranean route and as an entry point into Spain. However, whether intentionally or inadvertently, **Morocco is starting to change in this regard and is becoming increasingly a destination country purely for the fact that it has become so difficult for migrants to cross over into Spain.** The challenges posed by this increased burden for Morocco have led to the migration flows through the country becoming the object of legitimate concern and often subject to controversy.

> " When I entered Morocco, I regretted it because it was quite difficult. There are migrants who go back to Algeria to work and make money and then come back to Morocco. "
> Ivoirian man in Morocco, 25.

In 2013, however, **Morocco instigated a number of changes to its policies and laws in relation to migration, the impetus for which came from the 9 September 2013 thematic report on the situation of migrants in Morocco**, which was submitted by the National Council for Human Rights (CNDH) to His Majesty King Mohammed VI.

It demonstrates the Moroccan government's keen awareness of, and commitment to, its role in the mixed flows passing through its country and its commitment to approaching migration in a humanitarian way, in accordance with international law and in a framework of regional cooperation.[37] It led to the creation of four inter-ministerial committees related to: the regularisation of irregular migrants in the country, the status of refugees in the country, law reform in relation to migration, and a renewed commitment to regional and international cooperation in relation to migration.

37. http://www.processusderabat.net/web/index.php/news-and-events/towards-a-new-moroccan-immigration-policy

3.2.1 Exceptional Regularisation of Foreigners Residing in Morocco Irregularly, 2014

As part of the new Moroccan immigration policy, a campaign for the exceptional regularisation of foreigners with an irregular administrative status in Morocco was announced in September 2013 and applications were accepted throughout 2014. Under this campaign, offices were set up in each prefecture and province of the Kingdom in order to validate applications for regularisation and foreigners with an irregular administrative status in Morocco qualified for regularisation if they fulfilled one (or more) of the following criteria:[38]

1. Spouses of Moroccan nationals;
2. Spouses of foreigners living in a regular situation in Morocco;
3. Children of marriages involving the two above-mentioned scenarios;
4. Migrants in possession of a valid work contract;
5. Migrants who have lived in Morocco for five years or more;
6. Migrants suffering from a serious disease.

Persons that qualified for regularisation received a one-year residency card, which, according to a February 2015 government announcement, will be renewed automatically on expiration.[39]

The total number of applications submitted as of 31 December 2014 was 27,332, of which 17,916 received a favourable opinion. This results in an overall recognition rate of 65%. Following a recommendation of the CNDH, it was decided in Spring 2014 that all women and children would be automatically regularised, leading to all applications submitted by women and children (10,178) also being accepted.[40] The recognition rate varies across different regions of the country, however (for example, the recognition rate in Nador was lower than the overall recognition rate), indicating that the process was not always applied in the same way in all locations.

Regularisation benefited nationals of 116 countries, with Senegalese forming the largest group (6,600), followed by Syrians (5,250), Nigerians (2,380) and Ivoirians (2,281).[41] UNHCR explained that Syrians that applied for regularisation did not go through a RSD process. Some Syrians explained that they did not wish to apply for asylum as they felt that it may create problems for them when they eventually return home. It is also pertinent to note that Syrian applications for regularisation were coming particularly from Oujda,[42] which could suggest that the motivation for regularisation was to obtain a Moroccan passport for crossing the border into Spain.

According to actors working with migrants in Morocco, many sub-Saharans did not apply because they were afraid to become visible to the government, so the process has not necessarily integrated the cross section of migrants that exist in Morocco. Moreover, many of the 17,916 that were regularised, despite their newfound status, are not working because integration programs, skills training, or labour market programs did not accompany regularisation.

38. A national appeals commission was also created, presided over by the CNDH. **39.** https://www.fidh.org/International-Federation-for-Human-Rights/north-africa-middle-east/morocco/between-round-ups-and-regulations-morocco-s-vacillating-migration
40. Ibid. **41.** http://www.processusderabat.net/web/index.php/news-and-events/towards-a-new-moroccan-immigration-policy
42. As of November 2014, 350 Syrians had been regularised in Oujda.

Image 8: Somali migrant (Altai Consulting)

3.2.2 Regularisation of Refugees 2014

Under the new approach to migration resulting from the 9 September 2013 thematic report, an inter-ministerial committee was also established with the task of reviewing 853 cases of individuals recognised as refugees by the UNHCR in Morocco and the Bureau of Refugees and Stateless Persons, reporting to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, was reopened on 25 September 2013.

The commission interviewed 554 individuals and recommended the regularisation of the status of 546 refugees. The government stated that the remaining eight asylum seekers (three adults and five children) were not eligible for refugee status as they have Moroccan nationality. Those recognised were given refuge cards and residence permits for a period of one year.

3.2.3 Legal Framework for Migration

Law number 02-03 of November 11, 2003 on the "entry and stay of foreigners in Morocco, irregular emigration and immigration," which was intended as a comprehensive reform of the legal framework governing migration (as previously adopted under the French Protectorate), tends to give an overview of the approach to migration, rather than a clear blueprint for implementation.

The 9 September 2013 thematic report on the situation of migrants in Morocco and the consequent changes to Morocco's framework for migration also led to a process of law reform. In late 2014, three draft laws on asylum, combating trafficking in human beings, and immigration, were submitted to the Secretariat General of the Government. In parallel, a national strategy for asylum and for the integration of migrants is under preparation.

3.2.4 Programs and Actors

Morocco is also home to a vibrant civil society that serves the needs of migrants in a number of ways. Some of these actors include: Caritas, GADEM (Le groupe antiraciste de défense et d'accompagnement des étrangers et migrants), Medicines sans Frontiers, Terres de Homme, Fondation Orient-Occident, Medicines du Monde and Delegación de Migraciones amongst others. They work across a number of areas of assistance, including humanitarian assistance, medical and psychological support, legal assistance, advocacy, and integration.

UNHCR

UNHCR's main programs in Morocco include:

- RSD;
- Capacity building of the government for RSD;
- Overseeing the regularisation process for registered asylum seekers and refugees;
- Assistance programs for refugees through implementing partners;[43]
- Identifying and referring asylum seekers in border areas.[44]

UNHCR also conducts resettlement of refugees to the US, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Portugal and Iceland. In some instances, this is because refugees cannot live in Morocco and must be resettled elsewhere. For example, LGBTI cases cannot stay in Morocco as homosexuality is also outlawed in Morocco.

IOM

IOM Morocco[45] focuses on three main thematic issues:

- **Migration and Development:** understanding the links between migration and development in order to harness the development potential in countries of origin and to contribute to sustainable development and poverty reduction in those countries.
- **Direct Assistance to Migrants:** the main objective is to provide humane and dignified assistance to migrants in need and victims of trafficking.
- **Youth Support and Social Development:** offering alternatives to young and marginalized Moroccans particularly prone to irregular immigration.

43. Mainly in the areas of social, financial, medical and legal assistance; the provision of safe houses; and vocational training and job placement. **44.** For example, a system has been established for the referral of asylum seekers from Oujda to Rabat where civil society actors inform potential asylum seekers about the asylum process and then put them in touch with UNHCR if they wish to initiate one. By November 2014, 22 cases were referred from Oujda. **45.** http://www.iom.int/countries/morocco/general-information

Image 9: Nigerian migrants in Nador, Morocco (Altai Consulting)

THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN ROUTE



Figure 16: Detected irregular border crossings, Central Mediterranean route, 2008-2014



➤ **The Central Mediterranean route** refers to the mixed migratory flow coming **from Northern Africa to Italy and Malta.** Libya has traditionally been a major transit point for sub-Saharan and West African migrants along this route and the main departure point for crossing the Mediterranean. However, Egypt has become an increasingly significant transit and departure point in more recent times.

➤ The following section will examine the Central Mediterranean route by exploring the recent trends in the five relevant countries in terms of the profiles of the migrants on the route and the push and pull factors of migration; the main routes of travel and the conditions of the journey these migrants undertake; and an outline of the main programs and actors along the route (assistance programs and strategies for migration management). It builds upon the findings of the “Mixed Migration: Libya at the Crossroads” study conducted by Altai Consulting for UNHCR Libya in 2013 by focusing on how the situation has evolved in the central Mediterranean since then.

THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN ROUTE

1. PROFILES AND PUSH AND PULL FACTORS

1.1 RECENT TRENDS

1.1.1 Libya

The renewed political instability in Libya that began in mid-2014 (referred to henceforth as the Libyan crisis of 2014) created a number of changes to the environment for migrants in the country, the protection space for asylum seekers and, ultimately, the characteristics of the flows entering and departing Libya. This section provides an update on the situation in Libya today by building on findings made in 2013 in the 'Mixed Migration: Libya at the Crossroads study.'[46] For more background information please refer to that study.[47]

Risks and Vulnerabilities

UNHCR Libya reports a number of risks for migrants and asylum seekers during the Libyan crisis of 2014. While during the 2011 crisis, migrants were rumoured to be supporting Gadhafi and his regime, in 2014, rumours linked migrants to particular militia groups. However, this was more commonly the case for Syrian refugees, as opposed to the sub-Saharan migrants and asylum seekers in the country.

Image 10: Migrants in Tripoli's old city (Altai Consulting)

Syrians, and to some extent, Palestinians, were also scapegoated during the 2014 crisis and believed to have been benefiting from the instability by running businesses when Libyans were unable to do so. While Syrians and Palestinians had traditionally benefited from a relatively positive situation in Libya (Syrians and Palestinians enjoyed free access to education and healthcare and a general sympathy for their situation. Moreover, much like Iraqi refugees in Libya, Syrians and Palestinians are rarely detained by DCIM for illegal entry or stay in Libya), this began to change during the 2014 crisis, and in its lead up, and many of these benefits were no longer extended.

For the sub-Saharan migrants and asylum seekers in the country, the protection needs are different and extend beyond just the capital. Arbitrary arrest, harassment and intimidation are particularly rife for these communities. UNHCR Libya reports that members of

46. Altai Consulting/UNHCR Libya **47.** http://www.altaiconsulting.com/library_details/160987

religious minorities are especially at risk and have been targeted, robbed, pressured to leave Libya and in some cases, killed by extremists in the country.

These observations were confirmed by interviews with migrants and asylum seekers in Libya and Italy (by those that arrived in Italy through Libya). One 27-year-old Gambian man interviewed in Italy, explained: *"Libya is all about risk. Everything in Libya is a risk. The migrants are only suffering in Libya. Even five-year old boys say, 'give me money migrant'."* Moreover, in an environment of periodic roundups and arbitrary detention, sub-Saharan Africans are the most vulnerable. Many migrants in our sample also spoke of situations of bonded labour in Libya, or of not being paid for work conducted for Libyan employers; situations in the face of which they have no avenues for redress.

Detention

At the peak of fighting in 2014, as the situation in Tripoli further deteriorated, the Directorate for Combatting Illegal Migration's (DCIM) ability to run the detention centres in the capital was strained (as was DCIMs access to electricity, fuel and water) and so many migrants were released. However, once the situation became somewhat more manageable, normal operations resumed for the DCIM and migrants were once again rounded up and detained. After May 2014, the numbers of migrants boarding boats to Europe continued to increase however (according to IOM Libya: 22,000 people in July and 26,000 people in September), indicating that the release from detention was not causing the increase.

> " I was not safe in Libya. I needed to leave but I felt that if I tried to go back home by travelling back to the southern borders I would suffer again. So I decided to go to Europe instead. "
> Gambian man in Italy, 26.

DCIM has formally advised that as of March 2015, it maintains 18 detention centres in Libya, 15 of which are officially open, although not all of the 15 are holding detainees at present. These detention centres are outlined below in Table 1. On 12 May 2015, DCIM informed UNHCR Libya that the total population of detainees across the 18 detention centres is 4,869 persons, with the largest number of detainees being held in Al Karareem and Al Zawiya, each of which hold more than 1,000 persons.

Interviews with migrants and asylum seekers in Italy, who had come through Libya, suggested that there were also additional detention centres managed by militia groups in Libya. Most actors in the field agree that it is safe to presume that militia groups manage detention centres in Libya in order to create a market for smuggling services. Migrants in our sample spoke of being detained in centres in Al Zuwaya, Misrata, Al Tuwaysha, Sabha, Kufra and Benghazi. UNHCR reports that Al Zuwaya (between Zuwara and Tripoli) has been used increasingly to detain migrants who are rescued at sea by the Libyan Coast Guard. In Benghazi, DCIM has reportedly moved migrants out of Al Kwehfiah detention centre to a facility in Tokla but at the time of writing this had not yet been independently verified by UNHCR or by Altai teams. UNHCR stated that they are not aware of any migrants being held in official DCIM facilities in Al Tuwaysha. Migrants also reported that sometimes they were detained in makeshift centres that were set up in schools and sporting stadiums.

Migrants are detained for indefinite periods of time and they reported that they find their way out of detention either when smugglers are invited in to offer their services for journeys to Europe and migrants can 'buy' their freedom; when they are pushed on to boats while in detention without having paid or expressed an intention to move on to Europe; or when they are 'lent' to someone who needs manual labour and takes a few migrants for a

Table 1: List of migrant detention centres in Libya, under DCIM, as of May 2015

#	Location	Status
1.	Abu Salim, Tripoli	Open
2.	Ain Zara, Tripoli	Open
3.	Al Tuwaysha, Tripoli	Closed
4.	Al Karareem, Misrata	Open
5.	Al Zuwaya	Open
6.	Al Gweyah	Open
7.	Zeliten	Closed (under renovation)
8.	Al Khoms	Open
9.	Sorman	Open
10.	Benghazi	Open
11.	Tobruk	Open
12.	Al Qatrun	Open
13.	Sabha	Open
14.	Ghat	Closed
15.	Sabrata	Open but reportedly empty at present
16.	Kufra	Open
17.	Al Hamra, Gharyan	Open but reportedly empty at present
18.	Abu Rashada, Gharyan	Open

In terms of migrants being put onto boats to Europe while they are in detention without having paid or expressed an intention to move on to Europe, it is not clear who is orchestrating this exactly and for what reason but there a number of possible explanations. There is little to suggest that this is occurring in official DCIM detention centres, so perhaps as the ability of other groups to maintain detention centres becomes strained, they push migrants onto boats instead of releasing them into Libya. There have been reports of Libyans being concerned about the spread of Ebola through sub-Saharan migrants in the country, which may be what causes them to be pushed out via boats to Europe. Such measures are also reminiscent of decisions made by Gadhafi who used migration as a political tool to pressure Europe.

> “ I did not decide to come to Europe, I was put on a boat without having asked. Libyans presumed I wanted to go and as they did not pay me for one of my jobs, they put me on a boat instead to compensate me for my work. ”
> Ivoirian man in Italy, 20.

UNHCR and IOM work with partners within a protection working group in Libya, which also monitors and profiles the fluctuating numbers of detainees across the centres and provides humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable (unaccompanied minors, pregnant women, the disabled, persons with medical needs, etc.) in eight of the 15 centres, after it has been verified that these facilities are indeed under DCIM administration. They report that conditions in detention centers are generally over-crowded, lacking sanitation, and in critical need of essential items for infant children and prenatal care for pregnant women. There are particular concerns for sub-Saharan Africans in detention, particularly in relation to harassment, lack of protection, and the fact that the vulnerable and the minors amongst them are not separated. Moreover, some centres are completely inaccessible by UNHCR and IOM, causing the actors to be particularly concerned about conditions within them.

Outflows from Libya

In terms of outflows from Libya, migrants report a huge migratory pressure to leave the country in the current context: "*When I was in Libya it was everyone's desire to leave. Nobody wants to stay there any longer because it is so unsafe now.*" (Gambian male, 27, interviewed in Italy).

> " When I was in Libya it was everyone's desire to leave. Nobody wants to stay there any longer. Even the people who have been there for 18 years want to leave now because it is so unsafe. The families are going home but most of the young single men are coming to Europe. It is not easy to enter Libya and its not easy to leave Libya. One of my friends was forced by his boss to board a boat to Europe. He worked for him for six months but didn't get paid. Instead he was just forced to get on a boat to Italy for free. "
>
> Gambian man in Morocco, 27.

Some return to their country of origin, but most cross the Mediterranean for Europe or become stranded in Libya. For migrants who are in Tripoli or Benghazi (in the north of the country), to return home would mean traveling through the country to return to its southern borders to be able to cross the Sahara again and travel home. As there are a number of checkpoints throughout the country (established by both state authorities and non-state armed militia groups) and a heightened risk of arbitrary detention in the current instability, most of those interviewed said that they did not nor would not consider returning home in this way. Thus, they are more likely to board boats to Europe from the northern coastline: "*I was not safe in Libya. I needed to leave but I felt that if I tried to go back home by travelling back to the southern borders, I would suffer again so I decided to go to Europe instead.*" (Gambian male, 26, interviewed in Italy)

Moreover, some embassies were closed during the 2014 crisis, making it more difficult for migrants from their countries to seek assistance for a journey home. The closure of embassies also hindered family reunification through regular migration, including private sponsorship, and alternative forms of admission to third countries. This left migrants either stranded in Libya or desperate to leave by taking boats across the Mediterranean.

