Our Ref: *UN-EcoSoc/2021/50 – Climate Change* Date: 30 November 2021

Dear Sir/Madam,

**Re**: **47/24 – Human Rights and Climate Change**

Consultations on: Adverse Impacts of Climate Change on the Full and Effective **E**njoyment of Human Rights of People in Vulnerable Situations

Thank you for your communication on 9 September 2021 inviting ArcDH to contribute as a consultant to the research and report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) preparing in accordance with Human Rights Council resolution 47/24 entitled “Human Rights and Climate Change”.

We realize that the Council wishes to prepare and submit to its 50th session a report as titled above and will liaise the interconnectivity of the stakeholders in which we are one link as a consultant among a host of consultants and at the same time the Council is making a similar request to the Secretary-General to consult Member States and other relevant stakeholders as per Paragraph 14 of the above-mentioned resolution.

ArcDH, as a recently appointed Consultant, confirms the invitation. We are pleased to submit our 5-page (excluding this cover letter) Response to the 7 questions set in the questionnaires before the deadline on 30 November 2021. In summary, we wish to express our salient points and concerns as follows:

* This is the age of activism, but the Iranian authorities politicize every move by Azerbaijani activists and imprison them under hefty prison terms. For instance, Iranian authorities detained 34 Azerbaijani environmental activists who were expressing their solidarity with the Arabs of Khuzestan engaged in the Summer 2021 Protests to Water Crisis instigated by Iranian policymakers. One of these protesters, Mr. Parviz Siyabi, a 74-years old veteran activists and lawyer, has just been sentenced arbitrarily to 16 years of imprisonment.
* The Iranian authorities normally use climate change as *an excuse* *for their inaction or failure*, particularly in Azerbaijani provinces and in other minority nations.
* The true position of Iranian authorities on climate change is a matter of opinion and we are skeptical if they ever realize the enormity of the situation. Nonetheless, it motivates them to seemingly use the movement in order to break out of the sanctions or to secure international aids and funds for untold aims, as in reality there is no groundwork yet prepared for implementing climate change best practice.
* Should Iranian authorities be given access to international support on mitigating climate change, the risk of depriving minorities nations from access to the support need to be addressed before hand.
* The Iranian government is pursuing the alternative of self-sufficiency in food industry. Although this ambition is backfiring for the last 40 years, they would loosen any regulation to this end, and thereby sanction any emission scheme, as long as they can contribute to self-sufficiency. There was no space left in our Response report to this item, but we wish to draw your attention to this alternative policy, which will take the country further to the brink of accelerated climate change impacts and untold risks.

We wish every success for the conference and please do not hesitate to come back to me for any clarification.

Yours faithfully

Mrs. Jaleh Tabrizi

For and on Behalf of ArcDH

Adverse Impacts of Climate Change on the Full and Effective **E**njoyment of Human Rights of People in Vulnerable Situations

*Questionnaire*: *Human Rights Council resolution 47/24**on human rights & climate change*

**Preamble**

As per published information[[1]](#footnote-1), the average temperature-rise since 1980 at every grid in Iran is more than 1.5ºC (except for coastal margins). The variations are from 1.5 to 1.9. This alone indicates that climate change has kicked off in Iran but not necessarily strong enough to cause disasters. Iran’s performance on greenhouse gases (GHG) is systematically evaluated by *Our World in Data*[[2]](#footnote-2), according to which Iran is the world’s 8th largest emitter of greenhouse gases since 2015.

Many environmental problems, including climate change mitigation, are known to be “wicked problems.” This is a scientific term, which refers to never-ending changes without rethinking. We run the same risk here. So, we suggest that a set of conditions are necessary to ensure that the authorities in Iran do the right things rather than go off a tangent in their usual ways. The framing of the problems in Iran needs to consider:

* The Iranian authorities normally use climate change as *an excuse* *for their inaction*, particularly when budgets have to be allocated to Azerbaijani provinces or to other minority nations. For instance, the shrinkage of Lake Urmia is forced by Iranian authorities due to discriminatory practices and can be restored now if discriminations are stopped!
* The discourse of Iranian authorities on climate change is to break out of the sanctions or secure aids.
* Even discrimination on implementing measures to mitigate climate changes is evident. For instance, Iranian authorities are yet to provide gas-fired power stations to the thermal power station in Tabriz, which, still uses crude-oil, despite protests[[3]](#footnote-3). Instead, they threaten to close their own station! If we are not careful, they can show by this act to be a champion of tough actions but, in reality, they aim to conceal their past inactions and discrimination.

