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## **Special Rapporteur on the promotion of the right to freedom of opinion and expression**

### **Follow-up Report on Country Visits**

#### **Call for Submissions**

#### **Turkey**

The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression will present a follow-up report pursuant to country visits conducted under the auspices of the mandate. He will examine the impact of country visits on the promotion, protection, fulfilment and overall enjoyment of the right in five selected countries. He will analyse the level of implementation of recommendations made following the visits, and consider any other developments impacting upon the rights which may have occurred since the visit was completed. The findings will be presented as a supplementary report to the 41<sup>st</sup> session of the Human Rights Council in June 2019. For more information, please see the concept note attached.

In order to facilitate the preparation of the report the Special Rapporteur would welcome information from States and relevant stakeholders in response to the questions below, based primarily on recommendations made in the country visit report.

Please provide responses in the table below. We hope to receive your submission no later than 22 February 2019 to [freedex@ohchr.org](mailto:freedex@ohchr.org) with "Submission to the follow-up study on country visits of the Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression" as the title of the email. Submissions will be posted on the OHCHR website at the time of the publication of the report, except for submissions from non-state actors explicitly stating their wish to remain anonymous.

**On the implementation of recommendations made by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression following the visit of the Mandate Holder to Turkey**

**What efforts have been made by the State to ensure that no persons are held in detention, investigated or prosecuted for sharing opinions that do not constitute an incitement to hatred or violence consistent with article 19(3) and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights? Have any journalists, writers, judges or academics detained on such basis been released?**

(See: A/HRC/35/22/Add.3 para 77)

According to MLSA's data, **121 journalists have been put in pre-trial detention** since the Rapporteur's visit (we reached this number by looking at arrests since 1 January 2017). 72 of these journalists have been released since then. When taking those who were previously (who were already in prison when the Rapporteur visited) detained into account, a total of 141 journalists have been released since the Rapporteur's visit. MLSA's updated list on imprisoned journalists and media employees in Turkey shows that 139 journalists are still behind bars:

<https://medyavehukuk.org/en/imprisoned-journalists-and-media-employees-turkey>

In other words, there has not been a significant change albeit a small drop in the number of imprisoned journalists.

Among those who have since been released are the journalists from the *Cumhuriyet* newspaper trial (Kadri Gürsel, Akin Atalay, Ahmet Şık, Bülent Utku, Mustafa Kemal Güngör, Musa Kart, Güray Öz, Turhan Günay, Önder Çelik, Hakan Kara), *Die Welt* reporter Deniz Yücel, Mezopotamya Agency reporter Berzan Güneş, Mehmet Altan, Şahin Alpay, human rights activist Murat Çelikkan, and Diken reporter Tunca Öğreten.

Some examples of those arrested and released after the Special Rapporteur's visit include ETHA reporters Adil Demirci and Semiha Şahin.

Journalists are often released under judicial control measures (weekly signature duties at police stations and passport bans, sometimes even bans from leaving the province they reside in.) Travel bans and the need to check in regularly with a police station prevents reporters from performing journalistic activities properly.

Releases of journalists, writers, and academics have been sporadic and rather arbitrary over the past two years. The government's strategy seems to be releasing those who are more popular in the public eye as a public relations stunt while keeping others in prison. However, they have continued to detain new journalists or writers which has contributed to perpetuating the cycle of fear and which has effectively worked to create a chilling effect. New arrests in freedom of speech cases have occurred since the Special Rapporteur's visit including that of civil society leader and philanthropist Osman Kavala. An indictment against him has recently been completed 477 days after his detainment (on 20 February 2019), which means he remained in detention for over a year without any formal accusation. Journalist Ayşe Düzkan, former reporter for Sputnik Kurdish Salih Turan, ETHA reporter Pınar Gayıp, academic and human rights advocate Yiğit Aksakoğlu, CHP MP Eren Erdem, and HDP MP Sırrı Süreyya Önder are among the many who have been detained since the Special Rapporteur's visit and remain behind bars.