The opportunities for resettlement through UNHCR are also limited in the current context, primarily by the fact that officials from resettlement countries cannot travel to Libya to conduct interviews. Since January 2014, UNHCR has resettled just under 25 refugees (including several unaccompanied children), who were processed as urgent and emergency cases due to their critical need for a durable solution. Some 246 refugees submitted to the

USA for resettlement prior to 2014 could not be considered, following the suspension of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) selection missions to Libya.

Early in the crisis, some migrants were moving to Tunisia from Libya and from there returning home. However, the Tunisian government was hesitant in welcoming a large inflow of non-Libyan migrants from Libya, as they had done in 2011, mainly out of concerns that it would destabilise their own transition. Eventually, the border between Libya and Tunisia was effectively closed through the imposition of requirements that most migrants could not meet (namely, valid travel documents and proof of onward journey). In some cases, it has been reported that even when migrants did fulfil the requirements, they were still not allowed entry into Tunisia. This further limited the options available to stranded migrants in Libya.

It should be noted that IOM has facilitated assisted returns by plane in safety and dignity for migrants stranded in Libya during the 2014 crisis. The total number of people assisted by 3 February 2015 is presented in Figure 17 according to country of origin. This includes assistance for migrants who were still in Libya, as well as migrants who managed to cross the border to neighbouring countries and asked for IOM assistance in those countries (specifically, Tunisia and Egypt). IOM also supported the resettlement case of eight Libyans that were referred by UNHCR. IOM and UNHCR are now expanding existing information strategies to identify, refer and counsel those who are seeking repatriation rather than onward journey to Europe but may not be aware of assistance available.

Figure 17: Emergency evacuations from Libya by IOM Aug 2014-Feb 2015,



Migrants Communities who Remain in Libya and Stranded Migrants

Those that decide to remain in Libya are typically those that are still in stable employment, which tends to afford them a more secure situation. For example, at the commencement of the crisis in 2014 when there was heavy fighting on the streets, many migrants approached IOM Libya for repatriation. However, by the time their paperwork and logistics were organised, the situation had stabilised to some degree, allowing many to resume working and those that were working again decided to stay. IOM Libya reports that approximately 50 Yemenis had approached them at the initial stages of the crisis with requests for repatriation but by the time their applications had been processed, just over half of them wanted to leave.

Moreover, in 2012/2013, it was found that those in **protracted refugee situations in Libya are very unlikely to board boats to Europe**[48] and it seems that this is still the case as there are very few Palestinians and Iraqis arriving in Europe on boats from Libya.

Extremely vulnerable sub-Saharan migrants and asylum seekers that cannot afford the price of a sea journey to Europe and are too afraid to make the journey through the country to leave via one of its southern borders, or who are too afraid to make the sea crossing also become stranded in Libya. Moreover, they continue to live deep underground, making it difficult for aid organisations and agencies to have access to them in order to be able to assist them (with assisted returns, for example). In 2012 and 2013 it was found that the most vulnerable migrants and asylum seekers in Libya were unlikely to venture out of their homes and to the offices of aid agencies out of their fear of being apprehended by authorities, which made it difficult for aid agencies to have access to them.[49] Interviews with migrants and asylum seekers during this study indicated that these dynamics are even more pronounced in 2014, given the increased instability and the harassment from a greater number of groups and actors (due to the increase in non-state armed militia groups).

As of May 2015, there are 36,868 asylum seekers and refugees registered with the UNHCR in Libya. Of these, 27,964 are refugees, who are presented in Figure 18 according to country of origin, and 8,904 are asylum seekers, as presented in Figure 19.

Figure 18: Refugees registered with UNHCR Libya, per country of origin, May 2015[50]



Data source: UNHCR Libya

48. See "Urban Refugees in Three Libyan Cities" by Altai Consulting/UNHCR Libya, May 2013. **49.** See "Urban Refugees in Three Libyan Cities" by Altai Consulting/UNHCR Libya, May 2013 and "Mixed Migration: Libya at the Crossroads" by Altai Consulting/UNHCR Libya, September 2013. **50.** The 'Other' category refers to sending countries that represented only one refugee each. It includes Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon and Togo.

Figure 19: Asylum seekers registered with UNHCR in Libya according to country of origin (May 2015) [51]



Of the 27,964 refugees registered with UNHCR in Libya, 9,646 are men, 7,569 are women, 10,749 are children (who are accompanied by families), 120 are unaccompanied minors or separated children and 150 are women and girls who are identified by UNHCR as being at risk.[52] Their proportion of the total population of refugees in Libya is presented in Figure 20 below. This figure demonstrates that a good proportion of the refugees registered with UNHCR in Libya are at-risk or vulnerable to being at-risk.

Figure 20: Breakdown of refugee population in Libya according to profile (May 2015)



It is important to mention that the Libyan crisis of 2014 has also generated a community of internally displaced people, which UNHCR Libya estimates to be 394,274 individuals. This estimate, that was provided by UNHCR Libya, was obtained from interviews with local councils and NGOs in Libya in December 2014. This means that refugees and asylum seekers make up 9% of the total population of concern for UNHCR in Libya, as demonstrated by Figure 21.

51. The 'Other' category refers to sending countries that represent a maximum of 2 asylum seekers each. It includes Mali, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia (two asylum seekers each) and Nigeria, Congo, Sierra Leone, Togo, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Egypt, Cameroon, Jordan (one asylum seeker each) as well as two stateless individuals. **52.** For more information on the categorisation of women and girls at risk, please see:http://www.unhcr.org/excom/EXCOM/45339d922.html

Figure 21: Total population of concern in Libya by status (May 2015)



Inflows

While the numbers of migrants boarding boats to Europe from the Libyan coastline has increased, it is difficult to gauge the sizes of the inflows into Libya during the 2014 crisis. However, **anecdotal impressions from a number of actors indicate that the inflows into Libya may have decreased but not ceased.** For example, Agenzia Habeshia[53] believes that Eritrean asylum seekers that are now leaving their country are more likely to stay in Sudan or Ethiopia, instead of moving on to Libya, as they realise that the conflict in Libya, and the even higher levels of abuse that they can potentially suffer in that context, are worse than the risks they may face across the Mediterranean.

In any case, migrants and asylum seekers are still entering the country despite the instability and extreme abuse that they reportedly suffer in the country, which further supports the argument that the pull factors are not as relevant as the push factors. Moreover, it should be noted that Libya has experienced some level of instability since 2011, even prior to the 2014 crisis, and the **migration routes into the country are quite well established** now (further demonstrated in section D.2 on routes) so the routes into Libya are unlikely to cease completely because of the current instability.

Moreover, **the transit routes through Libya are also well established** and within some communities, the number of individuals that arrive in Libya purely to transit through, has increased. This is the case for Syrian refugees, for example.

There are also impressions of smugglers taking advantage of the situation and encouraging migrants to come to Libya now, telling them that now is the best time to board boats to Europe, given the internal instability. This impression is also fed by the fact that there has been an increase in certain nationalities that did not typically arrive in big numbers. For example, the number of Gambians in the flow has increased unexpectedly.

53. http://habeshia.blogspot.in/p/about.html

1.1.2 Egypt

While Egypt also experiences a mixed migratory flow into the country, it tends to be a transit location for the most part of the flow. Few migrants and asylum seekers intimate that they came to Egypt to stay; however, many arrive and realise that the journey to Europe is much harder than they anticipated and end up staying. There are also some migrants and asylum seekers who were pushed into the country by the increased controls along Israel's Sinai Peninsula border with Egypt.

As controls along Israel's Sinai Peninsula border with Egypt increased, Israel became virtually inaccessible to migrants and asylum seekers, causing some East Africans who were originally intending to move to Israel to remain in Egypt instead and to move to other parts of the country from the Sinai until July 2013. They are mainly Eritreans, Sudanese from Darfur, and Ethiopians from Oromo, some of whom were determined to be refugees by UNHCR, including victims of trafficking.[54] There are also some West Africans that entered Egypt though Sinai, but their numbers are low as Egypt does not tend to offer the employment prospects that they seek. There are concerns that the greater controls in the Sinai have also pushed traffickers into other parts of Egypt. In any case, flows through the Sinai became virtually inexistent after July 2013.

Another trend in Egypt over the last few years has been the increase of asylum seekers arriving in the country, the numbers of which doubled between 2011 and 2014. While there are over 130,000 registered Syrian refugees in Egypt as of April 2015, the number of non-Syrian refugees/asylum seekers in Egypt has also continued to grow in the period between 2011 and 2014. According UNHCR, as of April 2015, the population of concern in Egypt was comprised mainly of Syrians (134,089) followed by Sudanese (25,055), Somalis (6,524) and Iraqis (6,449), as presented in Figure 22.

Figure 22: Total population of concern in Egypt, as of April 2015 (UNHCR)



54. With regards to victims of trafficking, since 2010, UNHCR identified and registered 405 individuals, out of which 266 are still registered with UNHCR and the rest have been resettled.

Syrian refugees in Egypt who are registered with UNHCR are mainly from Damascus and rural Damascus (63%). Most did not arrive directly from Syrian Arab Republic but had been living in third countries such as Lebanon and Jordan before moving to Egypt and moved on when resources in those countries became depleted. Most arrived before the change in law in July 2013 when there were no visa requirements for Syrians to enter Egypt. The gender and age breakdown (Figure 23) and places of concentration (Figure 24) of Syrian refugees registered with the UNHCR in Egypt are presented below.

Figure 23: Gender and age breakdown of Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR Egypt, February 2015



Figure 24: Places of concentration of Syrian refugees in Egypt, as of February 2015



Data source (figures 23 and 24): UNHCR Egypt

As the flow of asylum seekers into Egypt has increased, the protection space has decreased, particularly in the case of Syrian refugees. After the overthrow of the Morsi government, requirements for Syrian refugees in Egypt changed. More specifically, as of July 2013 all Syrians in Egypt are required to have an entry visa and a national security clearance. Syrian refugees have since been affected by arbitrary arrest, as well as by deportation and detention for irregular entry into, or departure from, Egypt.

UNHCR Egypt reports that in 2014, 14,291 Syrians were registered by them, of whom only 1,276 arrived with a visa, which means the rest remain at risk of arrest, detention or deportation. From January-April 2015, UNHCR Egypt has registered 2,267 Syrians, out of whom 572 constitute new arrivals. A number of these new arrivals in 2015 appear to have obtained visas due to the residence of family members in Egypt, although the exact basis on which the visa was issued remains unclear. Since 2014, UNHCR has identified 52 cases of Syrian refugees in Egypt (all of whom were registered with the UNHCR) who applied for Egyptian visas for close family members abroad on the basis of family reunification and had their applications rejected. Since January 2015, UNHCR Egypt has recorded five cases of Syrians who arrived by air and were denied entry into Egypt due to the lack of a valid entry visa or the appearance of forged residency permits in their passports and returned to Syrian Arab Republic or to third countries (Lebanon or Turkey).

As socio-economic conditions for asylum seekers in Egypt became increasingly more unfavourable, this led to some refugees departing Egypt irregularly by sea or land in order to seek protection elsewhere. This is mainly because access to livelihoods and basic services has become increasingly elusive for refugees and asylum seekers and many community-based organizations find it increasingly difficult to assist them due to diminishing resources. However, since July 2013, Egypt has also stepped up its efforts to arrest and detain anyone trying to leave the country irregularly.

Image 11: A migrant receiving medical attention after being rescued in the Central Mediterranean (MOAS.eu/Darrin Zammit Lupi)

UNHCR Egypt reports that 3,051 individuals were detained in 2014 for attempting to depart Egypt in an irregular manner by sea. This includes 1,411 Syrians, 451 Palestinians, 448 Sudanese, 39 Eritreans, 113 Somalis and 34 Iraqi nationals. Among those, at least 845 were registered with UNHCR and UNHCR confirms the presence of a minimum of 445 women and 646 children amongst them. Since January 2015, at least 247 individuals (including Syrians, Sudanese, Eritreans, Ethiopians, Somali, Palestinian and Iraqis) remain in detention for attempting to depart Egypt irregularly by sea.[55]

In addition to sea departures, there have also been some departures by land from Egypt to Libya and Sudan. Despite the deterioration of security in Libya, UNHCR has observed small numbers of asylum-seekers and refugees (who are primarily from Sub-Saharan Africa) who had been living in Egypt, attempting to cross the Egyptian-Libyan border in an irregular manner in order to seek protection in Europe by boarding boats from the Libyan coast. UNHCR has also observed a slight increase of irregular departures involving African nationals crossing by land from Egypt to Sudan.

However, since the last quarter of 2014, there has been an increase in the number of releases from detention. UNHCR Egypt confirms that a total of 2,259 individuals who had been arrested for attempting to depart Egypt irregularly by sea have been released since early 2014. According to UNHCR, individuals are generally kept in detention for an average of two to three weeks before being released. Those released are typically individuals who

55. All data provided by UNHCR Egypt

were registered with the UNHCR and profiles tend to be families, children, the elderly and those with immediate relatives in Egypt. From January-April 2015, at least 67 asylum seekers and refugees registered with UNHCR were released from detention in Egypt.

Some of the less pronounced flows into Egypt include irregular sub-Saharan migrants, Asian workers and students of the Al-Azhar university. There are no visa requirements for passport holders from Guinea, which encourages a flow from this country, and in some cases, encourages a market for forged documentation from Guinea. There is also a flow of sub-Saharan Africans who come to study at the Al-Azhar University, which provides them with residency permits. Asian workers in the country tend to be mainly from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. The Bangladeshi embassy estimates that there are 7,000 Bangladeshi migrant workers in Egypt. IOM Egypt reports that there is a trend of domestic workers from these countries arriving on tourist visas and then overstaying their visas, which moves them into an irregular administrative status.

1.1.3 Tunisia

Tunisia is no longer a significant departure point for Europe; today there are more irregular migrants boarding boats for Europe from Egypt than from Tunisia. There are even reports of Tunisians and Moroccans traveling to Libya to board boats to Europe rather than doing so from their own countries, as well as migrants from other third countries (sub-Saharan Africans and Syrians) traveling from Tunisia to Libya to take boats to Europe. Figure 25 charts the number of arrivals in Italy that departed from the Tunisian coast between 2011 and 2014. It presents a downward trend and although there was an increase in absolute terms in 2014, it should be noted that 1,297 departures represents 0.8% of total arrivals in Italy in 2014, whereas in 2013, departures from Tunisia (908 individuals) accounted for 2.1% of arrivals in Italy, and in 2011, 45%.

Figure 25: Number of irregular arrivals in Italy that came from the Tunisian coast 2011-2014

Data source: Italian Ministry of Interior

Figure 26 charts the number of individuals that arrived in Italy on boats that left Tunisia and Libya over 2011-2014. While they experienced almost the same number of departures in 2011, departures from Tunisia progressively decreased, until they accounted for less than 1% of the flow in 2014, and departures from Libya progressively increased until they accounted for 83% of the flows in 2014.

Figure 26: Arrivals in Italy according to departure from Libya and Tunisia 2011-2014



Data source: Italian Ministry of Interior

Tunisia finds itself implicated into the mixed migratory flows through the Central Mediterranean mainly through rescue at sea operations. That is, boats that leave the Libyan coast with the intention of reaching Italy are sometimes rescued by the Tunisian coats guard and disembarked in Tunisia. As has been seen in the case of Malta, Tunisia's involvement in rescue at sea was also influenced by Mare Nostrum, with some migrants who had been picked up by the Tunisian coast guard having been transferred to Italian vessels and disembarked in Sicily under the operation. Figure 27 presents the number of individuals who were rescued at sea in Tunisian waters between September 2012 and November 2014. These figures include 14 VOTs (mainly Nigerian women) and 60 UAMs.

Figure 27: Rescues at Sea in Tunisian waters, from September 2012 to November 2014



Data source: IOM Tunisia

This decrease in boat departures from Tunisia seems to be as a result of a tougher stance against it by the Tunisian government. It has become very difficult for migrants to travel to the coastal regions of the country because there are police checkpoints all throughout and police will stop migrants in the streets and ask to see documentation. That is, **Tunisian authorities have been quite successful in preventing migrants from reaching the coast, rather than focusing on the curtailment of sea departures specifically.** Moreover, leaving Tunisia illegally is considered a crime and punishable by imprisonment.

Tunisia does become affected by the situation in Libya in more ways than one, however. When the situation in Libya deteriorates, there is often a spillover into Tunisia, which happened both at the time of the 2011 crisis and the 2014 crisis. **In 2011, 4500 asylum seekers moved to Tunisia from Libya but in 2014, the stance of the Tunisian government had changed and they were only willing to welcome individuals who had already been registered as refugees by the UNHCR in Libya.** Other non-Libyan migrants who wanted to cross the border from Libya to Tunisia could only do so if they showed a valid passport and proof of a purchased flight from Tunisia to home. The Tunisian government was also more likely to accepted groups of migrants (rather than individuals) and migrants who were supported by their embassies or IOM. The Tunisian government felt that the huge influx of people after the 2011 crisis had been difficult to manage and had led to increased prices and other unfavourable externalities. In 2014, they hoped to avoid such complications in order to be able to focus on their own transition.