The above are sufficient to indicate that the problems in Iran are ‘wicked problems’ but in a different way. We make a set of suggestions to this end in our response to Question 7.

# **1.** Describe the impacts of the adverse effects of CC on the full and effective enjoyment of the human rights of people in vulnerable situations. Where possible, please share specific examples and stories.

**Response by ArcDH:** Telltale signs of climate change impacts in Iran are detectable and the process is gathering momentum but not yet in its full force. Overall, published information indicates temperature can rise from its current level of 1.5ºC up to 6ºC[[4]](#footnote-4). Current initial impacts must be distinguished from mismanagement in central provinces but those in marginalized territories of minority nations, such as Azerbaijani provinces, are largely due to discriminatory practices, as outlined below.

## Biodiversity Degradation, Stress or Loss

The state of biodiversity in Iran is purportedly outlined in *The Fifth National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity* (April 2015), which identifies threat to biodiversity to stem from water scarcity, land degradation, pollution and dust storms. There is many intriguing information in the document including the failure to mention the loss of more than 200 species of birds at Lake Urmia. Although it mentions dust storms but attributes them to sources from Iraq and Saudi Arabia, it remains silent on emerging local dust/salt storms in Lake Urmia posing health risk to some 10 million Azerbaijanis and flora and fauna. Instead, it mentions a restoration committee for propaganda, which did not implement a single project.

## Deforestation

World per capita share of forests is about 1.1 hectare but that in Iran is less than 0.5 hectare[[5]](#footnote-5).  Iran’s forest acreage decreased from 19 to 14.4 million acres between 1900-2012 and shrank to 10.7 million by 2015[[6]](#footnote-6), please see the link.[[7]](#footnote-7)

Even discriminatory acts are practiced on deforestation in Iran. ArcDH has reported on an intriguing tree felling acts by Iranian underworld gangs, where nobody listens to grievances of Azerbaijanis in Iran. The following is an excerpt from their report[[8]](#footnote-8): “Autumn 2018 saw a new offence from invisible Iranian timber industries against Azerbaijani trees and forests nearly in all cities, but it was particularly vicious in the *Qara Dagh* Region of East Azerbaijan. Perpetrators appear from nowhere night-times, fell trees, denude forests, and remove trees by lorries. No one has been persecuted anyone of these perpetrators, despite massive campaigns raised in the social media. Members of Majlis raised the issue in the parliament but to no avail”.[[9]](#footnote-9) Ironically, these forests were being registered with the UNSECO under the auspices of *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. These forests are still under attack but intriguingly the registration was stopped[[10]](#footnote-10).

## 1.3 Depleting aquifers

The aquifers in Iran are lifelines but are being depleted fast. The depletions are being attributed to droughts and climate change but intriguingly without being attributed to mismanagement or to the authorities’ ineptness to aquifer hydrogeology. We wish to describe the problem in a greater depth. Maps of aquifer classification of world lands are compiled by WHYMAP[[11]](#footnote-11) and others. They show the structure of these aquifers and those in Azerbaijani provinces and in some other provinces were recharged annually. These aquifers are largely located within arid and semi-arid climates systems and are vulnerable or fragile. Those in affluent central provinces were fragile for their poor recharges. The abstractions through traditional systems were normally in balance with precipitation. Since 1990, the Iranian authorities encouraged pumping without constraints. The number of pumps in the Lake Urmia basin is quoted to be as many as: 16000 with 2000 additional mobile pumps. Now, all aquifers in Azerbaijani provinces are depleting and those in other provinces are stressed or in crisis.