Limit: 1,000 words

**Have measures been adopted by the State to ensure that the press, other media, and all individuals are able to comment on public issues and to inform public opinion without facing censorship or constraint?**

(See: A/HRC/35/22/Add.3 para 78)

No, the State has not adopted any measures at all. On the contrary, the State has spent most of these two years building a legal ground to justify freedom of speech violations that took place during the state of

emergency. The Government created the legal ground for silencing dissident voices and further normalized such practices.

Limit: 750 words

**Have steps been taken to reverse closures of media outlets, including Internet media? If so, which outlets have been granted permission to re-open? Have measures been put in place to ensure that media outlets are only suspended in exceptional circumstances prescribed by law and subject to judicial review?**

(See: A/HRC/35/22/Add.3 para 79)

On the contrary, new steps have been taken to further normalize and legalize closure of media outlets and Internet web sites. As it will be explained below, the Government has actually found a new method for further censoring Internet media with a new provision made to the Law no. 6112 (the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and Their Media Services Law) in February 2018.

Furthermore, bans targeting specific URLs have become more common than the practice of banning entire websites or domain names. News stories that are blocked are often about corruption, sexual harassment by state officials and/or people close to the Government, human rights violations against Kurds, disasters with high death tolls (high speed train accidents due to negligence, earthquakes, bombings, deaths of soldiers) worker deaths at construction sites (the most dangerous and deadly being the construction site of İstanbul's third airport, many news stories about worker deaths received access bans).

Limit: 750 words

**Has Law no. 5652 – the Internet Law – been reviewed? If so, what changes have been made to it?**

(See: A/HRC/35/22/Add.3 para 80)

No improvements were made regarding Law no. 5651. Articles under this law are still used to silence dissident journalists and repress plurality of voices in Turkey. This law is often used against ECHR standards and its applications constitute violations to Article 10 of the ECHR. Criminal Judgeships of Peace continue to issue many access bans about dissident and critical news stories. It has become increasingly difficult for both readers and content creators to monitor these blocks anymore because no notices are presented about them. The websites that kept track of blocked websites have also been blocked during this period. Official notices are not sent to content creators and the list of banned websites or URLs are not listed in the Official Gazette anymore. Due to these measures, it has become exceedingly difficult to monitor Internet censorship.

There have been some minor revisions made to the Internet Law and most of these changes concern a transfer of power to President Erdoğan. The cabinet of ministers, the Ministries of Justice, Internal Affairs, and Transportation, or the Prime Minister used to be authorized to make certain decisions under this law; however with Article 181 of the Decree-Law numbered 700 issued on 2 July 2018, all power regarding the Internet Law has been consolidated by President Erdoğan.

Moreover, a more significant legislative change regarding the Internet was a new provision made to the Law no. 6112 on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and Their Media Services, drafted in February 2018. This provision was titled "Presentation of media services via Internet."

This provision applies a traditional broadcasting licensing regime to media service providers on the Internet by giving extensive licence control powers to the Radio and Television Supreme Council ("RTÜK"), which is the Turkish state agency for monitoring, regulating, and sanctioning radio and television broadcasts. This amendment further enables the State to intervene with broadcasts made on the Internet and requires people to present criminal records and prove that they have a clean slate before founding any news websites. This provision allows the Government to not only control Internet media but allows it to have tremendous power over all kinds of streaming services and video sharing websites.

OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir shared a legal review with the Turkish authorities on elements of this bill in February 2018, claiming that if adopted it could restrict online broadcasting and further limit media pluralism in Turkey. The full statement can be found here:

<https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/373876>

Limit: 500 words

**Have any measures been taken to ensure requests for takedowns of online content are consistent with the requirements of articles 19(3) and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights? Has the Government refrained from excessive blocking and filtering of content?**

(A/HRC/35/22/Add.3 para 80)

No, the Government has not refrained from excessive blocking and filtering of content. The Government has indeed found new ways to ban access to specific URLs.

Content that is blocked is mostly about corruption, sexual harassment by state officials and/or people close to the Government, human rights violations against Kurds, disasters with high death tolls (high speed train accidents due to negligence, earthquakes, bombings, deaths of soldiers), worker deaths at construction sites (the most dangerous and deadly being the construction site of the third airport, many news stories about worker deaths received access bans).