There is also a flow of Libyans coming from Libya to Tunisia: the Tunisian Ministry of Interior estimates that there could be as many as 1.5 million Libyans in Tunisia today. Tunisia opened its doors to Libya out of a sense of solidarity or empathy for having experienced a similar transition. Some come and stay for a period of time (Libyan passport holders are able to enter Tunisia for a 90 day period without requiring a visa in advance) but there was also a flow of Libyans coming to Tunisia to fly to Europe due to the closure of airports in Libya.

In some instances, Tunisia also acts as a transit country for migrants and asylum seekers who wish to reach Libya. IOM estimates that 10,000 Syrians entered Tunisia from the Algerian border, on their way to Libya. They tend to fly into Algeria because there are no visa requirements for them and then they take buses to Libya, via Tunisia. This flow has ceased now, however, as Algeria began to require visas from Syrian passport holders in December 2014.

The irregular migrants in Tunisia are mainly sub-Saharans that entered Tunisia regularly as a result of the establishment of the African Development Bank in Tunis but moved into an irregular status over time. More specifically, a number of nationals from countries in sub-Saharan Africa moved to Tunis as employees of the bank and some relocated to Tunis along with domestic workers from their country of origin. When the employees of the African Development Bank returned home in 2014, many of the domestic workers decided to stay on to continue working in Tunisia, irregularly.

Outside of this flow of irregular sub-Saharan migrants, there are also flows of sub-Saharan migrants arriving through the aid of a smuggler (and in some cases, though a trafficker), and flows of migrants that gain visas on arrival[56] but end up overstaying these visas. According to IOM Tunisia, these individuals are particularly vulnerable to exploitation and trafficking into forced labour, domestic work, or sexual exploitation. There is also a market for forged passports from countries that are granted visas on arrival in Tunisia, for migrants from other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, for ease of passage into Tunisia.

The most sizeable group of migrants in the country, however, are of North African origins. Moroccan, Algerian and Libyan passport holders can enter Tunisia without visa requirements and stay for 90 days but residency and employment requires permits. There is a trend of these communities entering regularly but overstaying and becoming irregular, particularly Algerians and Moroccans.

56. Nationals from Niger, Senegal, Guinea, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana and Liberia do not require visas in advance.

Figure 28 sets out the country of origin of all migrants that were beneficiaries of IOM AVR programs in Tunisia between 2012 and 2014. By making the distinction between beneficiaries who approached IOM upon receiving an unfavourable decision on an asylum claim, beneficiaries who had been rescued at sea (boats that leave the Libyan coast with the intention of reaching Italy are sometimes rescued by the Tunisian coast guard and disembarked in Tunisia), and beneficiaries who found themselves stranded in Tunisia, it sheds some light on **the composition of migrants in the country**. While this data does not allow for any actual conclusions to be drawn, it does suggest certain trends. For example, almost all Nigerians who approached IOM for AVR had been rescued at sea, suggesting a very small community of settled Nigerians in Tunisia, whereas almost none of the Ivoirians had been rescued at sea, suggesting that there may be a more sizable community of Ivoirians living in Tunisia. All of the Gambian, Togolese, Pakistani and Bangladeshi AVR beneficiaries had been rescued at sea.

Figure 28: Countries of origin of migrants assisted by IOM Tunisia for voluntary return, 2012-2014



Data source: IOM Tunisia

1.1.4 Italy

In 2014, Italy experienced a dramatic increase in boat arrivals across the Mediterranean. As demonstrated by Figure 29, the last record had been in 2011, at the time of the Arab Spring, when just under 63,000 arrivals were recorded. In 2014, there were 170,100 arrivals, almost three times the 2011 record.

Figure 29: Number of boat arrivals in Italy 2002-2014



Data source: Italian Ministry of the Interior

Of the 170,100 individuals who arrived by boat in Italy in 2014, Syrians (42,323 arrivals) and Eritreans (34,329 arrivals) together made up 45% of the total number of arrivals. After Syrian Arab Republic and Eritrea, the next five largest sending countries were Mali (9,938), Nigeria (9,000), Gambia (8,707), Palestine (6,082) and Somalia (5,756).[57] Almost half of the Syrians who arrived in Europe in 2014 came through Italy.

While some argue that Italy's Mare Nostrum campaign[58] has caused these larger flows by acting as a pull factor, the reality is that there are a number of push factors that have led to an increase in people on the move towards the North African coast (namely, the Syrian crisis, the crisis in Iraq, and the worsening situation of military conscription in Eritrea) whose passage has been aided by Libya's open doors. Thus, it is hard to isolate the impact of any one of these phenomena. Moreover, at the end of Mare Nostrum there was no decrease in the numbers of arrivals, with over 33,000 arrivals having been reported in Italy by May 2015 (compared to just over 26,000 in the same period in 2014).[59] What is clear, however, is that smugglers did take advantage of Mare Nostrum by using boats that were extremely unsafe on the understanding that the migrants would be rescued by the Italian navy soon after their departure.[60] Interviews with migrants also give the impression that smugglers may have used Mare Nostrum to increase business by telling potential migrants that the fact that the Italian navy would rescue boats in the Mediterranean made it a good time to instigate the journey to Europe by boat.

Figure 30 presents boat arrivals in Italy according to country of origin between 2012 and 2014. As can be seen, **the composition of migrants changed quite significantly** over the three years presented. 2013 and 2014 saw a large increase in Syrians (from 11,307 in 2013 to 42,323 in 2014) and Eritreans (from 9,834 in 2013 to 34,329 in 2014), in terms of their proportion of all boat arrivals. Somalis, in terms of their proportion of all boat arrivals, decreased over the three years from 17% in 2012 (and the second most prominent sending country with 2,179 arrivals) to 8% in 2013 (moving to the third most prominent sending country with 3,263 arrivals) to 3% in 2014 (moving to the 7th most prominent sending country with 5,756 arrivals). Other nationalities of notable increase include Gambia and Mali.

Figure 30: Boat arrivals in Italy according to country of origin (2012-2014)



57. Source: Italian Ministry of the Interior **58.** See Focus box 9 on page 69 for more information on Mare Nostrum **59.** Source: Data provided by UNHCR Italy. See also http://missingmigrants.iom.int **60.** See Frontex Annual Risk Analysis for 2015



Data source: Italian Central Directorate for Immigration and Border Police

2014 also saw an increase in the number of individuals who arrived by sea in Italy and claimed Palestinian nationality; by year's end their number totalled 6,082 (compared to 1,075 in 2013). This includes Palestinians who were living in Syrian Arab Republic as well as Palestinians from Gaza. It is believed that in the last months of 2014, the number of Palestinians arriving from Gaza increased significantly, although the total number is not known.[61]

Another significant trend in 2014 relates to departure points for boat arrivals in Italy. Libya is still the most common departure point, with over 80% of boat arrivals in Italy in 2014 having departed from the Libyan coast, but boat departures from Egypt and Turkey did also increase in 2014. The number of individuals who had departed from Egypt increased from 1,401 in 2012 to 15,283 in 2014, accounting for almost 9% of all boat arrivals. Towards the end of 2014, the number of Syrians arriving in Italy from Turkey also increased. This is described in greater detail in section 2, "Main Routes of Travel and the Conditions of the Journey."

According to actors in the field, a significant number of those that came through Libya did not want to leave but ended up doing so when the security situation became unbearable. Interviews with migrants also revealed that many journeyed to Libya to find work there but were pushed out by their poor treatment, as further explained in section 1.1.1 "Libya."

Focus Box 8: The Global Initiative on Protection at Sea

UNHCR's Global Initiative on Protection at Sea is an initial two year plan of action, launched in 2014, that aims to support states to act to:

- Reduce the loss of life at sea, as well as exploitation, abuse and violence experienced by people travelling irregularly by sea, and
- Establish protection-sensitive responses to irregular mixed migration by sea.

In order to achieve these objectives, UNHCR cooperates with states; private actors, civil society, and international agencies such as the International Maritime Organisation, IOM, OHCHR, UNICEF and UNODC.

61. http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/news-and-views/press-briefing-notes/pbn-2014b/pbn-listing/mediterranean-irregular-migrants.html

In 2014, the number of applications for asylum, as a proportion of the total number of irregular arrivals, decreased in comparison to previous years. However, it is difficult to draw any implications from this in terms of the proportion of the flow that are irregular migrants and those that are asylum seekers as most of the Syrians and Eritreans that arrived in Italy in 2014 do not appear in the asylum statistics because they left Italy for other European destinations contrary to the Dublin Regulation. Popular destinations continue to be Germany and Sweden. Considering the high number of Syrians and Eritreans who arrived in Italy, their presence in centres in Italy is surprisingly low.

Figure 31 charts the number of applications for asylum between 1999 and 2014 as well as the number of irregular arrivals by boat over the same period. In some years, the number of asylum applications is greater than the number of boat arrivals because, while they are the majority, not all asylum seekers who arrive in Italy come by boat across the Mediterranean. Moreover, asylum applications in any given year are sometimes made by those who had been living in Italy for some years before deciding to apply for asylum and, in a limited number of cases (mainly in the case of Syrians) asylum applications are made by those who arrived regularly. Nonetheless, it does demonstrate a surprisingly low number of applications for asylum in 2014, considering the total number of arrivals.

Figure 31: Total number of irregular arrivals by boat and applications for asylum in Italy 1999-2014



Data source: UNHCR Italy and Italian Ministry of Interior

Unaccompanied Minors

The arrival of unaccompanied minors (UAMs) who arrive in Italy by boat continues to increase in 2014, as well as children arriving with families. In 2014, the UAMs who arrived by boat in Italy were predominately Eritrean and the children who arrived by boat with families were predominately Syrian. There were also a good number of sub-Saharan UAMs in the boat arrival statistics, mainly from countries such as Mali, Nigeria, Gambia, Ghana and Senegal. Egypt was the second most prominent sending country when it came to UAMs, however.

Eritrean UAMs who arrived on Italian shores in 2014 totalled 3,380. There were also 777 Eritrean minors who arrived with families. The trend for these UAMs tends to be to view Italy as a transit country and they generally move north once they are in Europe. Their motivations tend to be more than just economic; they are also searching for a way to create a brighter future and in some cases, seeking family reunification.

Egypt constitutes the second most prominent sending country when it comes to UAMs, with 1,965 Egyptian UAMs having arrived on Italian shores in 2014.[62] Egyptian UAMs also account for 48% of the total flow of Egyptian boat arrivals in Italy in 2014 (total number of Egyptians arriving by boat in Italy in 2014 was 4,095). It seems that Egyptians are more likely to send their young boys to Europe, as they know that they cannot be sent back until they are of age, and since Egyptians do not generally qualify for asylum, this seems to be their best avenue for creating a foothold in Europe. Italy tends to be the final destination for Egyptian UAMs who come to work and send money back to their families (particularly to repay the debt that their families owe to smugglers who assisted them in their transit, at least initially).

Syrian children tend to arrive with families, with approximately 9,000 having reached Italy in 2014. There were also 925 Syrian UAMs that arrived in Italy in 2014.

1.1.5 Malta

In 2014, Malta saw a large decrease in boat arrivals. As demonstrated by Figure 32 below, the average per year, since 2002, has been 1500 individuals, with some years experiencing a significantly lower number of arrivals (2003 and 2010) and some years significantly higher (2008). In 2014, there were only 568 arrivals and this was mainly due to the effects of Mare Nostrum (see Focus box 9 overleaf). Under this operation, the Italian navy was disembarking in Sicily and there had been no discussion of disembarkation in Malta, leading to a large decrease of arrivals for Malta.

Figure 32: Number of boat arrivals in Malta 2002-2014



Data source: Maltese Immigration police

Other than the decrease in numbers, there were a few other trends that emerged in 2014. One is the **increase in flows overland, particularly in the case of Libyans who are flying into Malta and seeking asylum.** There has also been a flow of Syrians flying into Malta (251 people in 2014), but the majority of those coming overland are Libyan (418 in 2014).

62. There were also 26 Egyptian minors who arrived with families in the same period.

Focus Box 9: Protection at Sea in the Mediterranean

Operation Mare Nostrum was launched by the Italian government on October 18, 2013. It aimed to increase maritime safety in the Central Mediterranean by providing more timely rescue of boats in distress, robust medical support at sea and greater effort to identify and prosecute the smugglers responsible. It came as a response to the increase in migrant deaths at sea in the Central Mediterranean in the second half of 2013. It was closed on October 31, 2014, to make way for a smaller EU rescue mission called Triton, overseen by the European border control agency, Frontex.

For Mare Nostrum, the Italian Navy deployed an average of 1,000 sailors at sea per day and five warships on permanent patrol in the waters between Sicily and North Africa, backed up by two submarines, two helicopters, five aircrafts and drone surveillance. The operation encompassed 50,000 patrolling hours and a monthly cost of 9 million euro for the Italian government (forming a total budget of 114 million euros, 30 million of which came from the European Commission).

During Mare Nostrum's one-year duration, the Italian Navy rescued over 160,000 people and seized nine smuggler mother-ships, which allowed them to gather evidence against smugglers. Consequently, 330 alleged smugglers were brought to justice.

While Mare Nostrum has been criticised for acting as a pull factor by inadvertently encouraging more migrants to attempt the dangerous sea crossing through the guarantee that they would be rescued in the middle of the Mediterranean, the large increase in flows through the Mediterranean is more likely to have been caused by the many instances of conflict in the immediate neighbourhood, such as in Libya, Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq, Central African Republic, and South Sudan. Moreover, the end of Mare Nostrum did not lead to a decrease in the flows.

By comparison, Triton's assets included seven vessels, one helicopter, four aircrafts and 65 officers. While 21 EU countries are contributing to Triton, the mission is limited to patrolling the waters within 30 nautical miles from the Italian coast and focuses on border control more than search-and-rescue operations. It has an estimated cost of 2.9 million euros a month.

In April 2015, however, after almost 900 migrants lost their lives in the Mediterranean in one weekend, EU member states agreed to triple the resources available to Triton, including donating assets to the operation. At the time of writing, Frontex and Italy, Greece, and Malta were also in discussion about expanding Triton's operational scope.

Private initiatives such as the Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) have also been established and contribute to increasing the capacity for search and rescue in the Mediterranean. MOAS's primary aim is to reduce loss of life during dangerous migrant crossings from North Africa to Europe. The initiative is equipped with a 40 metre vessel (the Phoenix), two Remote Piloted Aircraft (Schiebel camcopters), and two RHIBs (Rigid-hulled Inflatable Boats), together with an experienced team of rescuers and paramedics. MOAS supports search and rescue efforts in the Mediterranean by locating vessels in distress, informing the appropriate official Rescue Coordination Centre of such vessels and then assisting as directed or as required by the situation.

Most of the Libyans who flew into Malta came with documents but overstayed their visas and then applied for asylum. Many of them had Schengen visas, which they overstayed somewhere else in Europe and were sent back to Malta because the visa had been issued by the Maltese embassy in Tripoli. Many were granted protection in Malta and UNHCR has created specific guidance on the protection needs of Libyans, which is becoming increasingly important, post the 2014 crisis in Libya, in a few countries in the region (see also Tunisia). **The number of Libyan nationals applying for asylum in Malta has also increased from 345 in 2013 to 418 in 2014.**

There is also a new trend of migrants who have been granted asylum in Italy moving to Malta, either to reunite with family members, or to follow a perception of better job prospects (which is partly true, considering the unemployment rates in the two countries). While they arrive in the country regularly, many do eventually overstay their visas and some end up working without permits in Malta.

In 2014, there continues to be an upward trend in terms of the number of children arriving by boat. In 2013, of the 2008 people who arrived by boat, 443 were unaccompanied minors (UAMs), which accounts for 22% of the flow. In 2014, while the numbers were lower in general, 28% of arrivals were children (including UAMs and children arriving with families). Traditionally, the countries of origin for unaccompanied minors was Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan. Recently, there has been an increase in Syrian and Libyan unaccompanied minors. In terms of age, there is a continuing trend of younger UAMs arriving.

Image 12: Eritrean asylum seeker, Libya (Altai Consulting)

The issue of the detention of irregular arrivals in Malta came under review again in April of 2014 when IOM and UNHCR published a joint technical report on **alternatives to detention for unaccompanied minors in**

Malta.[63] It led to the Government of Malta announcing, shortly after, that they would no longer detain children.

The Maltese government has also indicated that legislative changes to the current detention policy[64] for all arrivals, not just unaccompanied minors, would be implemented by July 2015[65] in order to ensure that the rights of asylum seekers are in line with the new EU Reception Directive (Dublin III).[66] The recast Dublin directive states that detention is only permissible if the person poses a significant risk of absconding in order to carry out a transfer and that detention is permissible only after less coercive alternatives are first exhausted (Arts 8.1, 8.2). It also implies limitations on the use of detention by stating that access to employment for an asylum seeker must be granted within a maximum period of nine months.

In practice, some changes have already become visible in Malta's detention policy. Currently, families arriving with children are generally not detained and in 2014 were generally only detained for a few days for health checks. Also, many of the adults that arrived irregularly in 2014 were only detained for a few days or weeks. These gradual changes should be formalised in the new policy and revised legislation that the Government of Malta has stated will be implemented by July 2015.