## 1.4 Drought

Although droughts inflict hardship, they can still be dealt with by planning. Iranian authorities use droughts as a scapegoat for their inaction and ineptness. However, *Masoumeh Ebtekar*, chief of Iran’s Department of Environment (DoE), made a remark on 5 June 2016 that “The truth is that Iran’s precipitation pattern has not changed dramatically”[[12]](#footnote-12). We concur with this, as no drastic signal has been detected in the hydrometric studies of Iran to prove the country to be in the grip of climate change. The discourse in Iran should be about improving plans on climate change/droughts but not on scapegoats for inaction.

## 1.5 Drying Rivers: Qizil Ozen

A recent victim of drying rivers seems to be *Qizil Ozen* (river), the second largest inland river. The aquifers of Qizil Ozen are formed largely of Complex Hydrogeological Structures but are now seemingly stressed.

## 1.6 Dust Storms

Dust storms in the Lake Urmia basin exposes some 10 million Azerbaijanis to untold risks taking off from the salt pan of 0.5m-1.0m depth in the shrunken parts of Lake Urmia. Already the people in Urmia and Tabriz suffer from a diverse range of diseases. Unfortunately, Iranian authorities do not monitor the impacts.

## 1.7 Impacting Lakes

*The crises in Hamun* wetland in Baluchistan and Lake Urmia in East/West Azerbaijan are attributed to droughts/climate change but not to engineering measures implemented by Iranian authorities. The ecological problems of the Hamun wetland stems from trans-basin diversion. The problems in Lake Urmia are from building too many dams: 70 planned and 40 constructed! Although average climate warming within the Lake Urmia basin is as much as 1.5ºC, this is not large enough for the region for a drastic upset. The shrinkage of the Lake Urmia is primarily related to the ineptness of Iranian authorities and their intriguing political motivations against Azerbaijani provinces. *Isa Kalantari*, the executive of the Committee for the Restoration of Lake Urmia, has been the only Iranian official, who partially revealed the intrigue against Lake Urmia. He stated in October 2015 that “It was the responsibility of the DoE to ensure the *compensation flow* for Lake Urmia, but they neglected it[[13]](#footnote-13);” also, “Lake Urmia was led to drying for failing to comply with sustainable development principles …. We were hand-in-hand to dry Lake Urmia;” also “no one has the right to violate the rights of the future generations, but this was done against Lake Urmia in most express way. [[14]](#footnote-14) These are some exposures to ill-intentions of Iranian authorities.

## 1.8 Polluting air

Pollution is widespread in Iran and that of atmosphere pollution stems from vehicle emissions, operations of refineries and other industries with hardly any real regulations. The increasing temperature is impacting the pollution. There have been some initiatives to reduce air pollution in Tehran and other central cities but none in Azerbaijani cities!

## 1.9 Sinkholes

Sinkholes have been observed in the Azerbaijani Hamadan province in Iran due to the depleting aquifers.

## 1.10 Subsidence

Subsidence is reported in many plains in Iran, including those in Azerbaijani provinces with significant published articles.

## 1.11 Wildfires

Although Azerbaijani provinces suffer recurrent wildfires, there is no evidence to directly attribute the incidences to climate change. However, the evidence is plenty for arson and citing suspicious individuals with intriguing actions. The Iranian authorities have not persecuted anybody and fail to send any fire brigade but have prosecuted an outspoken activist!

## 1.12 Water Resources

Water resources failures came head-to-head in Khuzestan province in 2021, leading to long protests, as a result of which the Iranian authorities shot dead many Arab civilian protestors and now prosecuting more than 38 Azerbaijanis who expressed their solidarities with the Arabs. It became clear that the water from Arabs’ mountains were diverted to central affluent provinces and this was kept away from the public during the construction. In fact, a film leaked away from the Iranian Majlis stating that the decision taken by the meeting must not be taken to the media, see link for the film[[15]](#footnote-15).