Despite such measures, requirements of article 20(2) are disregarded by the Turkish judiciary as well. Sedat Peker, a notorious convicted criminal, posted a message on his personal website on January 13 2016. The message publicly threatened Academics for Peace and was titled "The So-Called Intellectuals, The Bells Will Toll for You First." He famously wrote "We will let your blood in streams and we will take a shower in your blood," in this message. After a backlash, a probe was launched against Peker; however, in July 2018 he was acquitted from all charges. Peker's lawyer demanded the written statement to be perceived as freedom of thought and expression. The Judge, Imran Arık Özcan ruled an acquittal about Peker on account of not committing any alleged crime.

- <https://bianet.org/english/law/199221-sedat-peker-acquitted-of-trial-of-threatening-academics>
- <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/notorious-criminal-threatens-academics-calling-for-peace-in-turkeys-southeast-93834>

Limit: 500 words

**Have emergency decrees remaining in place subsequent to the state of emergency been reviewed and revised to ensure their consistency with international human rights standards? In particular, has a process been put in place enabling persons deprived of their liberty pursuant to emergency decrees to initiate challenges to the lawfulness of their detention before a court?**

(See A/HRC/35/22/Add.3 para 82)

The State of Emergency was lifted on 19 July 2018. The emergency decrees have stopped since then, but most of the legislative changes made with these decree-laws have remained unchallenged and unrevised. The lifting of the state of emergency has brought Turkey closer to international human rights standards on paper; however, in reality removal of the state of emergency did not change much regarding freedom of speech, the Government continued to find new methods to oppress freedom of expression.

An Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures (widely known as The OHAL Commission) was founded with the Decree-Law numbered 685 in January 2017. This Commission began its active duty on 22 May 2017. The Commission members were appointed by President Erdoğan and could be listed as: Salih Tanrıkulu, Esat Işık Mehmet Karagöz, Mahmut Çuhadar, Mustafa İkbâl, Murat Aytaç, Osman Çal. These members include high level officials from various ministries, judges, and prosecutors; all are close to Erdoğan.

The Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures was established with the purpose of conducting an assessment of and giving a decision on applications related to acts established directly

through the decree-laws, without any other administrative acts being carried out. The Commission was meant to carry out an assessment of and render a decision on the following acts established directly through the decree-laws under the state of emergency:

- dismissal or discharge from public service, profession or organization in which the persons held office,
- cancellation of scholarships, expelling of students from public schools
- closure of associations, foundations, trade unions, federations, confederations, private medical institutions, private schools, higher education institutions, private radio and television institutions, newspapers and periodicals, news agencies, publishing houses and distribution channels,
- annulment of ranks of retired army personnel.

It was also ruled that in relation to the acts mentioned in this article, no subsequent application shall be lodged for the additional measures introduced by decree-laws brought into force under the state of emergency and for the acts subject to judicial review.

The Commission's Annual Activity Report for 2018 notes that as of 31 December 2018, 125.600 applications from real and legal persons have been received via their system. Out of these applications, the Commission reviewed and decided on 50.500 applications (3.750 were accepted, 46.750 were rejected) and 75.100 await decisions on their applications regarding their the deprivation of their liberty pursuant to emergency decrees to initiate challenges to the lawfulness of such decisions.

Unfortunately, both the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Council of Europe (CoE) have deemed this Commission as a tool for domestic remedy, which caused further suffering for many who are still waiting on decisions for their applications. The Commission's review and decision-making process is extremely slow and it is difficult to say that the members of the commission are independent and impartial; hence, it is not an effective domestic remedy. The European institutions' tendency to rely on this Commission is further depriving individuals of their personal liberties as they attempt to challenge the measures.

The Council of Europe has also met with the Commission. During this meeting, the Commission provided updated information on its work, including the number of applications introduced (125.000), the number of applications dealt with since its decision-making process started (44.000, between 22 December 2017 and 23 November 2018), and the number of successful applications leading to reinstatement of the applicants in their functions (3.200). Further information was provided as to the evidence used by the Commission, the information provided to the applicants as to the procedure, and the reasons set out in the Commission's decisions. Issues such as criteria for the prioritisation of cases, the possibility for applicants to seek interim measures pending the examination of their case and the possibility for the persons who were reinstated to seek additional redress before ordinary courts were also explored.