While overall numbers decreased, Syrian Arab Republic became the main country of origin of arrivals in 2014. Although Eritrea is the second most prominent country of origin for all arrivals in Europe in 2014, in Malta, Eritrea is the third most prominent country of origin, after Syrian Arab Republic and Somalia. In the three year period between 2012 and 2014, there was not only a decrease, in absolute terms, in the number of Somalis that arrived on Maltese shores, but the proportion of the entire flow that is comprised by Somalis also decreased from 65% in 2012 to 49% in 2013 to 21% in 2014. These dynamics are presented in Figure 33. Figure 33 also demonstrates that **while in 2012 and 2013 the flow to Malta was predominately comprised of Somalis and Eritreans, the composition of migrants in 2014 became more evenly spread over a greater number of nationalities.**

Figure 33: Country of origin of boat arrivals in Malta as proportion of total flow of boat arrivals 2012-2014



Data source: Maltese Immigration police

63. http://www.unhcr.org.mt/images/stories/unhcr_iom_SUMMARYREPORT.pdf **64.** Current national legislation in Malta indicates that irregular migrants can be detained for up to 18 months and asylum seekers for up to a year. **65.** The new EU Reception Directive must be transposed into national law by all member states by July 2015. **66.** See Focus box 2 on page 31 for more information.

Figure 34 presents arrivals in Malta, according to country of origin, in absolute terms.

Figure 34: Boat arrivals in Malta according to the main countries of origin (2012-2014)



Data source: Maltese Immigration police

In terms of the dynamics of Syrian arrivals in Malta, as has been seen in Italy, many refuse to be fingerprinted on arrival and **many leave Malta and move on to other European destinations through the use of fake documents.** UNHCR Malta reports that there have been cases of Eastern European criminal networks selling fake passports or identity documents to Syrians in Malta. Many of those that attempt to leave Malta with the use of these fake documents have been stopped at the airport or at the ferry ports. This prompts some of them to reluctantly enter the asylum process in Malta but some continue trying to leave until they are successful. Some were arrested and imprisoned in Malta due to their use of fake documents. As the Syrians tend to have greater economic resources when compared to arrivals from other countries of origin, they tend to move on from Malta within days or weeks, whereas for the others, it can take some months before they have the means to do so.

Interviews with the Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers (AWAS) in Malta revealed that these dynamics are quite problematic for them: "*From the perspective of a service provider, this is complex: you have a humanitarian disaster but the persons coming out of that disaster who are saved in Malta, are not using the instruments that are available for their protection.*"

In terms of the **profiles of the Syrians arriving in Malta**, there is a good mix of those who were in Libya for some time before deciding to cross the Mediterranean,[67] those who had spent some time in Egypt and other neighbouring countries before departing for Europe via Libya, and those that only passed through Libya to make their way to Europe.

As Malta is a small country, the reception of arrivals has been challenging over the years, especially when the number of arrivals was higher. Realistically, Malta can accommodate 2,500 people in its open centres. While the government is planning to increase its facilities, if the flows increase, Malta will require assistance in terms of

67. Usually due to a mix of both realising that the situation at home was not going to improve anytime soon, contrary to initial beliefs, and realising the need to move on to a destination that can provide conditions for settling into a new life and the deteriorating security situation in Libya.



Data source: UNHCR Malta

that they ever intended to settle in Europe and indicates that if they were able to find the same opportunities in their home country, they probably would never have left.

One 34 year old Nigerian man also explained the pull factors to Europe by also citing the factors that pushed him out of his own country: *"When the people in Europe tell me that their fathers or governments are bad, I shed a tear and tell them they don't know what paradise they are living in. They don't know what we live in Africa- this is why people risk their lives to come here. Here I see that there are equal rights. The way people treat me is with respect even though I am black. I ask myself, if the white man can treat me like this, a black man, an immigrant, then how must they be treating each other? If you want to stop people from risking their lives to come to Europe, you need to change the governments in Africa, establish the rule of law, give people a life in their own countries."*

Mare Nostrum has often been cited, and even criticised, for being a pull factor that encourages more migrants to move to the Libyan coast. However, while it is undeniable that Mare Nostrum has, to some extent, enabled the safe journey of migrants who were crossing the Mediterranean, most of them would have made the journey regardless. Migrants expressed that they moved to Libya because they felt that Libya's doors were open, not because of Mare Nostrum. This, along with the various crises in the region (Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq, Eritrea) led to the increased flows. Mare Nostrum made their journey from Libya to Italy safer so it allowed smugglers to organise boat journeys in greater numbers and so may have affected the increased arrivals in that way, by facilitating the journey between Libya and Italy, but not by pulling the migrants to Libya to begin with. Moreover, since the end of Mare Nostrum, the number of migrants on boats that departed the Libyan coast has increased (with over 33,000 arrivals having been reported in Italy by May 2015, compared to just over 26,000 in the same period in 2014),[68] which further supports the idea that Mare Nostrum was not the pull factor.

Image 13: Migrant living quarters, Tripoli (Altai Consulting)

68. Source: Data provided by UNHCR Italy

- The route through Chad to Sabha;
- The routes through Niger, which either take migrants north and directly into Libya or via Algeria;
- The route from Egypt to Libya, via Salloum (although flows are limited now).

While Libya, Sudan and Egypt stepped up their joint operations in February 2014, it is unclear how much of an effect this has had on the flows coming to the North African coast from the Horn of Africa via Khartoum. However, UNHCR Egypt did observe a slight increase of irregular departures from Egypt to Sudan by land in 2014, mainly involving African nationals.

Egyptian authorities stepped up their controls along the Salloum border (between Libya and Egypt) in 2014, mainly out of concern that weapons would be smuggled over the border, but there is anecdotal evidence that some Syrians still passed from Egypt to Libya with the provision of bribes. UNHCR Egypt has also observed small numbers of sub-Saharan African asylum-seekers and refugees who had been living in Egypt, attempting to cross the Egyptian-Libyan border in an irregular manner in order to seek protection in Europe by boarding boats from the Libyan coast. This is most likely in response to worsening socio-economic conditions for asylum seekers and refugees in Egypt and despite the worsening instability in Libya and increased controls along the Libyan/Egyptian border. There have also been reports of migrants (as well as Egyptian nationals) moving from Egypt to Libya with the intention of boarding boats to Europe but coming back to Egypt because Libya was so dangerous for them in mid-2014.

The coastal flow from Salloum (Egypt) to Libya by boat has seen a decrease in activity in 2014 due to the greater controls at Salloum. This is a route that emerged in 2013 where mainly Sudanese nationals would fly to Cairo and then move to the Libyan/Egyptian border at the Salloum border post. From there they would take boats from the Egyptian port that is closest to the Libyan border and travel by sea to Bardiyah or other Libyan coastal towns that are also very close to the border. By moving by sea from the Egyptian coastline to the Libyan coastline on either side of the Salloum border, they were often able to avoid border authorities.[70] However, there was very little movement of this manner observed in 2014.

There has also been a flow from Libya to Egypt. As discussed above, over 2013 and 2014 there have been various periods of increased boat departures from Egypt, often in response to poorer conditions in Libya (see Figure 37 and Figure 38). While the flow from Libya to Egypt was mainly comprised of Syrians (who were also the most prominent group on boats to Europe from Egypt), there are also impressions that the flows from Libya to Egypt included Egyptians and sub-Saharans trying to find their way home. Flows from Libya to Egypt became almost non-existent by the end of 2014.

A new route also emerged from Tunisia to Libya, which was mainly followed by Syrian refugees who would fly into Algeria (where they faced no visa requirements until December 2014) and then travel to Libya by bus, via Tunisia. This has now ceased, as Algeria now requires visas from Syrian passport holders.

70. For more information see section V.2.6.1 of "Mixed Migration: Libya at the Crossroads" (Altai Consulting/UNHCR Libya, 2013): http://www.altaiconsulting.com/library_details/160987

In 2013, there was also a **flow of Syrian refugees who would arrive by air into Tripoli** and then make onward journey to Europe by sea. Airflows into Libya decreased, however, following the 2014 crisis, particularly with the closure of the main airport in the capital. UNHCR Libya reports that there are now flows of Syrians flying into Libya again, usually from Jordan, with onward passage by sea to Europe organised in advance.

Image 14: Rescue at sea operations in the Mediterranean (MOAS)

During the 2014 crisis in Libya, there were also **movements from Libya to Tunisia,** which included Tunisians returning home as well non-Libyan migrants from Libya. IOM Tunisia reports that over July and August of 2014 there were sometimes up to 6,000 people per day moving over the border from Libya to Tunisia. The migrants were mainly sub-Saharan Africans escaping the conflict in Libya and most of these migrants simply transited through Tunisia on their way home. As explained in the section on Tunisian trends (1.1.5), the Tunisian government was hesitant in welcoming the flows and so at some point, the border became effectively closed. Non-Libyan migrants needed to present valid travel documents and proof of onward journey and were only permitted to stay in Tunisia for 72 hours. These requirements greatly curtailed the inflows and thereby limited the possibilities for stranded migrants in Libya to return home.

2.2 ROUTES FROM NORTH AFRICA TO EUROPE

As discussed previously, **2014 witnessed an increase in the number of departure points from North Africa to Europe along the Central Mediterranean route.** While the majority of departures in 2014 occurred from the Libyan coast (83%), there were also departures from Tunisia and Egypt. These are presented in Map 9.

2.2.3 Secondary Movements in Europe

The majority of Syrians and Eritreans who arrived in Italy through the Central Mediterranean route left Italy undetected for other European destinations. Most of the Syrians indicate that they would like to go to Germany, but Sweden and the Netherlands are often mentioned too. Syrians tend to be following networks (there is a very large Syrians Kurdish community in Germany) but Germany has also developed a reputation for offering better reception and integration procedures for refugees and presents more favourable economic conditions and employment rates compared to other European countries.

Syrians tend to move quite quickly, within days of their arrival, with friends and family and with the assistance of smugglers. Milan is usually their first destination as this is where they connect with smugglers who move them to other parts of Europe.

In October of 2014, European authorities stepped up operations to detect these irregular movements and there are now joint operations between the Italian and Swiss authorities at border locations with detected migrants and asylum seekers being pushed back. Dublin III (see Focus box 2 on page 24) now allows returns to port of arrival without fingerprints.

2.3 THE DYNAMICS OF MIGRANT SMUGGLING IN 2014

This section looks at the dynamics of smuggling across the Central Mediterranean with a particular focus on how dynamics have shifted over the last two years.

2.3.1 Tthe Marketing of Smuggling Services

The large increase in flows through the Central Mediterranean, the change in the composition of the migrants that comprise this flow (for example, the introduction of a population with greater economic means, such as the Syrians) and the effects of Mare Nostrum led to some deliberate changes to the dynamics of smuggling in this region in 2014. One of the most pronounced was a **greater focus on the marketing of smuggling services, particularly on social media, and the targeting of different groups of migrants through different packages of services.**

A number of Facebook pages appeared over 2013 and 2014 that not only advertised smuggling services and provided information about prices and departure points but also facilitated the organisation of the logistics required for travel. That is, these pages set out specific prices for specific routes of travel, they set out the steps that would need to be taken at each point along the way, and also posted updates on weather conditions and boat departures. Many of these pages had over 50,000 likes per day and uploaded pictures and information updates daily. A number of agencies were often able to follow the departure of boats and monitor for their safe arrival through information gleaned from such pages.

Around October and November 2014, when Mare Nostrum came to a close, there was evidence of blatant marketing on the part of smugglers on Facebook. There were many pictures posted of comfortable and safe journeys across the Mediterranean with the message being that although Mare Nostrum was ending, there was no need to worry as migrants would still be delivered safely to their destination.

With the increased dedication to marketing also came the development of "packages" to suit different migrants with different economic means. As Syrians have relatively better economic means as compared to the sub-Saharans moving along the Central Mediterranean route, and a relatively greater number of options available to them (given their status as refugees, their passports which still allow them to fly into certain countries, and the ability to choose from a greater number of routes as compared to say, migrants from the Horn of Africa), there developed amongst smugglers a sense of needing to present an enticing package in order to capture the business of Syrians. For example, Syrians would be sold "safer" journeys for an increased price. A safer journey normally entailed a life jacket and a place on the upper deck of the vessel. Sub-Saharan migrants would be routinely accommodated in the lower decks where cases of asphyxiation were common and where they would be the first to drown if the boat went into distress. Some Palestinian refugees who moved from Gaza to Malta spoke of having been through a process similar to having purchased a packaged journey from a travel agent.

There have also been reports of smugglers selling journeys to particular parts of Europe, not just Italy, for a higher price. That is, once the migrant arrives in Italy, he/she is put in touch with someone in the smuggler's network there who then facilitates his/her onward journey to other parts of Europe. The advantages and disadvantages of the various European countries, from the perspective of migration and asylum, are also compared on the Facebook pages in order to assist migrants in their decision regarding final location.

2.3.2 Conditions of Journey

Since the launch of Mare Nostrum, smugglers began to use vessels that were obviously too small or not seaworthy on the assumption that they would be picked up by the Italian navy soon after departure, thereby making the journey far more dangerous than it had ever been. While Mare Nostrum demonstrated a mammoth effort in terms of the total number of lives it saved at sea, the Mediterranean does span a very large area meaning it is still possible for some migrant boats to fall into distress undetected.

Moreover, throughout the duration of Mare Nostrum, there were reports of s**mugglers joining migrants on boats to Europe** and disembarking once Italian navy vessels were in sight (by way of a small dinghy). They would then remain close by until all the migrants had been transferred to the navy vessel, after which time, they would recover the boat so that they could re-use it. There are also reports of smugglers switching migrants to smaller and smaller boats the further they go out to sea for the same reason.

2.3.3 Prices and the Economics of Smuggling

While previously it was possible to price the various routes in standard ways, today the price of a particular route, or segment of the journey, depends on the nationality of the migrant paying for it and the level of service the migrant is willing to pay for. Moreover, the crisis in Libya in 2014 and the consequent multiplicity of actors vying for power and control, has led to different clans and tribes offering different prices for smuggling routes. Thus, the price paid also depends on the smuggling ring a migrant comes into contact with.

From a purely economic perspective, this has benefited sub-Saharan African migrants who are now paying less for the same journeys. This is both because there are more migrants on the route, and because Syrian refugees have greater economic resources, both of which translate into greater income for smugglers. There have been reports of middle-class Syrians paying as much as 2,000 euro for a place on a boat to Europe. Frontex reports that the value to a boat intercepted in September 2014 in the Central Mediterranean, which had 450 people

was calculated at 1 million euro.[72] In Egypt, there were also reports of a group of Syrians who were trying to move to Italy by boat having paid USD$3,000 each for the journey. Palestinian refugees from Gaza had also reported paying as much as USD$2,000 for a journey to Europe.

Another development in this regard is the 'purchase' of journeys from country of origin all the way to Europe. While previously migrants were inclined to make the journey in steps, sometimes stopping in countries along the way to make money for the next leg, and changing smugglers frequently at different points of the journey, there is a new trend emerging of paying for the entire journey at origin and being led all the way through. This was particularly perceivable amongst Eritrean migrants and is presumably facilitated by the lower prices now being demanded.

2.4 KIDNAPPING AND TRAFFICKING

2014 experienced a large increase in the arrival of victims of trafficking (VOTs) in Italy: the number of women who arrived irregularly by boat in Italy and who had been identified by officials to have been trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation, increased by 300% when compared to arrivals in 2013.

The impression is that the increase has been encouraged by the situation in Libya; that is, Libya is open and so there is a lot of money to be made by traffickers. Some actors in Italy also felt that there is a demand for the women in Europe (not just Italy, and not all of them stay in Italy), which also encourages the flow.

Focus Box 10: Human Trafficking at Law

Article 3, paragraph (a) of The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons defines trafficking in Persons as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

Nigerian women continued to account for most of the increase in the arrival of trafficked women on Italian shores in 2014, but there was also an increase in the numbers of trafficked Cameroonian women. Some actors in the field doubt whether these women are actually Cameroonian and feel that they might be Nigerians who claim Cameroonian nationality in order to avoid the scrutiny of the authorities that are looking for Nigerian women. However, it should be noted that during the same period, Morocco also experienced an increase in the number of trafficked Cameroonian women, a phenomenon that was verified by Cameroonian community leaders, which would suggest that trafficking amongst Cameroonian women is, in fact, on the rise.

72. http://frontex.europa.eu/feature-stories/people-smugglers-the-latter-day-slave-merchants-UArKn1

The Italian authorities have made considerable efforts to address the situation. Trafficking often entails an organised network where there is a nexus between the people that organised it at origin and the people at destination. For this reason, it comes under the National Anti-Mafia Directorate in Italy and law enforcement agents in the area of Palermo (Sicily) have been trained specifically in dealing with trafficking crimes.

Image 15: Rescue operation in the Mediterranean (MOAS.eu/Darrin Zammit Lupi)

Often by the time the VOTs arrive in Italy, they have experienced so much abuse in Libya that they are already aware of the fate that awaits them in Europe. VOTs are also subjected to much abuse and intimidation on arrival in Italy, which means they become too afraid to escape and it is almost impossible to extract them or even identify them. For this reason, authorities try to identify VOTs at the border when they first arrive. Extricating VOTs earlier in the journey has also proved problematic, as it has been challenging for Italy to elicit the cooperation of transit countries.