# **2. Describe any specific policy, legislation, practice or strategy that your** **Government has undertaken, in compliance with applicable international human rights law, to promote an approach to CC mitigation and adaptation, as well as loss and damage that ensures the full and effective enjoyment of the human rights of people in vulnerable situations. Also note and identify relevant mechanisms** **for ensuring accountability for the commitments including means of** **implementation.**

**Response by ArcDH:** Among the various ways of climate change legislation to guide public policy (see Nachmany et al., 2015), the environmental laws legislated in Iran would not fit decree-driven policymaking. We hold them to be window-dressings designed to justify the government but to look like those in democratic countries.

The legislations in 99 countries are reviewed in relation to climate change by Nachmany et al (2015)[[16]](#footnote-16) with following salient points concerning Iran. The targets by the Iranian government did not have short-term targets but only targets beyond 2020. The framework adopted was: “Iran National Rules of Procedure for Implementation of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol (2009)” but not adopted then. Iran pledged 4% cut in emissions by 2030 relative to business as usual or 12% cut conditioned on international support of $35bn, **and both conditioned on an end to sanctions**[[17]](#footnote-17). Climate change mitigation and adaptation is primarily governed by the National Climate Change Office, which is a part of the DoE[[18]](#footnote-18), a governmental agency overseen by the president. The literature reflects on climate change being taken up at the top of Iran’s leadership (e.g., the 15-points list[[19]](#footnote-19) expressed by Khamenei, to serve environmental policy directives, intriguingly emerged just before the 2015 Paris Agreement[[20]](#footnote-20)), but we argue that these are political gestures and not genuine policies for mitigating climate change!

Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) came to being in Iran as late as January 2017, when approved by Iran’s parliament (Majlis). It remains to be seen how it will be applied, as there is always a way in Iran to bypass any law, bend it or break it due to the incredible underworld network of collusion among different authorities. Consider two cases below, to reflect on making any law ineffective in Iran:

1. The Case of Lake Urmia: The Iranian authorities kept promising the restoration of Lake Urmia and they even set up a committee but simply did not implement any single positive action. The public perception is that they want to force the drying of the Lake Urmia and use climate change and droughts as scapegoats.
2. The case of Trans-basin diversion: as mentioned in **Section 1.12**.

Currently, the path to implementing mitigation measures has been quite slippery, including the withdrawal from sustainable development in September 2021 but then its reinstatement that Iran is taking part in the goal for climate change. However, when one enters Iran’s page on the UN site for SDG, there is no information other than the default UN information (see[[21]](#footnote-21)).

Human rights records of Iranian authorities are a suitable gauge to assess if the Iranian authorities are genuine for climate change mitigations. Nachmany et al. (2015) argue that “Despite promises of reform from the president, human-rights violations are still “rife” in Iran[[22]](#footnote-22) (they quote the former president that *no overnight solutions to Iran's problems*). They state that “Among the targeted groups are environmental campaigners,[[23]](#footnote-23) with more than 60 activists and researchers arrested in 2018”[[24]](#footnote-24). These are a tip of the iceberg. For instance, **a sentence of 16-years imprisonment** was just passed against Mr. Parviz Siyabi, a 74-years old Azerbaijani veteran activist and lawyer, for stating his solidarity in protesting against Water Crisis in Khuzestan in social media in Summer 2021. He is one of 34 Azerbaijanis environmentalist now under prosecution.

# **3. Share a summary of any relevant data that captures how the adverse effects of** **climate change have affected people in vulnerable situations, taking into account multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination (i.e., discrimination based on** **a combination of multiple grounds, including disability, gender, race, color, sex, language, religion, nationality and migration status).**

**Response by ArcDH:** Our vantage is that climate change in Iran is rolling out but not yet in full forces. Climate change is used as one of the scapegoats to shroud the massive failures of the Iranian governments, one after another. The only right actions are to plan and learn in an inclusive way, but no genuine steps have been taken to this end yet!