Limit: 750 words

**Have steps been taken to ensure the right to review and remedy for victims of unlawful arrest, detention or dismissal?**

(See: A/HRC/35/22/Add.3 para 83)

As mentioned above, the State of Emergency Commission's Annual Activity Report for 2018 notes that as of 31 December 2018, 125.600 applications from real and legal persons have been received via their system. Out of these applications, the Commission reviewed and decided on 50.500 applications (3.750 were accepted, 46.750 were rejected). Besides the very limited capacity of this Commission, no further steps were taken to ensure the right to review and remedy for victims.

Additionally, signatories of the Academics for Peace petition faced countless lawsuits since the Rapporteur's visit. Following the attempted coup d'état, many of these signatories already were expelled from their duties in universities. The [indictment against them was filed in October 2017](#) and The first hearing of the first wave of these trials where academics are tried with terror-related charges took place on 5 December 2017. After more than a year, these trials are still ongoing and most recently 13 academics

received a 1 year 10 months and 15 days prison sentence and 14 academics received a 2 years and 3 months prison sentence on 21 February 2019. Here are some examples from the latest verdicts:

- <https://bianet.org/english/freedom-of-expression/205746-28-academics-sentenced-to-a-total-of-59-years-2-months-5-days-in-prison>
- <https://bianet.org/english/freedom-of-expression/205457-deferred-prison-sentence-of-15-months-for-3-academics>
- <https://bianet.org/english/freedom-of-expression/205218-15-month-deferred-prison-sentence-for-3-academics>

The charges brought against the academics are all pursuant to Law no. 3713, the antiterrorism law. Relevant updates can be followed here: <https://barisicinakademisyenler.net/English>

Limit: 500 words

**What has been done to grant persons dismissed from their employment pursuant to emergency decrees access to appropriate and independent judicial and administrative mechanisms to challenge the lawfulness of such decisions?**

(See: A/HRC/35/22/Add.3 para 83)

As mentioned above, an Inquiry Commission on the State of Emergency Measures (widely known as The OHAL Commission) was founded with the Decree-Law numbered 685 in January 2017. This Commission began its active duty on 22 May 2017.

We have also mentioned how both European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and Council of Europe (CoE) have deemed this Commission as a tool for domestic remedy, which caused further suffering for many who are still waiting on decisions for their applications. The Commission's review and decision-making process is extremely slow and it is difficult to say that the members of the commission are independent and impartial; hence, it is not an effective method for domestic remedy. Decisions are politically charged and far from being impartial.

To give a specific example for the European institutions' attitude towards Turkey's domestic remedy mechanisms: for *Köksal v. Turkey* (application no. 70478/16) ECtHR ruled that "Turkish civil servants dismissed after attempted *coup d'état* must challenge the measure before the commission set up under Legislative Decree no. 685."

The ECtHR requires individuals to exhaust domestic remedies before applying to the court. When one's application is rejected by the Commission, they have the right to appeal this decision at an administrative court. If they get an unfavorable result there, they have the chance to take their case to the Constitutional Court. However, each of these steps takes a very long time and are extremely ineffective. Realistically, it takes 5 to 10 years for each individual to exhaust all domestic remedy mechanisms before they can take their case to the ECtHR. This slow process puts many in a prolonged state of civil death since being expelled with these decree-laws deprive one of many personal rights.

Limit: 500 words

**Has a process been initiated to review Law no. 3713 - the antiterrorism law – and ensure that counter-terrorism measures are compatible with article 19 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights? If the law has been reviewed, what changes have been brought about?**

(See: A/HRC/35/22/Add.3 para 84)

No, Law no. 3713 has not been reviewed or changed during this period. Journalists continue to be charged with these counter-terrorism laws without the presence of any call to violence or any propaganda promoting violence. Any opposing opinion or criticism toward the government is regarded a terror crime in the courts. As mentioned above, Academics for Peace are also facing charges and receiving prison sentences pursuant to this law.