IOM Italy has done considerable work with VOTs since 2007, which has resulted in the development of specific indicators to help them detect VOTs. They have observed that most VOTs in Italy come from rural areas close to Benin City in Nigeria, tend to be 22 years old or younger (most of them being minors), and quite innocent. They always have a very basic level of education and either come from very large families or are orphans. Most VOTs believed that they were coming to Italy to do domestic work but even those that realised that they would be forced into prostitution were not aware of the level of exploitation that they would be exposed to. Most VOTs believed that they would make much more money than they actually do, which is generally common for all migrants, not just the VOTs, and most were not aware of the modalities of their prostitution (they did not realise they would be soliciting on the street, for example).

The Italian government has developed advanced mechanisms for the protection of VOTs. Once someone has been identified as a VOT (usually by specialised institutions and service providers), they are granted a residence permit for six months, which is transferrable into a work permit once the individual moves into paid employment.

3. MAIN PROGRAMS AND ACTORS

This section explores the main activities of UNHCR and IOM in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Italy and Malta. It should be noted that in each location a host of civil society organisations, NGOs, government bodies and institutions are also involved in the provision of services to migrants and asylum seekers/refugees and in the management of mixed migration flows through these countries.

3.1 EGYPT

3.1.1 IOM

IOM Egypt supports the Government of Egypt and other relevant actors to govern migration in a manner that effectively maximises the positive impact on Egypt while minimizing potential costs on migrants and society. The three main program streams for IOM in Egypt that are relevant to the subject of this report are AVRR, direct assistance to migrants, and counter-trafficking.

In terms of migrant assistance, the Migrant Assistance Division (MAD) at the IOM Country Office in Egypt provides direct assistance to vulnerable migrants and victims of trafficking, with the overall objective of ensuring the dignity and well being of migrants in need. This includes migrants with health concerns, as well as individuals who are vulnerable to abuse such as the elderly, unaccompanied migrant children and stranded migrants.

Such assistance is provided in coordination with partner organizations and comprises of:

- Counseling and health care upon identification;
- Financial assistance to cover housing and food;
- Non-food Items (hygiene & dignity kits, underwear, clothes, and blankets) and food items;
- Accommodation in the regional shelter for VOTs;
- Legal assistance to allow VOTs to pursue criminal charges against traffickers in accordance with Egypt's Counter-Trafficking Law 64/2010.

IOM believes that Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) services are an indispensable part of a holistic approach to migration governance. These programs facilitate the orderly and humane return and reintegration of migrants who are unable or unwilling to remain in host countries and wish to return voluntarily to their countries of origin. For such migrants, AVRR programs are often their sole source of relief.

Beneficiaries of IOM Egypt's AVRR programs include individuals whose application for asylum has been rejected or withdrawn, stranded vulnerable migrants, victims of trafficking and other vulnerable groups, including unaccompanied migrant children, or those with health-related needs. As part of reintegration assistance, IOM and its partners provide migrants with socio-economic support to promote their self-sufficiency, and, to allow them to contribute to their local communities. In most cases, post-return monitoring is also provided to returnees in order to ensure the sustainability of their return.

In response to migrant smuggling and human trafficking into and through Egypt, towards Libya and Europe, IOM Egypt supports governmental efforts to reform the current legal framework on the smuggling of migrants. In March 2014, the Government of Egypt set up the inter-ministerial "National Coordinating Committee

to Combat and Prevent Illegal Migration" (NCCPIM). In addition, and subsequent to the promulgation of Law 64/2010 on Combating Trafficking in Persons to which IOM provided expert review, IOM supports the National Coordinating Committee on Combating and Preventing Trafficking in Persons (NCCTIP). As part of its cooperation with NCCPIM and NCCTIP, IOM provides technical support and capacity building to address irregular migration and ensure the protection and assistance of vulnerable migrants.

3.1.2 UNHCR

UNHCR is conducting **refugee status determination (RSD)** in Egypt on behalf of the national government and in its programs, focuses on: access to education, livelihoods, access to health, protection, access to residency, and the resettlement of VOTs in conjunction with IOM.

UNHCR is also **advocating the Egyptian government** for the release from detention of asylum seekers and refugees, access to detention centres for the determination of needs and non-refoulement.

UNHCR, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) and IOM have a joint and coordinated response to the detention of migrants in detention. UNHCR assesses protection needs, IOM provides medical assistance, and MSF provides non-medical assistance.

Other **UNHCR partners in Egypt** include: Arab Council for Supporting Fair Trials and Human Rights, Arab Medical Union, Care International/USA, Caritas, Catholic Relief Services, Central Association for Kindergarten's Supervisor's League, Danish Refugee Council, Egyptian Foundation for Refugee Rights, ICMC, Dr. Mostafa Mahmoud Society, Refuge Egypt, Refuge Point, Resala Association, Save the Children, Terre Des Hommes – Psycho-Social Services and Training Institute in Cairo, Tadamon, AOHR.

3.2 LIBYA

3.2.1 IOM

IOM has been running three ongoing projects in Libya. In addition to ongoing AVRR programs from Libya, IOM also participates in the **START program** (see Focus box 11) under which they target the following objectives:

- Support the Libyan Government to assess and address labour market gaps through human capital development and regular migration;
- Support the Libyan Government to review and strengthen migration-related policies and legislation and enhance national capacities to manage migration flows and uphold the human rights of migrants;
- Enhance Regional dialogue and improve coordination between the Libyan Government and neighbouring countries;
- Improve access to essential services (such as healthcare) amongst Libyans and migrants in vulnerable and conflict-affected areas and strengthen the capacities of government and non-governmental service providers to cope with future migration flows.

The third project is supported by the US Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. It supports migrants in detention centres in Libya by supporting vulnerable migrants, developing a system for biometric data, and developing the capacity of immigration officials at the centres on how to use such data, amongst other things.

Focus Box 11: IOM's START program

Funded by the European Union (EU) and implemented by IOM, the START (Stabilizing at-risk communities and enhancing migration management to enable smooth transitions in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya), Project commenced on 01 January 2012. Under this comprehensive programme, IOM supports the Governments of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya to stabilize at-risk communities and enhance migration management – helping to establish preconditions to smooth transition processes and sustainable recoveries in the three target countries.

IOM also provides **psycho-social support to detained migrants** in three centres in Tripoli, Misrata and Benghazi and also supports a network of NGOs to provide such support.

During the Libyan crisis of 2014, IOM also organised evacuation and repatriation for stranded migrants. A total of 373 migrants were assisted in this way between August 2014 and February 2015 (see Figure 17 on page 58).

3.2.2 UNHCR

Despite the Libyan crisis of 2014, UNHCR Libya continues to provide services for asylum seekers and refugees, mainly through local partners.

Through an implementing partner, UNHCR maintains community development centres in Tripoli and Benghazi, both of which provide assistance to persons of concern to support access to livelihoods, education, health care, safe shelter, and humanitarian relief items, as well as registration with UNHCR, and renewal of attestations.

Since the crisis, UNHCR has been staffing a **24-hour hotline in Benghazi** that allows asylum seekers and refugees to call for service. They have also established four other hotlines around the country in 2014: one for Syrians; one for emergencies (including detention); one for registration and one for community services, which manages UNHCR's cash assistance program to support approximately 1,200 of the most vulnerable asylum seekers and migrants across the country. An addition, five more telephone hotlines will become active by mid-2015.

In Tripoli, UNHCR continues to **maintain an alert system with the Libyan coastguard** for boats in distress off the Libyan coast; they are also contacted by the coast guard when rescued migrants are being disembarked so that asylum seekers have the opportunity to connect with UNHCR and so that UNHCR can provide humanitarian relief items, hygiene kits, medical assistance, and referral of migrants to IOM, where appropriate, for assisted return to their country of origin.

In 2013, detention monitoring continued but was suspended in the first half of 2014, during the peak of the instability in Libya, and replaced by visits to centres for the purposes of assistance provision only. In 2015, detention monitoring is slowly being re-introduced for the identification of vulnerable individuals and referrals.

3.3 TUNISIA

3.3.1 IOM

Figure 39: Rescues at sea and voluntary returns for those rescued at sea in Tunisia,



Data source: IOM Tunisia

IOM Tunisia's main programs in Tunisia that are relevant to mixed migration include:

- AVR and AVRR;
- Implementing activities under the START program (see Focus box 11 on page 94);
- Working with health authorities to gather data on migrants with HIV for the "National Program for the Fight Against HIV/AIDS";
- Providing direct assistance to migrants through local partners;
- Over 2011 and 2012, IOM Tunisia was involved in emergency evacuations for migrants wishing to return home;
- Preventing irregular migration, particularly amongst UAMs, in areas where the risk is higher, through the EU funded "SALEMM" project.

3.3.2 UNHCR

Pending the creation of a national asylum system, UNHCR conducts RSD in Tunisia and ensures that persons of concern are registered and issued with UNHCR certificates to protect them against arbitrary arrest, detention or expulsion.

The UNHCR's overall objective is to support the creation of a comprehensive national protection system, which includes commenting on the national government's framework for asylum and training officials.

UNHCR also supports the authorities in developing a systematized response in cases of rescue at sea, in cooperation with other agencies, particularly the Tunisian Red Crescent and IOM.

Additionally, UNHCR focuses on:

- Increasing access to education for refugee children, in conjunction with the Ministry of Education;
- Increasing access to healthcare through its partner, the Tunisian Red Crescent, and increasing knowledge on health issues through awareness raising activities;
- Helping refugees to achieve self-reliance through activities such as vocational training, apprenticeships, micro-projects, language classes, employment referrals and financial assistance to refugees with special needs;
- Facilitating the integration of refugees through its self-reliance program and in the spirit of durable solutions.

3.4 ITALY

Migration management in Italy is still coordinated under the umbrella of the **Praesidium project**, with the main partners being UNHCR (refugees and asylum seekers), IOM (other migrants), Save the Children (unaccompanied minors) and the Italian Red Cross (health).

Focus Box 12: The Khartoum Process

The EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative, also known as the 'Khartoum Process', was launched on 28 November 2014. It is a joint initiative of the ministers of the 28 EU countries and Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, Egypt and Tunisia, as well as the European and African Union Commissioners in charge of migration and development and the EU High Representative. The initiative was launched with the aim of tackling the trafficking and smuggling of migrants between the Horn of Africa and Europe.

The governments agreed on assisting the participating countries in establishing and managing reception centres; cooperating in the identification and prosecution of criminal networks; supporting victims of trafficking; protecting the human rights of smuggled migrants; and promoting sustainable development in countries of origin and transit in order to address the root causes of irregular migration.[73]

3.4.1 IOM

The main activities of IOM in Italy include:

- Monitoring of detention and reception centres with UNHCR;
- AVR and AVRR;
- Migration for development: working with migrants to create development in their own countries, not necessarily through returns but also through the diaspora;
- Family reunification project: Orientation of migrants from Morocco coming to Italy for family reunification, using DNA testing to identify family links for people at origin asking for reunification, speeding up family reunification processes for UAMs and asylum seekers in the EU;
- Psychosocial services.

3.4.2 UNHCR

UNHCR in Italy works under three broad program streams:

- Working with other partners to provide information to new arrivals in southern Italy and to ensure that asylum-seekers and persons with special needs are referred to the relevant administrative procedures and reception structures;
- Monitoring reception conditions and making recommendations for the improvement of these conditions to the relevant authorities;
- In order to contribute to the quality of refugee status determination, UNHCR participates in the national refugee status determination procedure, in the Territorial Commissions and, in an advisory capacity, in the National Commission.

73. http://ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/911-khartoum-process-eu-and-african-union-launch-initiative-against-smuggling-of-migrants.html

3.4.3 Save the Children

Under the Praesidium project, Save the Children focuses on minors, both those that are unaccompanied and those that come with families. The main activities include:

- Sharing legal information about procedures in Italy and at the European level and on family reunification;
- Ensuring that basic rights are observed in first aid facilities by liaising with authorities;
- Assisting authorities to determine the ages of those that claim to be unaccompanied minors;
- Mediation at landing points to give legal assistance and also material assistance to minors, in cooperation with the authorities, IOM, UNHCR and other Praesidium partners.

3.5 MALTA

In addition to the work of UNHCR and IOM, reception arrangements in Malta are managed by relevant government entities. There are also a range of NGOs providing support to migrants and asylum seekers and counselling services.

3.5.1 IOM

IOM Malta works mainly on **return and reintegration**, integration and resettlement. Under the first, they implement a number of AVR and AVRR programs. Under the "Enhanced Cooperation between Malta and Migrants' Countries of Origin: Lessons Learned and Sharing of Experience with other European Countries" project, IOM works on improving technical links between the Maltese government and government representatives from selected countries of origin in the spirit of AVR.

Under the **integration component**, IOM implements three projects. All three are funded by the European Integration Fund, work with migrants who are not asylum seekers or refugees and do so in conjunction with the Ministry for Social Dialogue in Malta. The Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education are also involved. The three projects are:

- The Pan European Conference on the Integration of Immigrant Spouses and Children: a research project that will end in a conference and compares policies and best practices across EU countries;
- Supporting the Integration of third country nationals (TCNs) by enhancing their awareness on the Maltese Legal and Social Context;
- Mainstreaming a common model of inter-cultural competence for the integration process of TCNs: involves training staff in relevant government ministries on how to deal with cultural sensitivities.

IOM Malta is also active in the resettlement of refugees from Malta to the United States under the USRAP program, which is carried out together with UNHCR. Approximately, 450 to 500 refugees are resettled per year.

3.5.2 UNHCR

UNHCR's work in Malta includes:

- Monitoring access to asylum in Malta;
- Advocating for a protection sensitive asylum system and related policies;
- Capacity building with government and partner agencies;
- Promoting durable solutions through local integration and resettlement or intra-EU relocation;
- Increasing the general awareness about asylum issues in the country.

CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES & CROSS ANALYSIS


160,000
120,000
80,000
40,000
0
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

In 2013, Syrians arrived by air into Algeria, Egypt and Libya, all of which did not require visas for Syrians at the time. Libya was the main departure point for Europe so Syrians arriving in Algeria would move by bus to Libya, via Tunisia, in order to board boats to Europe. Air arrivals into Egypt either moved to Libya or made direct sea crossings from the Egyptian coast close to Alexandria. Both Egypt (since July 2013) and Algeria (since December 2014) now require visas from Syrian passport holders and the airflows have ceased. Airflows into Libya also decreased following the 2014 crisis, particularly with the closure of the main airport in the capital. UNHCR Libya now reports that there are flows of Syrians flying into Libya again, usually from Jordan, with onward passage by sea to Europe organised in advance.

Sudan still admits Syrians without the need for a visa, allowing the airflow into Khartoum to remain active. From Khartoum, Syrians typically move into Libya and up to the northern coast. Since October 2014, there has also been a flow of Syrians from Khartoum to Egypt through Aswan.

There are also flows to Turkey and Morocco. Towards the end of 2014, the number of Syrians that arrived in Italy on boats that had departed Turkey increased. There is also a flow that flies to Madrid from Turkey. Respondents explained that Syrians on this flow typically fly from Turkey to South America and then take a plane from there to Spain.

Some Syrians interviewed in Morocco also explained that they had transited through Libya in order to move to Morocco. This trend is more common for Kurdish Syrians who are not as warmly welcomed by the Arab population of Libya.

2. DECISION-MAKING FACTORS WHEN SELECTING BETWEEN THE ROUTES

Figure 41: Detected irregular arrivals, Eastern Western and Central Mediterranean routes, 2008-2014



Data source: Frontex website

Figure 41 plots the number of detected arrivals on the Eastern, Western and Central Mediterranean routes between 2008 and 2014. While the Eastern and Western Mediterranean routes have remained relatively stable over time, the Central Mediterranean route has experienced significant peaks and troughs, with 2014 representing a massive increase. In terms of absolute numbers, the Western Mediterranean route experiences the smallest flows.

> " Every town I arrived in, I would find black people and they would say: 'if you want to go to Libya, you should go this way and if you want to go to Spain, you should go that way'. "
> Ivoirian man in Spain, 25.

One of the questions this study focuses on is how do migrants decide which route they will follow and what factors influence their decision making process? This question was explored specifically in terms of the Central Mediterranean route and the Western Mediterranean route, as these routes were the focus of the study. However, some of the findings have a more general application and may shed some light on decisions in relation to the Eastern Mediterranean route also.

The study revealed that the route of travel a migrant adopts is influenced by a number of factors, some of which the migrant has control over and some of which he/she does not have control over. In general, four types of profiles emerge in terms of deciding which route to follow:

1. Migrants that decide on their destination and route before they start the journey and do not change their mind along the way;

2. Migrants that do not have a clear intention when they depart and make decisions along the way according to information they receive from smugglers or other migrants;
3. Migrants that are aware of only one route and did not realise that they had a choice;
4. Migrants that initially follow the Western Mediterranean route but after realising how difficult it is to cross over into Spain, move to Libya to follow the Central Mediterranean route.

Typically, the considerations that factor into the decision between the two Mediterranean routes studied, are: how heavly border-crossing points are controlled; the ease of passage to Europe; the possibility for regularisation at some point along the route; the levels of abuse and conditions in the transit countries; the risks involved; the duration of the journey; the cost of the journey; and the presence of networks or friends along the way or in transit countries.

The specific pro and cons for the two routes studied are set out in Table 2.