In Iran there is no social learning in policymaking, so it either serves to strengthen the dogmatic basis of the government or provides a window-dressing for some of the policies for the international consumption. Our expert opinion is that the greater the requirement for inclusivity on the combination of multiple grounds (e.g., disability, gender, race, color, sex, language, religion, nationality and migration status), the greater chance for seeding proper best practice in mitigating climate change and environmental problems in Iran. These need to be treated head on.

We would recognize that each group classified under disability, gender, race, color, sex, language, religion, nationality and migration status, should qualify as a vulnerable group in Iran and often an individual would have multiple vulnerability grouping. There are others that would be vulnerable to climate change, e.g., the aged, the children, the poor, both in central and marginalized provinces. There would be a common base for vulnerability, e.g., the poor but marginalized provinces would have further identity from the above list leading to multiple exposure intensities.

# **4. Describe any mechanisms and tools that are in place to measure and monitor the** **impacts of climate change on the full and effective enjoyment of the human rights of people in vulnerable situations.**

**Response by ArcDH:** Other than the melodrama stories made up by Iranian official media, the truth is that we are not aware of any measure to be in place to monitor impacts of climate change. Having said this, we are aware that driven by the UN assistance, hydrometric, hydrogeologic and meteorological stations are established throughout the country, and probably equability, in the country. The establishment of these gauging stations is the single best practice, thanks to the UN.

# **5. Identify/share examples of good practices/challenges in the promotion,** **protection, and fulfilment of the human rights of people in vulnerable situations in the** **context of the adverse effects of CC.**

**Response by ArcDH**: It is with regret that we should state that we have not witnessed, observed or read about any good practice *in the promotion,**protection, and fulfilment of the human rights of people in vulnerable situations in the**context of the adverse effects of climate change* in Iran*.* However, we should report that still there are relics of fraternity among the minority nations in significant amounts that are mobilized under the hardship conditions to alleviate some of the hardships of their fellow human beings. During flash flood events in Spring 2019, considerable humanitarian aids were mobilized from Azerbaijani provinces to impacted areas. However, Iranian authorities, detained up to 50 Azerbaijani activist volunteers!

6. Include examples/good practices that highlight international andmultilateral cooperation and approaches implemented through close consultation with and active involvement of people in vulnerable situations.

**Response by ArcDH:** We areawareof a number of projects between Iran and the UN willing to help the vulnerable people or the uptake of the UN principles, such as decision-making by participation. We are also aware of the willingness by Japan and Australia to help the revival of Lake Urmia. Furthermore, we are aware of some academic research purporting participatory workshops. In reality, there is no basis for the formation of stakeholder groups in Iran if there is no security for them to express their dissident views. You may see politicians disagreeing and expressing their views but the issue on their discussions are normally red herring. Let us explain this. Consider the pumping water from an irrigation well. If a farmer pumps illegally, then the whole system is lined up to blame the aquifer failures on this illegal pumping, but no one will ever discuss the absence of an equitable water distribution plans. At the same time, the city parks will get disproportionate amounts of water allocation to irrigate the parks, and no one will bark at them. One such Current issue is the ‘imagined’ plan for transferring water from River Araz to Lake Urmia. Two officials from two Azerbaijani provinces take diametrically opposing views against this supposed project (red herrings) and engage in a hard-hitting democratic debate to safeguard the interests of the people[[25]](#footnote-25). This is the way the Iranian authorities obscure the discourse on water crisis by using a grade of red herrings.

# **7. Provide any additional information you believe would be useful to support** **climate action that promotes the full and effective enjoyment of the human rights of people in vulnerable situations.**

**Response by ArcDH:** While best practice is to develop strategies and plans to reduce risks of climate change, in Iran, blame games seem to be the norm. Public perception seems to be that climate change is regarded as a gift for explaining failures. The Iranian authorities are not engaged in policymaking by social learning and taking account of the UN conventions, but they follow their own dogmas but pay lip services to the UN progressive guidelines. If the lip services are not sufficient, they flout the conventions in most belligerent fashion. Arguably, policymaking in Iran is driven by decree and budgets are allocated in favor of the Iranian ultra-nationalism and pushing minority nations to catastrophic failures or to the brink.

