C. The organizational structure of the monitoring framework: alternatives and preferences – one or more mechanisms
An initial consideration for the State party is whether it should designate (and maintain or even strengthen) an existing
mechanism or establish an entirely new framework. In this regard, the following factors are particularly relevant:
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Human and financial resources. The decision by a State to either modify and/or add functions to an existing framework or, instead, establish a new one will
naturally be affected by financial and human resource considerations. In some cases creating a new structure shaped on the
Convention's expectations could be more cost-effective than reconceptualizing the mandate, the expertise and the mentality
of an existing institution; in others, the NHRI, ombudsperson or specialized agency could be sufficiently flexible to adapt
to additional tasks.
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Commitment to the Convention. To have a fully functioning framework, commitment to the Convention's innovative approach is as important as resources. The
national framework should represent a ground-breaking human rights body, with its promotion, protection and monitoring duties
reflecting the Convention's principles. The nomination of commissioners and/or staff needs to involve persons with disabilities.
The body has to be open to the participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations (see below),
and have sufficient credentials of integrity, independence and expertise in human rights monitoring.
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A twin-track approach. In the context of development cooperation, it is recognized that, at times, disability-specific development measures are
necessary while, at other times, disability rights should be mainstreamed into general development programmes, projects and
other interventions. The same logic can be applied to the monitoring of the Convention. At times, specific knowledge of the
Convention, its social/human rights approach and its general principles is essential to ensure that monitoring respects the
Convention. For example, in mainstream human rights work, the Principles for the protection of persons with mental illness
and the improvement of mental health care are still commonly applied, while disability rights experts question these Principles,
which are sometimes in conflict with the Convention. Consequently, either ensuring full participation of disability rights
experts or, alternatively, having a stand-alone disability rights commissioner or other mechanism might be preferable to having
an existing human rights mechanism take over the monitoring role foreseen under article 33.
In addition, the State must consider whether its national framework will have one or more mechanisms. Here are some options:
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1. Attribute the monitoring function to a single entity, i.e., one independent mechanism
The explicit link in article 33 (2) between the framework and the Paris Principles suggests a preference for attributing the
monitoring function to a national human rights institution. Such attribution would certainly comply with the Convention.
Nowadays, over 100 national human rights institutions have been established worldwide. They may be called human rights commissions,
ombudsmen or institutes.
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2. Attribute the function to a framework consisting of more than one independent mechanism
The Convention also foresees the possibility of more than one independent mechanism being appointed.