Within the scope of our “Justice Monitoring Program,” MLSA has monitored 90 court sessions across 10 provinces of Turkey between 1 June 2018 - 31 December 2018. According to the findings of our Justice Monitoring Report, in the cases that we have monitored, 72% of the charges brought against the defendants were antiterrorism offences. In 35 of the 71 trials we observed, defendants were charged with spreading terrorist propaganda, in 25 they were charged with membership in a terrorist organization, in 7 they were charged with willingly and knowingly aiding and abetting a terrorist organization, in 5 they were charged with founding and/or leading a terrorist organization and in 5 they were charged with committing a crime on behalf of a terrorist organization without being a member.

These data present a very limited picture of the nationwide repercussions of this law’s application. We can say with confidence that journalists are most frequently prosecuted pursuant to this law; news stories, articles, and interviews are often presented as evidence regarding charges on “spreading terrorist propaganda.”

Limit: 500 words

**Have steps been taken towards the repeal of articles 125(3) and 299 of the Penal Code? If so, at what stage is this process and what are its effects?**

(See: A/HRC/35/22/Add.3 para 85)

The article regarding insulting the president of the Republic notes that when the offence is committed in public, the sentence to be imposed shall be increased by one sixth. Usually social media posts or opinions expressed by celebrities are deemed “public” and receive higher sentences. In the last two years, many ordinary individuals have received fines for insulting Erdoğan on their social media accounts. The legislation regarding these insult/libel articles has not changed and cases about these articles have increased in number. Any kind of criticism is considered slender and even publications or individuals who are close to Erdoğan receive such sentences when publishing a critical opinion.

Furthermore, the referendum of 2017 allowed President Erdoğan to become the first president to lead a political party since 1950. He took over from Binali Yıldırım in May 2017 and was reinstated as the AKP’s governing leader. Erdoğan benefits from Article 299 as both a party leader and a president. Any criticism towards AKP or its governing officials is punished pursuant to Article 299. Erdoğan widening the scope of this law further allows a political party’s leader to unlawfully benefit from this legislation.

Here are some of the popular examples from the past year:

- In April 2018, an İstanbul court sentenced singer Suavi to 11 months and 20 days in prison for insulting President Erdoğan but the sentence has been converted to a fine of 14,000 Turkish Liras. (The practice of converting sentences to fines is very common in relation to Article 299 cases): <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-singer-suavi-sentenced-to-11-months-in-jail-for-insulting-erdogan-130486>
- In July 2018, an İstanbul court handed down a suspended sentence of 11 months and 20 days to prominent Turkish singer and actress Zuhâl Olcay for allegedly insulting President Erdoğan on stage during one of her concerts: <https://stockholmcf.org/istanbul-court-gives-turkish-actress-suspended-sentence-for-allegedly-insulting-erdogan/>
- In November 2018, Hüsnü Mahalli a columnist for the opposition newspaper *Sözcü*, was handed a suspended sentence of 1 year and 8 months for insulting public officials; however, he was not sent to jail due to time already served and as the ruling is up for appeal. Mahalli was detained in December 2016 and released in January 2017 pending trial: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-journalist/turkish-court-hands-sentences-to-journalist-for-criticizing-erdogan-officials-idUSKBN1ND1YL>
- In February 2019, 75-year-old Ali Şahin was sentenced to complete a reading list and write the books’ summaries by an İstanbul court. Şahin has allegedly insulted Erdoğan in a coffeehouse although he denied the allegations. The list includes Erdoğan’s biography and some other

Islamist and pro-Erdoğan publications, as well as George Orwell's *Animal Farm* and Dostoyevsky's *Crime and Punishment*.

<https://www.turkishminute.com/2019/02/11/elderly-man-sentenced-to-read-summarize-erdogans-biography-for-insulting-him/>

It is ironic that the last two URLs are blocked in Turkey and we had to access them via VPN. While searching for English language links to provide in this form, we have faced countless URLs that were blocked.