In general, the study revealed that the Central Mediterranean route is far riskier and more dangerous but yet has a greater chance of success, in terms of arriving in Europe. That is, if a migrant survives the journey to Libya, they are almost guaranteed to be able to board a boat to Europe (although their safe arrival in Europe is not always guaranteed). For this reason, the profiles on the Central Mediterranean were far more desperate and had very little to lose, when compared to profiles on the Western Mediterranean route.

Table 2: Pros and cons for the Western and Central Mediterranean routes

Pros: Western Mediterranean

- Safer: the journey to Morocco does not pose as many risks as the journey to Libya. Morocco itself also presents safer living conditions when compared to Libya at the present moment. The sea crossing from Libya is also quite dangerous and perceived as being more dangerous than the various crossing points (sea and land) between Morocco and Spain.
- Networks: as crossing into Spain became more difficult and Morocco inadvertently became a destination country, big networks developed, which could act as a pull factor.
- Regularisation: After the regularisation campaign of 2014, Morocco is perceived to have greater legal/regular pathways when compared to Libya, which is important for some migrants: *"I didn't consider Libya because I would not be able to be regularised there and build a legal life there. I had some friends there who told me it was easy to find work and easy to go to Europe through illegal means but not through legal means."* (Male, Guinea, 38)

Cons: Central Mediterranean

- Sea journey: the dangerous sea journey from Libya prevents some migrants from taking this route, given the risks involved and the increasing number of deaths at sea. Some migrants interviewed, talked of their fears of "the river" (which is what they call the Mediterranean).
- Libya: Conditions in Libya today, following the 2014 crisis, particularly for migrants and particularly for sub-Saharan migrants, have become so difficult and abusive that it is preventing some migrants from taking this route. The high rates of arbitrary arrest and detention in Libya (by both state and non-state actors) is a particular risk for sub-Saharan migrants: *"I was going to go via Libya but I saw some people coming from Libya when I was in Gao and they told me there is war there and that it's very hard to live there. They told me that it is better to go via Algeria and Morocco to get to Europe"* (Male, Mali, 29, Interviewed in Spain)

Pros: Central Mediterranean

- Jobs: Libya has greater employment prospects than the other countries in North Africa and relatively high salaries, allowing migrants to work along the way. Moreover, if a migrant finds stable employment in Libya, it may prevent him/her from having to make the dangerous journey across the Mediterranean.
- Ease of passage to Europe: The instability in Libya makes it much easier to affect a successful sea crossing from the Libyan coast, when compared to journeys from Morocco to Spain. If a migrant manages to arrive at the Libyan coastline, he/she is almost guaranteed the ability to board a boat to Europe.
- Secondary European movements: Moving from Italy to northern Europe is much easier than moving north from Spain.
- Cheaper: The greater controls between Morocco and Spain have also affected prices charged by smugglers. Moreover, the increased number of people on the move along the Central Mediterranean route in 2014, as well as the increased number of migrants with greater economic means (Syrians) has led to somewhat of a decrease in price for sub-Saharan Africans on this route. *"There are migrants who leave Morocco to go to Libya simply because it is cheaper. It's completely a financial decision. In Morocco, you pay 1,300 euros to a smuggler for a ferry to Spain, whereas in Libya it's about 500 euros."* (Male, Nigeria, 37)

Cons: Western Mediterranean

- Expensive: The increased controls between Morocco and Spain and the consequent difficulty in crossing over has increased prices along this route.
- Difficult passage to Europe: The increasing difficulty in crossing over to Spain is causing more and more migrants on this route to inadvertently settle in Morocco: *"There are many migrants who leave from here for Libya when they are not able to cross into Spain. Information spreads very easily- when friends in Libya call and say its easy to cross to Europe from here, then many go."* (Male, Cameroon, 40)

3. CROSS ANALYSIS: KEY TAKE-AWAYS

3.1 THE NATURE OF THE FLOWS AND SHIFTING PATTERNS

In 2014, over 218,000 migrants arrived in Europe through the Mediterranean, including arrivals in Spain (4,250), Italy (170,100), Malta (568), Greece (43,500) and Cyprus (339). It is estimated that 3,072 people lost their lives while attempting to cross the Mediterranean during this period (compared to just 600 in 2013).[75] Italy was receiving over 15,000 arrivals per month and an average of approximately 500 arrivals per day. Most of the migrants that arrived through the Mediterranean in 2014 had been rescued under the Mare Nostrum operation and almost half of them were from Syrian Arab Republic or Eritrea.

In 2015, so far (January 1 – June 5) an estimated total of 91,950 migrants have arrived in Europe through Italy (47,100), Spain (1,000), Malta (100) and Greece (43,750).[76] It is estimated that 1,865 migrants have lost their lives in attempted sea crossings through the Mediterranean in the same period.[77]

The nature of the flows is also evolving. **The numbers of children, particularly unaccompanied minors, within the flow continues to increase,** across the receiving countries. For example, in Malta, 28% of the flow was UAMs in 2014. The main sending country for UAMs who arrived in Italy by boat in 2014 was Eritrea and then Egypt.

The number of women who are trafficked for sexual exploitation is also increasing and new networks are emerging. For example, while the main country of origin has traditionally been Nigeria, the number of Cameroonian women who had been trafficked in 2014 increased greatly on both the Western and Central Mediterranean routes. In Italy, there was a 300% increase in detections of women who arrived in a context of trafficking and in Morocco it is estimated that 90% of the Nigerian women and 70% of the Cameroonian women in the country arrived in a context of trafficking. Women from Cote d'Ivoire and DRC are also found in situations of prostitution in Morocco but more out of desperation for money and it often starts in Arlit, Niger, a location known for its large prostitution rings. While these women may not have entered prostitution in a context of trafficking, they are at risk of being trafficked for sexual exploitation due to their vulnerability.

The nature of the flows in 2014 also further proved that the flows are dynamic and highly adaptable: as Libya became more dangerous, boat departures from Egypt increased; as controls increased in the Sinai, smugglers moved into other parts of Egypt; as Spain becomes more elusive for migrants on the Western Mediterranean route, more migrants move to Libya to make the journey across the Mediterranean. **2015 is already demonstrating shifting patterns** with a six-fold increase in arrivals in Greece when compared to the same period in 2014, presumably because migrants are avoiding Libya's turmoil.

The dynamism of the flows also demonstrates that efforts to curtail the flows usually just moves them elsewhere. For example, Spain has responded to the migratory pressure on the borders of Ceuta and Mellila by

75. 'Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration,' IOM, 2014; http://www.unhcr.org/531990199.html **76.** Estimated by IOM through data provided by respective governments and IOM field offices. **77.** Data on deaths is compiled by RES. All numbers are minimum estimates.

developing bilateral policies with Morocco and using strong enforcements along the borders (three rows of six-metre fences topped with barbed wire). The result of such measures is that migrants are increasingly prevented from crossing over into Spain, causing Morocco to have to deal with the mixed migratory flows more urgently as it becomes an inadvertent country of destination, rather than a country of transit. That is, **the flows to Spain have not ceased, they have simply been diverted elsewhere.**

Consequently, labels such as transit and destination country are no longer as relevant as they used to be. Across the entire Mediterranean these concepts have become increasingly fluid. In addition to the shifting patterns between Morocco and Spain, some migrants indicated that they initially set out for North Africa (and not even a particular country in North Africa) because of a perception of relatively favourable economic conditions when compared to sub-Saharan Africa. Some of these migrants eventually attempt to move on to Europe when they do not manage to find favourable living conditions in North Africa even if this was not their initial intention. This means that a country is sometimes a destination country and sometimes a transit country, but also demonstrates that the push factors are far more relevant then the pull factors.

Returnees can sometimes have the effect of encouraging friends and family to migrate, particularly when they return with greater economic means or with new projects at origin. Also, returnees who repeat their migration often take others with them. This means that repeat migration does not only open the migrant up to risky and dangerous journeys again, but can increase the number of people on the route.

3.2 THE NORTH AFRICAN DEPARTURE POINTS

The challenges posed by the increased burden for Morocco, as a result of the increased controls along its borders with Spain, have led to the migration flows through the country becoming the object of legitimate concern and often subject to controversy. In reality, Libya is not the only departure point at which migrants are experiencing abuse and neglect or discrimination. Migrants in Morocco are also suffering in this regard, albeit to a lesser extent. The changes Morocco instigated in 2013, in relation to its migration policies and laws, however, demonstrate the Moroccan government's commitment to approaching migration in a humanitarian way.

In terms of risks and vulnerabilities, vis-à-vis Libya, armed clashes and the deteriorating security, human rights and humanitarian situation in Libya in 2014 has led to migrants being exposed to even greater levels of arbitrary arrest and detainment, ill-treatment, harassment and in some cases, death by extremists. **This has created a migratory pressure for migrants that had been living in Libya for some time.** That is, the instability became so great that they felt desperate to leave. The lack of options for leaving the country (with Egypt and Tunisia effectively closing their borders and the difficulties in accessing the southern borders of Libya to return home) often meant that departing via the Mediterranean was the most viable solution.

Yet, despite the grave situation for migrants in Libya, the inflows into Libya have not ceased. This suggests that **migrants who continue to travel to Libya are potentially motivated by very strong push factors, which are much stronger than the pull factors.**

The situation in Libya also demonstrates that the **migratory routes into Libya, and the transit routes through Libya, are very well established** and, given that Libya has experienced some level of instability since 2011, these routes are not necessarily going to cease because of the current situation. There is also evidence to suggest that smugglers are exploiting the current instability in Libya by encouraging migrants that now is a good time to make the journey to Europe via Libya.

3.3 THE SMUGGLING INDUSTRY: SHIFTING DYNAMICS AND METHODS

In terms of smuggling, the increased number of Syrians, who have greater economic means, on the route and the general increase in the number of people on the move, led to some **identifiable changes within the smuggling industry.** This includes aggressive marketing, particularly on social media, the creation of 'packages' for certain groups of migrants, "safer" journeys for a price, and different prices depending on the country of origin of the migrant and the smuggling network that the migrant comes into contact with in Libya. This led to a general decrease in price for sub-Saharan African migrants but heavier prices for Syrian refugees.

Moreover, **as the flows increased, smugglers used sea vessels that were less and less seaworthy** on the assumption that the migrants would be picked up by Mare Nostrum soon after departure. This led to the journeys becoming more and more dangerous.

Other perceivable changes in relation to smuggling include the fact that migrants themselves have started addressing their own vulnerabilities, as can be seen by the utilisation of "guarantors" when dealing with smugglers in Morocco.

The study also identified that the smuggling and trafficking industries continue to thrive because migrants continue to demand their services, in the face of a lack of legal pathways. Many of the migrants interviewed stated that they would have preferred to migrate regularly if the option had been available to them. The regularisation campaign in Morocco confirmed this as many of the migrants that benefited from the campaign stated that they would attempt to settle in Morocco now that they were regularised, instead of moving to Europe. That is, if migrants had more options for regular migration, they would cease to demand smuggling services, which would destroy the market for smugglers.

Further to the point about regular v. irregular migration, the study found that as migrants remain in an irregular situation, they are often forced into the informal economy as they do not have the right to join the formal economy, which opens them up to exploitation but also encourages a black market or organized crime in some cases.

3.4 PUSH FACTORS EMERGE AS MORE RELEVANT THAN PULL FACTORS

While **Mare Nostrum** may have been exploited by smugglers in order to increase the number of boat departures from the Libyan coast, it is unlikely that it was the pull factor that caused the flows. **There were a large number of push factors that led to migrants moving to the North African coast** and they would most likely have come anyway. These push factors include the continual war in Syria, the emergence of ISIS in Iraq, the conflicts in the Central African Republic and South Sudan and the worsening repression in Eritrea. Libya's open doors then

facilitated these flows. Moreover, the number of arrivals by boat in Europe continued to increase after Mare Nostrum ended.

Moreover, as has been explained previously, a number of dynamics suggest that the push factors are much more relevant that the pull factors. For example, a number of migrants attempted to settle in neighbouring countries before migrating to North Africa and only did so when attempts to create a more stable life proved futile in neighbouring countries. A good proportion of the flow did not have a destination in mind when departing from origin but simply decided to move towards North Africa on the perception that economic conditions are more favourable there when compared to sub-Saharan Africa. The inflows into Libya continued in 2014 despite deteriorating security and human rights and increasing arbitrary arrest, detainment and harassment.

The exceptional regularisation of irregular migrants in Morocco also demonstrates a potential to positively affect the dynamics of the flows. Many migrants that had been regularised under the campaign stated that they would now attempt to settle in Morocco and establish a life there, instead of moving on to Europe through dangerous and clandestine journeys.

The study also revealed that **certain factors that had previously been understood as pull factors are in fact coping mechanisms rather than pull factors.** For example, migrants interviewed in Spain explained that they establish networks amongst themselves and amongst migrants from the same country of origin in order to survive, but they are not pull factors that influence their choice of location.

3.5 A DECREASING NUMBER OF OPTIONS FUELS FLOWS ACROSS THE MEDITERRANEAN

These strong push factors have also been compounded by the shrinking of the asylum space and tougher stances towards irregular migration in North Africa. **The North African countries along the route balance the development of their own country and people, internal stability, and national security** when making decisions regarding migration flows into the country, which does not always translate into sound migration policies and durable solutions. In many cases it has led to the shrinking of the asylum space in countries in North Africa, such as Egypt and Tunisia.

The shrinking of the asylum space in countries in North Africa adversely affects Syrian refugees who find that they have fewer options in terms of finding protection in neighbouring countries or countries close by, a gap that has not been met by greater pathways for safe and legal journeys to Europe. **In their search for protection and safety, Syrian refugees are seen moving in many directions, along different routes, using different modes of transportation.** At the beginning of the Syrian crisis, most Syrians who left the country were looking for protection and assumed that they would return home after a few months. As the crisis worsened and a resolution could not be seen in the near future, expectations changed and Syrians started searching for locations in which they could settle down and in which they would have opportunities for livelihoods. This was also fuelled by the diminishing resources to assist Syrians in neighbouring countries (Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey, Iraq), the relatively poor economic conditions in those countries and the changing policies in relation to Syrians in those countries (for example, the requirement for an entry visa in Egypt, Algeria and Iraq). This fuelled secondary movements from those neighbouring countries to Europe.

This led to more Syrians crossing the Mediterranean, in very dangerous ways, and having to spend large amounts of money to pay smugglers for journeys to Europe in order to find protection. **The other effect of these dynamics is that they fuel the smuggling industry.**

This also prompts us to **expand our understanding and definition of protection.** For most asylum seekers, protection includes having a job and an income and being able to provide for one's family. Thus, even for migrants who fled their countries in search of protection, the choice of destination is still influenced by economic conditions and income generating options, which is why asylum seekers that receive protection in one country, or have the opportunity to do so, sometimes still move on to other countries. This was observed not only amongst Syrian refugees but also in Morocco where asylum dynamics are characterised by secondary movements. That is, many of the asylum seekers in Morocco had either received protection in Algeria before they moved on to Morocco, or had passed through Algeria and could have done so.

3.6 AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL

Intra-European movements are also increasing and smugglers are now selling journeys from a migrant's home country to a particular European country instead of the frontline countries, such as Italy and Spain. The most popular destination countries in 2014 were Germany and Sweden. This increase was fostered by the greater number of Syrian refugees on the route who have greater economic means and different expectations, given their socio-economic position before they had to flee their country.

Inadequacies in Europe's asylum system are also becoming apparent in light of the increased flows. More specifically, receiving countries on Europe's southern borders, particularly those positioned in the Central Mediterranean (such as Malta and Italy), bear the burden of the increasing inflows within a context where most migrants do not wish to inhabit those countries and are looking to move north to countries such as Germany and Sweden. Both Malta and Italy struggle with the number of arrivals, but particularly Malta which, given its size and small population, has been receiving the most migrants per capita of any industrialised nation in the world. Moreover, inadequate reception conditions and deficiencies in the asylum procedures of certain member states interfere with the implementation of EU policies. For example, Germany has decided for the fourth consecutive year that they will not return asylum seekers to Greece, even if Greece is deemed responsible for the asylum claim under the Dublin Regulations, citing inadequacies in Greece's asylum laws.

Moreover, while the Dublin regulations were created in an attempt to avoid 'shopping around' for the best conditions for those seeking asylum, we are increasingly discovering inadequacies in this system **as migrants continue to move through the continent, contrary to the Dublin regulations.** In fact, prohibiting these movements has encouraged the growth of a business in intra-European smuggling. Moreover, it drives the migrants underground where they are forced to enter the informal labour market, which makes them vulnerable to exploitation and abuse and has the potential to promote illicit activity and organised crime.

4. ACROSS THE CROSSING POINTS: TOWARDS BETTER MIGRATION MANAGEMENT

Figure 42: Towards better migration management: interventions in the short, medium and long term



Any effort to address or manage the irregular flows across the Mediterranean requires not only efforts at the European level but at all points along the route in a coordinated response that takes into account the variety of countries along the way, the variety of actors in these countries, and the spectrum of risks and vulnerabilities that migrants face along the way. It requires a package of coordinate responses that are implemented in the short, medium and long term. As it is a mixed migratory flow, these efforts also need to account for the various types of migrants that comprise this flow, in acknowledgement of the fact that they all possess human rights that should be safeguarded.