ArcDH supports fully the transformation of climate change requirements into an item of human rights through Items 1 to 18 in the UN resolution 47/24. ArcDH bears witness that the Iranian authorities have not yet adopted a comprehensive, integrated, gender-responsive, age-inclusive and disability-inclusive approach to climate change, consistent with UNFCCC objectives and principles. We also bear witness that the resolution is not explicitly inclusive of minority nations in a country as often underpinned by recommendations of Mr. Fernand de Varennes, the Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues.

We express our concern that should the Iranian authorities embrace the UNFCCC good practice on climate change mitigation practices, still there is no guarantee to address efficiently economic, cultural and social impacts and human rights challenges that climate change presents in Azerbaijani provinces and in other minority provinces in Iran, for the enjoyment of human rights, where policies of Iranian authorities undermine their resilience and transform their territories into vulnerable areas.

We propose that any aid to Iran on implementing mitigation of climate change is scrutinized on stringent conditions to ensure the resources are equitably allocated to all nations in Iran.

If the UN does not require indicators on the equitability of the allocation of the support to all the minority nations and ethnic groups in Iran, we are confident that their problems will be swept under the carpet by the Iranian government.

If the UN does not require independent certifications, the minority nations in Iran will be concealed as usual.

1. <https://www.carbonbrief.org/mapped-how-every-part-of-the-world-has-warmed-and-could-continue-to-warm> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. [Iran: CO2 Country Profile - Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/co2/country/iran?country=~IRN) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. <https://www.isna.ir/news/1400082922740/> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See the published information in: <https://www.carbonbrief.org/mapped-how-every-part-of-the-world-has-warmed-and-could-continue-to-warm> [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. <https://deforestationiniran.wordpress.com/> [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. <https://lobelog.com/irans-disappearing-forests-pose-environmental-challenge/> [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Mongabay Deforestation statistics for Iran: <https://rainforests.mongabay.com/deforestation/archive/Iran.htm> [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. “The Situations of Minority Nations in Iran” (Our Ref: ArcDH/2019/081 in May 2019): A Brief by ArcDH to Inform the Special Rapporteur's and Secretary General’s to the General Assembly [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. <https://www.isna.ir/news/97100703525/> [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. <https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1399/03/24/2285030> and <https://www.irna.ir/news/84116363/> [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. World-wide Hydrogeological Mapping and Assessment Program <https://www.whymap.org/whymap/EN/Maps_Data/Gwr/gwr_node_en.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. <https://www.doe.ir/?news/140762/318705/558167/lake-urumia-will-be-restored> [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. <https://www.isna.ir/news/94072214712> [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. <http://www.tabnakazargharbi.ir/fa/news/88139> [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. <https://www.farsnews.ir/khuzestan/news/14000108000014> [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. A Review of Climate Change Legislation in 99 Countries Summary for Policy-makers - Legislation in 99 Countries <https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Global_climate_legislation_study_20151.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. <https://www.carbonbrief.org/the-carbon-brief-profile-iran> [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. [Department of Environment Islamic Republic of Iran (doe.ir)](https://www.doe.ir/portal/home/?140762/%d8%a7%d8%ae%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%b1%20%d8%a7%d9%86%da%af%d9%84%db%8c%d8%b3%db%25) [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. <http://english.khamenei.ir/news/2497/Expand-green-economy-administer-justice-and-raise-awareness> [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. <https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-the-final-paris-climate-deal> [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. <https://iran.un.org/en/sdgs> [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22886729> [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/22/iran-environmentalists-sentenced> [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/01/irans-year-of-shame-more-than-7000-arrested-in-chilling-crackdown-on-dissent-during-2018/> [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. [مخالفت نماینده اردبیل با انتقال آب ارس به دریاچه ارومیه (donya-e-eqtesad.com)](https://donya-e-eqtesad.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%B1-64/417460-%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%AA-%D9%86%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A8%DB%8C%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B3-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%A7%DA%86%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%87) [↑](#footnote-ref-25)