In addition to the more well-known examples provided above, many ordinary individuals faced arbitrary charges regarding Article 299. Posts shared on social media or even retweets of others' tweets have been presented as evidence in such cases. Not everyone who posts a dissident opinion gets charged, of course. However, the arbitrary nature of such fines and detainments perpetuate the cycle of fear and creates a chilling effect, further forcing individuals to self-censor while they are posting on social media. Some recent examples include but are not limited to:

- Taylan Özdemir received a 11 months 20 days sentence for allegedly insulting Erdoğan. The court converted the sentence to a fine of 7000 Turkish Liras :  
<https://ilerihaber.org/icerik/erdogana-hakarette-bugun-sosyal-medya-paylasimina-7-bin-tl-para-cezasi-70168.html>
- In October 2018, an İstanbul court sentenced 78-year-old Ali Ergin Güran to 8 years and 2 months in prison for sharing posts that criticized Erdoğan and Chief of Defense of the time. Güran was found guilty pursuant to both 125(3) and 299. The Appellate Court revoked the decision and gave a new verdict, sentencing Güran to 7 years in prison:  
<https://tr.sputniknews.com/turkiye/201810021035474668-ali-ergin-guran-cumhurbaskani-hakaret-hapis-cezasi/>

Limit: 500 words

**Have any further laws, regulations, policies, administrative decisions or other measures affecting the right to freedom of opinion and expression been implemented following the Special Rapporteur's visit?**

As mentioned above, a significant change regarding the Internet media was made by drafting a new provision made to the Law no. 6112 on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and Their Media Services, drafted in February 2018. This provision was titled "Presentation of media services via Internet."

This new provision applies a traditional broadcasting licensing regime to media service providers on the Internet by giving extensive licence control powers to the Radio and Television Supreme Council ("RTÜK"), which is the Turkish state agency for monitoring, regulating, and sanctioning radio and television broadcasts. This new draft further enables the State to intervene with broadcasts made on Internet and requires people to present criminal records and prove that they have a clean slate before founding any news websites. This law also requires these individuals to obtain licenses approved by RTÜK to operate news websites. This law allows judges to ban access to broadcasts or news videos posted on the Internet without even holding a trial in less than 24 hours.

Limit: 1,000 words

**Is there any relevant additional information you would wish to add?**

Over the past two years, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has come under criticism regarding its decisions in cases filed by applicants from Turkey on the grounds that it has been too favorable about the effectiveness of the domestic remedies in Turkey. This has indicated that there is a need to show the ECtHR and other relevant bodies that Turkey's judicial system is far from being effective, speedy, or efficient. Media and Law Studies Association (MLSA) has conducted a trial monitoring project in the second half of 2018, a project that was funded by the Friedrich Naumann





Foundation. The data we collected were gathered from 90 court sessions in 82 hearings of 71 separate trials, all evaluated on the basis of a standard form prepared by IPI and MLSA's Legal Unit.

The results of the monitoring showed that Turkish courts remain below the domestic and international standards set for securing the right to a fair trial, protected under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Below are some of the most frequent and systematic forms of violations of the right to a fair trial:

- In 49% of the sessions, the defendants were tried whilst in detention. Considering that these were trials pertaining to freedom of expression, this amounts to a violation of constitutional rights.
- In 34% of the sessions where defendants were in prison, the suspects were not physically brought to court. The overuse of the video-conferencing system Ses Görüntü Bilişim Sistemi (SEGBİS), or the Audio and Visual Information System, constitutes a violation of the defendants' right to be present in the courtroom and the right to have a face-to-face confrontation, which is protected under Article 6 of the ECHR.
- In 36% of the court sessions observed where the defendants were in detention, the defendants were brought to the courtroom in handcuffs. This is a violation of the principle of presumption of innocence, protected by the Turkish Criminal Procedure Code (CMK), the Turkish Constitution, and the ECHR.
- 72% of the charges against the defendants were terror-related crimes. In 35 out of the 71 the trials observed, defendants were charged with terrorist propaganda; in 25 they were charged with membership in a terrorist organization; in 7 they were charged with willingly and knowingly aiding and abetting a terrorist organization; in 5 they were charged with founding and/or leading a terrorist organization, while in 5 cases they were charged with committing a crime on behalf of a terrorist organization without being a member.

Our report also includes a section titled "Further Legal Commentary on Violations," and presents commentary with specific examples on unlawful arrests, lengthy detention periods, physical absence of defendants from the courtroom, changes to the panel of judges, the practice of using handcuffs on unconvicted persons, lack of private judicial deliberations, and disrespectful conduct of judges toward defendants.

Limit: 500 words