It should be noted that, given the urgency of the situation in the Mediterranean, it is important for all of these responses to be affected with urgency and in the present time period. Those grouped under medium-term and long-term categorisations may need a longer time frame to be refined and perfected but these categorisations in no wise imply that the interventions are not required immediately.

Short-term responses include:

1. Protection at sea
2. Access to asylum

Medium-term responses include:

3. Counter-smuggling and anti-trafficking measures
4. Information campaigns
5. Regularisation campaigns

Long-term responses include:

6. Increased legal alternatives to dangerous journeys
7. Coordination and cooperation
8. Regional mobility schemes
9. New approaches to a coordinated European asylum system
10. Integration of migrants and asylum seekers at destination
11. New approaches and alternatives to camp management

Each of these is described in further detail below.

4.1 SHORT-TERM RESPONSES

4.1.1 Protection at Sea

While Mare Nostrum has been criticised for acting as a pull factor, the reality is that operations like Mare Nostrum are required to save lives at sea in the face of strong push factors. The large flow through the Mediterranean (and particularly the Central Mediterranean) requires a robust mechanism of rescue at sea and although Triton is a signal of greater European commitment to search and rescue in the Mediterranean, it currently does not have the requisite capacity or resources. IOM estimates that deaths at sea have increased ninefold since the end of Mare Nostrum.

In the long term, protection at sea requires increased capacity for search and rescue, meaning that the relevant countries in the region require the support of the international community to increase this capacity. A number of initiatives have already started working towards these objectives, including the Global Initiative on Protection at Sea (see Focus box 8).

Moreover, protection at sea does not make a difference between migrants and asylum seekers. **Although the flow is mixed, migrants, asylum seekers and refugees are all entitled to the same basic rights.**

4.1.2 Access to Asylum

As those fleeing conflict or persecution are also moving alongside others who possess different motivations, **any efforts to address irregular migration must not jeopardise access to asylum.** Ensuring access to asylum includes early identification of those needing protection, ensuring adequate reception facilities in destination and identifying durable solutions.

It also implies that efforts to dismantle smuggling routes need to take place in parallel with the provision of greater means for access to asylum. For example, there are currently communities of asylum seekers in Libya, or coming through Libya, that utilise the same smuggling routes as other migrants in order to access asylum in Europe. Any efforts to dismantle these smuggling routes needs to ensure that asylum seekers still have a way to access the protection they need.

4.2 MEDIUM-TERM RESPONSES

4.2.1 Counter-smuggling and Anti-trafficking measures

Trafficking often involves a trans-national network that begins at origin and extends to destination. While smuggling does not always involve such a trans-national network, in 2014 this became increasingly the case. The greater number of migrants that described purchasing a journey from origin to destination in 2014 implies that there is at least some collaboration between the different networks. This means that efforts to address these illicit industries require very specific methods.

As was detailed previously in the report, actors and authorities in Italy have developed specific indicators that commonly characterise a trafficking context, allowing them to detect women that are possibly in this situation. Often by the time women in this situation arrive at destination, they are too afraid or too controlled to speak out or escape from their captors. For this reason, **efforts to detect trafficked women, and to dismantle the trafficking networks, require cooperation amongst a number of countries and detection earlier in the journey.**

However, while it is important to address the growth of these industries, it should also be noted that the smuggling industry represents a symptom of the problem but does not constitute the core problem itself. That is, **the smuggling industry continues to thrive as long as there is a demand for irregular migration and this demand exists as long as migrants do not have options for regular migration.** If there were a greater number of pathways for safe and regular migration, most migrants would much prefer to travel safely and to invest their money into a regular pathway, meaning the demand for irregular migration would cease, thereby dismantling the market for smugglers. While trafficking is in many ways more complex, it does also often rest on supply and demand dynamics.

Moreover, **any attempts to dismantle smuggling networks and routes must be accompanied by increased safe and legal pathways** so that migrants and asylum seekers who are using these routes and networks to find protection elsewhere are not prevented from being able to do so and do not become forced into dangerous situations.

4.2.2 Information Campaigns

Previous studies[78] have demonstrated that information is circulating amongst migrants, and to a lesser extent, asylum seekers, but that learning about the risks of the journey does not necessarily deter them. These studies have also demonstrated that migrants in destination rarely send negative news home, thereby fuelling unrealistic expectations of life in Europe. Thus, **in order for information campaigns to be effective, they need to be targeted and carefully planned. This entails testing new models to understand how realistic information should be presented in order to have an impact on the recipient.**

Greater information on alternative and regular pathways, particularly at origin and in transit countries earlier on in the route will allow migrants and asylum seekers to make more informed decisions and may prevent them from

78. See “Mixed Migration: Libya at The Crossroads” by Altai Consulting/UNHCR Libya, section 6.

resorting to dangerous and risky journeys. This would, of course, accompany the development of a greater number of regular pathways.

Moreover, disseminating information on policy changes in transit countries and at the European level would also allow migrants and asylum seekers to make more informed decisions. This is particularly in light of the fact that in 2014 it was found that smugglers were one of the primary information sources in this regard (for instance, smugglers comparing policies in various European countries and EU asylum laws on dedicated Facebook pages).

The vehicles through which information is shared also need to be considered carefully. Information centres can be effective because migrants then know that they can go to a particular location to receive information. However, these centres will only reach migrants who are looking for information. Thus, it is important to supplement information centres with methods of dissemination that work with current dynamics. For example, making efforts to spread information amongst migrants themselves, who can then disseminate information to other migrants, is imperative, given that most migrants explain that their information comes from other migrants. Moreover, by disseminating information through word of mouth, amongst migrants, it allows the information to reach those that may not necessarily be seeking it.

This study and others[79] have also identified **particular points or locations on the route** that act as information hubs. Disseminating information at these locations, amongst the migrants themselves and through centres, would also maximise the impact of information.

4.2.3 Regularisation Campaigns

The example of Morocco's exceptional regularisation of foreigners residing in Morocco irregularly presents an interesting model that could potentially be emulated. Regularisation campaigns of this nature allow migrants to enter the formal labour market, which not only protects them from being vulnerable to exploitation and abuse but also allows them to contribute to the local economy, which benefits the country.

Such campaigns also have the potential to prevent migrants from engaging in clandestine and dangerous or life-threatening journeys. For example, a number of migrants interviewed for this study expressed that now that their status was regularised, they would attempt to settle in Morocco instead of attempting a clandestine journey to Europe, even if initially they had intended to move to Europe through irregular means.

4.3 LONG-TERM RESPONSES

It should be noted that while the interventions and responses described in this section will often require a long-term vision, the urgency of the situation in the Mediterranean demands that these responses be implemented in the short-term, with a long-term view to their refinement.

79. See "Mixed Migration: Libya at The Crossroads" by Altai Consulting/UNHCR Libya, section 6.1.1.

4.3.1 Increased Legal Alternatives to Dangerous Journeys

While the number of people on the move across the Mediterranean is increasing, the legal alternatives to these risky journeys are not increasing at the same rate. Part of the task requires addressing the demand for irregular pathways, which will not only serve to dismantle the smuggling industries, but also prevents migrants and asylum seekers from undertaking life-threatening journeys.

Legal options could include:

- **Circular migration schemes** that promote temporary jobs at the low-skilled and high-skilled level and in industries that demonstrate a demand for foreign labour (for example, agriculture). Such schemes could target communities or individuals that are vulnerable to smugglers.
- **The promotion of private sponsorship schemes** that could potentially target diaspora communities already in Europe. Private sponsorship schemes also have the potential to divert money away from smugglers as they provide migrants and their families alternative legal pathways to channel their economic resources into.
- **Increased resettlement quotas** with links between industrialised nations.
- **Greater efforts for family reunification** (Dublin III already makes good progress in this direction), as many of those coming by boat are hoping to reunite with family already in Europe.

Promoting regular migration has the potential to generate revenue streams that would divert money away from the very large economy that has been born out of irregular migration and smuggling and that would lead to migration benefiting not only migrants but also the countries involved. For example, revenue streams could be created in the form of visa fees, through increases in cross-border trade and in the form of increased income tax. That is, as migrants enter the formal economy (as opposed to the informal economy, which is where most migrants find themselves when they have an irregular administrative status) they will pay taxes to the national government on income gained.

Moreover, promoting regular migration and integrating migrants into gaps that exist in local labour markets (which fills the gap in terms of labour supply in certain industries), if managed effectively, has the potential to increase **skills development amongst migrants, which often encourages them to want to return home** at some point and put their newfound skills into use in their home country. This could be combined with programs of circular migration or 'return of qualified workers' programs. These are programs which have already proven successful in a number of countries where IOM builds technical assistance programs involving qualified members of the diaspora returning home to rebuild institutions and the economy (e.g. 'Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals' programs by IOM)

However, it should be noted that legal means for migration are often balanced against the time required for them to be realised. That is, if they are not executed in a speedy manner, then migrants and asylum seekers are still likely to opt for quicker irregular pathways.

4.3.2 Coordination and Cooperation

The situation in the Mediterranean has further demonstrated that the countries in the region are very much affected by one another. For example: as Libya became more dangerous, boat departures from Egypt increased; as controls increased in the Sinai, traffickers moved into other parts of Egypt; as Spain becomes more elusive for migrants on the Western Mediterranean route, more migrants move to Libya to make the journey across the Mediterranean; as conflict increased in Africa and the Middle East, flows to Europe increased; as the protection space contracted in North Africa, asylum seekers started to move to Europe; as socio-economic conditions deteriorated in North Africa and the Middle east, the flows to Europe increased.

This demonstrates that **cooperation and coordination is required, not just to take into account the totality of actors and risks and opportunities along the way, and to address protection gaps in all countries along the route, but to also ensure that any interventions do not simply move the flows elsewhere.**

Levels of cooperation include:

- **Between layers of countries:** for example, as in the Khartoum process (see Focus box 12);
- **Between countries (bilateral agreements) and at the regional level** to promote labour mobility;
- **Between governments, civil society, international organisations and the private sector:** for example, as in the Global Initiative on protection at Sea (see Focus box 8);
- **Amongst international organisations:** for example, between IOM and UNHCR;
- **Within governments:** amongst the various ministries of a country, in the spirit of a 'whole of government' response.
- **At the international level:** to focus on addressing the root causes of forced displacement, rather than the root causes of human mobility, through early warning mechanisms and conflict resolution and prevention mechanisms.

4.3.3 Regional Mobility Schemes

Following on from the previous point about coordination and cooperation, at the regional level this can include providing more **opportunities for migrants and asylum seekers in transit countries,** which is becoming increasingly relevant in a context of strong push factors and increasingly irrelevant pull factors. That is, **if greater opportunity existed in transit countries, some part of the flow would be content to stay there and would not feel the need to undertake life-threatening boat journeys.** Moreover, promoting more regional mobility has the potential to benefit the countries involved.

ECOWAS is cited as an interesting example of regional labour mobility and freedom of movement. In this region, smuggling of migrants is almost non-existent (because migrants have the right to move across borders and thus do not have a need or demand for irregular movements) and migrants move between the countries in the region by paying for local transportation, which is affordable and safe and contributes to local economies. There is also a great deal of labour migration between the countries in this region.

I**ncreasing opportunities for migrants in transit countries could involve job creation programs** that integrate vocational training and education in order to nurture the development of skills that can be applied to specific gaps and opportunities on the local labour market.

Providing greater opportunities to migrants in transit countries, in terms of access to livelihoods and education, also has the potential to **prevent migrants from entering Libya.** Not only has Libya become the main departure point

for life-threatening boat journeys across the Mediterranean, but the current instability also creates grave risks and vulnerabilities for migrants when in the country. Thus, preventing movements to and through Libya is imperative in the current context.

4.3.4 New Approaches to a Coordinated European Asylum System

While the efforts towards a common European asylum system are noteworthy, inadequacies within the system indicate an opportunity to further refine it.

While a common European asylum system has been created in acknowledgement of Europe as one union, protection given to asylum seekers in one European country is not recognised in another. That is, protection granted by the Maltese government is not recognised by the German government and does not grant the individual the right to live in Germany. **While one of the reasons for which the union was established was to encourage freedom of movement, particularly in terms of labour mobility, among its citizens, this same principle is not extended to refugees.** This is when one could argue that, in practical terms, labour movement already exists amongst the migrants and refugees who arrive.

It is increasingly becoming apparent then, that to better manage and control the flows, and ultimately decrease them, **greater mobility** is required, rather than greater controls. If the majority of migrants entering through Italy and Malta are heading north, to countries such as Germany and Sweden, perhaps this movement can be legalised by creating a situation where asylum seekers, when recognised by one state, are given freedom of movement within the union for a period of time. It should also be noted that if such arrangements were put into place, it is unlikely that all migrants would leave Italy and Malta, it would only apply to a particular segment of the group, and in such a case, those that remain would have a **better chance at integrating.**

4.3.5 Integration of Migrants and Asylum Seekers at Destination

The integration of migrants and asylum seekers is key as nothing has the potential to undermine migration policies more than a feeling of "us and them" and the perception that migrants are taking jobs away from the local population.

Integration requires a long-term vision and a number of interventions including public information campaigns that target the sensitisation of the local population; labour market programs that channel foreign labour into areas where local labour is scarce; and assistance to migrants and asylum seekers on arrival to promote their autonomy. Promoting the autonomy of migrants and asylum seekers includes access to accommodation, language classes, skills development and job placement programs, but also requires such assistance to be provided in a manner that allows the individual to take ownership for their development and integration. This could include, for example, a stipend that allows the migrant to make their own decisions in relation to housing, rather than providing camps and centres for their shelter.

4.3.6 New Approaches and Alternatives to Camps and Reception Centers

Following on from the previous section, promoting the autonomy of asylum seekers and migrants, in the spirit of integration, prompts a rethinking of refugee camps, encampment policies and reception centres. **While such centres address some of the immediate needs of migrants and asylum seekers, they also keep these individuals separate from the rest of society and thus, do not promote their integration.**

Encampment policies for refugees in certain countries (such as Sudan, for example) also act as push factors for some refugees who do not wish to spend their lives living in camps. This is particularly the case for refugees that do not envisage the situation at origin improving in their lifetime and are thus looking to establish themselves elsewhere permanently. In the Sudan, this has led to smuggling routes not only out of the country but also out of the camps. Moreover, it leads to refugees undertaking extremely risky, and sometimes life threatening, journeys to find protection elsewhere.

The other risk posed by large camps and centres is **the potential for delivering vulnerable migrants and asylum seekers into the hands of traffickers.** This is especially a concern, given the increase in trafficked women arriving in Europe in 2014 and the increase in unaccompanied minors in the flow across the Mediterranean.

Finally, the **large budgets that are required to maintain camps and centres could be used in different ways** that may more directly benefit migrants and asylum seekers and nurture their autonomy, while still providing them with means for accommodation but potentially at a lower cost to the state.

5. A MODEL FOR THE ONGOING MONITORING OF THE FLOWS

Beyond providing an updated picture of the migratory flows through the Central and Western Mediterranean, Altai was also tasked with proposing a system for the ongoing monitoring of these flows that could be established by IOM and its partners.

This study provided the opportunity to establish a network of contacts amongst actors and practitioners across the countries surrounding the Mediterranean and to assess the availability of data and knowledge on the flows through the Mediterranean.

5.1 AVAILABLE DATA

Quantitative data is available at destination through the data collection efforts of the national governments of the frontline countries and it is typically disaggregated by country of origin, gender, age and port of arrival. Frontex also gathers its own data and uses it, as well as that collected by national governments, to produce quarterly and annual reports that provide an updated picture of the flows.[90] Organisations such as UNHCR and IOM often supplement this data through their own efforts.

Some qualitative data is also available but it is not systematically gathered. For example, IOM and UNHCR and their partners collect information on profiles and routes but it often exists informally amongst team members who are in the field and is not always systematically aggregated and shared. Frontex also gathers and provides some contextual information but this is generally from the perspective of border protection.

A few local NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs) were found to be gathering data at the local level and mapping communities of migrants in transit countries. For example, Delegations de Migrations conducted a mapping of migrant locations in Nador, Morocco, by conducting key informant interviews with heads of communities and migrants themselves and developed an estimate of the number of migrants in the area.

5.2 A MORE COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF DATA COLLECTION

What is lacking is a more systematic and comprehensive approach that brings together existing data, while also bridging the gaps that exist through new modules of data collection. Essentially, it would focus on a matrix of trends and issues that, when combined, would allow not only profiles, flows and trends to be analysed but would also help anticipate future flows.

More specifically, it would focus on the following layers of information:

5.2.1 Profiles and Trends

The main communities of migrants and the evolution of their decisions and behaviour, as well as identifying new groups as they emerge and seeking to predict the evolution of their behaviour (is it the beginning of a new trend?

80. See Frontex FRAN reports

Is it comprised of a number of spontaneous arrivals or were the individuals organised into a group? Were there others involved in the facilitation of their journey? Etc.)

5.2.2 Rationale for Migration

The main push and pull factors at various points along the route, including social trends and trigger events across countries of origin and how these may lead to new migratory aspirations. Changes in policy in the various countries along the route would also be monitored from the perspective of push and pull factors.

5.2.3 Risks and Vulnerabilities to be Addressed Along the Way

This would include analysis of the dynamics of smuggling and trafficking and tracking trends in this regard, as well as other risks at different points along the route. Other risks could include, arbitrary detention and protracted conflict in transit countries and the impact this has on the treatment and experiences of migrants and asylum seekers, as well as access to territory and asylum for asylum seekers.

5.2.4 Impact of Programs and Interventions

Programs and interventions, at different points along the route, would be monitored in order to understand how they are affecting the flows and to ensure that they are not simply moving the problem elsewhere. These various layers are delineated in Figure 43.

Figure 43: The matrix of factors to be monitored on an ongoing basis



As demonstrated by the grey arrows in Figure 43, there are flows of migrants moving from origin to neighbouring countries and becoming absorbed there, there are those that move on to frontline countries in North Africa and become stuck there or decide to stay, there are those that make it to frontline countries and decide to return to neighbouring countries, some make it across the Mediterranean to frontline countries on Europe's southern borders and some move on from there to other countries in Europe, contrary to Dublin regulations, with the number

of migrants along these flows becoming less and less as we move further along the chain of countries (as shown by the different sizes of the various grey arrows). The various layers of information gathered would need to account for these various flows and movements.

5.3 APPROACH

The proposed approach involves updating information on a biannual basis to provide an evidence base for policy makers and to feed into program design and evaluation.

It would combine qualitative interviews across a number of hot spots including crossing points, migrant reception and detention centers and migration hubs, with:

- Key informants (key field personnel within IOM, UNHCR and other organisations whose informal knowledge on the dynamics has not yet been systematised)
- Community leaders and smugglers
- Migrants themselves

This would then be combined and analysed with quantitative data that exists at the European level.

This study has already allowed Altai Consulting to pinpoint key individuals that would act as ideal informants for such an exercise. However, there is also a **learning effect** that accrues from repeating the exercise on a biannual basis; both in terms of developing networks across the hotspots and the tremendous value that arises out of longitudinal analysis.

It will result in a **biannual update** that would be concise, focusing on changes and identifying interesting opportunities and new vulnerabilities.

ANNEXES



ANNEX I: LIST OF FIGURES

Figures

Figure 1: In-depth interviews with migrants according to location 16
Figure 2: Percentage of the sample of migrants attributed to each country 16
Figure 3: The sample of migrants according to country of origin 17
Figure 4: Breakdown of the sample of migrants in terms of age 17
Figure 5: Breakdown of the sample of migrants in terms of gender 17
Figure 6: Detected irregular border crossings, Western Mediterranean route (sea and land) 2008-2014 19
Figure 7: Number of irregular border crossings into Ceuta and Melilla between 2010-2014 21
Figure 8: Country of origin of irregular arrivals in Spain in 2014 (all borders) 21
Figure 9: Asylum seekers in Spain in 2014 by country of origin 1 22
Figure 10: Asylum seekers and refugees in Morocco in 2014 according to country of origin 24
Figure 11: Push and pull factors on the Western Mediterranean route 26
Figure 12: The dynamics of smuggling in Morocco 43
Figure 13: Irregular boat arrivals at the Canary islands 2006-2014 45
Figure 14: Types of protection granted to all recognised asylum seekers in Spain 2010-2013 49
Figure 15: AVR through IOM Spain, 2010-2014 50
Figure 16: Detected irregular border crossings, Central Mediterranean route, 2008-2014 57
Figure 17: Emergency evacuations from Libya by IOM Aug 2014-Feb 2015, according to country of origin 62
Figure 18: Refugees registered with UNHCR Libya, per country of origin, May 2015. 63
Figure 19: asylum seekers registered with the UNHCR in Libya according to country of origin (May 2015) 64
Figure 20: Breakdown of refugee population in Libya according to profile (May 2015) 64
Figure 21: Total population of concern in Libya by status (UNHCR Libya, May 2015) 65
Figure 22: Total population of concern in Egypt, as of April 2015 (UNHCR) 66
Figure 23: Gender and age breakdown of Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR Egypt, Feb 2015. 67
Figure 24: Places of concentration of Syrian refugees in Egypt, as of Feb 2015. 67
Figure 25: Number of irregular arrivals in Italy that came from the Tunisia coast 2011-2014. 69
Figure 26: Arrivals in Italy according to departure from Libya and Italy 2011-2014. 70
Figure 27: Rescues at Sea in Tunisian waters, from September 2012 to November 2014. 70
Figure 28: Countries of origin of migrants assisted by IOM Tunisia for voluntary return, 2012-2014. 72
Figure 29: Number of boat arrivals in Italy 2002-2014. 72
Figure 30: Boat arrivals in Italy according to country of origin (2012-2014) 73
Figure 31: Total number of irregular arrivals by boat and applications for asylum in Italy 1999-2014. 75
Figure 32: Number of boat arrivals in Malta 2002-2014. 76
Figure 33: country of origin of boat arrivals in Malta as proportion of total flow of boat arrivals 2012-2014. 79
Figure 34: Boat arrivals in Malta according to the main countries of origin (2012-2014) 80
Figure 35: Resettlement from Malta according to receiving country, 2005-2014. 81
Figure 36: Main issues influencing push & pull factors of migration, Central Mediterranean Route 81
Figure 37: Irregular arrivals on the Italian coast by country of departure 2012-2014. 88
Figure 38: Country of departure of irregular boat arrivals to Italy as a proportion (2012-2014) 88

Figure 39: Rescues at sea and voluntary returns for those rescued at sea in Tunisia, Sept 2012-Aug 2014. 97
Figure 40: Detected irregular arrivals, Central and Western Mediterranean routes, 2008-2014. 101
Figure 41: Detected irregular arrivals, Eastern Western and Central Mediterranean routes, 2008-2014. 104
Figure 42: Towards better migration management: interventions in the short, medium and long term 112
Figure 43: The matrix of factors to be monitored on an ongoing basis 121

Maps

Map 1: The Western, Central and Eastern Mediterranean routes 12
Map 2: Fieldwork locations 16
Map 3: Routes through Algeria to Morocco 35
Map 4: Routes to Morocco via Mauritania 37
Map 5: Routes within Morocco 38
Map 6: Key locations within Morocco 38
Map 7: Routes from Morocco to Spain 39
Map 8: Routes to North Africa on the Central Mediterranean Route 84
Map 9: Main routes from North Africa to Europe 87
Map 10: Main routes from Egypt to Europe 89
Map 11: Syrian refugees and Mediterranean routes 101

Focus Boxes

Focus box 1: Definition of Mixed Migration 13
Focus box 2: The Dublin Regulation (Dublin III) 29
Focus box 3: ECOWAS 36
Focus box 4: Entering the enclaves with Moroccan passports 40
Focus box 5: Operation Seahorse Atlantic 45
Focus box 6: The Rabat process 46
Focus box 7: Definition of a Refugee, 1951 Convention 48
Focus box 8: The Global Initiative on Protection at Sea 74
Focus box 9: Protection at Sea in the Mediterranean 77
Focus box 10: Human Trafficking at Law Please 92
Focus box 11: IOM's START program 96
Focus box 12: The Khartoum Process 98

Images

Image 1: Migrant camps in Oujda, Morocco (Altai Consulting) 23
Image 2: Somali migrant (Altai Consulting) 25
Image 3: A migrant shows his injuries after attempting to storm the fences, Oujda Morocco (Altai Consulting) 28
Image 4: Refugee reception centre, Madrid (Altai Consulting) 30
Image 5: Migrants waiting for work (Altai Consulting) 32
Image 6: Fences along the border between Morocco and Melilla (Altai Consulting) 41
Image 7: CETI in Melilla (Altai Consulting) 44
Image 8: Somali migrant (Altai Consulting) 53
Image 9: Nigerian migrants in Nador, Morocco (Altai Consulting) 55
Image 10: Migrants in Tripoli's old city (Altai Consulting). 58

Image 11: A migrant receiving medical attention after being rescued in the Central Mediterranean (MOAS.eu/Darrin Zammit Lupi) 68
Image 12: Eritrean asylum seeker, Libya (Altai Consulting) 78
Image 13: Migrant living quarters, Tripoli (Altai Consulting) 83
Image 14: Rescue at sea operations in the Mediterranean (MOAS) 86
Image 15: Rescue operation in the Mediterranean (MOAS.eu/Darrin Zammit Lupi) 93

Tables

Table 1: List of migrant detention centres in Libya, under DCIM, as of May 2015. 60
Table 2: Pros and cons for the Western and Central Mediterranean routes 106

ANNEX II: LIST OF LITTERATURE REVIEWED

#	Name	Author(s)	Year
1.	World Politics Review Feature Report: Almost Home? Morocco's Incomplete Migration Reforms	Katharina Natter	2015
2.	Asylum Information Database Country report: Malta	AIDA, JRS, Aditus, ECRE	2015
3.	European Court of Human Rights Factsheet: Dublin cases	n/a	2015
4.	Joint IOM and UNHCR Technical Report: Unaccompanied Migrant and Refugee Children: Alternatives to Detention in Malta	n/a	2014
5.	Frontex Annual Risk Analysis 2014	n/a	2014
6.	Irregular Migration as a Response to Geopolitical Shocks: The Long-term Effects of Short-term Policies	Martin Ruhs; Nicholas Van Hear	2014
7.	Sur la Route des Migrants au Niger	IOM	2014
8.	Migration in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia: Overview of the Complex Migratory Flows in the Region	IOM	2014
9.	Vulneraciones de Derechos Humanos en la Frontera Sur Melilla	CODH	2014
10.	Going West: Contemporary Migration Trends From the Horn of Africa to Libya and Europe	RMMS	2014
11.	Vulneraciones de Derechos Humanos en la Frontera sur – Melilla: Informe de la Comisión de Observación de Derechos Humanos (CODH)	n/a	2014
12.	Frontex FRAN Reports	n/a	2013-2014
13.	Dublin II Regulation, Lives on hold, European Comparative Report (ECRE)	Matiada Ngalikpima; Maria Hennessy	2013
14.	Maghnia: Franchir la frontière infranchissable – Rapport de mission sur la vulnérabilité des migrants et des réfugiés subsahariens à la frontière Algéro-marocaine	Davide Gnes	2013
15.	Five Decades of International Migration in Egypt	Jackline Wahba	2013
16.	Migration Policy Centre: Migration Profile for Morocco		2013
17.	Violences, Vulnerabilite et Migration: Bloques aux Portes de l'Europe	MSF	2013
18.	World Migration Report 2013	IOM	2013
19.	Migration Policy Centre: The Arab Spring and Migration in Egypt one year on: Impacts, Perceptions and Attitudes	Hend Hafez; Ayman Ghaly	2012
20.	Unaccompanied Children on the Move	Susanne Schultz; Christine Adam; Sarah Craggs; Ana Fonseca; Anna Hardy (IOM)	2011
21.	Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Working Paper: Monthly Demographic Now Cast, monthly estimates of the migration flows in Spain	Miguel Ángel Martínez Vidal, Sixto Muriel de la Riva	2010
22.	Focus Migration - Country Profile on Morocco.		2009
23.	Migration in Morocco: History, Current Trends and Future Prospects	Özge Bilgili, Silja Weyel	2009
24.	Human Mobility in the Mediterranean Basin: An Integral Element of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership	Catherine Wihtol de Wenden	2009
25.	Focus Migration - Country Profile on Spain	n/a	2008
26.	Focus Migration - Country Profile on Morocco.		2008
27.	The World Bank: Migration from Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, Synthesis of Three Case Studies	Christophe Schramm	2006
28.	Turning the tide? Why 'Development Instead of Migration' Policies are Bound to Fail	Hein de Haas	2006

ANNEX III: LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS INTERVIEWED

#	Organisation	Position	Name
EGYPT			
1.	IOM MENA	Regional Director	Pasquale Lupoli
2.	IOM MENA	Regional Migrant Assistance Specialist	Sarah Craggs
3.	IOM MENA	Research Officer	Harry Cook
4.	IOM MENA	Consultant	Steve Thorps
5.	IOM Egypt	Country Programme Coordinator	Amr Taha
6.	IOM Egypt	Senior Immigration and Border Specialist	Donato Coluci
7.	IOM Egypt	Program Manager-Migrant Assistance	Nuria Fernandez Vidal
8.	IOM Egypt	Pogramme Officer-Migrant Assistance Division	Emanuella Muscarà
9.	IOM Egypt	National Project Coordinator-Migrant Assistance Division	Heba Abdel Latif
10.	IOM Egypt	Case Manager-Migrant Assistance Division	Ahmad Saeed
11.	IOM Egypt	Migration Health Coordinator	Ahmad Abdolhaliem
12.	IOM Egypt	Case Manager-Migrant Assistance Division	Noha Aman
13.	UNHCR	Senior Protection Officer	Maria Bances del Ray
14.	UNHCR	Senior Protection Officer	Karmen Sakhr
15.	UNHCR	Senior Operations Manager	Sajal Gupta
16.	UNHCR	Protection Officer	Daniel Tessandori
ITALY			
17.	IOM	Project Manager/Legal Expert	Simona Moscarelli
18.	IOM	Reintegration Focal Point	Cedric Dekeyser
19.	IOM	AVR/CT Counsellor	Gina Villone
20.	UNHCR	Protection Associate, Praesidium Coordinator	Riccardo Clerici
21.	Save the Children	Minor Protection, Praesidium Coordinator	Alessio Fasulo
22.	Mineo Migrant Centre	Director	Sabastiano Maccarrone
23.	Agenzia Habeshia	Director	Father Mussie Zerai
LIBYA			
24.	IOM	Program Officer-START	Maysa Khalil
25.	UNHCR	Protection Officer	Amy Buchanan
26.	UNHCR	External Relations and Communications officer	Dunnapar Fern Tilakamonkul
27.	UNHCR	Senior Protection Officer	Sarah Khan

#	Organisation	Position	Name
MALTA			
28.	The Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers	Director	Alexander Tortell
29.	Ministry for Home Affairs and Security	Director of Policy	Joseph St. John
30.	IOM	Officer in Charge	Martine Cassar
31.	IOM	Project Manager	Laura Maciulskaite
32.	IOM	Project Integration Assistant	Iva Antoncic
33.	IOM	USRAP Project Coordinator	Tanja Contino
34.	UNHCR	Representative	Jon Hoisaeter
35.	MOAS	Director	Martin Xuereb
MOROCCO			
36.	IOM	Head of Programming	Rudolf Anich
37.	IOM	Programme Manager	Mohammed Ali Lahlou
38.	IOM	Assistant Anti-Trafficking Officer	Soleil Muniz
39.	IOM	Liaison Officer	Hicham Hasnaoui
40.	IOM	Operations Assistant	Zakaria Ennasri
41.	UNHCR	Protection Officer	Barbara Colzi
42.	Cooperation Suisse	Deputy Director of Cooperation	Silvana Hogg
43.	Cooperation Suisse	Program Officer	Mouloud El Kamel
44.	Conseil des Migrants, Rabat	President	Constantin Ibanda
45.	Conseil des Migrants, Rabat	Vice President	Serge Guomou
46.	Caritas, Oujda	Director	Enrique Vichera
47.	Caritas, Oujda	Administrator, Caritas Centre	Maria Jose
48.	Delegación de Migraciones, Tanger	Director	Inma Gala
49.	Delegación de Migraciones; Tanger	Program Manager	Malika Haouzir
50.	Medicine du Monde Belgique, Oujda	Medical Coordinator	Tarik Oufkir
51.	Delegación de Migraciones, Nador	Project Coordinator	Luis Manzano
52.	Visa sans Frontières, Tanger	Founder & President	Mamadou Yaya Diallo
53.	n/a	Independent researcher	Hassan Ammari
SPAIN			
54.	Ministry of Interior	Deputy Director for International Affairs and Alien Policy	Jesus Fernandez Caballero
55.	Ministry of Employment and Social Security	Technical Advisor for the Secretary General of Immigration and Emmigration	Ana del Carmen García Quirós
56.	Ministry of Employment and Social Security	Director of International Protection Programs	Paloma Pino

#	Organisation	Position	Name
57.	IOM	Head of Office	Maria Jesus Herrera
58.	IOM	Project Assistant	Teresa Botella
59.	IOM	Resource Management Officer	Carmen Penalba
60.	UNHCR	External Relations and Communications officer	Maria Jesus Vega
61.	UNHCR	Protection Assistant-Melilla	Natalia Sago
62.	Spanish Committee for Refugees (CEAR)	Advocacy and Social Participation Coordinator	Nuria Diaz Sacristan
63.	Centro Puelos Unidos	Area de Incidencia	Cristina Manzanedo
64.	CETI Melilla	Coorinator	Maria Dolores MORALES
TUNISIA			
65.	IOM	Chief of Mission	Lorena Lando
66.	IOM	Head of Programming Unit	Lalini Veerassamy
67.	IOM	Program Manager- START	Nassima Clerin
68.	IOM	AVRR Cordinator	Fabio Donofrio
69.	IOM	Project Assistant	Nadia Cheikh
70.	OHCHR	Human Rights Officer	Hajer Bouyahia
71.	Terre d'Asile	Director	Anais Elbassil
72.	Caritas	Member	Father David
73.	Tunisian Red Crescent	Migration and Refugees Program Coordinator	Hafedh Ben Miled